-
"A country without a patent office and good patent laws is just a crab and can't travel any way but sideways and backwards."
- Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, 1889.
No. ________
__________________________________________________
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
____________
ELIOT I. BERNSTEIN,
Petitioner,
v.
THE FLORIDA BAR, et al.,*
Respondents.
____________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Florida Supreme Court
____________
appendix c - www.iviewit.tv
____________
In Forma Pauperis
Eliot I. Bernstein - Pro Se
10158 Stonehenge Circle - #801
Boynton Beach, FL 33437
561-364-4240Counsel for Petitioners
__________________________________________________
federal, state and international crimes commissioned in the theft of IP from Iviewit
the United States Constitution (Article 1, section 8, clause 8)
Congress shall have the power ... to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries.
Inventors are one of the only private sector
job occupations to be protected under the United States Constitution and after
reading this document you will know why.
Interactive Table of Contents
A. INJURED PARTIES
1. Inventors
3. Iviewit Companies Shareholders
4. Other Owners
B. Class I Defendants (CRIME CHART))
2. Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein, Wolf & Schlissel, P.C.
5. Blakely Sokoloff Taylor & Zafman LLP
6. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon LLP
7. Christopher & Weisberg, P.A.
8. Yamakawa International Patent Office
10. Intel/R3D (Silicon Graphics, Inc., Lockheed Martin & Intel) & Ryjo
11. Tiedemann Investment Group
12. Crossbow Ventures/Alpine Partners
13. Broad & Cassel
15. Fifteenth Judicial Circuit - West Palm Beach Florida
17. The Florida Bar/Florida Supreme Court
C. Class I - Patent Pool Violators
1. MPEGLA, LLC.
2. DVD6c Licensing Group (DVD6c)
3. Any other Proskauer, MPEGLA, LLC. controlled, influenced and/or affiliated patent pool. Hereinafter collectively, all infringing pools know or unknown, referred to as ("Pools")
D. CLASS II - DEFENDANTS
1. Non-Disclosure Agreement Violators ("NDA") And Other Contract Violators
E. CLASS III DEFENDANTS
F. THE HISTORY OF IVIEWIT
1. introduction
2. Preface
4. IP And Corporate Formation - What The Company Was Told, What Shareholders Believed
5. The First Conspiratorial Ring
6. Formation Of Shadow Companies To Effectuate The Theft Of The Iviewit IP
7. Formation Of Shadow Patents To Effectuate The Theft Of The Iviewit IP
8. Third Party Attempted Thefts Of The IP
11. Busting Joao
12. The Cover Up And Perpetuation Of The Joao Frauds By Foley And Rubenstein
13. The Filing Of European Patents And The Frauds Upon The EPO - Joao And Foley
15. The Busting Of Foley, Proskauer, Utley, Intel/R3D, Goldstein And Lewin
16. The Patent Attorney Joao Has 90 Patents In His Name - Many Stolen From The Company And Its Inventors
19. The Unraveling Of The Conspiracy By Caroline Prochotska Rogers, Esq. And Steven Selz, Esq.
20. The Schiffrin And Barroway Affair And The Cover Up At Labarga's Court
22. The Busting Of Blakely Sokoloff Taylor & Zafman
23. Investigations At The Patent Office of charges the attorneys committed fraud upon the united states
25. Fraud Upon American international group And General Re - Fraud On The D&O Policy
26. The Filing Of Bar Complaints With The States Of New York, Florida And Virginia
27. The Filing Of Bar Complaint With The United States Patent And Trademark Office
28. Filings With Federal And State Authorities
30. First Department Ordered Investigation Of Krane, Rubenstein And Joao
31. The Uncovering Of Conflicts Of Interests At The Supreme Court Of Florida - The Florida Bar
33. The Cover-Up At The State Supreme Courts And Affiliated Bar Associations In New York And Florida
36. The Virginia Bar
37. Labarga
38. Perpetuating The Abuse Of Public Office And Conflicts Of Interest - Aiding And Abetting The Crimes
39. Denial Of Due Process, Interference With Counsel & the manipulation of the Legal System
40. Denial Of Due Process In Prosecuting Public Office Complaints
42. Denial Of Due Process Causes Loss Of Inventor Rights
44. Unsung Heroes
45. Witnesses
46. Questions, More Questions And No Answers
47. Closing
G. CURRENT STATE, FEDERAL & INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
1. United States Patent And Trademark Office Investigations
3. State Of New York Grievance Committee For Second And Eleventh Judicial Districts
4. Florida Supreme Court Case #Sc04-1078 - Eliot I. Bernstein And P. Stephen Lamont V. The Florida Bar
5. Federal Small Business Administration ("Sba") Fraud
6. Federal Bureau Of Investigation ("Fbi")
7. Securities And Exchange Commission ("Sec") And The Boca Raton Police Department ("Boca PD")
8. American Institute Of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA")
10. Department Of Justice ("DOJ")
11. Internal Revenue Service ("Irs")
12. United States Copyright Office Investigation ("Usco")
13. United States Federal Bankruptcy Court Fraud
14. Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission
15. Pennsylvania Bar
16. Insurance Fraud - American International Group ("Aig")
17. Department Of Business And Professional Regulation - Florida
18. European Patent Office ("Epo") Investigations
19. Japanese Patent Office ("Jpo") Investigation
H. FEDERAL CRIMES
2. Violation Of The False Claims Act
4. Violations Of Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations (Rico)
5. Conspiracy
6. Supreme Court Agency Public Office Abuse, Supreme Court Of New York, Appellate Division: First Dept And The Supreme Court Of Florida
7. Racketeering
9. Violations Of The Department Of Commerce
10. Fraud Upon The United States Patent And Trademark Office
11. Violations Of Protection Of Trade Secrets
12. Fraud Upon The United States Copyright Offices
13. Violation Of Federal Bankruptcy Law
14. Counterfeiting And Forgery
15. Fraud And False Statements
16. Malicious Mischief Violation
18. Stolen Property
20. Bribery, Graft, And Conflicts Of Interest
21. Perjury
23. Violations Of Postal Service
24. Internal Revenue Code Violations
26. Title 15 Ch 22 Subch Iv Subchapter Iv - The Madrid Protocol
27. Contempt
28.
Obstruction Of
Justice
For A Complete List
Of Federal State And International Crimes And Statues Violated Click Here
I. New YORK STATE CRIMES
2. Violations Of Public Offices New York Supreme Court Appellate Division: First Department
4. State Of New York Trademark Laws
5. New York State Consolidated Laws Article 210 - Perjury And Related Offenses
J. FLORIDA STATE CRIMES
2. Florida Rico (Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organization) Act
3. Ch 896 - Offenses Related To Financial Transactions 896.101 Florida Money Laundering Act
6. Florida Title Xxxiii Regulation Of Trade, Commerce, Investments, And Solicitations
7. Florida Protection Of Trade Secrets
9. Ch 815 - Computer-Related Crimes
11. Florida Ch 817 - Fraudulent Practices - Part I - False Pretenses And Frauds, Generally
12. Florida Perjury
13. Florida State Tax Law - Chapter 220 - Income Tax Code
14. Theft, Robbery And Misappropriation And Conversion Of Funds
15. Florida Law Sec 812.081 Trade Secrets; Theft, Embezzlement; Unlawful Copying; Definitions; Penalty
K. DELAWARE STATE CRIMES
2. Violations Of Delaware Corporate Laws
L. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
1. Fraud Upon The Japanese Patent Offices (Jpo)
2. Fraud Upon The European Patent Offices (Epo)
A. Injured Parties or the “good guys”
1. INVENTORS
*Eliot I. Bernstein - ("Bernstein"); *Zakirul Shirajee - (Shirajee"); *Jude Rosario - ("Rosario"); *Jeffrey Friedstein - ("Friedstein"); James F. Armstrong - ("Armstrong"); Patricia Daniels - ("Daniels"); Matthew Mink - ("Mink"); *indicates core inventor on the application, others true and correct inventors were intentionally left off or displaced, Hereinafter inventors collectively referred to as ("Inventors").
2. IVIEWIT COMPANIES
*Certain companies were opened fraudulently without Board approval or knowledge and may not be owned by the Shareholders.
Uview.com, Inc. - DL; Iviewit Holdings, Inc. - DL; Iviewit Holdings, Inc. - DL; Iviewit Holdings, Inc. - FL; Iviewit Technologies, Inc. - DL; Iviewit.com, Inc. - FL; Iviewit.com, Inc.- DL; I.C., Inc. - FL; Iviewit.com LLC - DL; Iviewit LLC - DL; Iviewit Corporation - FL; Iviewit, Inc. - FL; Iviewit, Inc. - DL; ANY OTHER JOHN DOE COMPANIES ("JOHN DOE") NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME, AS INVESTIGATIONS REMAIN OPEN. Hereinafter iviewit companies collectively referred to as ("Iviewit").
3. IVIEWIT STOCK AND NOTE HOLDERS:
H. Wayne Huizenga Jr./Investech Holdings LLC - ("Investech"); Crossbow Ventures/Alpine Venture Capital Partners LP - ("Crossbow"); Atlas Entertainment/Tidal 4/Robert Shapiro; Alanis Morissette; Happy Feet Living Trust - Ellen DeGeneres; Heche Trust - Anne Heche; Lauren Lloyd Living Trust; Scott Welch; New Media Holdings, Inc. - ("New Media"); Kenneth Anderson - ("Anderson"); James Osterling - ("Osterling"); James F. Armstrong - ("Armstrong"); Guy Iantoni ("G. Iantoni"); Jill M. Iantoni ("J. Iantoni"); Andrew R. Dietz ("A. Dietz"); Donna B. Dietz ("D. Dietz"); Patricia Daniels ("Daniels"); Bettie Stanger ("B. Stanger"); Lisa Friedstein ("L. Friedstein"); Mitchell Welsch ("M. Welsch"); Joan Stark ("J. Stark"); Anthony Frenden ("Frenden"); Anthony Giordano ("Giordano"); Jack Scanlan ("Scanlan"); Misty Morgan ("Morgan"); Maurice Buchsbaum ("Buchsbaum"); Emerald Capital Partners, Inc. ("Emerald"); Armstrong Hirsch Jackoway Tyerman & Wertheimer, P.C. ("AHJTW"); David Colter ("Colter"); Kevin Lockwood ("Lockwood"); Alan Young; Ed Butler; Joe Ryan; David Bernstein ("D. Bernstein"); Kevin Roach; Barry Becker ("Becker"); Tony Chirino ("Chirino"); Gregory B. Thagard ("Thagard"); George DiBedart; Stephen Verona; Charles Brunelas )“Brunelas"); Courtney Jurcak ("Jurcak"); Tammy Raymond ("Raymond"); Matthew Mink ("Mink"); Misty Marie Morgan ("Morgan"); Jennifer Kluge ("Kluge"); Jude Rosario ("Rosario"); Zakirul Shirajee ("Shirajee"); Donald G. Kane, II ("Kane"); Simon L. Bernstein ("S. Bernstein"); Geoffrey And Caroline Prochotska Rogers, Esq. And Children ("Rogers"); P. Stephen Lamont ("Lamont"); P. Stephen Lamont II; The Joshua Ennio Zander Bernstein 1999 Trust; The Jacob Noah Archie Bernstein 1999 Trust; Daniel Elijsha Abe Ottomo Bernstein; Eliot Ivan Bernstein ("Bernstein"); and Candice Michelle Bernstein ("C. Bernstein")
OTHER DEBENTURE OWNERS
Richard R. Rosman; Anthony Lewinter; Mollie Dekold ("Dekold"); Joseph Allen Fischman; Theodore Stuart Bernstein And Children; David And Pamela Simon And Children; Ginger Stanger ("Ginger"); Amanda Stanger; Crystal Stanger; Brett And Uli Howard ("Howard"); Mitchell Zamarin; Lorna And Christopher Grote; Joel & Robin Gonsalves And Children (Amber Tuomi, Holly Tuomi, Tyler Tuomi, Brooke Gonsalves, Ashley Gonsalves, Krystal Gonsalves & Jeanette Gonsalves); Gregory And Wendy Gonsalves And Children; Thaddeus And Judy Gonsalves And Children; Sherri Frazier And Children; Dorothy Winters; William And Michelle Slaby ("Slaby"); Michael And Nikki Stomp ("Stomp"); Karen And Kevin Kiley ("Kiley"); Jane Valence; Marc Garber, Esq.; Robert Feigenbaum; Beth And Frederick Klein; Partial List of Shareholders (Iviewit does not attest to these figures or names) and other known silent owners ("Johnny Q. Shareholders").
Hereinafter, collectively referred to as, ("Shareholders").
B. Class I Defendants - hereinafter ("defendants")
*Click on the firm name or hyperlinked names for INDIVIDUAL crime charts BELOW OR HERE FOR ENTIRE ORG CHARTS
Alan S. Jaffe - Chairman Of The Board - ("Jaffe"); Kenneth Rubenstein - ("Rubenstein"); Robert Kafin - Managing Partner - ("Kafin"); Christopher C. Wheeler - ("Wheeler"); Steven C. Krane - ("Krane"); Stephen R. Kaye - ("S. Kaye"); Matthew Triggs - ("Triggs"); Christopher Pruzaski - ("Pruzaski"); Mara Lerner Robbins - ("Robbins"); Donald Thompson - ("Thompson"); Gayle Coleman; David George; George A. Pincus; Gregg Reed; Leon Gold - ("Gold"); Albert Gortz - ("Gortz"); Marcy Hahn-Saperstein; Kevin J. Healy - ("Healy"); Stuart Kapp; Ronald F. Storette; Chris Wolf; Jill Zammas; FULL LIST OF 601 liable Proskauer Partners; any other John Doe ("John Doe") Proskauer partner, affiliate, company, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Proskauer ROSE LLP; Partners, Associates, Of Counsel, Employees, Corporations, Affiliates and any other Proskauer related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("Proskauer").
2. MELTZER, LIPPE, GOLDSTEIN, WOLF & SCHLISSEL, P.C.
Lewis Melzter - ("Meltzer"); Raymond Joao - ("Joao"); Frank Martinez - ("Martinez"); Kenneth Rubenstein - ("Rubenstein"); FULL LIST OF 34 Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein, Wolf & Schlissel, P.C. liable Partners; any other John Doe ("John Doe") Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein, Wolf & Schlissel, P.C. partner, affiliate, company, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein, Wolf & Schlissel, P.C.; Partners, Associates, Of Counsel, Employees, Corporations, Affiliates and any other Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein, Wolf & Schlissel, P.C. related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("MLGWS").
Ralf Boer ("Boer"); William J. Dick - ("Dick"); Steven C. Becker - ("Becker"); Douglas Boehm - ("Boehm"); Barry Grossman - ("Grossman"); Jim Clark - ("Clark"); FULL LIST OF 1,042 FOLEY AND LARDNER liable Partners; any other John Doe ("John Doe") Foley & Lardner partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Foley & Lardner; Partners, Associates, Of Counsel, Employees, Corporations, Affiliates and any other Foley & Lardner related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("Foley").
Richard Schiffrin - ("Schiffrin"); Andrew Barroway - ("Barroway"); Krishna Narine - ("Narine"); FULL LIST OF 40 SCHIFFRIN AND BARROWAY, LLP liable Partners any other John Doe ("John Doe") Schiffrin & Barroway, LLP partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Schiffrin & Barroway, LLP; Partners, Associates, Of Counsel, Employees, Corporations, Affiliates and any other Schiffrin & Barroway, LLP related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("SB").
5. Blakely Sokoloff Taylor & Zafman LLP
Norman Zafman - ("Zafman"); Thomas Coester - ("Coester"); Farzad Ahmini - ("Ahmini"); George Hoover - ("Hoover"); FULL LIST OF 74 Blakely Sokoloff Taylor & Zafman LLP liable Partners; any other John Doe ("John Doe") 5. Blakely Sokoloff Taylor & Zafman LLP partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Blakely Sokoloff Taylor & Zafman LLP; Partners, Associates, Of Counsel, Employees, Corporations, Affiliates and any other Blakely Sokoloff Taylor & Zafman LLP related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("BSTZ").
6. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon LLP
Martyn W. Molyneaux - ("Molyneaux"); Michael Dockterman - ("Dockterman"); FULL LIST OF 198 Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon LLP liable Partners; any other John Doe ("John Doe") Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon LLP partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon LLP; Partners, Associates, Of Counsel, Employees, Corporations, Affiliates and any other Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon LLP related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("WHAD").
7. Christopher & Weisberg, P.A.
Alan M. Weisberg - ("Weisberg"); any other John Doe ("John Doe") Christopher & Weisberg, P.A. partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Christopher & Weisberg, P.A.; Partners, Associates, Of Counsel, Employees, Corporations, Affiliates and any other Christopher & Weisberg, P.A. related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("CW").
8. YAMAKAWA INTERNATIONAL PATENT OFFICE
Donald J. Goldstein - ("Goldstein"); Gerald R. Lewin - ("Lewin"); Erika Lewin - ("E. Lewin"); Mark R. Gold; Paul Feuerberg; Salvatore Bochicchio; Marc H. List; David A. Katzman; Robert H. Garick; Robert C. Zeigen; Marc H. List; Lawrence A. Rosenblum; David A. Katzman; Brad N. Mciver; Robert Cini; any other John Doe ("John Doe") Goldstein & Lewin Co. partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Goldstein & Lewin Co.; Partners, Associates, Of Counsel, Employees, Corporations, Affiliates and any other Goldstein & Lewin Co. related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("Goldstein").
10. INTEL, Real 3d, Inc. (SILICON GRAPHICS, INC., LOCKHEED MARTIN & INTEL) & RYJO
Gerald Stanley - ("Stanley"); Ryan Huisman - ("Huisman"); RYJO - ("RYJO"); Tim Connolly - ("Connolly"); Steve Cochran; David Bolton; Rosalie Bibona - ("Bibona"); Connie Martin; Richard Gentner; Steven A. Behrens; Matt Johannsen; any other John Doe ("John Doe") Intel, Real 3D, Inc. (Silicon Graphics, Inc., Lockheed Martin & Intel) & RYJO partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Intel, Real 3D, Inc. (Silicon Graphics, Inc., Lockheed Martin & Intel) & RYJO; Employees, Corporations, Affiliates and any other Intel, Real 3D, Inc. (Silicon Graphics, Inc., Lockheed Martin & Intel) & RYJO related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("Intel/R3D").
11. Tiedemann Investment Group
Bruce T. Prolow ("Prolow"); Carl Tiedemann ("C. Tiedemann"); Andrew Philip Chesler; Craig L. Smith; any other John Doe ("John Doe") Tiedemann Investment Group partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Tiedemann Investment Group and any other Tiedemann Investment Group related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("Tiedemann").
12. Crossbow Ventures™ / Alpine Partners
Stephen J. Warner - ("Warner"); René P. Eichenberger - ("Eichenberger"); H. Hickman “Hank” Powell - ("Powell"); Maurice Buchsbaum - ("Buchsbaum"); Eric Chen - ("Chen"); Avi Hersh; Matthew Shaw - ("Shaw"); Bruce W. Shewmaker - ("Shewmaker"); Ravi M. Ugale - ("Ugale"); any other John Doe ("John Doe") Crossbow Ventures™ / Alpine Partners partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Crossbow Ventures™ / Alpine Partners and any other Crossbow Ventures™ / Alpine Partners related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("Crossbow").
13. BROAD & CASSEL
James J. Wheeler - ("J. Wheeler"); Kelly Overstreet Johnson - ("Johnson"); any other John Doe ("John Doe") Broad & Cassell partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Broad & Cassell and any other Broad & Cassell related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("BC").
14. FORMER IVIEWIT MANAGEMENT & BOARD
Brian G. Utley/Proskauer Referred Management - ("Utley"); Raymond Hersh - ("Hersh")/; Michael Reale - ("Reale")/Proskauer Referred Management; Rubenstein/Proskauer Rose - Advisory Board; Wheeler/Proskauer Rose - Advisory Board; Dick/Foley & Lardner - Advisory Board, Boehm/Foley & Lardner - Advisory Board; Becker/Foley & Lardner; Advisory Board; Joao/Meltzer Lippe Goldstein Wolfe & Schlissel - Advisory Board; Kane/Goldman Sachs - Board Director; Lewin/Goldstein Lewin - Board Director; Prolow/Tiedemann Prolow II - Board Director; Powell/Crossbow Ventures/Proskauer Referred Investor - Board Director; Buchsbaum - Board Director; Warner - Board Director; any other John Doe ("John Doe") Former Iviewit Management & Board partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to Former Iviewit Management & Board and any other Former Iviewit Management & Board related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("Board").
15. FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT - WEST PALM BEACH FLORIDA:
Judge Jorge LABARGA - ("Labarga"); Triggs; any other John Doe ("John Doe") FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT - WEST PALM BEACH FLORIDA staff, known or not known to have been involved at the time. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("15C").
16.
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
&
THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION: SECOND
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
First Department Chart
Second Department Chart
Thomas Cahill - ("Cahill"); Joseph Wigley - ("Wigley"); Krane, any other John Doe ("John Doe") THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE staff, known or not known to have been involved at the time. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("First Dept DDC").
17. THE FLORIDA BAR
Lorraine Christine Hoffman - ("Hoffman"); Eric Turner - ("Turner"); Kenneth Marvin - ("Marvin"); Anthony Boggs - ("Boggs"); Joy A. Bartmon - ("Bartmon"); Kelly Overstreet Johnson - ("Johnson"); Jerald Beer - ("Beer"); Triggs; Wheeler; any other John Doe ("John Doe") The Florida Bar staff, known or not known to have been involved at the time. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("TFB")
18. MPEGLA, LLC.
Columbia University; Fujitsu Limited; General Instrument Corp; Lucent Technologies Inc.; Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.; Mitsubishi Electric Corp.; Philips Electronics N.V. (Philips); Scientific Atlanta, Inc.; Sony Corp. (Sony); EXTENDED LIST OF MPEGLA LICENSEES AND LICENSORS; any other John Doe MPEGLA, LLC. Partner, Associate, Engineer, Of Counsel or Employee; any other John Doe ("John Doe") MPEGLA, LLC partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to MPEGLA, LLC and any other MPEGLA, LLC related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("MPEGLA").
19. DVD6C LICENSING GROUP
Toshiba Corporation; Hitachi, Ltd.; Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd.; Mitsubishi Electric Corporation; Time Warner Inc.; Victor Company Of Japan, Ltd.; EXTENDED DVD6C DEFENDANTS; any other John Doe DVD6C LICENSING GROUP Partner, Associate, Engineer, Of Counsel or Employee; any other John Doe ("John Doe") DVD6C LICENSING GROUP partners, affiliates, companies, known or not known at this time; including but not limited to DVD6C LICENSING GROUP and any other DVD6C LICENSING GROUP related or affiliated entities both individually and professionally. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as ("DVD6C").
20. ANY OTHER Proskauer PATENT POOL WHEREBY LEGAL SERVICES HAVE BEEN RENDERED FOR POOL LICENSORS OR LICENSEES
21. ANY OTHER JOHN DOE CLASS I DEFENDANT THAT MAY BECOME KNOWN AT ANY OTHER TIME, AS INVESTIGATIONS REMAIN OPEN
C. Class Ii - Defendants
1. NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT VIOLATORS ("NDA") AND OTHER CONTRACT VIOLATORS
EXHIBIT “” - LIST OF NDA VIOLATORS;
NOT ALL LISTED CLASS II DEFENDANTS MAY BE IN CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS RELATING TO THE NEXUS OF EVENTS AND THE COMPANY IS ASKING CEASE AND DESIST ACTIONS IN THESE MATTERS, UNLESS OTHERWISE MENTIONED HEREIN.
D. Class Iii Defendants
1. PATENT POOLS LICENSEES
EXHIBIT “” - LINK TO PATENT POOL LICENSEES
NOT ALL LISTED CLASS III DEFENDANTS MAY BE IN CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS RELATING TO THE NEXUS OF EVENTS AND THE COMPANY IS ASKING CEASE AND DESIST ACTIONS IN THESE MATTERS, UNLESS OTHERWISE MENTIONED HEREIN.
E. THE HISTORY OF IVIEWIT
"A lawyer with his briefcase can steal more than a hundred men with guns." Mario puzo - the godfather
"A lawyer who steals more than a hundred men with guns is nothing more than a thief, a menace to society, a threat to the establishment of law and all who practice it honestly and with integrity." - Eliot Bernstein
May this honorable court find no mercy for these criminals cloaked as lawyers!
1. Introduction
This crime has now become so complex and has at stake the integrity of the entire legal system while attacking the core of free commerce, the inventors rights' to invention. The violations of the Constitution of the United States of America ("Constitution") are alleged against those entrusted to uphold the Constitution, corruption in the core, in perhaps the largest criminal infiltration into the legal system ever, by licensed lawyers acting as criminals. It will be evidenced herein that the integrity of the patent office and its ability at protecting inventor rights and upholding its constitutionally sanctioned authority to protect such rights, is at stake. Patent attorneys acting as criminals to steal client technology learned under attorney privilege. Patent attorney then creating a patent pooling scheme to monopolize on the inventions and act as a barrier to entry for the true inventions by tying and bundling the inventions into elaborate licensing schemes. Antitrust at its finest, for the criminals are learned in the art of law and with such knowledge comes the potential for using the knowledge for criminal purposes. If such crimes as described herein are allowed to prevail, it could lead to a failure in democracy and free enterprise ensured by the Constitution, caused by those sworn to uphold it. If one cannot trust ones patent lawyers and the legal system from stealing and violating the laws and cannot find a safe harbor to patent inventions through the United States patent system, the effects on commerce could be catastrophic.
With great foresight our founding fathers choose to protect the occupation of inventor, perhaps the only non-government job occupation protected directly in the Constitution under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8. The reason the inventor appears as a protected job occupation in the opening of the Constitution, is that if invention is not protected and rights given to the inventor to enjoy royalty, than there really are no rights to protect. Personal property and invention would be owned by the government or the king. Free commerce and all those personal freedoms associated with our democracy would not exist for the citizens if one did not own the rights to their property. The Constitution places the rights of the inventor directly before the creation of the lower courts in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 9, and this was done presumably with intent. Intent that ensured when issues as sacred as inventors' rights are at stake and lower courts have failed to provide protection, that the matters must lie with the Supreme Court, In these matters, due to conflicts of interest and violations of public offices the lower courts, which are the direct and proximate loss of invention rights, never have these rights been challenged by so insipid a corruption.
In a situation where no legal remedies can be sought elsewhere, because the legal system has been infiltrated in conflict, there truly is no other court than this Court, left to ferret out the truth and protect free commerce and inventors' rights before they are lost. As Mark Twain stated:
"A country without a patent office and good patent laws is just a crab and can't travel any way but sideways and backwards."
- Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, 1889.
Iviewit has been to lawyers and they have corrupted and l-rd knows with the stolen monies gained from the inventions, the criminals have been able to purchase justice at every level of the legal system. Wherever Iviewit and the Shareholders have attempted to press their claims against the attorneys, the attorneys are later found handling their own complaints directly in violation of public office positions and acting in conflict. Iviewit has been to corrupt court rooms, where civil judges acted seemingly insane, usurping our rights to counsel, canceling a trial on the eve of the trial without notifying Iviewit or its lawyers, then rushing to dismiss Iviewit's two law firms at the rehearing scheduling. Two law firms abandon Iviewit the eve of trial rescheduling; each claiming the other would be representing Iviewit at trial and the judge allows it? One law firm was even in a binding Letter of Understanding ("LOU") to represent Iviewit through all of these claims against its lawyers and such binding letter should have covered representation at that court and this Court and provided two million dollars of funding which was due upon signing. Once denied counsel, the judge immediately granted a default judgment to the law firm Proskauer for Iviewit failing to secure replacement counsel? Turns out the companies that were sued by Proskauer, although named identical to companies of the Shareholders, were companies set up by Proskauer in a complex corporate and patent shell scheme to steal patents.
Iviewit and the Shareholders have done the right thing as private citizens reported these atrocious crimes to the appropriate federal, state law enforcement, international authorities, state bars and civil courts. At each of these venues, where lawyers control, the attorney conduct process has been perverted, the playing field tipped using illegal methods and the state bars were used as personal legal aid for the corrupted attorneys who are planted top down. In fact, the state bar associations were used to writing letters of exoneration without any investigation. Iviewit has now found these criminal attorneys have planted conflicted Proskauer partners that have penetrated the Supreme Court bar agencies and disciplinary departments in New York and Florida that prevented due process through public office corruption.
These corrupted attorneys have misused law again and again in attempts to destroy the Iviewit companies, Inventors and Shareholders and deny them of their rights to their inventions for self gain; using, or shall we say abusing, the law and legal system as if the Constitution they are beholden to uphold were written on toilet paper. Failing their oaths sworn to a G-d to uphold law as if no G-d existed. These criminal attorneys need to be disciplined by nothing other than the highest Court in the world for their crimes. In order to show the world the United States legal system will not tolerate this type of penetration and perversion of the legal system and to prevent a panacea on the patent office by inventors fearing taking their inventions to lawyers for fear of their lives being destroyed for their inventions, instead of being rewarded. A message must be sent by this Court that those who violate such G-d sworn oaths of law and use their legal license to commit federal, state and international crimes will be punished to fullest extent of the law and then some. Attorneys found misusing the law and legal public office positions to commit and then attempt to cover up crimes will be punished by no less power than the United States Supreme Court. In this instance the state supreme courts and their self-regulating attorney disciplinary systems have already been penetrated and perverted to make due process impossible in those states. In fact, these consumer agencies, the state bars, have now pitted Iviewit against two state supreme courts, courts that due to the conflicted actions of their members, are now wholly conflicted with Iviewit. To return these matters to the lower state courts only allows corruption to continue, more innocent people to be swayed by corruption, or for legitimate entities like the state supreme court bar associations or civil courts to become infiltrated and decimated to further deny due process. The ability of these corrupt lawyers to penetrate the legal system causes this case to find no safe harbor within the legal system for Iviewit and the Shareholders to press their claims. The United States Supreme Court must stand to prevent such crimes within the legal system by those running the legal system, especially where many of the crimes are not only against the Iviewit Shareholders and Inventors but against foreign nations, the United States directly, and a multiplicity of state and federal agencies. No more challenging case has been presented to the United States Supreme Court with the entirety of free commerce, the patent and trademark system and the legal system at stake. Never before in the history of the United States has an inventor approached these most esteemed walls of justice, beaten and abused by the very legal system designed to protect and ensure inventor rights. The legal system converted to a tool for the crimes to be committed and then the tool to avoid prosecution.
One must ask why all these lawyers are afraid of the courtroom, afraid to confront the evidence and witnesses against them. Attorneys afraid of open court. Attorneys who have resorted instead to violating public offices causing an overwhelming appearance of improprieties at the highest levels of the legal institution to evade actions against them. Attorneys using unscrupulous methods to prevent due process, to prevent being confronted by their accusers. Iviewit stands ready today, if this Court accepts the case or finds a safe conflict free forum for these matters to be heard, to present the case against these thousands of lawyers of the accused firms. Represented only by a Pro Se, In Forma Pauperis, inventor. Finally one asks, if there is nothing to hide by these law firms accused and the state bar officers found in violation of their offices, then where are they, why at each legal venue is the appearance of impropriety rampant? Are they afraid of solo Pro Se, In Forma Pauperis inventor? If not, Iviewit challenges these lawyers to come before this Honorable Court and answer the questions inquiring Shareholders want to know. Like where have the patents gone? Why are they all in the wrong inventors' names? Why are they missing the process of the invention? Why are they not assigned as they should be according to the attorney dockets? Why are the patents, if done well, now in suspension pending by the Commissioner of the Patent Office on charges the attorneys committed fraud on the United States Patent and Trademark Office? Where are the books and records these attorneys maintained and why do they now claim to have lost most of them? Where are the bank records, especially those relating to investors deposits, including monies from the Small Business Administration? Why are companies with identical names existing that appear owned by our attorneys and appearing to have stolen patents in them? Why do our patent attorneys and former management have patents in their names, not disclosed to or authorized by Shareholders? What happened to the Board where have they fled and why were Shareholders not notified the Board was packing it in and running? Why are Board members and other professionals and investment advisors profiting from the use of the Iviewit technologies for themselves and not the Shareholders?
All Iviewit asks for is a fair and impartial forum for due process under law, free of further conflicts of interest and improprieties, to hear the answers to the above questions that these lawyers fail to respond to written requests for.
2. PREFACE
MPEGLA LLC stands as the main criminal enterprise accused herein of being a monopolistic and anticompetitive patent pool, converted and controlled by the accused lawyers to monetize stolen IP from Iviewit. The pool is spearheaded by Iviewit former counsel and Proskauer partner, Kenneth Rubenstein, who is currently under investigation by the United States Patent & Trademark for fraud upon the USPTO and under state, federal and international investigation for his part in the alleged theft of intellectual properties and other crimes. Proskauer a former real estate firm since the 1800's developed a sudden appetite for IP work after meeting the Inventors and learning of their inventions. Proskauer then instead of filing timely and correct patents for the Inventors rushed about and acquired the MPEGLA patent pools as part of a complex scheme to steal IP from their retained client. Where the Inventions stolen were the single largest competitive threat to the patent pooling scheme, the pool once acquired by Proskauer, acting as counsel to the aggrieved Inventors and MPEGLA, then just stole them and bundled them into a license. MPEGLA is now one of the single largest infringers of the technologies. It will be evidenced herein that Rubenstein, acting as Iviewit patent counsel, learned of the technology from the Inventors and then applied it to a bundled MPEG license for MPEGLA, a pool he formed. Not only did Rubenstein bundle and tie the product to products in the pool, Proskauer stole the patents for themselves. Rubenstein brought in patent counsel Joao who, after meeting the inventors, made application in his own name for ninety patents according to his own account.
This is what MPEGLA LLC claims;
The patent pool was formed in 1997, by the trustees of Columbia University, Fujitsu Limited, General Instrument Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.V. (Philips), Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and Sony Corp. (Sony) to jointly share royalties from patents that are essential to compliance with the MPEG-2 compression technology standard. The MPEG-2 standard patent pool comprises a number of essential patents put into the hands of a common licensing administrator empowered to grant licenses on a non-discriminating basis, collect royalties and distribute them on a pro-rata allocation based on each licensor's contribution. The terms of the arrangement were negotiated with and approved by the US Department of Justice, see DOJ letter (June 26, 1997)[eib1] and the immediate press release regarding the review (June 26, 1997).
As evidenced by the following letter from the
DOJ when Iviewit filed a complaint against MPEGLA for antitrust charges, MPEGLA's claim that the
DOJ “approved and negotiated” the pool, became apparently false as the DOJ
states a far different account of their involvement or approval of the pooling
scheme, (see exhibit DOJ
response and
DOJ letter from Iviewit). The
DOJ response to Iviewit, although initially requesting more evidence,
subsequently has been preceded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and the
United States Patent & Trademark Office ("USPTO") initiating investigations,
yet the key point is that the DOJ issues these "approval" letters routinely
to anyone that requests them, it acts as no immunity from anti-trust
investigation or gives no seal of approval. Yet MPEGLA LLC touts this
letter as a lever to claim the validity of their illegal patent pooling scheme. The walls of MPEGLA LLC are certain to
crumble if the claims herein are proven true, which is inevitable, and like
patent pools before it,
the DOJ will break it this up for its illegal activities.
Soon others will follow with similar stories, see
HyperDoc
- On2 Letter.
In a similar patent scheme, Rubenstein and DVD6C try to claim approval from the DOJ. DVD6C Licensing Agency. In 1999, another patent pool was formed by Toshiba Corporation, Hitachi, LTD. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., LTD., Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Time Warner Inc., and Victor Company of Japan, LTD. For products manufactured in compliance with the DVD-ROM and DVD-VIDEO FORMATS. See the letter to Carey R. Ramos, Esq. (June 10, 1999) from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Department Of Justice, Antitrust Division and the subsequent press release from the DOJ (June 10, 1999). There are presently 80 U.S. patents for DVD-Rom Drives, DVD-Video Players and DVD Decoders, and 96 U.S. Patents for DVD-ROM discs and DVD-Video Discs. The royalties under the joint license for DVD-Video Players and DVD-ROM Drives are 4% of the net selling price of the net selling price. DVD6C stands as another arm of the criminal patent pooling scheme, operating as a patent pool, controlled and monetized by Proskauer et. al., to monopolize and drive from market the true inventors of technologies that could not survive without the Iviewit Inventions. These patent pools have massively proliferated the Inventions learned under attorney/client privilege through tying and bundling them with other technologies and licensing them through this scheme to profit themselves. The thefts were coordinated by the very attorneys entrusted with protecting the IP for the Inventors and Shareholders. In committing the thefts, the attorneys not only committed crimes against the Inventors and Shareholders but committed frauds upon the United States, foreign nations, state and federal institutions.
Not only was the intent to steal the patents but also to create from the stolen patents an anticompetitive monopolistic power with the intent of cornering the markets for which the stolen IP would dominate. These crimes involved the setting up of Pools cloaked in DOJ approval which could monetize the stolen IP, through a “legitimate” business enterprise and launder the profits through these criminal store fronts and then back to the Proskauer law firm. Can you imagine, the head MPEGLA attorney, acting as counsel for Iviewit and no conflict waivers were secured, no China Wall was formed to separate Rubenstein from the inventions or protect from this. Rubenstein who is head of the newly formed Proskauer patent department, is responsible and billed for through his department for all of the following: (i) the oversight of the patent filings by his former partner Joao and his former firm MLGWS, (ii) securing of investment from investors by Rubenstein directly opining on the technologies to investors, law firms and investment banks, (iii) filing of numerous trademarks, copyright protections, trade-secrets and patent assignments, acting as Iviewit's Board of Director on technology issues, (iv) securing non-competes and non-disclosure agreements, (iv) structuring licensing deals including with Fortune 500 companies, (v) setting up corporations to monetize the royalties and in every action they were hired to perform they instead attempted elaborate crimes.
Fascinating to note that once caught and knowing of the glaring conflict, Proskauer attempted to advance the claim that Proskauer did no intellectual property work for Iviewit. Further, that Rubenstein only referred Iviewit to Joao and they only did corporate work and did not know about the intellectual properties or Inventions. Under deposition, two key Proskauer partners, Wheeler and Rubenstein, attempted in contradiction to a wealth of factual evidence to claim they knew nothing of the Inventions. Rubenstein went so far as to state he was being harassed to come to a deposition where he knew nothing of the Inventors or Inventions. If such claim is proven false, and the evidence and witnesses are overwhelming, then everything crumbles and the Pools are stopped and Inventions and royalties returned to the true and correct Inventors.
There is more to the crime than just creating anti-competitive monopolistic Pools to tie and bundle the inventions to knock the Inventions out as a competitive threat while simultaneously using them with remuneration. A simultaneous series of criminal actions was taking place to actually steal the inventions for later profit, as the Pools share royalty based on patent contributions and then divide amongst the participants. Proskauer needed to actually the get the patents out the Inventors and Shareholders hands to fully monetize the inventions and into others names. To accomplish this they also had to drive from the market the true Inventors' and destroy the legitimate Iviewit companies. Yet how would this benefit them, if the companies went bankrupt and out of business? The answer comes in a complex corporate and patent scheme of illegal companies created to steal the core inventions whereby two sets of patents was created and two sets of companies were created. These illegitimate companies were formed identical to the Iviewit Shareholder companies, and in some instances identically named to the legitimate companies, except these companies appear owned by Proskauer and perhaps other John Doe's. With two sets of companies, add two sets of almost identical patents, one set full of error for the legitimate companies and another set with the core inventions written into others names and assigned to the illegal companies, through false oaths and application to the USPTO. The legitimate patents were switched with bogus patents on the way to the patent office by Iviewit patent counsel, this set certain to fail having been intentionally replaced with deficient applications. So, as inventors Bernstein, Rosario, Shirajee and Friedstein signed the applications, they were switched with meaningless and incorrect patents filled with math errors, incorrect inventors, missing the key aspects of the inventions, assigned and owned incorrectly and certain to fail at the USPTO for any of these reasons.
The core patents were switched into the bogus companies, through a fascinating series of name changes and fraudulent assignments to the USPTO, as will be evidenced herein and in exhibit. The other set of patents while looking almost identical to the other contained the secret sauce and were put into the fraudulent companies, through false oaths of application by false inventors. Certain other inventions were written directly into others names, including Joao, the patent attorney and former partner of Rubenstein at MLGWS and others were written into a Proskauer referred management plant, Utley.
The crimes were nearly completed, when fate would have it, that these criminals disguised as lawyers, accountants, and their referred management, were caught in the act. It has now taken several years to piece together the many fragments of the crimes that will be evidenced herein, exposing a scheme so complex it will leave you in disbelief. A crime that violates so many laws by those charged with upholding law and then crimes to further cover up the crimes through a pattern of racketeering by the law firms and others involved, including abuses of public office, elevating to offices within the state Supreme Courts of New York and Florida. While the company was learning of the original crimes and piecing the evidence together, those who were caught then began a series of steps to attempt to cover up their crimes and buy off or illegally influence investigations and court actions. Threats on the life of the key inventor, Eliot Bernstein were made, forcing him to relocate his family across country fleeing overnight for safety.
Actions began against those caught on behalf of Iviewit and the Shareholders based on the fragmented evidence and little knowledge known of the entirety of the scheme in 2001. Those actions initially filed were deflected through a series of abuses of public offices, through conflicts of interest that were successful at blocking the complaints, both civil and criminal. Until the conflicts were discovered several years later and which have now elevated the matters to members of Supreme Court bar associations and senior ranking court officials caught in the conflicts and cover-up. In the end, a corrupt group of attorneys will be exposed, attorneys who used the law to commit crimes and have used the law to attempt to cover up their crimes; crimes not only against the Iviewit Shareholders but crimes directly against the United States and foreign nations, currently under federal investigations including the Small Business Administration Inspector Generals Offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
It will be evidenced that to deny due process and evade prosecution Proskauer either planted or used individuals with public offices of influence in the complaint processes to act directly to derail the complaints and create the appearance that the complaints had no factual basis. Planted to derail state bar complaints against the attorneys, civil court actions against the law firms (including preventing a counter complaint from being heard) and local law enforcement investigations. These conflicts and public office violations rise to Krane, the former President of the New York State Bar Association ("NYSBA"), Judith Kaye the Chief Judge of the New York Supreme Court of Appeals and Kelly Overstreet Johnson, the President of The Florida Bar. Positioning members of the disciplinary departments and courts in conflict by these law firms, prevented due process of Iviewit pressing their claims.
The series of events defined herein, will at times need to be viewed not only as they were occurring in the historical timeline, which will appear as a random series of criminal events, but also with the understanding such criminal actions were occurring as part of an unknown bigger picture criminal scheme. Viewed with a big picture mentality, the randomness of the criminal elements will be seen as part of the larger crime and conspiracy, each part combines to reveal the ultimate goal of the criminal enterprise, theft of the patents and creation of an anticompetitive monopolistic power to proliferate and profit from such stolen IP. Without such big picture view of the criminal enterprise and how the criminal actions commissioned are inter-related for the ultimate purpose of controlling the market through a monopoly with the stolen IP; would leave one in a state of disbelief of the allegations and how the various crimes all piece together. It would appear impossible to believe how or why the criminal acts were done if viewed as separate acts, so one must take the hundred or so crimes committed as part of a single act, a crime to steal patents heralded even by thieves as the "Holy Grail" inventions of our time.
So complex has the web of events now become,
because what at first must have started as simple plan, “a bata bing”, to steal
the patents from the Inventors for monetization by the attorneys
became more and more difficult as more and more people became
involved. To further complicate matters for the thieves, when these other interested parties
began to
buy stock and later ask questions
about where it was,
it
began to unearth bits of what appeared to be criminal acts being committed.
But as hard as it is for you now to believe, it has been equally hard for the
Shareholders to believe, that some of the largest law firms (criminal
enterprises) in the country conspired together to commit the crimes. New
firms brought in to cover up the tracks of the prior firms, as they became
exposed, acting on behalf of the Shareholders in facade. Later,
when bits and pieces of the crimes were being uncovered leading to the crimes
being exposed in court and other venues, the crimes had to elevate within the
legal system itself, with corrupted public officials and planted public officials
who would violated their offices to prevent due process and hide the guilty from
the evidence and witnesses against them.
The
courts and bar associations became cloaking mechanisms for the criminals.
To knock out the Iviewit complaints and block due process Defendants did all of the following:
1. in the civil court they bribed or induced a judge to deny Iviewit access to the courts, deny the right to counter complaint, throw a scheduled trial, deny counsel to Iviewit by terminating not one but two law firms on the eve of trial, cancel a scheduled trial without notice, overlook direct perjured written statements to the judge that absolutely were contradictory to deposition statements and statements made to the state bars and rule against Iviewit in a default for failure to retain replacement counsel,
2. with local law enforcement it would take foul play to derail the investigations in a complex law enforcement attempt to deny complaints from being properly docketed and investigated,
3. with supreme court created state bar associations in Virginia, New York and Florida, this would entail planting conflicted public officers of the Supreme Court bar associations through conflicted Proskauer partners or others conflicted with Proskauer within the agencies to control the complaints; and,
4. with the state supreme courts, this would take the bribing or planting of justices to cover-up or overlook crimes presented them, including overlooking conflicts in their courts with public officers of those courts.
Such cover-up efforts at first were successful in derailing the bar complaint investigations, evading trial in civil court and thwarting local law enforcement efforts through a very successful campaign to buy and influence justice. All the while causing catastrophic ruins to the Iviewit companies and the delays caused had material effect on loss of patent rights to the Inventors, inapposite the Constitution's intent. When certain conflicts, violations of public office positions and appearances of impropriety were later exposed in several of the investigations, yet another layer of cover-up was effectuated. The cover-up would now have to involve the influencing, bribing and/or planting of justices and high ranking bar officials at the state supreme courts, to again deny due process and preclude investigation into the new public office corruption crimes exposed. With that successfully done, the matters have no elevated
Although effective at first, all the cover up's have truly done is create an ever increasing layer of guilty parties that have become involved through aiding and abetting the criminal attorneys evade prosecution. With each new level of cover-up, the list of guilty parties' increases and such new players now come mainly from the legal system that is supposed to prevent such crimes and regulate lawyers, exposing corruption in the legal system previously unheard of. The criminals being mainly lawyers, are well versed in the laws and have tremendous influence on the legal system and the political system. Recruiting or planting individuals to aid and abet in avoiding prosecution became critical to evading prosecution, as will be evidenced herein and in exhibit. The monies from the stolen inventions are giving the criminals enough finances to almost buy themselves out of federal, state and international investigations and crimes, including crimes committed against government agencies.
As far fetched as this may all seem without first knowing the events or having delved into the evidence, it must also be accepted that the magnanimity of the crimes has grown, due to this ever increasing list of crimes commissioned in desperation to avoid prosecution. Not only is it now about stealing patents but now these criminal attorneys must evade prison for federal offenses, not only against those they have stolen from but for crimes against the United States and hosts of foreign countries. The complaints filed by Iviewit for the cover-up attempts are against attorneys for: conflicts, failure to insure client protections, conflicts with public office positions with state supreme courts and with state supreme court bar associations, failure of supreme court disciplinary agencies to enforce court orders for investigations, failure of the supreme courts to punish verified conflicts and violations of public offices, failure of supreme courts and supreme court bar associations to follow their own rules regarding conflicted members and failure to uphold judicial cannons by judges. With each complaint the amount of cover up necessary and people planted to deflect the complaints increases, the more innocent souls that must become corrupted to block due process. In the criminals inability to face the prosecutorial music, they take on more and more casualties, many may not at first be aware of the enormity of the crimes they are aiding and abetting, when they take a briefcase of cash or on a wink of an eye and promise of a partnership they violate their ethics. Yet, on a matter which at first may seem so easy and so inconsequential quickly poses enormous liability. Any act that aids and abets these heinous lawyers in their crimes, causes that person committing such act to become involved in the entirety of the federal, state and international crimes, as an accomplice.
The attorney criminals operating through the criminal enterprise patent pool MPEGLA and others, have plenty of briefcases of cash from the illegal profits inured from the stolen IP, to have already corrupted deep within the courts, the state bars, local law enforcement and perhaps patent offices around the world.
These crimes could only have been perpetuated by lawyers for all of the following reasons:
1. patent lawyers were necessary to make the patent thefts possible,
2. ethic attorneys and other high ranking legal officials violating public offices were essential to succeed in the cover-up attempts at the courts and bar associations, and,
3. the average criminal, once caught, would not have had the ability or knowledge to use the legal establishment as a shield, a lawyer, especially leading US law firms, would be able to accomplish this by merely applying for the correct positions, and,
While the theft of the patents was being executed; the criminals needed a legal enterprise to begin proliferating the inventions in a controlled environment and to launder the stolen profits. The enterprise, MPEGLA LLC, was then converted to steal and proliferate the inventions and block the Iviewit technologies from market using almost every known of anti-competitive criminal action to derail the Iviewit inventions. The criminal attorneys acquired Pools in existence at the time, and later formed newly created Pools, to further proliferate the stolen technologies through bundling and tying. Pools supposedly created to make standards for digital media, used to commission the theft and proliferation of the stolen IP, only lawyers acting as criminals could have created such an intricate criminal enterprise and cloaked it in the law. The Pools, once in possession of the stolen IP processes, would then become the dominant force in the market by licensing the inventions through the Pools. The Pools simply tied the inventions into bundled licenses, now commonly referred to as MPEG and other standards.
Although intellectual property attorneys are not supposed to have conflicting interests with their clients as it is illegal, it is the key of how to steal inventions from inventors for self endowment. For example, say you invented a new widget to end all widgets, and you went to a top law firm for patenting the product. You revealed to your new attorney the process you invented as required by law and he was supposed to file them for you as a licensed attorney with the USPTO and instead filed them for himself and the widget company he founded and controlled. Yet, in that single act of converting your invention, a myriad of federal criminal actions occurs, starting with false oaths to the USPTO and hosts of violations of the patent bar that patent attorneys are required to be licensed with.
This is exactly the same scenario as what has occurred with the Iviewit Inventions. What has led to the Commissioner of the USPTO and the Director of the Office of Enrollment & Discipline ("OED") for the USPTO, Harry I. Moatz ("Moatz") to suspend the patent applications of Iviewit, while charges of FRAUD UPON THE USPTO is investigated. Those being investigated by such federal patent authorities are the former intellectual property attorneys for Iviewit. Charges filed, were prompted by the Director of the OED, Moatz, after discovering evidence of foul play by the attorneys, including IP Dockets with materially false and misleading information, these same documents being tendered to the SBA, securities firms (including Goldman Sachs, Gruntal & Co., Wachovia Securities and all the Shareholders) to secure investment. These documents used to secure investment capital set off another wave of crimes committed violating hosts of securities laws and crimes against the federally backed SBA.
All that needed to be accomplished to complete the crime was to remove the threat of the true Inventors getting their Inventions patented. Once rid of the companies and inventors, the perpetrators needed only to then place the stolen patents into the Pools to generate the lion's share of the revenue split for the patent holders that are members of the Pools. Every effort has been made by the accused to destroy the Iviewit companies and destroy the life of the primary inventor, as evidenced herein and in exhibit, all to get these core patents. Recently the main inventor Eliot Bernstein's car was blown up, in a scene that looks like a car bombing out of Iraq, see Exhibit Car Blown Up, Bernstein's wife and children were hours away from picking the car up from an auto body shop where had this occurred with them in the car, these matters would have taken a horrible turn. Fire investigators have ruled out spontaneous combustion in the matter and are investigating arson with accelerants found. Utley, when originally caught, flew out to California to threaten Bernstein that if he did not shut up about what was discovered (patents for things like "Zoom and Pan on a Digital Camera" found in Utley's name and not assigned to the company) that he and law firms would destroy him, his family and his companies. Bernstein has since feared the worst, as he had already notified federal authorities at the time of Utley's threat, of certain of the crimes known at that time. These legal snafu's only compound the damages to the aggrieved parties and put all those witnesses who have made statements life hang in the balance of this Courts decision to put an end to the madness of desperate men, no matter their legal standing, they must now be tried for their crimes and the intellectual properties returned to the rightful owners. Anything short, compromises the life of Inventor Bernstein and his family.
Through proliferation of the technologies, these Pools have become the dominant force in the market, with Proskauer & Rubenstein controlling the patent approval for the Pools. The Pools have infringed upon the Inventors' patent pending technologies by blocking submission of the Inventors' patent pending applications and blocking actions to reveal the crimes through legal means. These Pools now generate revenues in the billions annually and the patents have been estimated to be worth between trillions and priceless, and the means to keep the stolen goods have escalated to the insane. Revenues generated mainly from the Inventors' Inventions and the markets they created or expanded upon (i.e, digital images and video transmitted on low bandwidth cell phones -- impossible without the inventions), denying Iviewit Shareholders of their royalties at any cost, blocking prosecution through purchasing the legal system.
Once such acquisition of the Pools by Proskauer and those controlling the Pools was completed, agents of the criminal enterprise Pools were then needed to:
1. derail the true Inventors from getting their patents approved,
2. derail the Iviewit companies from success,
3. begin monetization and proliferation of the technologies through tying and bundling of the inventions with other Pool products for license,
4. through a series of fraudulent transactions with departments of state in several states, create a fraudulent set of shell companies to place the stolen intellectual properties in, such companies mirrored the Iviewit companies in name, thus creating “shadow companies”,
5. create a fraudulent second set of patents, with false and fraudulent inventors, and place them in the shadow companies to tiptoe out the door for later monetization in the Pools, thus creating “shadow patents”,
6. create a fraudulent set of accounting books to cover the tracks of the fraudulent companies and stolen investor funds,
7. control the internal records and investor records through management plants put it under false pretense who failed to disclose previous attempts at intellectual property thefts by falsifying resume,
8. destroy the Iviewit companies where the true Inventors and Iviewit Shareholders had interests;
9. once the true companies failed and the patents failed at the patent office, to dissolve or rename the bogus companies and thus walk out the backdoor with the inventions with new and patently false inventors listed, and
10. finally, to drive the Inventors off a cliff with their families in an "accident" so that over the twenty year life of the patents, there would be no claims against them.
The agents were planted in the company in either accounting, management or legal positions and this maintained control over all facets of the process so that nobody could catch on. Those that would normally protect a client against such travesties were the crooks at every level. Once these steps were achieved, in order to share revenue from the Pools with the other patent holders in the Pools, one needs to have “essential” patents. This need for essential patents may answer the question as to why these attorneys not only needed to destroy the true Inventors Inventions and companies keeping them from market but had to go the extra step of gaining control of the IP with intellectual properties issued in false inventors names.
The initial conspiracy coordinated by Proskauer, failed due to a series of lucky breaks and tip-offs to the Iviewit Shareholders and Inventors that began revealing the schemes. The proverbial "peeling of the onion" and it has since taken several years to unravel the many crimes. Years to figure out how the crimes pieced together, how justice was being thwarted with the amounts of evidence submitted against the criminals, all the while the damages caused to the Iviewit Shareholders and Inventors intensifying. Crimes are still today being investigated and uncovered almost four years later.
A theory will be advanced herein, that one of the largest investors in Iviewit, once finding out about the scams that had taken place by the attorneys, began yet another attempt to gain control of the IP. This conspiracy again is inapposite the interests of Iviewit Shareholders and Inventors and committed through a series of very diabolical transactions. Where this investor was referred by Proskauer and yet at first appeared to be in the dark. The crimes committed in this instance may constitutes yet a second conspiratorial ring of new players that may have even begun to extort the first conspirators of their prize, the Pools revenues. Such second conspiratorial ring has only recently come under scrutiny for their actions, in which, yet again, the theme of stealing the patents from their rightful owners and the Iviewit Shareholders is at the heart of the scheme. Again, the secondary result is to quash Iviewit and the main Inventor from existence, so as to have the "grail" all to themselves. Again, this second conspiracy may derive benefit, in yet untold ways, from the Pools of the first conspiracy or may have created alternate ways to monetize the patents in yet unknown ways. What makes the second conspiracy possible, is those involved in the second attempt, became aware of the first conspiratorial ring and possessed evidence the Iviewit Shareholders (including themselves and the federally backed Small Business Administration who they had secured investment funds from) had been scammed. The second conspiratorial ring would then be led Crossbow, whose knowledge of the crimes is evidenced by the signing of the document accusing the law firms of fraud upon the USPTO. This document lead to the ongoing investigations at the USPTO, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Crossbow Signed Charges of Fraud Upon the USPTO. Yet, instead of going to the authorities and revealing their knowledge (until forced by the fear of being included in the charges being filed with the USPTO), Crossbow had begun a series of steps to take control of the IP for themselves and further perpetuate fraud and other crimes to achieve their end.
The second conspiratorial ring, had taken monies from the federally backed SBA, and on information and belief, failed to disclose to the SBA through proper accounting and disclosure, the true nature of the events surrounding the writing off of their loans. In effect, they attempted to abscond with SBA monies, as well as the monies invested by the Iviewit Shareholders and further have the pie all to themselves. Yet, because of the second conspiratorial rings direct ties to the first group, referred by members of Proskauer, what may appear separate and distinct conspiracies, may be in fact be a “good guy/bad guy” facet of the first ring. Thus, why the second ring remains hypothesis, a hypothesis that is being tested by the Inspector General of the Small Business Administration and the FBI.
The motive for these attorneys and then the investment bankers to commit such heinous crimes is simple, greed. The inventions have been heralded as perhaps the most significant inventions in the history of digital imaging and video. So “bleeding edge” and cool were these inventions, with literally thousands of hardware and software applications and advancements, Defendants risked it all to steal them. So cool as to kill and perhaps die for, so cool as to constitute cause for constitutionally insured protection of the Inventors by no less than this Court or an act of Congress.
The United States Constitution was designed with such little guy versus goliath scenarios and most definitely the reason the founders placed the rights of the inventor at the very outset of the Constitution. Inventor rights are protected prior to the Constitution's establishment of even the lower courts (which comes immediately after Inventor rights), thus the only Court at that point in the Constitution to handle matters of Inventors' rights, would be the Supreme Court. Alongside the creation of militia and rights of warfare, fall the rights of the inventor to enjoy the fruits of their labor, despite the powerful forces of business and government that may want to steal such rights without consideration or paying homage in royalty. So high up are the rights of the inventor to enjoy royalty from invention, for they form the basis of free commerce and personal property rights, that they command placement in the opening Article of the Constitution. One of the only private sector job occupations named in the Constitution to enjoy special constitutional protections. After becoming cognizant of the crimes herein, it will become obvious inventors need such constitutional protections, as the job of inventor may be the most dangerous job. In the series of events recounted herein, one will find Inventors not only are confronted by the ill will of “big business” trying to forcefully extract the Inventions but also must fight the very legal system that is supposed to protect them. No greater test of the Constitution can be had than when the very people (lawyers) who have been entrusted with upholding it, have become the violators of its sanctity and then use their colored cloaks of justice to attempt to hide the crimes they have committed and shield themselves from prosecution.
Further, the Constitution was instituted to form a fair and impartial mechanism of due process, which is the basis of the law and order. When law and order are violated by those charged with upholding it, no greater threat exists to the future of law. If criminals disguised as lawyers in large law firms can penetrate and control the legal process to deny citizens of their properties and their rights to protect their properties, the system instilled in the Constitution to prevent this, is to take arms against the corruption that threatens the fabric of freedoms. Iviewit and the Shareholders have taken every legal road, only to find it has been purchased and corrupted. Iviewit has been denied its rights to due process and due process has been usurped entirely, including the right to complain against public officials caught violating their offices. Complaints cannot be made because the dirty and vile attorneys accused of these crimes now control the complaint process as well, making the state bar self-regulation and disciplinary system nothing more than a criminal lawyer playground to use to launch personal defenses and deny complaints fair and impartial procedure under law by simply handling complaints against themselves. If caught in conflict, hell that is just one more position that needs to be purchased or gotten to deflect that crime. See where this goes, to utter lack of trust in the legal system resulting in anarchy and distrust for the constitutions ability to regulate freedom.
Doubtful the Constitutions founders ever imagined a case where the very system of patent protection would become corruptible, that such corruption would come from within, and those who broke the law would be those who took oath to uphold it. Never could it be imagined that those who broke the laws, would be able to skirt due process, again through abuses of the legal system, all in violation of the Constitution they are sworn to uphold. These crimes now disgrace the entirety of the legal system and all good lawyers who uphold justice, threatening to tarnish the establishment of law permanently or until all those involved are weeded out and put in prisons for their crimes. Until such time that justice can be restored, due process ensured, inventions returned to Inventors, the Constitution has failed and the American way has been lost. Perhaps, we will begin to teach our children that it is better to seek patent protection in Russia. Although that statement seems jocular it is no joking matter, for if Inventors fear no protections in the United States, they will take their inventions elsewhere and this could have cataclysmic effect on the economy of the United States. It seems at first strange to a layman that the Constitution protects inventors rights' to their inventions, until it is realized that invention is the very backbone to a free commerce. That democracy depends entirely upon the existence of personal property rights and laws to protect those rights and further a fair and impartial non-corrupted legal system to ensure them. In fact, if it works out that the Inventors' rights are not protected in this instance, especially from the very legal system charged with protecting invention rights, than everything is owned by the king and we may as well turn back to slavery and truly flush the Constitution.
The following series of events now leads to the very steps of several state supreme courts and the state supreme court bar associations. The state bars, and they will be evidenced herein to have failed, are supposedly instituted to regulate corruption by attorneys who abuse their legal powers on behalf of the public. Imagine that, a self regulating body, this would work if conflicts were avoided instead of neglected. These institutions have been infiltrated and defiled and stand accused herein of aiding and abetting the furtherance of the crimes to protect their legal brethren, even when they have gone criminally insane. Through infiltration, the state bars have become attorney protection agencies for criminals and have failed to provide any line of defense against attorney corruptions. It will be evidenced herein, that Krane, a once esteemed Columbia ethics professor, who is charged with rule creation and enforcement in New York for attorney conduct, represented both himself and his partners in bar complaints while having undisclosed conflicted roles of influence at that department. Conflicts with his roles at the very supreme court disciplinary department the complaints were filed at and while having active duties as the former President of the New York State Bar Association. To top it off, Kaye will be shown to have a major conflict of interest with the Iviewit Shareholders, and in fact, to be an Iviewit Shareholder. Kaye may be the key to preventing due process in New York and allowing the perversion of the disciplinary system in New York to control the complaints. In fact, if she fails to stymie due process in these matters, it will be evidenced herein that her husband and his Proskauer partners may lose the entirety of their assets, their licenses to practice law and be forced to trade in their legal robes for prison rags and serve lengthy federal sentences.
The stakes are high, if such corruption wins, it is a loss for the Constitution, the faith of the people in their legal system will be crushed as this story is told and will cause a loss of faith in the patent system, yielding a loss in faith of democracy, and thus a very somber day in American history. On the other hand, it could be the biggest day for the peoples rights, where the little ole “ma and pa” inventor wins not only against “big business” but against abuses of the patent system by corrupt patent attorneys and public office corruptions. If the legal system succeeds in its duties to uphold the Constitution, to regulate and punish its own, it is a landmark day for the founders of the Constitution and proves the fabric of the Constitution for the people. If not, G-D save the people.
3. THE INVENTIONS
Bernstein had hired Zakirul Shirajee and Jude Rosario upon moving from California to Florida to complete the work on the conversion of a Bernstein authored multimedia presentation to a website; the web was in its infancy at the time. Severe problems were noticed by Bernstein, Shirajee, Armstrong and Rosario in the conversion of the graphics for low bandwidth transmission on the web. First, the compression technologies used at the time for creating two-dimensional virtual reality (i.e. virtual real-estate home tours) were insufficient for use on the web. Although a cool tool, the compression degraded the original photo art to an unbearably low-resolution image in a tiny window with virtually no ability to zoom into the image without pixel distortion. Bernstein was not satisfied with such limitations and recruited Shirajee, Rosario and Armstrong to begin work on discovering a system and method for full screen super high-resolution images, with low file size, that would defeat pixel distortion and that could be transmitted at low speed. This concept seemed impossible, using even state of the art equipment. Daniels was hired for photography of the images and was a contributing inventor.
After countless nights in search of the solution, a novel approach was discovered in the scaling and compression of the virtual reality images that overcame the obstacles of the prior art. Allowing for super high zoom capabilities on low resolution images; this discovery was previously thought theoretically impossible. This idea was so new to digital imaging and so "out-of-the-box", once it was applied, it forever changed the course of the digital imaging world. Uses were unlimited: virtual worlds, games, flight simulators, camera's, video camera's, televisions, medical imaging devices, satellite imagery, space telescope imagery, etc., all these applications would now have super-high, crystal-clear, zoom resolution, on super low resolution images. Medical imaging devices such as; Magnetic Resonance Imaging ("MRI") and X-Ray's with new depth of imaging. Flight simulators and satellite imaging now had three-dimensional depth qualities on low-resolution two-dimensional images, now commonly referred to as “digital zoom”.
Such discovery led Bernstein to partner with his father, Shirajee, Rosario, Iantoni and Armstrong to form a company and seek IP protection for the invention. After the initial imaging invention, inventors Bernstein, Shirajee, Armstrong, Daniels and now Mink began to apply the image scaling concepts to the problems of video over the Internet. Similar to the problem of imaging over the web prior to the inventions, video was a problem compounded due to the enormity of the file size and the compression algorithms in place at the time (algorithms such as the Motion Picture Industry Group ("MPEG") standards and others). Prior algorithms had been constrained by the mathematical limitations in the compression of video which left video encoding for low bandwidth so degraded it no longer looked like video.
The problem, bandwidth. For example, a TV cable is a far larger in bandwidth than a phone line, therefore something has to give and what was sacrificed was the quality of the video art transmitted. The compression for Internet bandwidth (56Kbps to 300Kbps) created the following video parameters, prior to Inventors' video inventions for transmitting video:
1. A reduction in the video viewing frame size from full screen, as in television, to postage stamp sized viewing screens of 160x120, merely a sixteenth of full-screen,
2. Reduced the frame rate from the prescribed 29.97 fps for viewing audio and video in “real time” down to a mere 5-6 frames per second,
3. Reduced the sound quality to lower than an AM radio,
4. Provided a ghastly picture out of synch with the audio after only a few seconds.
5. Click here to see sample of what internet video looked like prior to inventions HERKY-JERKY KUNG FU MOVIE. Try watching that video in full screen and a Kung Fu flick turns into a horror show.
The bandwidth required for full screen video prior to the inventions, was believed to be a minimum 1.5Mbps, a full T1 line. The Internet at high speed was providing a mere 300Kbps and the gap between what was needed to transmit full screen and what was available, was analogous to trying to suck an elephant through a straw. Industry experts and engineers had given up further attempts at achieving such a miracle and resigned to a standard for the Internet that made video so degraded it was nothing more than a cool toy for geeks with virtually no realistic commercial applications. The market for “MPEG” compression was thereby limited to video creation tools for CD's and the likes with no marketability of the product for consumer video over the Internet or other low bandwidth markets. In fact, before the Inventors' video inventions, the search for a compression algorithm that could achieve such television quality over the Internet was dubbed in the industry the search for the “holy grail”, EXHIBIT “” - 1999 02 17 - Interactive Week Article INTEL Re State of Video on Internet. This article establishes that quality video at the time was not possible at low bandwidth and even Intel engineers had seen the Internet as being a text based medium until the dawn of the fiber age, still 20-30 years away. It is apparent from this article in February 1999, quoting Intel engineers, the Internet was limited in multimedia due to bandwidth constraints and was going to be limited to a text based medium with banner ads. Without the Iviewit inventions the Internet would have no video, nor would low bandwidth cell phones.
The team of Bernstein, Shirajee, Rosario, Armstrong, Daniels and Mink began working on an idea that led to the creation of a method for scaling video that solved for the prior limitations and immediately was heralded by leading industry experts to have been the “holy grail” discovery of digital video compression. This novel technique used the brain to aid compression and decompression of the video, similar to an optical illusion of a magician. So out of the box was this invention, leading engineers upon first seeing the video were awestruck and baffled; they were witnessing something they'd concluded was impossible. The Inventors were thought to be charlatans and other video compression techniques claiming to be able to achieve transmission of full screen video at the time were found to be just that.
This video compression discovery resulted in a 75% improvement over existing methodologies. The invention produced a 75% reduction in file size and required 75% less processing power. This invention paved the way for video to expand to new markets, previously thought impossible, in both low bandwidth spectrum (i.e. Video cell phones and Internet video) and the super high bandwidth spectrum (i.e. HDDVD). For low bandwidth applications, it was almost a one hundred percent (100%) improvement over prior video compression methods.
Before our video invention, video since the dawn of television had been transmitted using “interlacing”. Bandwidth constraints plagued the early Television pioneers too. The early programs flickered because there was not enough bandwidth to send 29.97 frames per second ("fps") through the airwaves. The flicker was the result of too few frames-per-second being received by the television viewer; early TV's suffered from video not synchronized with the audio. This flicker and lack of synchronization is uncomfortable on the human eye and, were it not fixed, might have spelled doom for what is now one of this country's most used technologies and an everyday part of the fabric of the American home.
How was this conundrum solved? A psychologist was brought in to analyze the problems and see if consumers would watch TV with its limitations; the answer was clear, they would watch for a minute or two and then turn it off. This same psychologist then invented the idea of splitting each frame of the video into two pictures and then transmitting them to the user and rebuilding the two half frames into one again on the user end. Achieved fast enough, the viewer would never see the reassembling process. You have been fooled watching TV this way since the beginning of the television. This nifty trick termed “interlacing” saved 50% of the bandwidth, and solved for the flicker and synch problems, all using the brain as the compression and decompression engine.
The Inventors' video inventions relied upon a similar optical illusion, which was to create a perfect scaleable image transmitted in a tiny frame size that could be transmitted in such small package and then scaled back to full screen on the user end. If the user's eye and brain were not able to notice the difference between the tiny image and its scaled counterpart, the viewer would again be tricked into thinking what was transmitted was full screen, full frame-rate video. A study conducted on behalf of Iviewit by the Milwaukee School of Engineering, studied the human mind to answer this question. They conducted a controlled experiment whereby individuals were shown the newly created video versus video created through other methodologies at the time and the results were astonishing. The scaled video actually performed better than full screen video which was shocking. This meant for 75% less bandwidth that the files took to transmit, better optical results were being achieved. This result is evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Milwaukee School of Engineering Study. Every Internet site today displaying video uses the video invention, almost every piece of hardware and software for video now encompasses the technologies.
Once such video invention was discovered, the inventors Bernstein, Shirajee, Rosario, Armstrong, Daniels and Mink began work on a yet another new invention combining the proprietary video scaling process and the proprietary zoom imaging technique. A new invention was born enabling high resolution zoom on low resolution video, again a novel concept. This invention is now appearing on next generation televisions.
Finally, the inventors Bernstein, Shirajee, Rosario, Armstrong, Mink and now Friedstein began applying their video and imaging concepts to remote controlled video and imaging applications in low bandwidth environments and a new invention was filed for with the USPTO. This invention allowed users to simultaneously log in to video cameras and remotely control operations through a browser or other network based applications. The prior inventions combined with the remote applications resulted in yet another novel invention.
The inventions described below, are collectively herein after referred to as, ("Inventions") and are listed below with a brief description.
1. Mathematical Scaling Formula for Imaging
2. Mathematical Scaling Formula for Video
3. Mathematical Scaling Formula for Imaging and Video
4. Remote Control Video and Imaging
In terrestrial media such as cable or satellite television, Iviewit video expanded instantly available bandwidth, which had been peaked for years, to allow 75% more content to be transmitted than under prior technologies. The cable systems had peaked on bandwidth for the consumers and the video invention allowed a tripling of content for consumers with virtually no cost to cable companies.
The Inventions have been heralded by leading engineers as the most important inventions of the decade in regards to digital imaging and video and have transformed among other things, the Internet from static web pages to content-rich extensions of the sponsoring company. These inventions have spawned entire industries and significantly expanded markets for others including; hosting companies, server companies, chip companies, graphic designers, entertainment companies and virtually any enterprises that can derive benefit from imaging and video representation of their product or service.
In the imaging arena the face of digital photography changed forever with the addition of “Digital Zoom”, which allows for imaging devices such as cameras and now televisions to zoom and pan on low resolution images without pixel distortion. So your watching a football game and want to freeze the video and then zoom in on replay to read the lips of the quarterback, this is now possible, EXHIBIT “” - Sony Zoom TV. Zoom TV's, yet again, another brand new application of the Inventions.
4. IP AND CORPORATE FORMATION - WHAT THE COMPANY WAS TOLD, WHAT SHAREHOLDERS BELIEVED
With the Inventions discovered, S. Bernstein and Bernstein then immediately began to look for patent counsel, so the Inventors could then license the IP and raise investment capital. S. Bernstein and Bernstein were the original angel investors who provided the funding for initial formation of a company and initial legal work. S. Bernstein recruited the help of a friend and neighbor, Lewin, whose firm Goldstein was retained from the beginning for accounting and consulting, to aid in the corporate development and handle all financial transactions. Lewin became the company accountant through his firm Goldstein and later became a member of the Board of Directors of Iviewit and an Iviewit Shareholder.
Lewin referred the Bernstein's to Proskauer, he had close thirty-year personal friendships with both Wheeler and Gortz, with the intent Proskauer would secure patent counsel to protect the inventions, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Lewin Deposition on Rubenstein.
Wheeler undertook representation of the Bernstein's immediately upon seeing the imaging invention from Lewin. Wheeler claimed he had extensive knowledge of computers himself personally, and claimed he was a “geek” and stated he had never seen images with such zoom and pan features in his experience. Wheeler immediately claimed that he would have to get back to his firm in New York regarding a patent attorney, as his practice in Florida was a branch real estate office of the larger New York Proskauer and as such had no IP partners in Florida. Wheeler was unsure about the New York office having IP counsel but stated he would check, and if not, they would refer someone.
Wheeler, after several weeks acting as counsel for the Bernstein's and with full access to the Inventions on private protected websites and other confidential materials, further acting under attorney/client privileges, proclaimed that he had found the perfect patent lawyer, Rubenstein. Prior to the Iviewit corporate formations, Wheeler recruited Rubenstein who brought along Joao to evaluate and aid him in writing and filing the patents representing Joao as Rubenstein's underling at Proskauer. Wheeler represented them as patent counsel of Proskauer who would evaluate the inventions from a patentability perspective and file patents and other IP to protect the Inventions.
Wheeler stated there would be no need to set up corporations or move forward in any way without an evaluation from Rubenstein, a patent evaluator for the patent pool, MPEGLA, LLC. Wheeler arranged conference calls with Rubenstein, Joao, Shirajee, Rosario and Bernstein to fully disclose the Inventions for evaluation.
Additionally, it was explained that Rubenstein was evaluating the technologies as part of a deal involving stock in the yet to be formed Iviewit, Inc. The stock was to be in exchange for Proskauer legal services, including the IP services. Further, payment of the legal bills would be deducted when either investment money was obtained and the remainder when royalties from MPEGLA LLC licensing monies were paid. The payment by MPEGLA LLC was to be within six months to a year; Wheeler remarked securing a deal with MPEGLA LLC was a “slam dunk” as Rubenstein was the originator of such pool and inclusion was limited only to his decision to place the patents in the pool. Wheeler formulated the stock for services agreement, but stated Proskauer would only agree to such transaction after Rubenstein's opinion of the technologies and a partners vote to accept the stock. The stock for legal fees agreement was accepted by Proskauer after Rubenstein opined, similar to the following written Proskauer opinion, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Rubenstein/Proskauer Patent Opinion. Rubenstein claimed the Inventions were “novel”, a patent term to describe completely unique and patentable ideas. Proskauer became IP counsel to Iviewit for patents, trade secrets, copyrights and trademarks. After Rubenstein's opinion and review identifying the Inventions not only as “novel”, but also “essential” patents for inclusion into the pool. Wheeler was able to secure the stock-for-services agreement with the Proskauer partners and Proskauer took Iviewit, Inc. stock.
Under the stock for services arrangement Proskauer agreed to delay payment of billings until financings were secured or royalties from the licensing of the technologies by Rubenstein's patent pool were realized. Rubenstein and Wheeler claimed Rubenstein's MPEGLA LLC. patent pool would be one of the largest licensors and resellers to licensees of such Inventions. Iviewit Shareholders were led to believe Rubenstein was going to file the patents with Joao, and in a matter of months he would place the patents in the Pool and royalties would be a short time away. Later it would be learned with the acquisition of Rubenstein (which happened after Proskauer learned of the inventions), Proskauer acquired control of the Pool and has since subsequently been creating other pools for various applications of the technologies. Proskauer suddenly became the controlling force behind the largest single infringer of the Inventors' Inventions, illegally and in conflict with the Inventors, the Iviewit Shareholders and investors.
Rubenstein was to be used for patent litigations, formation of the IP strategies in coordination with Lewin and Wheeler's corporate formations and for the legal opinions needed to raise capital, as evidenced in statements by the Chairman of Iviewit, S. Bernstein and other Iviewit Shareholders “EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit Chairman and Iviewit Shareholder Statements on Rubenstein. To further strengthen investment opportunities Rubenstein and Wheeler were elected to the Advisory Board of Iviewit. Both Rubenstein and Wheeler were listed in such capacity for investor materials, including a Wachovia PPM and for an SBA loan as “Iviewit patent counsel”, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Wachovia PPM Excerpts. Both Wheeler and Rubenstein were sent copies of business plans and Wachovia had done extensive due-diligence as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Wachovia Due Diligence Letter. Wheeler used Rubenstein to secure investments evidenced herein and in exhibit, and Rubenstein and the Proskauer IP group had full disclosure of all Iviewit IP. Wheeler and Lewin controlled, reviewed, co-authored, billed for the business plan documents and presentation materials and controlled the distribution of all materials, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer Business Plan Billings. Irrefutable evidence will be provided herein that Rubenstein and Proskauer were acting as patent counsel for Iviewit. Corporate documents and business plans containing such statements as Rubenstein was patent counsel and retained counsel were not only reviewed by Proskauer, but transmitted to Proskauer potential clients and investors. That these same business plans submitted to investors, including for the Wachovia Private Placement Memorandum and the SBA compliance documents have Rubenstein and Wheeler listed prominently as advisory board members and Rubenstein listed as "Iviewit Patent Counsel" and "Retained Patent Counsel". Proskauer co-authored, billed for, managed for distribution, distributed, almost every business from the inception of Iviewit until their termination.
With Rubenstein's opinion in hand, the Bernstein's began to immediately bring in large potential investors and potential partners and began recruiting officers for the company and other investors to raise capital.
Iviewit Inc. was formed by Proskauer and Goldstein and Proskauer prepared stock for seed investors (including themselves), friends and family, who were all contributing in various capacities to roll-out the technologies for studies of the inventions while they were being patented.
For stock for services performed, founding stock was granted to the following initial investors, Inventors' and early contributors who were donating services of importance:
S. Bernstein - Chairman of the Board, angel investor, 30% Founding Stock
Zakirul Shirajee - Inventor and Iviewit Inc. employee. 2.5% Founding Stock
Jude Rosario - Inventor and Iviewit, Inc. employee. 2.5% Founding Stock
Eliot Bernstein - Inventor and Iviewit, Inc. President. Bernstein owned the balance of stock after all founding distributions were made. The original deal between S. Bernstein and Bernstein upon forming the company was 70% Bernstein and 30% S. Bernstein. All other founding stock distributions were from Bernstein stock only and not S. Bernstein's percentage
Daniels - Inventor and Iviewit, Inc. photography consultant. 2.5% Founding Stock
Armstrong - Inventor and Iviewit, Inc. employee. 3.5% Founding Stock
J. Friedstein and L. Friedstein - J. Friedstein, inventor and representative of Iviewit through Goldman. Goldman took immediate interest in the company and began introducing Iviewit through Friedstein to investors and potential licensees. Friedstein's father, Sheldon Friedstein ("S. Friedstein") was with Goldman for thirty years and both Friedstein's were in the private client services high net worth sales division. Goldman signed NDA and maintained strict policy on the securing of NDA's for their referrals. 5% Founding Stock
Kane - Representative of Iviewit through Goldman. Kane was recruited by the Friedsteins' for his pedigree in the technology sector. Mr. Kane was a Managing Director in the Investment Banking Division of Goldman Sachs & Co. During his fourteen-year career at Goldman, Mr. Kane created the firm's Midwest Financial Institutions practice and founded a Global Financial Institutions Technology Group. He is a member of the Kellogg Graduate School of Management Advisory Board at Northwestern University. Kane became an Iviewit Shareholder and board director and this was a huge addition. Later, Kane left Goldman to start a technology venture fund whereby several of his early stage companies were in various stages of licensing deals and negotiations with Iviewit for use of the technology
Proskauer - IP and corporate legal services. It was agreed legal service fee's would be delayed until investment or revenues generated from Rubenstein's inclusion of the patents into the Pools. Since Rubenstein acted as sole patent evaluator to such Pools at the time and he had already opined the IP was novel, this seemed like a phenomenal arrangement with Wheeler and Proskauer. Proskauer was spending enormous amounts of time with Iviewit and controlling every facet of the corporations. With offices directly across the hall from Proskauer, Iviewit and Proskauer were daily acquaintances. Rubenstein and Wheeler later joined the Advisory Board and were directly responsible for, and controlled, all legal aspects of corporate formations and IP strategies. For the promised services Proskauer accepted 2.5% of the Founding Stock
Lewin - Accounting and consultancy work. Lewin later became a board director and his daughter; CPA E. Lewin became an Iviewit employee. Lewin is a next-door neighbor of S. Bernstein and was in on the ground floor when the technologies were discovered. Lewin arranged for similar fee payment to Proskauer, taken out of future financings and/or future royalties. 5% Founding Stock
M. Welsch - Investor and representative of Iviewit on behalf of Gruntal & Co. and UBS. Gruntal had been retained alongside Goldman for investment banking deals. Welsch is a thirty-year friend and client of Bernstein. Proskauer delayed Welsch's founding stock for unknown reasons. 2.5% Founding Stock
New Media where AHJTW was retained by inventor Bernstein personally to handle his personal rights and interests to the Inventions and AHJTW was also instrumental in consulting work and introductions to major motion picture studios and others for Iviewit. Bernstein had a prior fifteen-year business relationship with AHJTW through partners James R. Jackoway, Esq. ("Jackoway"), Michele M. Mulrooney, Esq. ("Mulrooney"), Alan Epstein, Esq. ("Epstein") and former partner Richard Rosman, Esq. ("Rosman"). AHJTW is the finest legal firm in the entertainment performer service business having its roots sprung from another Bernstein fifteen-year insurance client, Irell and Manella LLP. ("Irell") considered the finest legal firm in the entertainment business. Bernstein had client relations with Irell and AHJTW for close to twenty-years. Epstein became and advisory board member and key player in aiding Iviewit in licensing meetings with major motion picture studios. Irell and Manella was later brought in to arrange licensing deals with Sony, AOLTW/WB and Paramount. New Media and AHJTW agreed to take payment similar to Lewin and Proskauer for legal services and consultancy work. It is interesting to note, only AHJTW bills were not paid when financings came in, while Proskauer and Goldstein paid themselves handsomely at every funding. 2.5% Founding Stock
Kenneth Anderson - Whom at the time was with Arthur Andersen & Co. and before the dissolve of such firm in the Enron scandal, Anderson had moved on to work with Jim Clark on MyCFO.com, an online accountancy for high net worth individuals. Anderson had been with Andersen in the private client service business since such service was first offered and because of his dual legal and accounting degrees, he was considered at the very top of Andersen and had a who's who rolodex. Anderson bought into Iviewit later after the founding stock was granted and became a board member
A. Dietz and D. Dietz for services preformed. The Dietz's are owners of an entertainment travel agency and rock n' roll shipping company, Rock-It Cargo USA, Inc. and Air Apparent Travel and twenty year friend and client of Bernstein. 5% Founding Stock
James Osterling for services preformed. Osterling had known Bernstein while acting as CFO to a home building company, for billionaire Donald Bren and his son. Bernstein had client relations with executives of the Irvine Company and Bren Company for almost twenty years. 2.5% Founding Stock
G. Iantoni and J. Iantoni for services preformed and Iviewit, Inc. employees. 5% Founding Stock
Bettie Stanger - Bernstein's wife Candice's grandmother who had loaned Bernstein early funds before corporate formation and for consideration. 1% Founding Stock
Later, other prominent names and figures would add to the list of shareholders, including:
H. Wayne Huizenga
Wayne Huizenga Jr.
Ventures - CEO Stephen J. Warner formerly started the Merrill Lynch Venture Capital fund
Ellen DeGeneres - Ellen Video on Iviewit can be found on the home page or video gallery
Alanis Morissette
C. Tiedemann
Atlas Entertainment - Robert Shapiro
Those are most of the original players in Iviewit, all there for one reason, the Inventions. At this point in time it appeared there was a single company to license the technologies from the Inventors, the four core technologies were being patented by Rubenstein and Joao working for Proskauer and MLGWS, the patent applications would take approximately six months to a year for approval, and MPEGLA LLC. would begin generating royalties in the same time frame.
5. THE FIRST CONSPIRATORIAL RING
In order to fully understand the conspiracy against Iviewit Shareholders and Inventors one must begin with the first link of the conspiracy. Lewin represents such first link in the chain and refers Proskauer. One must view each action henceforth, with both an understanding of what Iviewit Shareholders perceived and what was actually occurring to effectuate the scams by Lewin and Proskauer from the inception of their services.
The following flow-chart, EXHIBIT “” - RICO Crime Charts (Microsoft Power Point Presentation) or RICO Crime Charts (Adobe PDF Print), shows how the criminal enterprise, similar to a mafia crime organization, grew from the initial Lewin point of contact with Proskauer. Proskauer then masterminded the attempted theft of the Inventions from that point forward and all players accused of the initial conspiracy were then planted by Proskauer or became aligned with Proskauer, in order to carry off or cover up various parts of the crimes.
Almost all accused Class I Defendants have proven tentacles to Goldstein and Proskauer. All Pools violators and most the NDA violators have direct tentacles to Proskauer and Rubenstein, and there are now thousands, perhaps millions of violators of the Inventors' Inventions exist due to Proskauer's actions. It has become evident the referrals of Proskauer for management and patent work were called in to execute certain parts of the crimes and/or the cover-ups. The attempted theft of Inventions valued in the billions, perhaps trillions of dollars, stands as one of the most grotesque and massive crimes ever attempted. Further, the crimes are also against the government. Not only crimes against Iviewit Shareholders but fraud upon government agencies such as; the USPTO, the United States Copyright Offices, the federally backed SBA and two state Supreme Courts. It is evidenced herein and in exhibit that several of the named conspirators, have had a past together in the attempted theft of patents from another business. Those involved in such patent swindle were from Wheeler, Dick of Foley, and their friend Utley, the same individuals Iviewit Shareholders are accusing of similar crimes. It was not learned until far later about the past patent malfeasances. The prior record of patent swindles is identical to what is happening to Iviewit and the prior patent malfeasances were never disclosed, evidence a conspiratorial pattern and criminal network.
Lewin and Wheeler became an integral part of the formation of Iviewit, Inc. and all other entities, both legitimate and illegitimate. Lewin and Wheeler were instrumental in securing capital for the companies both personally and from third party accredited investors such as the initial seed investor, H. Wayne Huizenga, H. Wayne Huizenga, Jr. and others.
Lewin and Wheeler attended all initial technology disclosure meetings, giving them a wealth of inside information and both made presentations to a multitude of their clients and investors as to the efficacy of the technologies. Rubenstein upon learning of the patent processes immediately stated the technologies would and could be applied to every form of digital imaging and video, hardware and software applications and he was amazed such optical trick had been overlooked for years.
Lewin and Wheeler were daily fixtures at Iviewit Inc. from the inception, and in fact, both offered their offices as initial meeting places for all corporate business, board meetings, and investor presentations. They were Iviewit's most trusted partners, where such trust was gained through their professional titles. Lewin was in charge personally, and with his daughter, E. Lewin, also a CPA, with all accounting and tax preparations for Iviewit including handling the day-to-day bookkeeping and checkbooks. In fact, so entrenched in Iviewit was Lewin, he had E. Lewin placed as an Iviewit employee in control of the books and acting in an officer capacity at Iviewit. Lewin was present at meetings with a Proskauer referral Intel/R3D whereby the technologies were evaluated and heralded to have applications for almost every known form of digital video and imaging.
Lewin was present at meetings with Hassan Miah ("Miah"), whereby Miah claimed the inventions as the “holy grail” discoveries of the Internet and Miah was formerly with the Intel/CAA multimedia lab, accredited by many for spawning the Internet as a consumer multimedia concept. Miah was CEO of XING Technologies, which later sold to Real Networks, Inc. Miah was being courted for the CEO spot at Iviewit and had known of Rubenstein, and in fact, XING had MPEG essential technologies licensed by the Rubenstein patent pool MPEGLA, LLC. at the time. Miah stated if Rubenstein and he had never seen the technologies, and they were two of the most prominent names in video and imaging technology, it was novel. Yet, he asked for an opinion from Proskauer and Rubenstein regarding their evaluation of the technology.
Miah, through his attorney Rosman, requested an opinion from Proskauer and Rubenstein as to the patentability of the processes. Miah had been brought to Iviewit by referral of Rosman, a fifteen year friend to Bernstein, to do due diligence for a major seed investment in Iviewit from Sky Dylan Dayton and Kevin O'Donnell, both Earthlink founders who managed a start-up venture fund and were Rosman clients. Proskauer opined in a letter authored by Wheeler on behalf of Rubenstein and the patent department at Proskauer, attached EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer/Rubenstein Patent Opinion.
Wheeler then took full disclosure documentation of the patent processes for dissemination to Rubenstein, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer Status Report IP Issues where Rubenstein is reviewing a second and third invention in this update. Wheeler brought in Rubenstein who was the creator and patent pool evaluator for MPEGLA, LLC and Wheeler misrepresented Rubenstein at the time to be a Proskauer partner. Rubenstein represented himself as a Proskauer patent partner, in both letters and phone conversations with the Inventors, EXHIBIT “” - Rubenstein Letter to Bernstein Regarding Patents.
After several weeks of disclosures with Rubenstein and Joao, it was learned by Iviewit management from an interested investor Rubenstein was not with Proskauer but with the firm of MLGWS. Calls were made to the New York Proskauer offices where it was confirmed Rubenstein was not a partner of Proskauer and neither was Joao listed as a partner or any other relation to the Proskauer firm.
Calls and emails were then sent to Wheeler and
Gortz to find out what exactly was going on and why Rubenstein was being
misrepresented to investors and Iviewit. Upon confrontation of such information
Wheeler & Gortz responded Rubenstein and Joao had just been added to the
Proskauer firm and were in transition from MLGWS, as EXHIBIT “” -
Rubenstein at MLGWS Document shows.
Once confronted with this evidence, Wheeler stated Rubenstein was moving
immediately to Proskauer from MLGWS and Joao was staying behind at MLGWS for a
short while to finish the work he and Rubenstein had remaining at MLGWS. Wheeler then stated Iviewit needed to take a retainer with MLGWS until Joao transferred to
Proskauer, to cover the costs of filings, since Joao did not have a billing
account with Proskauer yet.
Although
this appeared strange at the time, it did not seem to be significant, as
hindsight would have it, and so on the recommendation of Rubenstein and Wheeler,
Iviewit contracted MLGWS for filings, in addition to the Proskauer stock
arrangement and deferred billings. It was not learned until Joao responded to a
New York bar complaint against him, in fact, Joao did not join MLGWS until
Rubenstein had left to Proskauer, making the Wheeler and Rubenstein
statements they had worked together at MLGWS false.
In hindsight, this would have been the first indication Proskauer was up to no good, but Wheeler's sale of such misrepresentation was smooth and with promises Rubenstein's Pools would be a major licensee of the technologies for Iviewit. What appeared to be a minor misrepresentation of the acquisition of a patent attorney now appears to be central to the conspiracy to steal the inventions through acquisition of MPEGLA, LLC. as a Proskauer client, along with Rubenstein and his team from MLGWS, all for the benefit Proskauer. It is now evident Rubenstein's patent pool scheme was the key component to monetizing and proliferating the Inventors' IP for Proskauer. Proskauer began to move in a direction to control such Pools that would ultimately become the largest infringer and competitor to Iviewit and at the same time began elaborate schemes to attempt to take the Inventions for themselves. This provides the reason a former real estate law firm since 1875, Proskauer, suddenly and overnight, after learning of the Inventors' Inventions (Define this term and list inventions somewhere), becomes a major player in digital multi-media patent pooling where such Pools are the largest infringer of Inventions and such Pools act as anticompetitive monopolistic criminal organizations that have bundled and tied the Iviewit Inventions into the Pools products. This scheme evades payment to Iviewit Shareholders and acts to block Iviewit from achieving market acceptance of their products.
It was not known at the time of engagement, Proskauer acquired Rubenstein and the entire IP department of MLGWS after learning of the Inventions. It now appears the acquisition of Rubenstein and his patent pool MPEGLA, LLC. were directly correlated to the acquisition of Iviewit as a client. It appears now Proskauer's intent from the start was to proliferate the Inventions through such Pools including MPEGLA, LLC and directly inure benefit through billings, revenue sharing, MPEGLA LLC legal licensing fees for Proskauer, all to the detriment of Iviewit Shareholders and Inventors. It is evidenced at Proskauer's website www.proskauer.com Proskauer has now begun developing new Pools, all dependent on the Inventors' Inventions. It will be evidenced herein and in exhibit such Pools are anti-competitive and monopolistic in nature. Rubenstein acts as sole patent evaluator for the Pools, having the sole discretion to choose what technologies will share in revenues from patents in the Pools. Those who use the “standard” such as: MPEG, DVD and others, generate revenues from licensing the “standard” and the profits are then split between the patent holders and the licensing group, Proskauer included. Patent pooling, by its very nature, tends to create anti-competitive practices and historically the government and this Court has torn down such pooling concepts for this very reason.
Rubenstein in a sworn statement to a judge, later attempts to claim in a Proskauer instigated lawsuit against Iviewit, he is the target of harassment by Iviewit, whom merely requested his deposition to review his involvement as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Rubenstein Statement to Judge Labarga. It is imperative the reader understands Rubenstein is being requested to take a deposition whereby if he knew nothing about Iviewit and had no involvement other than to refer Joao, as his statement to the court reflects, he should not have feared a simple deposition. The deposition under such scenario would only have taken a moment to state such claims of no knowledge. Proskauer's attempt to hide Rubenstein from his deposition, again in a lawsuit they instigated, seems highly suspect.
The court ordered Rubenstein to take his deposition and Rubenstein is confronted with evidence directly pointing to his involvement in Iviewit far more than a simple referral to Joao. Proskauer billed Iviewit for legal services related to corporate, patent, trademark, trade secret, copyright and other work in a sum of approximately Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars ($800,000). Proskauer now tries to claim this outrageous bill is for a start-up company and for “general corporate” legal work, void of patent work. This is another materially false statement with insurmountable evidence to the contrary, as evidenced by EXHIBIT “” - Wachovia PPM Showing Proskauer/Rubenstein Retained As Patent Counsel, whereby it states Proskauer was “retained patent counsel”, Rubenstein was “patent counsel for Iviewit” and Rubenstein was an advisory board member of Iviewit. This information is contained in every business plan that was billed for, reviewed and disseminated by Proskauer directly to investors over a three-year period. All Iviewit investment documentation stands in direct opposition to the current claim by Rubenstein that he and Proskauer preformed no patent work and knew nothing about Iviewit.
Rubenstein states in the court statement he was not a Proskauer partner on the account and billing records indicate Rubenstein entries in the billings spanning a three-year period, EXHIBIT “” - Rubenstein Billing Entries. Such billing entries completely are contradictory to Rubenstein's statements to the New York Supreme Court: First Department DDC and the Florida civil court, he states he only made a referral to Joao for Iviewit and had nothing else to do with Iviewit. Again, Rubenstein's credibility is shattered when one reviews a correspondence with AOLTW/WB whereby Rubenstein is shown to have been contacted and opined favorably on the patents in direct opposition to his statements, EXHIBIT “” - AOLTW/WB Rubenstein Opinion.
Rubenstein and Wheeler now claim in sworn written statements to the First Department DDC and The Florida Bar they and Proskauer know nothing about Iviewit Inventions and IP in diametric opposition to the evidence and witnesses. Such denial is in effort to hide the conflict of the patent Pools using the Inventions, such knowledge of the Inventions was gained through Rubenstein, who acted as Iviewit patent counsel and as patent evaluator to the Pools. Proskauer acting in any legal capacity, whereby they had full access to Iviewit Inventions and IP, would certainly have needed to secure conflict waivers, which they did not, to protect Iviewit from the Pools. Especially when the Pools now represent the largest infringer of the Inventions, there is no doubt that Proskauer and Rubenstein should have shielded and protected Iviewit no matter what capacity they now claim they acted as counsel and represented Iviewit for. Undoubtedly, Proskauer would have had to secure such client protections for Iviewit, even if they did not do any IP work, which they did. Proskauer clearly and admittedly did IP and corporate work for all the following included in their own bill for patent, copyright (including source codes for the inventions), trade secrets and trademarks. Proskauer's claims to not know the Invention processes are refuted in the fact the billings are replete with these services, all of which contain access to the disclosure of the invention processes. These crimes represent severe violations of attorney/client privilege and conflicts of interests as fully evidenced herein and in exhibit. Rubenstein and Wheeler in making such false statements have committed acts of perjury and violations of communicating false information to tribunals.
Rubenstein is the partner in charge of the entire IP department at Proskauer for patents, copyrights, trade secrets and trademarks. Access to the Inventions by Proskauer partners is not only fact but also both Rubenstein and Wheeler maintained and shared personal copies of the patents in their offices of all the Inventions and patent filings, EXHIBIT “” - Wheeler To Rubenstein Iviewit Patents. Such transfer of the entire five volume patent portfolio of Iviewit by Wheeler to Rubenstein comes almost two years after meeting Proskauer and far after Rubenstein referred Joao. In fact, Rubenstein after introducing Joao, per his own sworn statements to courts and in response to a bar complaint, should have nothing to do with Iviewit, and yet, he is receiving the patents, again with no client protection established. The fact Rubenstein had full access to the Iviewit Inventions, is evidenced in IP billings by Proskauer, EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer IP Billings. Again this is irrefutable evidence Proskauer's IP department headed by Rubenstein, had full access to the Inventions through disclosure for patents, trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets. Proskauer and Rubenstein provided no protection between Iviewit and MPEGLA, LLC. Rubenstein and Proskauer are patent counsel to both parties causing a major conflict. It is evidenced that MPEGLA, LLC now utilizes the Inventions and Rubenstein and Proskauer represented both parties with no conflict waivers and Proskauer directly inures benefit from MPEGLA, LLC presents overwhelming problems to Iviewit Shareholders and Inventors.
All partners that transferred with Rubenstein from MLGWS all work on the Pools Proskauer now controls and new ones being created by Proskauer. These IP partners all had full access to the “secret sauce” and not one of them, or the firm of Proskauer, took an iota of typical and customary protections for Iviewit, in fact they did the opposite, which violates attorney ethics in numerous ways as exhibited herein and in exhibit. In fact, from the Rubenstein and Wheeler depositions we see evidence they are unclear about customary client protections, such as conflicts checks and retainers in regards to Iviewit, EXHIBIT “” - Rubenstein Deposition Regarding Conflicts Check and EXHIBIT “” - Wheeler Deposition Regarding Conflict Check and Retainer. Unsure a conflicts check was even preformed and working supposedly without a retainer for several months according to Wheeler's deposition, Proskauer disregards such procedures as certainly Rubenstein's Pools would have had to have waivers seeing they are the largest infringer of the Iviewit Inventions.
At the time of the engagement of Proskauer and thereafter, Iviewit Shareholders were advised and otherwise led to believe Rubenstein was the Proskauer IP partner in charge of the account for patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets as clearly indicated by the evidence herein and in exhibit. Rubenstein's participation is clearly indicated by investors in statements furnished to Iviewit clearly showing Rubenstein's opinion was the basis for their investments, EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit Shareholder Statements. Rubenstein is listed as an advisor to the board in compliance documents used to secure SBA funds by Crossbow, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - SBA Loan Compliance Documents.
Rubenstein now attempts to claim he was not patent counsel for Iviewit, all of these statements and representations to investors and to secure government funds from the SBA, were false and misleading. This constitutes securities fraud, as discussed herein and in exhibit, perpetrated on Wachovia Securities, Crossbow, the federally backed Small Business Administration, and Iviewit Shareholders by Wheeler, Rubenstein and Proskauer. The same was true for the venture funds, including loans from the federally backed SBA, which were transacted through Iviewit's largest investor Crossbow where for every dollar of Crossbow money, on information and belief, the SBA invested two dollars.
Proskauer further began to proliferate the Inventions to other third parties. Proskauer also created a mechanism to proliferate the Inventions to certain of their clients, under signed and binding Non-Disclosure Agreements ("NDA"), evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - NDA List whereby Proskauer is fully cognizant of their clients' uses of the Inventions in violation of NDA's and other forms of agreements secured by Proskauer for their clients. Proskauer has proliferated the Inventions through violation of attorney client privileges by Rubenstein and other Proskauer partners who represent the Pools in conflict.
Wheeler introduced Iviewit to Intel/R3D to have the Inventions evaluated from a market application standpoint. Intel/R3D was a company holding almost all the core patents in three-dimensional graphics at the time. Intel/R3D was a conglomerate of the following corporations at the time: Intel, Silicon Graphics and Lockheed Martin. Intel/R3D also after evaluation of the technologies wrote letters regarding the efficacy of the Inventions, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Intel/R3D Opinion. Wheeler handles the disclosures of the Inventions with Intel/R3D as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Wheeler Transferring Disclosure to Intel/R3D.
After securing all relevant Iviewit Inventions disclosures under NDA and as a strategic alliance partner with Iviewit, Intel/R3D vaporized, as its minority shareholder, Intel, acquired it entirely. It is alleged with the acquisition of Intel/R3D by Intel, Intel acquired the know how of the processes and such technologies are now commonly found in the chip graphic code of Intel, acquired through acquisition of Intel/R3D. Intel's use is unauthorized and inuring no benefit to the Iviewit Shareholders. Intel had many applications for the Inventions that suddenly were proliferated across Intel hardware and software platforms, platforms Intel/R3D had been working with Iviewit to develop.
It is the series of events that led up to the disclosure meeting scheduled by Wheeler with Intel/R3D that began Iviewit questioning if the patents were being handled correctly by Joao and Rubenstein. This meeting is where the onion begins to first peel, the first evidence of wrongdoings is uncovered, and the “best laid plans” of Proskauer begin to go awry. Cover-up and deception begin at an almost unbelievable pace and it took several years for Iviewit to shift through and trace back the steps of a very complex and multi-tiered scheme to defraud. What was revealed as evidenced herein and in exhibit is a true conspiracy to steal Inventors' Inventions and Inventors are protected under the United States Constitution, in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, as one of the only jobs protected by the Constitution. When you see the enormity of forces opposing the Inventors, you will understand why the founders of the country placed inventor protection at the very beginning of the Constitution. Normally it is big business trying to unfairly wrangle inventions from the small inventor the Constitution protects, in fact must protect, to ensure free commerce. In this case not only is big business attempting such unauthorized uses of the Inventions, but Iviewit's own patent counsel is attempting to wrangle the Inventions' from the Inventors, in one of the greatest abuses of legal power ever. The theft is occurring through attorneys abusing their privileged law degrees, to steal Inventors' Inventions and in doing so they have committed fraud upon the USPTO, the United States Copyright Offices, two State Supreme Courts, foreign patent authorities, the SBA and the Iviewit Shareholders.
It is here the reader is asked to accept the following statements and allegations herein as true, no matter how far reaching and unbelievable it may all seem, no matter how truly complex the Defendants have made the matters. To accept the conspiracy theory and attempt to understand first how Iviewit Shareholders and others were seeing the events at the time. The complication in presenting such a complex conspiracy is being able to convey this duality of realities, the conspiratorial reality and reality and provide the massive evidence necessary to prove the conspiracy true and not just theory. This document has been created to allow the reader to delve deeply within the thousands of pages of evidence as curiosity grows. Since two realities now exist, the conspiratorial reality and reality, one needs prove through review of the evidence and witnesses, and in some cases irrefutable facts, that every thing claimed is either true or false. Without investigating the facts and testing the evidence first, one cannot make a decision if it is conspiracy theory or conspiracy. No easy task when there are massive amounts of evidence to compare and contrast. This crime appears to be one of the largest frauds ever perpetrated to steal technology by the very attorneys retained to protect such technologies and thus is not a simple crime to grasp. Within the conspiratorial reality, it will be evidenced all of the following, including but not limited to:
1. timelines have been altered to try and change the story to fit the crime by the perpetrators and allow for time for the perpetrators to file patents for themselves before filing patents for the Inventions,
2. patent applications have been forged and oaths falsified in violation of federal laws regarding patent oaths,
3. investors monies, including the federally backed Small Business Administration, have been absconded with and eye-witness statements have been turned over to the police for investigation,
4. an Iviewit patent attorney, Joao, patenting Iviewit Inventions in his own name,
5. to Utley patenting inventions falsely with Foley in his own name again in violation of federal laws regarding patent oaths,
6. to complex patent and corporate shell games to attempt to steal the technologies whereby companies were formed to mirror the Iviewit companies and patents were filed to mirror the Iviewit patents without knowledge or consent of the Iviewit Shareholders,
7. to fraud and forgery upon U.S. and International patent authorities,
8. to fraud on the U.S. Copyright office,
9. to false and misleading resumes promulgated by Proskauer for Utley to hide prior patent malfeasances showing Wheeler, Utley and Dick had worked "jobs" together before, to steal patents from business owners. This history evidences the plan was formulated from day one.
10. to an untold and undisclosed history of past patent theft by several of the Defendants named herein and in exhibit, including but not limited to, Utley, Wheeler and Dick,
11. to attempts to bankrupt Iviewit through a scam perpetrated by former Iviewit management (all referred by Proskauer) whereby false and misleading claims were made to a United States Bankruptcy Court,
12. to attempts to gain control of the patents through a lawsuit by Proskauer for a billing case. Proskauer had no bills for such patent holding companies they attempted to sue, and,
13. to two state Supreme Court bar agencies now involved in affirmed conflicts of interest by high ranking Proskauer partners, in abuse of public office positions, attempting to cover up for and deny due process of bar complaints filed against them.
These are only a fraction of the elements necessary to fulfill such crimes and only a portion of what Iviewit has uncovered to this point, with new facets of the crime being uncovered daily. These elements are necessary to understand why the current reality is, including but not limited to:
1. the Commissioner of Patents has suspended the patent applications in the United States pending investigation into charges of fraud upon the USPTO by the patent attorneys, named herein and in exhibit, for six-months,
2. upon request to extend such six month suspension for another six months pending investigation into the charges of fraud upon the USPTO by the Defendants, on the first request, an additional six month suspension has been granted,
3. charges of fraud on the USPTO are currently under investigation by the OED Director Moatz,
4. allegations of fraud on the USPTO are now pending investigation by the Commissioner of Patents and such charges were filed by Iviewit and Crossbow,
5. the SBA Inspector General Office has begun to audit the trail of their monies,
6. the Supreme Court of New York: First Department has ordered an “investigation” into charges against Krane, Rubenstein, Joao, Proskauer and MLGWS based on recent discovery of major conflicts of interest and appearances of impropriety by Proskauer partners,
7. the Florida Supreme Court in case SC04-1078 now refuses to file charges of conflicts of interest and abuse of public office by yet another Proskauer partner Triggs, even after affirming such conflict. This denial of due process is a large part of what has brought the case to the United States Supreme Court, and,
state, federal and international authorities are all now investigating the alleged crimes.
Wheeler arranges a meeting with Intel/R3D for disclosure of the patent processes and claims Rubenstein and Joao will be attending telephonically. A meeting where all the IP processes were to be disclosed and it was believed the IP was fully protected by applications filed by Joao under the direction of Rubenstein. Iviewit requests Wheeler secure a copy of the patent filings for review by the Inventors, before disclosure to Intel/R3D. Wheeler, Joao and Rubenstein all begin an evasive pattern attempting to hold off sending copies of the filings before the disclosure to Intel/R3D. The Intel/R3D meeting entailed full disclosure of the processes to a multitude of imaging and video engineers representing Intel/R3D, Intel, Silicon Graphics, Inc. and Lockheed Martin and concerned Iviewit Shareholders wanted certainty and evidence of the patent filings as a protection.
Immediately before the meeting, a package was sent from Joao at MLGWS containing only one patent application and such application was very different from what was disclosed to Joao and Rubenstein. Certain Inventors were entirely missing from the application and it appeared to be filed approximately three months late. Wheeler when confronted regarding such missing applications and other problems stated he was trying to get a hold of Rubenstein and Joao, who had literally disappeared. With the meeting only hours away and Rubenstein and Joao missing to get explanation, Wheeler attempted to sell Iviewit to go ahead with disclosure since he had secured NDA's for Intel/R3D. Wheeler claimed the NDA, signed by the CEO of Intel/R3D, Stanley, offered enough protection even if the patents were not filed. Wheeler repeatedly assured Iviewit the patents had been filed based on his prior conversations with Rubenstein and Joao. The entirety of a four hour drive to Intel/R3D was spent trying to contact either Rubenstein and/or Joao, who were still missing. It further became apparent Rubenstein and Joao, scheduled to attend the meeting telephonically, were going to miss the scheduled meeting, and force Iviewit to disclose patent processes without counsel. At the scheduled meeting time the only counsel Iviewit had was Wheeler with a real estate background and who is not a member of the patent bar.
Upon getting to the meeting, S. Bernstein, acting as Chairman of the Board, became very disturbed by the fact that waiting behind the conference room door were world renowned engineers and patent experts from Intel/R3D and Wheeler had failed to prove patent protection or even have patent counsel present as promised, to address issues and protect Iviewit. As the minutes ticked away to meeting time, final desperate calls went out to reach Rubenstein and Joao, all to no avail.
Wheeler stated the meeting could start and to disclose the imaging process Joao had sent an application over for. He was hoping during the presentation Rubenstein and Joao would call to confirm the filings of the other inventions and show up for the meeting. The meeting began and the imaging inventions were displayed and then disclosed to a room full of leading engineers from Intel/R3D, Intel, Silicon Graphics, Inc. and Lockheed Martin. After such display of the inventions, and before disclosure, Stanley asked the engineers if they could determine how the images were zooming without pixel distortion on remarkably small files. When no one could describe how it was occurring, Stanley asked for disclosure and inventors Bernstein, Shirajee and Armstrong gave disclosure. Upon learning of the “how”, it was reveled as a complete shift from traditional teachings and further it would have application to all forms of digital screens, be it camera's, televisions, computer screens or virtually any screen, including microscopes, medical imaging devices, satellite imaging, etc. Stanley, after the reveling, asked his right hand woman Rosalie Bibona ("Bibona") what the royalties such patents would generate over various software and hardware applications. Bibona retorted the imaging applications would be worth billions annually. She went on to claim Intel/R3D was working with several leading camera manufacturers and the technology would have application for digital cameras to have high capability zoom built into the camera via hardware and/or software and the value of that alone could be worth a fortune.
When it came time to show the video inventions, final calls were put out for the missing Joao and Rubenstein, and whereby they had dropped off the earth, missing a scheduled meeting with engineers and patent experts. At such time, it was still not clear if they had filed the applications timely or correctly. S. Bernstein called a time-out for members of the Iviewit team to discuss what to do and whereby Shirajee, Bernstein, Armstrong, Wheeler, Lewin and S. Bernstein convened to discuss how to proceed. Wheeler again stressed disclosure was safe since Proskauer had secured NDA's but he was outvoted and S. Bernstein stated it should be OK to display only the video inventions without offering any disclosure of the process and to reschedule another meeting to Orlando once it was verified the patent applications had been filed.
The meeting re-adjourned and video inventions were displayed and again Stanley asked the engineers for explanation and whereby the best guesses were far short of the process. Again Stanley asked without knowing how, a similar question of, if it is true and the video process works what would the value be. And Bibona, still dumbfounded they were seeing full-screen, full frame-rate video, at real time frame rates over modem bandwidth speeds, declared it was priceless, the “holy grail” of video and words to that effect. Stanley, also still dumbfounded, as he had seen it several weeks before and still could not figure it out how it worked, was further baffled his engineers could not figure it out either. Stanley was also disappointed Iviewit would not disclose how it worked, after he arranged to have such a large array of engineers and patent experts attend. The meeting concluded with discussions of how to form a strategic alliance and licensing arrangement for the imaging inventions and similarly for the video, once they had time to review the patents and processes. Wheeler agreed to have Rubenstein/Joao send over the patent materials to Intel/R3D's patent group.
This meeting was pivotal to Iviewit and everyone from Iviewit was dumbfounded at the valuations given to the technologies and the implications of what this praise, from one of the most esteemed imaging and video companies in the world meant for Iviewit. Yet, what also resonated was the overwhelming concern regarding the IP protection or lack thereof and why the IP appeared to have problems.
Immediately after the meeting, Wheeler contacted Joao and Rubenstein, who suddenly reappeared and Wheeler conveyed inapposite his prior claims, the video and other inventions had not been filed. Wheeler claimed Joao and Rubenstein stated the one patent somehow provided protection for all three inventions, until they filed the others. Wheeler flip-flopped on his prior statements and Joao's prior claims the separate and distinct filings were filed. Immediately after the Intel/R3D meeting, Wheeler called Bernstein to inform him Rubenstein and Joao wanted to meet with the Inventors telephonically to review the video patent applications and processes and they now decided to file separate and distinct filings for each invention. Wheeler then scheduled a meeting for Joao, Rubenstein, and other Proskauer IP partners with Shirajee, Rosario and Bernstein at the Proskauer Boca offices to again disclose the processes for filing. Such meeting got cut short when a cell phone with a live connection was discovered in the coat pocket of Lewin, who had stopped by Wheeler's. When asked to leave the meeting during the disclosure, Lewin forgot to take his jacket with him and left an open cell phone line connected to an unknown third party.
What was remarkable about this series of events with Lewin was it was found Lewin had introduced Iviewit to VD and VD had begun the unauthorized use of the processes. It was learned from members of Goldman Sachs Lewin had an undisclosed interest in VD and had taken no protections against conflict. In fact he deliberately had concealed his interest in VD. It was also learned Lewin was conducting unauthorized presentations to a neighbor of his, Mitchell & Lori Rubenstein, the future founders of Hollywood.com. It was learned unauthorized uses were being conducted by almost everyone Lewin and Wheeler were introducing Iviewit to. Lewin's open line in a patent disclosure meeting seemed highly suspect. Wheeler was notified of what Lewin had done and volunteered to conduct investigations into the unauthorized uses and to undertake an investigation into the conflicts, which he did and billed for, of his close friend Lewin. Lewin then began a series of steps to protect Iviewit from future conflicts, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Lewin Conflict Letter. Inventor's Bernstein and Shirajee upon discovery of the phone, immediately left such meeting and were confronted by Proskauer partner Rocky Thompson ("Thompson") who stated he could not believe a live phone was discovered and made arrangements with Gloria Berfield ("Berfield"), Wheeler's assistant, for a new conference room, free of bugs, to continue. A tape of such call and the events was given to and accepted by Berfield to be put in the Proskauer safe, along with the patents they maintained.
At such time, a series of events began to occur leaving Iviewit Shareholders concerned about patent counsel Joao and what exactly he was up to, with missing patents being the first problem. The missing inventors on the applications was the next issue. Again, Wheeler contacted Rubenstein and stated Rubenstein stated foreigners could not be on patent applications. Regarding the late filings Wheeler stated Rubenstein stated patent law was based on a first to invent, not first to file system. What Rubenstein and Wheeler failed to communicate is patent law in various countries is based on first to file, not on first to invent. Proskauer than began billing Iviewit for immigration work for Shirajee and Rosario, to get them citizenship, to enable them to sign the applications. Upon researching the patent laws, inventor Bernstein later discovered there was no rule baring foreigners from signing on United States patents. Bernstein immediately began to demand the true and proper inventors be listed on the patents.
At this time a series of break-ins to Bernstein's home began and Bernstein's home had become a quasi lab where the Inventions were discovered. Strangest yet, nothing was missing, just the lab had been disturbed, all break-ins were reported to the Boca PD. Wheeler was contacted regarding the break-ins, he immediately requested all of the pertinent data and patent works be brought to the Proskauer offices for safe keeping. He stated Proskauer would begin investigation into the matters and he had a private investigator he would call. The Iviewit buzz began at this time and significant players were lining up at the door to see the “Grail” Inventions. Miah was interviewing for CEO and Wheeler then suggested the company needed a significant industry leader to run Iviewit and he suddenly remembered his “best” friend, Utley, would be the perfect candidate. Wheeler recommended and delivered a fabricated resume on Utley to the Iviewit Shareholders to engage the services of Utley as President of Iviewit.
Wheeler only brought Utley into the picture when Iviewit was close to signing Miah as CEO, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Miah Letter, for Iviewit and Miah's background was superior to Utley and thus why Wheeler and Utley fortified Utley's resume with bogus credentials, false engineering degree's, false college degree's and the likes. Wheeler could not lose control of Iviewit by letting in any outsiders, Wheeler claimed Huizenga and Intel/R3D both demanded Utley as President, without him running the company they would not participate. Such recommendation by Wheeler of Utley was based on a resume submitted with materially false and misleading information, covering up past patent thefts of Utley. Again, it would be helpful if the reader could pause for a moment and digest Proskauer planted Utley, with a concealed history of patent misappropriation, unbeknownst to Iviewit Shareholders. It becomes evident later in the Utley and Wheeler depositions that Wheeler was fully cognizant of such problems and may have in fact played a part in them and certainly played a major role in the concealment. Utley, who bears a resemblance to grandpa, comes into the company referred by Proskauer with a bogus resume and with bad intent from the start. One can clearly see Utley and Wheeler are professional liars as exhibited in the description given of Utley's prior accomplishments at his former employer, Diamond Turf Equipment, Inc. ("DTE") in the resume submitted to the company by Wheeler - EXHIBIT “” - Utley Original Resume which are completely false and misleading.
In the original Utley resume, Utley heralds himself for the continuing success of DTE due to his inventions at DTE. In his deposition Utley contradicts his own resume statements when he is forced to tell the truth regarding what really happened at DTE. Claiming under deposition patent disputes occurred over inventions, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Utley Deposition Statements DTE Patent Issues and this led to his termination. This exemplifies Wheeler and Proskauer had intent to conceal the past from the start, and covered up such patent theft from his former employer with bogus background information regarding Utley's employment history and education. The truth is, the patent thefts caused by Utley, Dick and Wheeler at Utley's former employer DTE were unknown to Iviewit until after Utley was caught misappropriating patents from Iviewit and fired. Initially Utley's background was supposedly checked thoroughly by Proskauer before making such recommendation and Wheeler and later Dick vouched personally and professionally for Utley.
After it was learned Utley was attempting to abscond with patent ideas from Iviewit, inventor Bernstein called Monte Friedkin ("Friedkin"), Utley's former employer and a prominent Florida businessman. Bernstein asked Friedkin to review the claims made in the Wheeler/Proskauer resume for Utley. Friedkin's statements were so shockingly contradictory to Utley's resume, Friedkin claiming : (i) Utley was fired for stealing patent technologies from his company, (ii) DTE was immediately closed for such patent theft caused by Utley, (iii) Wheeler knew of the cause for Utley's termination, and (iv) he thinks the attorney for Utley was Dick but Utley had hired him outside the company to perfect the crime. This is one of the first major affirmations these were not just random criminal acts by various individuals. Instead showing a coordinated conspiratorial effort by Wheeler, Dick and Utley to conceal their past from Iviewit from the start. A pattern was established as the nexus of events led to the closure of DTE were almost identical to what Iviewit was just beginning to uncover. It was described by Friedkin, as walking the patents out the back door, identical to what Iviewit was learning had happened to them by the same group of individuals at DTE.
Friedkin's statements were so remarkable that immediately after Bernstein's call, counsel for Bernstein, Caroline Prochotska Rogers, Esq. called Friedkin to confirm such statements. This evidenced to counsel and others Wheeler, Dick and Utley had been swindling the Iviewit Shareholders from the moment Wheeler/Proskauer planted Utley with such bogus resume. This information causes a severe credibility problem for Wheeler, Dick and Utley. At the time Wheeler made the recommendation of Utley to the Board, Wheeler knew and had participated in the series of events that led to the IP thefts with Utley's former employer, DTE. Even Utley testifies Wheeler was aware of the real cause of his termination under deposition EXHIBIT “” - Utley Statement Wheeler Knew.
Wheeler had a part in the misappropriation of the patents from DTE with Utley. Wheeler formed a company, Premier Connections, Inc. of Florida, for Utley. According to Dick's statements to VSB this is where the misappropriated IP was transferred. Wheeler under deposition claims the opposite of his sworn statements to The Florida Bar in regards to having worked for Utley in the past, and when Iviewit responds to TFB showing Wheeler has committed perjury, Wheeler writes a retraction of his prior statements, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Wheeler Deposition Stating He Did Not Disclose Prior Representation of Utley and EXHIBIT “” - Wheeler Florida Bar Statement Stating He Did Disclose His Prior Representation of Utley. Finally, once caught in the contradiction of his sworn statements to TFB and his deposition, Wheeler admits to TFB he committed perjury, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Wheeler Retraction Of Sworn Statements Admission of Perjury. Upon admission, Wheeler states through his conflicted author Triggs (acting in violation of his TFB public office position), he sees no conflict or anything wrong with his actions and therefore the perjury is not material. TFB was fully informed of this contradiction in two sworn statements, constituting perjury. TFB had Wheeler's own admission of the contradiction in his statements and statements to TFB, absolute proof and admission of perjury. Yet, somehow TFB failed to file charges against Wheeler or report the perjury to law enforcement. In fact, TFB took a passive role and did nothing to further clarify the false statements made by Wheeler, other than to except his explanation the matter perjured was not to important. These conflicting and perjured statements to tribunals was definite cause to investigate the conduct of Wheeler and file charges and nothing.
Utley in deposition claims Wheeler never did any personal legal work for him, EXHIBIT “” - Utley Perjured Deposition Wheeler Never Represented Me. This evidences that Utley and Wheeler cannot get their lies coordinated. Under deposition it is further revealed by Utley, that Dick, the very same patent attorney recommended to Iviewit by Wheeler and Utley to replace Joao and MLGWS, was also involved in the DTE patent thefts, as EXHIBIT “” - Utley Deposition Dick Attorney for DTE Patents shows. Dick in a response to a Virginia bar complaint, also admits such involvement and then attempts to minimize the damages caused by their prior thefts of inventions, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Excerpts From Dick Bar Response. Under deposition Utley states no patent was filed by Dick, EXHIBIT “” - Utley Perjured Deposition Dick Did Not File Patent at DTE and yet in Dick's sworn statement to the Virginia Bar he directly contradicts Utley's Deposition, stating he filed the patent in November of 1996, EXHIBIT “” - Dick States to VSB He Filed Patent for Utley. Further as exhibited already herein, Utley then states in a sworn statement to VSB he did file a patent application, contradicting his earlier deposition. It is apparent Utley, Wheeler and Dick cannot get their lies straight, in regard to their past history of patent theft. Utley, Wheeler, Rubenstein and Dick have perjured themselves in official proceedings in violation of Florida, New York and Virginia perjury laws in addition to other violations this transcends in the criminal codes.
Despite knowledge and involvement in the DTE patent thefts, Wheeler never mentioned such facts concerning Utley to any representative of Iviewit and in fact undertook to "sell" Utley as a highly qualified candidate who would be the ideal person to undertake the patent evaluation work. Wheeler claimed Utley was a highly qualified engineer with a purported college degree. Wheeler and Utley, to raise capital from private investors and the federally backed SBA then tendered such false and misleading resumes, concealing the past patent thefts of Utley and falsifying his prior employment history. By approving and disseminating false resumes for Utley, which were included in the raising of funds in a PPM, violates Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 and numerous other state and federal laws as will be evidenced herein. So embedded in deception is Utley, in a few months after working for Iviewit, when he submits a new resume for the Wachovia PPM, he suddenly (from the time of the Wheeler resume) to his new one, graduates college, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Utley Wachovia Resume whereby Utley claims a college degree. Under direct deposition testimony, Utley states he has never graduated college, as EXHIBIT “” - Utley Perjured Deposition No College Degree shows, contradicting his own resume. Disseminating a false college degree is a crime in Florida, as evidenced herein and further such false statements are crimes when presented for due diligence for Private Placements and due diligence requests by the Small Business Administration. These perjured and false statements to tribunals are further crimes in the state of Florida, Virginia and New York where they took place, as evidenced herein and in exhibit.
Proskauer falsified and altered billing information to hide patent work and Rubenstein's involvement. Based on the over-billing by Proskauer, Iviewit paid a sum of approximately Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) together with a two and one-half percent (2.5%) equity interest in Iviewit. Through falsified billing records Proskauer attempted and succeeded at suing Iviewit companies Iviewit Shareholders do not have interests in. Proskauer owns these companies and this led to uncovering an elaborate scheme where shadow companies were set up to steal Inventions. The lawsuit against the shadow companies was an attempt to hide these companies through fraudulent bankruptcies and fraudulent lawsuits. Recently through work with the USPTO it was learned patents were in companies that were not listed on attorney dockets submitted to the USPTO, as evidenced in the Iviewit Shareholder Communication and Letter of Liability of April 2004. When it was learned patents were in materially false and unknown companies, it was traced back to these shadow companies that Iviewit Shareholders are still learning about. The patents have been transferred through a series of fraudulent documents transmitted to the USPTO and foreign patent offices into such fraudulent corporate shells.
Joao, Utley, Wheeler, Dick, Rubenstein, Boehm, Becker, Proskauer, MLGWS and Foley conspired to falsify billing statements to replace copyright and trade secret work with trademark work. The billings are fraught with evidence of copyright work and trade secret work that has never been filed for or maintained by the law firms. Iviewit was led to believe these IP items were being filed and maintained. Currently no evidence exists that these billed for works were ever completed. Proskauer, MLGWS and Foley all billed Iviewit for copyright and trade secret legal services, for protecting the source codes and other business IP. It appears these were never filed or maintained and this has cost Iviewit Shareholders' loss of constitutionally protected IP rights. Further constituting federal, state and international criminal acts and ethical violations of both the state bars and the USPTO patent bar.
Joao, Utley, Wheeler, Dick, Rubenstein, Boehm, Becker, Proskauer, MLGWS and Foley conspired to allow the infringement of the Inventions and other IP of Iviewit, by Pools overseen by Proskauer and Rubenstein. Proskauer and Rubenstein profit directly from such infringements, to the detriment of Iviewit Shareholders. Rubenstein had full access to the Iviewit IP and Rubenstein acts as lead counsel for the Pools, all with no conflict waiver. This is a severe conflict of interest violating the NYSBA code of attorney conduct and the patent bar code of conduct. This provides a direct link to how Rubenstein proliferated the Inventions throughout the Pools and why he now desperately attempts to deny knowing anything about the Inventions or Iviewit to hide the glaring conflicts. Rubenstein and Proskauer acted as IP counsel for Iviewit and the Pools creating a portal for the Iviewit IP to become assimilated, bundled and tied with various other patents maintained by the Pools, creating an anticompetitive force using the stolen technologies, and using such anticompetitive Pools to then deny Inventors their rights to the royalties owed them.
Proskauer and Rubenstein failed to secure conflict of interest waivers from Iviewit, leaving no “Chinese Wall” or any protections between Rubenstein, Iviewit and the Pools. Further, the Pools now are controlled and inure benefit directly to Rubenstein and all Proskauer partners. Under ordinary circumstances such conflict waivers and separations would have been commonplace for Proskauer, especially if they had had the Pools as clients before learning of Inventor inventions. No matter what type of legal work Proskauer performed, with the Pools as a new Proskauer side business, the firm has direct interests, and the largest competitive threat to the Pools are the Iviewit Inventions, Proskauer would surely have had to pass on the Iviewit account without amazingly strong separations in place. Further, Rubenstein and Wheeler under deposition are unclear if a conflict check was done and Proskauer could then not produce one when a court ordered document production for all documents was secured.
Iviewit claims Rubenstein learned the processes of Inventors Inventions acting as patent counsel for Iviewit and allowed such proprietary technologies to be used without remuneration to Iviewit to thousands of members of the Pools acting at the same time as counsel and patent evaluator to the patent pool MPEGLA, LLC. The Pools by denying Iviewit royalties by excluding the technologies from the Pools, again, Rubenstein is sole gatekeeper to what patents are included in the Pools, has created an anti-competitive force. The Pools act as a key part in an elaborate scheme utilizing the Pools as a mechanism for anti-trust violations and other crimes to be perpetrated, as evidenced herein and in exhibit.
At the same time Miah, Intel/R3D, Rubenstein and others opined on the novel aspects of the Inventions, investors began to line up. Miah, referred by attorney Rosman, was reviewing the technologies for a possible investment from Earthlink founders operating an angel fund. Jeffrey Friedstein and Donald G. Kane of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ("Goldman") signed Non-Disclosure Agreements and began representing the Inventions to potential investors and customers of Goldman. M. Welsch, who had been working with investment firm Gruntal & Co. ("Gruntal"), was additionally signed up via Gruntal as an investment banker for Iviewit. These investment firms began a flurry of investment opportunities that were in various stages of closing. Friedstein and Kane of Goldman became angel investors, along with prominent others. Kane later became a member of the Board of Directors.
Wheeler and Lewin then together recommended H. Wayne Huizenga ("Huizenga") and H. Wayne Huizenga Jr. (Wayne Jr.) through a contact, they both knew personally, Cris V. Brandon ("Brandon"). Wheeler and Lewin then arranged multiple meetings of which they attended and controlled all presentations and later all transactions. Huizenga did due diligence which was entirely facilitated by Wheeler and Lewin, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Wheeler Letter to Huizenga. Huizenga relied on Rubenstein's opinion conveyed through Wheeler had conversations with Miah and Intel/R3D before investing. Lewin and Wheeler then stated Wayne Jr. was ready to make investment but only under certain terms and the major term was the acceptance of Utley as an officer of the company. Wheeler wanted Utley to be the CEO of Iviewit but the board limited Utley's role to Chief Operating Officer. Wheeler told Bernstein to resign as President of Iviewit and let Utley have his role or no deal with Huizenga. Bernstein then resigned as President and Utley became President, Chief Operating Officer and a Board Member.
Huizenga made a seed investment of five hundred thousand dollars (U.S. $500,000.00) and such investment was to file and protect for the IP. Immediately upon funding, Wheeler and Lewin recommended and secured offices directly across from Proskauer's office in Boca Raton, Fl. Utley, Wheeler and Lewin then convinced the Board (is this defined ever should have exhibit list) to begin to invest in an operational business of the encoding of video and images with the Iviewit proprietary processes. Wheeler assured Iviewit from Proskauer's client uses and Rubenstein's Pools uses, the royalties from these alone and fees generated would pay for such operation. Wheeler assured Iviewit Huizenga would spring for the rollout costs of such large-scale operation. This strategy was in opposition to the strategy initially outlined for Iviewit by the Board and sold to Huizenga. The strategy had been to have Iviewit be an IP licensing company generating royalties.
Lewin and Wheeler began creating an operational company Iviewit.com, Inc. and the business plan was built to support both an operational and royalty plan. Further meetings were then arranged with Huizenga, Wayne Jr. and Brandon where such operations were discussed at length and Huizenga began referring other strategic partners to Iviewit, under NDA, to use the Iviewit processes for encoding operations. Wheeler now controlled management and the angel investor Huizenga. Wheeler then orchestrated a strategic alliance agreement with Intel/R3D. Wheeler sold this deal to the Iviewit Board as a licensing deal whereby Intel/R3D would pay royalties for uses of the Iviewit Inventions. Proskauer handled all the transactional work for this arrangement and it became nothing more than a vehicle to further steal the processes.
6. FORMATION OF SHADOW COMPANIES TO EFFECTUATE THE THEFT OF THE IVIEWIT IP
At this point of creating a new company for operations, a complex corporate shell game began whereby corporations were opened with no board or Iviewit Shareholder approval and these corporations later are found to have IP transferred and other critical items transferred or issued into them, all unauthorized and through a series of fraudulent documents. A list of companies has been found exceeding imagination and most of them were not approved by the Board or done with any consent of management or the shareholders. Were these companies were not discovered until far later and some have only recently been uncovered. Some of them appear to have patents they should not have. Once the second set of patents was discovered, evidence began to surface suggesting multiple companies were being set up. Certain companies seem to be formed with no state records, yet insurance policies are issued to them. Other companies are taking confidentiality agreements, billed for and prepared by Proskauer, and no state department records exist for such companies. Proskauer was billing companies that do not exist in state records. False companies were set up in such volume it remains unclear if all companies have been discovered and to what purpose each served in the scheme. Until recent conversations with the USPTO, companies where the patents were supposed to be according to the IP dockets of three law firms, is not where they are, owners are wrong, inventors are wrong, assignments are wrong and multiple frauds have occurred federally, state and internationally.
The current list of companies below contains a brief description of the company and any fraud associated with it known at this time and pending further investigation.
· IVIEWIT, INC. - FL; - The original Iviewit Company
· IVIEWIT, INC. - DEL; - Proskauer drafted and submitted confidentiality agreements for this company and Delaware corporate records do not exist for such company. EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit Delaware Confidentiality.
· UVIEW.COM, INC. - DL; - The company with the shareholders later changes its name to Iviewit Holdings, Inc.
· IVIEWIT HOLDINGS, INC. - DL; - (f.k.a) Uview.com, Inc.
· IVIEWIT HOLDINGS, INC. - DL; - A second Iviewit Holdings, Inc. unauthorized by the board or management. This company is formed with this name, two weeks prior to Uview.com, Inc. changing its name to Iviewit Holdings, Inc. One minute prior to Uview.com, Inc. changing its name, Iviewit Holdings, Inc., changes its name to Iviewit Technologies, Inc. and with these changes patents were supposed to be in Iviewit Holdings, Inc. (fka) Uview.com, Inc end up in the Proskauer owned Iviewit Technologies, Inc. Corporate records are missing for this company and Iviewit Holdings, Inc. (fka) Uview.com, Inc. can find no ownership interest in this company. The shareholders of this company appear to be: Proskauer, New Media, Shirajee and Rosario. Arthur Andersen after almost a year of auditing Iviewit requests confirmation this company, Iviewit Technologies, Inc. is owned by the true Iviewit Shareholders and no such evidence has ever been produced
· IVIEWIT TECHNOLOGIES, INC. - DL; (fka) Iviewit Holdings, Inc. - Changes name one minute after Uview.com, Inc. becomes Iviewit Holdings, Inc. and ends up with core patents. The Board was told Iviewit.com, Inc. was changing its name to Iviewit Technologies, Inc., to lose the ..com stigma, and this was entirely orchestrated by Proskauer & Goldstein and possibly Donald Kane of Goldman Sachs (pending further investigation). The Board was confronted with such after audits were begun and further when the second set of patents was discovered and such company literally appeared from nowhere. The shadow Iviewit Holdings, Inc. was unknown prior, a series of false and misleading corporate structures were then inserted fraudulently into the records. Such structures were created out of nowhere once information began to surface, in an attempt to cover up the exposed the shell companies.
· IVIEWIT HOLDINGS, INC. - FL; - A fraudulent director and officer policy appears to be insured and state records of Florida do not reflect a company filed in FL. Evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - AIG Cover Page to Directors and Officers Policy
· IVIEWIT.COM, INC. - FL; - Was an unknown company, unauthorized by the company, and somehow transforms into I.C., Inc. - FL. Again it is presumed this company may hold IP and would have served as a shell company. Proskauer and Goldstein handled this transaction it appears and corporate records maintained by Proskauer remain incomplete
· I.C., INC. - FL; - Uncertain how this company came to be.
· IVIEWIT.COM, INC. - DL; - This was an operating company that was supposed to become Iviewit Technologies, Inc. according to Wheeler.
· IVIEWIT.COM LLC - DL;
· IVIEWIT LLC - DL;
· IVIEWIT CORPORATION - FL; - Proskauer bills for such company as one of the billing entities and yet no corporate entity has been discovered. Evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer Corporate Letter on Iviewit Corporation and EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer Billing for Iviewit Corporation a Company Which Does Not Exist.
It appears from records of the Arthur Andersen failed audit of Iviewit, certain companies, may in fact have no ownership interests by the Iviewit Shareholders and the IP owned by those companies might also not have interests owned by Iviewit Shareholders, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Arthur Andersen Audit Information. No such evidence exists today to show ownership in such company by anyone other than Proskauer. Proskauer failed later under a litigation production requirement for all documents, to provide corporate documents for multitudes of the companies and provide the missing corporate records.
For further information regarding the owners, inventors and assignees on the patents, please submit a written request, stating the nature and need of your inquiry, as this information remains confidential. Shadow companies were formed through a series of fraudulent documents concocted by Proskauer and their management referrals and a list of such companies, is evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - List of Iviewit Legitimate and Illegitimate Corporations, subject to change based on ongoing investigations.
Original patent applications, were assigned fraudulently to a suspect company, in a complex name change scheme, whereby two Iviewit Holdings, Inc.'s were formed and one then immediately renamed itself and all patents were to be in Iviewit Holdings, Inc. some literally walked out the door in a shadow company. Only one Iviewit Holdings, Inc. was to be formed through a name change from Uview.com, Inc., where the shareholders had vested interest and the patents were to reside. Instead a second Iviewit Holdings, Inc., a shadow company with identical name in Delaware, was formed two weeks prior to the scheduled name change of Uview.com, Inc., and the patents ended up transferring into such shadow company, via fraudulent documents by Proskauer, MLGWS, Joao and Utley, and simultaneously the Uview.com, Inc. shareholders were left with a set of shadow patent applications. The patents put into Iviewit Holdings, Inc./Uview were markedly different than the original inventions and have been reviewed by leading legal patent experts and others; consensus is they contain none of the pertinent disclosures and have countless other flaws now under investigation.
Joao drafted and executed such felonious assignments together with Wheeler. The shadow Iviewit Holdings, Inc. was created for twelve days, and then changed names to Iviewit Technologies, Inc. and with no authorization from the Board or knowledge by any of management, other than those named herein as conspirators. Iviewit Technologies, Inc. is only one of the companies ownership cannot be ascertained on. Lewin and E. Lewin prepared a series of fraudulent accounting books to conceal the fraud and misled Iviewit Shareholders and auditors as to the true corporate structure. E. Lewin is confronted by Andersen auditors as having misled auditors regarding the corporate structure, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - E. Lewin Accused of Misleading Andersen Auditors and EXHIBIT “” - Andersen Work Papers.
Proskauer, MLGWS, Foley and BSTZ prepared a series of
fraudulent patent and corporate documentation and a series of fraudulent IP dockets were
given to the Iviewit Shareholders, investors, and auditors. The IP dockets were prepared with false owners, inventors and
assignees with malice and intent to mislead the Iviewit Shareholders of who
owned the IP.
Proskauer misled auditors and investors, regarding the corporate structure, as
evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer False Corporate Structure.
The
transaction involved precise timing to have the original core technologies moved
and the key to the transaction was using the dual named corporations and
having the shadow companies kept secretive by Proskauer, Goldstein, MLGWS,
Rubenstein, Joao, Wheeler, Lewin and Utley. This
switch of patents into shadow companies was not learned until recently, when the
patent office informed Iviewit several of the patents on the IP dockets prepared by counsel were not correct. There was materially false and misleading information regarding
inventor, assignment and owners. When this was discovered it immediately led to
the suspension of the patents by the Commissioner of the USPTO, pending
investigations into the frauds upon the USPTO and such information
formalized investigations into the attorney misconduct at the USPTO by Director
of the USPTO OED Director Moatz.
It would be later learned critical elements of the Iviewit patent portfolio had not only been filed improperly by Joao, but Joao was patenting the missing items in his very own name. A patent attorney suddenly became a leading inventor utilizing Inventions learned by taking disclosure under retainer from the Inventors. Joao had stated he was applying for applications for the inventions for the Inventors and then applied for them under his name instead. As will be evidenced herein and in exhibit, these actions are in violation of both attorney ethics at the state bars and the patent bar and in violation of federal, state, and international law.
7. FORMATION OF SHADOW PATENTS TO EFFECTUATE THE THEFT OF THE IVIEWIT IP
It will become apparent the reason for the shadow companies was the transfer of the IP to shell companies with wrongful owners in a scheme involving shadow patents going into shadow companies. To execute such, the following series of patent applications was applied for, currently known and subject to change pending ongoing investigations in the United States and internationally.
8. THIRD PARTY ATTEMPTED THEFTS OF THE IP
1. Joao - Joao, both during and after his engagement with Iviewit, filed a series (known approximately ninety) in his own name, also taking false oath of inventor to USPTO a federal crime. Joao violated almost every attorney/client privilege and violated his oath before the USPTO as a registered attorney. Joao has perpetrated his fraud internationally as well and complaints are being filed with the Institute of Professional Representatives Before the European Patent Office which is the attorney complaint department similar to the USPTO OED. In the EPO Joao has committed fraud against approximately thirty companies.
2. Utley patents - Patents were applied for in the name of Utley who contributed nothing to any patents or concepts while working for Iviewit. Counsel Foley knew Utley was not an inventor and prepared applications with materially false and misleading information. Utley and Foley made false oaths to the USPTO and EPO. Utley's deposition is fraught with false and misleading statements regarding patents applied for in his name and assignments never done.
3. RYJO IP on Applet - RYJO and Huisman have filed for Trademark and Copyright protection for ideas learned while contracted with Iviewit.
4. Intel/R3D(SGI, Intel & Lockheed Martin) - Intel has acquired Intel/R3D and with acquisition violated NDA's and strategic alliance agreements and proliferated the technologies across a broad range of Intel, SGI and Lockheed products.
5. Distance Learning Companies (Proskauer, Tiedemann, Reale & Utley)
6. Goldman Sachs/Kane - Kane and Goldman Sachs have multiple clients using Iviewit inventions in violation of NDA's and other confidentiality agreements. Kane since departing Goldman has become involved in multiple companies using the Iviewit Inventions and Kane was a Board member during such time his private investments began using and proliferating the technologies. Goldman has allowed the use of the technologies amongst their clients who learned of such technologies from Kane and Friedstein, and then violated NDA's and other confidentiality agreements. Goldman has funded many of the companies proliferating the technologies and profited enormously from unauthorized uses and stock market transactions relating to the technologies.
9. THE PROLIFERATION OF THE TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH A CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE MPEGLA, LLC., VIOLATIONS OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGES AND VIOLATIONS OF NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS
The technologies were so broad and truly changed everything to do with digital imaging and video, as to cause a massive influx of interested parties to sign NDA's and strategic alliances to learn how the processes were done, EXHIBIT “” - NDA Violators and Other Contract Violators. Wheeler made it clear to the Iviewit Board, management and Iviewit Shareholders, Rubenstein was positioning the IP to be used by possibly thousands of major corporations through the Pools who would want to use the technologies as the Pools grew. At the time the MPEGLA, LLC. pool was small, with only a few licensors and licensees, as prior use of the MPEG standard was limited in use and applications. But since the application of the stolen technologies, to the pool's prior technologies, the pool has mushroomed in size due to the advancements made by the unauthorized use of the Inventions, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Pool Licensees and Pool Licensors. Wheeler and Rubenstein made statements MPEG would explode with the advancements made by Inventors inventions with these revolutionary patents, and such has become the case.
Rubenstein and now Proskauer's newly acquired Pools, denied of the Inventors' Inventions would be worthless, and Rubenstein feared such technologies as a competitive threat and immediately began a series of frauds with Joao designed to sabotage and otherwise deny Inventors' their Inventions while attempting to gain control of them through a series of frauds. These crimes were all occurring in the background, so Inventors were disclosing one thing and signing applications for one thing. Then prior to filing, they switched filings to be materially different than what Inventors told them and signed for. In some instances, currently under investigation, are documents such as a supposed patent application submitted by Joao to the USPTO which on such application the transmittal dates from Joao to Iviewit are an unbelievable 3/10/1900 and 3/10/2020, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Joao Filed Patent Application With Impossible Dates and a multitude of other suspect filings as evidenced herein and in exhibit.
10. MPEGLA LLC ACTS AS THE MAIN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE STORE FRONT TO LAUNDER MONIES FROM STOLEN TECHNOLOGIES - Proskauer /Rubenstein CONTROL MPEGLA, LLC.
11. BUSTING Joao - THE INVENTIVE THIEF
With all these deals happening at light speed it was found by Iviewit that Joao, the patent attorney, was filing patent applications in his name. Upon review, he appeared to be using and benefiting from Inventions and other IP such as trade secrets and copyright information. At the time it was not known the extent of such behavior or why. Wheeler was immediately called to explain what Joao was doing and if such claims were true. Wheeler and Rubenstein assured Iviewit Joao's patents had nothing to with imaging, video or remote control video imaging. Iviewit began uncovering inventions claimed by Joao using video, imaging and remote video imaging. No protections were ever secured by MLGWS or Joao, disclosing if Joao ever had patents or such patents were not infringing upon Iviewit Inventions. Were Joao after meeting Iviewit suddenly applied for 90 patent applications, rivaling Thomas Edison in inventions and many reviewed so far by Iviewit, appear lifted from Iviewit while Joao acted as counsel and filed during the time he acted as counsel and subsequently, EXHIBIT “” - Joao 90 Patents.
At this same time Huizenga wanted a third party review of the patents and brought in counsel Stephan J. Filipek ("Filipek") of Fish & Richardson PC ("FR") to review the work of Rubenstein and Joao, as he was preparing to do another round of funding for the operations of Iviewit. Wheeler arranged a meeting for Utley, Rubenstein, Joao and Filipek to meet in Rubenstein's New York Proskauer office and such meeting took place. Filipek's response was relayed by Brandon to Iviewit who stated Filipek had great concern with regard to the patents, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Wheeler Filipek Meeting Notes. Brandon called inventor Bernstein to relay such devastating news stating Huizenga and Wayne Jr. loved the technologies but according to Filipek (and now confirmed by other attorneys) the patents appeared to have major problems. Brandon stated Filipek's review found the patents “missing the boat” and Brandon further stated these items must be immediately rectified and Rubenstein and Joao needed to explain what was going on to Filipek and the Huizenga's before additional investment could made.
This caused immediate concern by Iviewit Board members and immediately began investigation into the matters by Wheeler. Wheeler did several things to respond to the questions by Filipek and evade Huizenga that at the time seemed coincidental but with hindsight may prove more conspiratorial. Joao was already suspect due to the information he was patenting ideas learned while counsel to Iviewit in his name, and this news was all but unbelievable. Wheeler and Utley came to the Iviewit board with a plan to replace Joao with a recommendation for a friend of theirs, Dick of Foley, as Joao had become suspect and his work product was under fire, as EXHIBIT “” - Utley Major Problems With Joao Work shows. Per Wheeler and Utley, Dick had been with IBM and had worked in the patent department and Utley claimed to have a long-term relationship with Dick from their IBM days. Foley was a solid Midwestern firm and Dick appeared to have a credible background. With Proskauer and Utley, whom Iviewit at this point still trusted implicitly, this sounded like a perfect replacement to Joao who was coming under intense scrutiny, even in the transition of files from MLGWS to Foley, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Foley Letter Joao Patent Problems. Utley was finding errors in Joao work and this resulted in intense scrutiny of Joao causing Wheeler again to state he was investigating the alleged rumors. Joao became the fall guy and Dick of Foley stepped in to fix and correct the problems everyone was now aware existed.
12. THE COVER UP AND PERPETUATION OF THE Joao FRAUDS BY FOLEY AND LARDNER AND Rubenstein
In order to clean up the Joao patent problems and keep the scam concealed, Proskauer needed now to replace not only Joao but also Huizenga. To replace Huizenga, Wheeler introduced Iviewit to Crossbow, a Florida venture fund, run by Stephen J. Warner whose past accomplishments include serving as president, chief executive officer, and co-founder of Merrill Lynch Venture Capital, Inc. which, under his leadership, grew to more than $250 million in venture funds under management. Crossbow had another lead in via former Crossbow fund advisors, Maurice Buchsbaum and Eric Chen, of whom Proskauer/Wheeler had referred to Iviewit. Later Buchsbaum had a management and board position and Chen had a board position. Almost overnight, Crossbow appeared, funded Iviewit, and with such funding Wheeler was out of the hot seat with Huizenga. Iviewit cannot say with certainty Crossbow, at this time or at any time, was a knowing participant of the original conspiracy against Iviewit with Proskauer. Certain recent evidence and conversations with Warner point to the fact Crossbow may have been duped into investing by Proskauer/Wheeler and may not have known until later Proskauer and others were up to no good. Crossbow's situation will be discussed as a possible secondary attempt to abscond with the patents to a company Digital Interactive Streams, Inc. After it was learned by Crossbow what Proskauer and others were up to. Either Crossbow represents a second conspiratorial ring or a very effective “good guy/bad guy” player in the original conspiracy.
To calm the Iviewit Board Shareholders regarding Rubenstein's referral Joao, Wheeler claimed Rubenstein had reviewed Joao's provisional patent filings and although they were very broad, this was by design. Claiming since they were Provisional applications they were only placeholders for patent applications and did not need to be detailed or exact, just notice an invention was made. Wheeler claimed Filipek just wanted to make sure the non-provisional applications were filed with the entirety of the inventions and processes. Further, Wheeler stated Crossbow had hired patent counsel to review the IP as part of their due-diligence for their fund and no problems were found that could not be easily fixed with Foley. Foley set out claiming upon filing the patent applications, due one year after the provisional filings were filed by Joao, everything would be corrected, the inventors corrected, the errors would be corrected and the assignments would be corrected.
To further cover up the problems of Joao to Huizenga and Iviewit, so as to remove the threat of Huizenga causing further waves in doing due-diligence, Wheeler and Lewin arranged for a meeting at Huizenga's office to secure the next round of funding for their proposed operational facilities. They invited S. Bernstein, the then Chairman of the Board, to the meeting with them. Huizenga and others had already expressed concern about such operational enterprise, as it was not necessary according to most on the board, as the company was geared for licensing technologies, not encoding video and images. Wheeler and Utley had proposed setting up such operational units based on the number of clients Proskauer and Rubenstein and MPEGLA, LLC would have requiring such services. According to their strategy, Iviewit would be the chosen as the provider of the encoding services, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer Partner Client Letter.
Upon return from the Huizenga meeting, inventor Bernstein was called by Utley, Wheeler and Lewin, where they demanded the termination of S. Bernstein from the Board. More shocking, they asked Bernstein to remove his father and co-founder from the Board, all on the account of some nonsense S. Bernstein had insulted one of the Huizenga principals in the meeting. Bernstein had worked with his father for twenty years and been on hundreds of meetings with him and although a shrewd businessman, he had never seen him actually insult anyone, personally or professionally. Bernstein looked up to his father as one of the most morally ethical people he had ever known. S. Bernstein had raised hundreds of millions of dollars from leading world banks and similarly sold hundreds of millions of dollars of life insurance with leading insurance carriers and throughout the countless meetings had never insulted a single businessman.
Wheeler, Lewin and Utley pressed on Bernstein if S. Bernstein was not terminated from the Board immediately, Huizenga was definitely not going to fund Iviewit further. So insulted was Huizenga's key employee they claimed, they were unsure if the bridge could be repaired. They further claimed it was the Huizenga executive who wanted S. Bernstein to resign. Bernstein did not buy into this story and said he could not fire his father under such circumstances. Lewin and Wheeler suggested S. Bernstein become Chairman Emeritus and maintain his Board seat but not have the full title. Bernstein agreed to talk with his father, but this was a pivotal point in inventor Bernstein's distrust of Wheeler, Lewin and Utley. Lewin acted on the one front to be a friend (and in fact is a neighbor) of S. Bernstein and then behind his back, to his son, was attempting to force his removal from the company appeared highly suspect.
As to Joao's patents in his own name, it was then conveyed Joao had filed patents earlier in his career and they had nothing to do with video or imaging technologies. At the time it was unbeknownst Joao was applying for some 80 patent applications in his name from the time of meeting Iviewit. For the moment, Proskauer had found a solution to bury the emerging problems. Another problem Proskauer had to overcome was to knockout investment banking firms brought in by others. These were not Proskauer controlled, where these firms were beginning to “look under the hood” and due complete due-diligence. M. Welsch of Gruntal had taken Iviewit to an analyst and the analyst was requesting copies of the patents as part of due diligence prior to moving towards an Initial Private Offering ("IPO") and further first round capital. Gruntal was contracted as one of the investment-banking firms for Iviewit and had brought Iviewit into many prominent cable television operators and others in the industry. Welsch was beginning already to make client introductions for future licensing deals, all under NDA. Wheeler then referred Wachovia Securities to Iviewit and Buchsbaum's son worked with Wachovia at the time. Wheeler's referrals were replaced by Crossbow referrals at Wachovia. Buchsbaum and Wheeler stated the Gruntal contract would have to be terminated and replaced with a Wachovia contract, which was later consummated.
Iviewit had also recruited Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ("Goldman") to aid in investment banking relations and in client introductions. Goldman signed an NDA, EXHIBIT “” - Goldman NDA and began introducing clients and investors, all under NDA, to Iviewit. Goldman representatives Friedstein and Kane attended an early technology evaluation at Wheeler's offices with Miah, Eric Camirand of Cinax Design, Inc. (a leading video and imaging software company), Epstein, Wheeler, Shirajee, Bernstein and others and Miah and Camirand confirmed the technology worked and was applicable across a wide array of video and imaging software solutions.
Kane had relationships with high-level executives at Lockheed Martin and was instrumental in developing a relationship with Intel/R3D working with Wheeler. Kane had contacts at Proskauer and worked closely with Wheeler on corporate formation strategies. Kane and Friedstein became founding shareholders of Iviewit and Kane later joined the Iviewit Board. Kane had been with Goldman for many years, when after reviewing the Iviewit technologies on behalf of Goldman, he resigned from Goldman. Kane, after leaving Goldman then formulated an investment fund, along with Sushil Garg and Gerald Schulman (creators of http protocol). Many of the start-up companies Kane is involved with have been conducting the unauthorized use of the Iviewit Inventions learned by Kane via his involvement with Iviewit. Goldman contacts, under NDA, also currently conduct the unauthorized use of the Inventions as will be discussed herein and in exhibit.
Friedstein and his fathers S. Friedstein, through Goldman, proliferated the technologies to major potential Goldman licensees and investors. Many of these potential clients and clients, now conduct the unauthorized use of such technologies violating their NDA's. Many were in various stages of negotiations and contracts with Iviewit. The unauthorized uses may be non-related to the crimes committed in a conspiratorial nature by Proskauer, yet are a direct result of the damages inflicted on Iviewit by Proskauer and other conspirator named herein and in exhibit. Wheeler and Kane proposed to the board a corporate strategy involving setting up a new corporate structure to replace Iviewit, Inc. and it was in the effectuating of such new corporate structure a “ghost” structure of shell companies with similar names was formed by Proskauer and Utley, without consent or authorization from the Board or management. Such “ghost” companies were mirrored to Iviewit companies and once such corporate scheme was devised, a series of “ghost” patent applications was applied for. Proskauer, MLGWS and Foley constructed assignments to move the core technologies and replace them with the bogus patent applications. The “ghost” patent applications have falsified inventor Utley, fraudulent assignments, assigned to wrong companies. All without knowledge, consent or approval of the Board, Inventors or management. It was learned from Moatz's patent team assigned to these matters, the patent portfolios generated by the Iviewit attorneys contain materially false and misleading information versus what is filed with the USPTO, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - USPTO Information Compared to the Iviewit Patent Portfolios. Such fraudulent information was transferred to Wachovia Securities for due-diligence, further constituting bank fraud and for compliance with SBIC SBA loans.
Such revelation by the USPTO as to the inconsistencies in the filings and the attorney dockets has led to the filings by Iviewit and Crossbow with the Commissioner of Patents, of charges of fraud upon the USPTO and Iviewit by Proskauer, Foley, MLGWS, BSTZ, SB and others. Warner of Crossbow, signed alongside Iviewit in these most serious allegations of attorney corruption and conspiracy, after a thorough review with the Crossbow staff and fund advisors: Buchsbaum, Hersh, Chen, Shaw, Eichenberger, Powell, Shaw, Ugale, and Shewmaker. Prior to consulting with his staff, EXHIBIT “” - Warner/Crossbow E-mail's Regarding Fraud on USPTO Warner's reaction to the charges of fraud being conveyed was he was not at first familiar with the situation. Warner, who holds a law degree, appeared hesitant at first in signing such heavy charges against leading law firms, asking to remove the allegations from the document at first. At first Warner claimed to not know of all the crimes alleged and later changed his story upon signing, stating Crossbow personnel were aware and not he.
After such review with Crossbow management and based on their knowledge of the events, Warner signed personally as CEO on behalf of Crossbow without a single change to the allegations, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Crossbow and Iviewit Charges of Fraud upon the USPTO. He signed for each U.S. filing these charges the attorneys had committed fraud upon the United States. Such signing has significant implications as now not only does Iviewit claim fraud but Crossbow claims fraud, a leading investment fund and such claims indicate fraud on the SBA.
On information and belief from recent conversations with Warner, Wheeler and Triggs contacted Warner to find out if Warner indeed had signed charges of fraud upon the USPTO against Proskauer and others and Warner conveyed to Wheeler indeed he had. Wheeler did such calling to Warner after he had been apprised via a Letter of Liabilities/Shareholder Communication - EXHIBIT “” - April 2004 Shareholder Communication/Letter of Liabilities, notifying him of such charges against him and his firm. Wheeler threatened litigation against Iviewit to collect a default judgment and lien against the patents and Warner retorted he had called his secured notes and assigned the patents to DiStream Interactive, Inc. ("DiStream"). Iviewit and the Iviewit Shareholders were not part of such Crossbow transaction with DiStream and this may represent invalid assignments and invalid ownership held by DiStream.
Crossbow stated to the West Palm Beach Post they had sold Iviewit, EXHIBIT “” - Palm Beach Post Article. Suffice it to say at this point, Crossbow did not own Iviewit.com to sell it. This article was later retracted by the Palm Beach Post. Such publication, with the other issues surrounding Iviewit at the time was making it impossible for Iviewit to work with anyone, when people thought the company had been sold and Iviewit and the Inventors no longer had rights to Iviewit or patents. Crossbow Board representatives, Buchsbaum and Powell stated in prior Board meetings, the secured loans were to protect the Iviewit Shareholders from actions being threatened by Proskauer and Proskauer referred management after they were terminated.
Recent conversations with Warner, reveal Crossbow may have been duped by Proskauer and Wheeler and invested in an Iviewit entity that did not hold the IP rights to the correct set of patents. Warner reveals to Bernstein and Lamont the Crossbow dollars invested in Iviewit were composed of federally backed SBA loans and if fraud was committed upon Crossbow, it was committed upon the SBA. Iviewit has notified the inspector general and others at the SBA of the crimes committed and a full report will be submitted shortly, as Iviewit still attempts to piece together this piece of the puzzle. The SBA Inspector General Office has recently began an audit into where the SBA funds in Iviewit and their investment in the patents went. On the one hand Crossbow claims they wrote off their investment and the SBA loans, while on the other hand they are off selling their loans to DiStream and taking assignment on the patents. It appears this allowed them to get rid of the SBA loans, transfer the assets to another company they own, DiStream, and attempt to get rid of the Iviewit Shareholders, allowing them total control of the patents. An amazing strategy to take it all for themselves. Perhaps, since becoming aware of the Proskauer/Foley attempt to steal the patents, they had no fear of being caught in their attempt. This brilliant attempt by Crossbow to steal the inventions from the proper owners seems strung together by Matt Shaw and Renee Eichenberger, who fail to return calls from Iviewit shareholders to address questions of how they sold a company they did not own or have controlling interest in. How they failed to notify (even a whisper) the Iviewit Shareholders they had sold Iviewit and taken the patents, and perpetrated a fraud on the Iviewit Shareholders like the federally backed SBA.
Utley, who claims never to have relied on Rubenstein, conveyed documents naming Rubenstein as “patent counsel” and Proskauer as “retained counsel” with pertinent patent information included. According to current sworn statements from Utley, Wheeler and Rubenstein this is false and misleading information, constituting either fraud on the SBA or perjured statements to legal tribunals or "who's on first" in perjured statements. Utley under sworn deposition testifies he never used Rubenstein in any capacity and Rubenstein was not involved whatsoever with Iviewit, EXHIBIT “” - Utley Deposition Whereby He Claims Rubenstein Not Iviewit Patent Counsel or Advisor. It is proven by the letter to the Board by Utley, his claim of never using Rubenstein as an advisor is materially false. Utley further sends patent materials to Rubenstein an “advisor to the board”, EXHIBIT “” - Utley Sending Patents to Rubenstein Naming Rubenstein as Advisory Board Member. This is direct evidence of perjured deposition by Utley and Utley's credibility is further damaged. Further evidence of perjured statements by Utley regarding Rubenstein are evidenced in the materials Utley sent to Crossbow regarding compliance for the SBA loan. Crossbow requested compliance regarding the Iviewit management and boards for the SBA, and Utley forwarded portions of the Wachovia PPM. Rubenstein is listed not only as an advisory board member but “Iviewit patent counsel”. A direct contradiction to Utley, Rubenstein and Wheeler's sworn deposition statements, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Crossbow SBA Compliance Documents Showing Rubenstein as Iviewit Patent Counsel. The crimes, in addition to perjury are of false and misleading statements to: two Supreme Court bar associations, a Florida civil court, the SBA, securities fraud on Wachovia Securities. As evidenced at a recent former (or are they former if they never really disbanded formally according to law) board of directors meeting, to discuss the patent suspensions, Warner took a supportive role of the Iviewit managements efforts to bring the crimes to prosecution with the authorities as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - 2004 05 02 Board Meeting Notes Lamont, taped copies available upon request. Support from Crossbow and Warner of the Iviewit efforts, evidence perhaps Crossbow and Warner had not been involved with the federal crimes and frauds on government agencies with Proskauer and their cohorts.
Foley then tenders letters stating Joao's work was incomplete and files were missing, but assures Iviewit they are fixing the patent applications and will correct the prior provisional work, non-provisional filings and PCT works of Joao under the direction of Rubenstein. Foley then begins a furtherance of the patent thefts, misleading Iviewit Shareholders as to the patents being filed, and begins to write patents into Utley's name and other patent crimes. Foley begins a series of false and misleading IP dockets and such dockets and audits of the IP were relied on for the Wachovia PPM, business plans, and to secure funds from Iviewit Shareholders. In the following example, the IP information transferred by the patent attorneys was materially false and failed to disclose either the shadow companies or shadow patents, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Foley Letter to Wachovia. This letter claims all patents are in Iviewit Holdings, Inc., which is materially false and misleading as evidenced herein and in exhibit. In fact, several of the core technologies had been transferred into the shadow company, Iviewit Holdings, Inc., for only a few weeks, before the name of that shadow company changed to Iviewit Technologies, Inc. At the time of the Foley letter to Wachovia, the name change was already perfected and therefore the information is wholly false. Foley was hired to audit the work of Joao for investors and management and what this letter indicates is they continued to perpetuate the fraud.
After replacing Joao, Foley begins to convince Iviewit Inventors they are filing patents according to the falsified IP dockets and Utley then comes to inventor Bernstein with blank patent signature pages to sign for inventors, Shirajee, Rosario and Bernstein. Utley demands Bernstein sign such blank signatory pages for patent applications and Bernstein demands to see copies of the applications before singing.
13. THE FILING OF EUROPEAN PATENTS AND THE FRAUDS UPON THE EPO - Joao AND FOLEY
It has been found similar to the fraud on the USPTO the scheme involved applying for patents, where false and misleading information was perpetrated to the EPO. Fraud again was committed by licensed representatives of the EPO, working in conjunction with the law firms in the United States, and the attorneys involved worked together to file the applications with false inventor oaths, false information and wrong content. It appears again the intent was to create two sets of patents, one for inclusion into the legitimate Iviewit companies and one for inclusion to the illegitimate Iviewit companies or into wrong inventors' names with no assignments to anyone.
14. THE COMPANY AS IT STOOD IMMEDIATELY PROCEEDING THE BUSTING OF Utley WITH A SECOND SET OF PATENTS, BEFORE THE FIRST LAYER OF THE ONION REALLY PEELED
It was as if overnight a roller coaster ride would begin that would feel as if the car were missing a few wheels. In one sense, the company was on a roll, and nothing to do with Proskauer, MPEG, Foley, Utley or any other of the riff raff. The company had many tentacles to good and decent people, people who loved the technologies, the inventors and were doing business in such regard. Contracts with the leading multimedia companies, leading hardware and software companies were in a variety of stages and all to do with contacts from hardworking people doing a good days work. These other threads may also lend to the undoing of the criminals who stole the technologies, as it stands as validation of the technologies, stands directly inapposite the stories of the criminals and is proof of how powerful these technologies are. Iviewit was being valued at close to one hundred million dollars and accounts were signing licensing and strategic alliances to use the technologies. Offices were headquartered in Boca Raton, FL with offices opened in New York, California, Chicago and New Jersey, growth was speed of light in anticipation of the approval of the patents and counsel had reviewed prior art and found nothing in the way. The following deals were being consummated:
· AOLTW/WB and Iviewit were in several relationships as evidenced in:
o Exhibit “” - AOLTW/WB Agreement
o Exhibit “” - AOLTW/WB Licensing Deal
o Exhibit “” - AOLTW/WB Use Letter
o Exhibit “” - AOLTW/WB was moving to do a twenty-five million dollar investment
· Hyatt Hotels and Resorts
o Exhibit “” -
· Intel, Silicon Graphics Inc., Lockheed Martin, Intel/R3D
o Exhibit “” -
o Exhibit "" -
· Sony
o Exhibit “” -
o Exhibit "" -
· Paramount
o Exhibit “” -
o Exhibit "" -
· Wachovia
o Exhibit “” -
o Exhibit "" -
· Hollywood.com
o Exhibit “” -
o Exhibit "" -
· VERSIFI
o Exhibit “” -
o Exhibit "" -
· Kodak
o Exhibit “” -
o Exhibit "" -
· Gear Magazine
o Exhibit “” -
o Exhibit "" -
· Atlas Entertainment
· Ellen DeGeneres
· Alanis Morrissette
The company had cash and the company had commitments from investors to maintain the company until next round financing was secured and was preparing for an IPO at one of the hottest times in the market, when the evidence of foul play and crime began to surface. The company had begun collecting steady revenue from the AOLTW/WB agreement.
15. THE BUSTING OF FOLEY, Proskauer, Utley, Intel/R3D, GOLDSTEIN, Lewin, E. Lewin, Reale, Hersh, Intel/R3D
Utley asks for inventors to sign blank patent signature pages, claiming he does not have the patent applications with him but signatures had to be executed by midnight or the filings would be lost and rights' to Shareholders would be lost. Bernstein refused to sign blanks and then happens to see three, three ring patent portfolio binders on Utley's desk and requests to review the binders. Utley refuses to give the binders to Bernstein stating they were too voluminous to read. Bernstein demands time to review and Utley still refuses. Bernstein then recruited James F. Armstrong to help wrangle such patents from Utley while Bernstein and his assistant Jennifer Kluge, had time to copy the binders. Bernstein and Kluge copied all such binders and Bernstein and Armstrong then began a review of the documents ascertained.
Bernstein and Armstrong were stupefied at what they found. Inventors were missing entirely or replaced by Utley, inventions were titled incorrectly, there was evidence of patents going into Utley's name solely. The content was materially false and in fact fraught with mathematical errors. It appeared there were two sets of patent books but it was almost unbelievable, as Foley and Proskauer were leading law firms and this just could not be true. Bernstein then took this information to what they thought at the time were all trusted Board members, Kane, Buchsbaum, Powell, S. Bernstein, Lewin, Epstein, Anderson and certain management and employees. Utley had stated patent applications were to be filed at midnight on the night he was caught with the fraudulent patent books and this also was untrue, as upon contacting Foley regarding the problems, they stated the applications were not due until midnight, the following day. Bernstein and Armstrong than notified board members, including but not limited to: S. Bernstein, Kane, Lewin, Buchsbaum, Powell, Epstein and Anderson of what was being discovered. On the advice of management and Board members alike, it was determined taped teleconferences with patent counsel Foley and Proskauer needed to occur immediately, to find out what was going on and try and correct certain of the errors. This caused immediate concern by Crossbow and others, as to exactly what was going on with the patents.
Taped teleconferences took place over a three-day period, EXHIBIT “” - 2000 07 31 Taped Conference, EXHIBIT “” - 2000 08 02 Taped Teleconference Part 1, EXHIBIT “” - 2000 08 02 Taped Teleconference Part 2, and EXHIBIT “” - 2000 08 04 Taped Teleconference. The first meeting took place in time to correct certain of the errors prior to filing at midnight that night. An entire day was spent correcting the errors, as many of the problems as could be ascertained in a day, and at the end of such meeting, filings were to be made with the corrections. These filings failed to make any of the changes and are filed as if the meeting had not taken place. In the following two days even more is revealed when it is then learned assignments and inventors were incorrect and members of the Board and certain shareholders asked about the liabilities to Shareholders of having incorrect and wrong inventors. Wheeler attends such taped conference in place of Rubenstein and Wheeler represents Proskauer is looking into the charges of Shareholder liabilities resulting from incorrect patent applications, the Joao errors and the fraud this may constitute upon Shareholders. Obviously if the inventors and assignments were incorrect, the investors would not have proper ownership interests. It was further requested Foley prepare a written letter to the Board, concerning the liabilities resulting from wrong inventors, wrong mathematical formulas and other problems discovered, including assignment and ownership issues.
Errors filed even after in the taped discussions, Bernstein and Armstrong had corrected the errors mathematically with the Foley attorneys and yet they still filed them wrong. This under errors and omissions is enough to sink Foley in damages but that it was done with fraudulent intent should sink those lawyers involved to federal prison sentences. It must be remembered that without hindsight, at the time these looked simply like errors and much of the scam was not known at the time. Now with far more information regarding what was really happening, these events reveal far more than errors, they reveal conspiratorial intent in the furtherance of crimes. The tapes reveal evidence of attorney corruption at Foley and at the time Iviewit was still not cognizant of the past patent thefts of Utley, Wheeler and Dick at DTE. These meetings, resulting from catching Utley with two sets of patent portfolios, with him illegally an inventor for inventions he did not invent, or have any part in inventing. It was the first real recognition something far broader may have been occurring.
These discoveries led to a series of letters between Iviewit and Foley. Foley attempts to at first cast doubt on inventor Bernstein, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit and Foley Correspondence Regarding Patent Errors as the reason for their intentional errors and blatant frauds in the patents. Foley begins to assert the matters are somehow Bernstein's fault and so begins an assault on Bernstein. At the time, Bernstein and others did not know the true intent of the actions and assumed they were innocent errors they had stumbled upon. It is now evidenced herein and exhibited this was part of a far larger fraud to steal the inventions. At the time, it would have been unbelievable to have asserted such was the case, as these again were leading law firms and lawyers, where something that preposterous is for Clancey novels or the likes. Then when requested by Board members to produce a letter opining on the admitted liabilities of such errors in the patents, Foley is forced to admit errors in their work. Errors exposing Iviewit to potential loss, EXHIBIT “” - Foley Errors and Liability Letter. Further evidence can be found in inventor Armstrong's letter to Foley, EXHIBIT “” - Armstrong to Foley Regarding Errors in the Patents, of the concern spreading through Iviewit regarding what exactly was going on and why patents were being filed incorrectly and not assigned according to what Shareholders had been told. Not knowing of all the crimes now known these crimes appeared as strange events but not as catastrophic as one would think now, knowing how the pieces fit together with the other crimes. Therefore, all of this was initially perceived as errors, mistakes and incompetence.
As difficult as it is to ask the reader to believe a mass conspiracy was taking place, even now with evidence before you, it was equally hard for Iviewit Shareholders, Iviewit management and the Iviewit Board to believe even errors as profound as these were occurring with firms such as Proskauer and Foley handling the IP. For a more thorough review of the complaints and evidence against Foley and Dick, the Iviewit rebuttal to Dick's bar complaint response, EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit Rebuttal to Dick VSB Bar Complaint (please expand and wrap the bookmarks in the Adobe PDF file). Replete with evidence and an in-depth review of all the patent frauds committed by Foley, MLGWS and Proskauer. Fraud at both the USPTO and foreign patent authorities is evidenced.
Evidence began to surface rapidly and pressure was mounting on Utley, Foley and Proskauer and demands were made by the Iviewit board for answers to the liabilities caused to Iviewit Shareholders. Liabilities resulting from what appeared to be improper assignments, improper inventors, improper patent content and faulty math contained in the filings. A massive and coordinated series of conspiratorial steps then took place to force Iviewit out of business and scare inventor Bernstein for his life, from revealing the truth of what had been discovered or further probing into the matters. These assaults on Iviewit and inventor Bernstein remain today, attempting to prevent the truth from being revealed, to prevent prosecution for their crimes, and to hope they can destroy the companies and evidence against them.
Utley then came to the Iviewit California offices unannounced and threatened Inventor Bernstein if further investigation or probing into the matters occurred and if he were not made CEO, with fully signing authorities, Bernstein should watch his back upon returning to his family in Florida, as Proskauer and Foley would be watching, directly threatening Bernstein and his family. Bernstein in response called his wife, had her pack their kids and belongings and flee Florida, leaving their home, to move into a hotel for the next several months in California. This move came after Bernstein immediately called several Board members and Iviewit Shareholders and it was determined it was safest for Bernstein and his family not to return to Florida until the matters were presented to investigators. The reason for these precautions was although Utley did not know this at the time, Bernstein had already begun notifying Iviewit Shareholders, certain of the management team, investors including Crossbow and Huizenga, the federal patent authorities and others of what had been discovered.
Bernstein had been in California setting up a satellite office, as deals had closed for Iviewit with AOLTW/WB whereby the Iviewit processes were to be used for all video production for their websites. Iviewit had taken offices directly above WB's encoding operation and had taken over the encoding processes at such time. Were further, Sony and other studios were preparing to use the Iviewit processes to consummate a digital download and streaming of movies of five of the major studios. License deals and encoding deals were being drafted by now Irell and Manella for such uses. Bernstein, S. Bernstein, Kane, Buchsbaum, Powell, members of the AOLTW/WB team and others decided Bernstein should stay in California. Further, all involved in the patent problems: Proskauer, Foley, Wheeler, Rubenstein and others should be immediately terminated and new counsel and management needed to be secured. The Florida operations were to be closed and the corporate headquarter moved to California. Such changes needed to be planned for though and certain precautions had to be taken as this was a major change in corporate strategy and overthrow of prior counsel and management.
Powell, Kane, S. Bernstein, Buchsbaum, Epstein, Anderson and others began to undertake a course of actions to replace counsel, secure records, transfer personnel, relinquish employees, close down offices and begin sorting out what exactly had been stumbled upon. Crossbow was fully cognizant of what was transpiring and with Kane, worked to rid the company of Utley, Proskauer and others. It was discussed with AOLTW/WB and Sony representatives and it was determined such course of action would not effect ongoing deals as Crossbow represented to them they stood behind Iviewit and were continuing funding. Crossbow had Powell assess the situation and Powell worked with inventor Bernstein to secure new legal counsel to evaluate the prior work. Bernstein had a fifteen year relationship with members of Irell and Manella and it was determined they would replace Foley and Proskauer for IP work and securing licensing deals underway already. Upon reviewing certain evidence presented to them, Irell referred BSTZ to investigate the filings and correct the problems in the filings. Iviewit, with Crossbow as an ally at the time funding the transition, retained both Irell and BSTZ to investigate the work of Foley, Proskauer and Meltzer and so began the unearthing of even more IP crimes.
Crossbow came to California to meet with AOLTW and Sony and evaluate the emerging relationships. Powell met with representatives of AOLTW regarding a proposed funding and licensing deal formulated upon a multi-layered implementation of the Iviewit technologies. AOLTW had already begun to use the Iviewit processes under NDA and an encoding/licensing relationship. Upon investigating the investment portion of the deal material facts were uncovered regarding litigious actions against Iviewit. When reviewing the patents, representatives of AOLTW/WB found patents were incorrect and Iviewit was in litigation with Proskauer and former management was attempting an involuntary bankruptcy on the company. Powell assured AOLTW/WB and Sony, Crossbow was not aware of the problems and would work to rectify the problems. Utley was terminated, the offices were moving to Los Angeles and they would continue funding of Iviewit as promised and agreed to. David Colter, a senior technologist for AOLTW/WB and Douglas Chey of Sony Digital, were present at meetings with Powell and disclosed the site www.moviefly.com later changed to www.movielink.com was being created using the Iviewit processes. Both advised Powell they were using the processes on their websites and were planning on using Iviewit services and licensing the technologies. Powell assured Colter and others Crossbow stood behind Iviewit one hundred percent throughout the change in management and meetings with AOLTW/WB senior investment people should continue and funding was not an issue. Colter explained to Powell he and other leading technologists at AOLTW/WB wanted to make sure Utley was fired and no further deal would be possible with any of the major studios with Utley involved.
Utley had recently been confronted at a major studio and caught in a tangled web of lies regarding his past and his knowledge of the inventions, by like one of the smartest guys in the biz, Jerry Pierce of Universal studios, and Epstein and Buchsbaum were in attendance. After such meeting, Epstein, who had referred Universal, after waiving Utley good riddance in embarrassment, stated AHJTW could no longer introduce Iviewit to any of their clients, until Utley was fired. Epstein and Buchsbaum brought to the attention of certain senior management, certain Board members and Crossbow, the problems Utley was creating at major clients. Utley was falsifying information and perhaps causing loss of clients from his behavior, and he had to go.
After leaving the Universal lot, and by only yards,
inventor Bernstein was called by Colter at AOLTW/WB claiming Pierce had
called both he and Thagard claiming Utley was out of his mind and his
mathematics and understanding of the inventions were all wrong.
Colter had stated Chey at Sony was aware and word was spreading fast
and damage control had to start immediately, everyone was in concurrence
management had to go and all tentacles to Proskauer had to be severed.
Kane was asked by Bernstein, S. Bernstein, Epstein, Colter, Buchsbaum, Crossbow and others, to aid in the terminating of Utley from the company and Utley came to a board meeting proposing a porno deal and deal with such companies, and was proposing some distance learning deal he had begun to formulate and the board fired him. Utley had flown in a group of people for the board meeting, without knowledge or consent of the board and they were asked to leave without saying a word by Kane. Kane, by order of the Board and investors asked Utley to leave the company. The Board determined Utley would be terminated, the Boca Raton staff relieved of their jobs and the equipment and remaining personnel would be relocated to California.
Several weeks later at the next Board meeting it was discovered by Powell, who had happened upon the Iviewit offices and was startled to see employees still there and it appeared Utley had done nothing requested of him by the Board. At the board meeting, Powell confronted Utley with why the employees were still there and who was paying for them, as Crossbow had already ceased funding for these employees and the Boca operation. Utley replied he had furloughed everyone, and the board requested clarification of why they were not terminated as proscribed. Utley claimed he was working on investments and was in the process of closing down but it was then learned Utley and Reale were beginning to alter and destroy documents.
Evidence were beginning at this point to show further criminal activities were taking place. Inventor Bernstein was called by Buchsbaum and other Iviewit Florida employees, with allegations that in preparing to move the offices, Utley and Reale were attempting to bribe employees with a briefcase of cash. According to a witness statement, Reale claimed the briefcase contained stolen cash from Iviewit investors and further attempted to have such employee aid and abet in stealing proprietary equipment and IP processes. The employees were told Iviewit was being closed and they were being fired and if they wanted to leave and join Utley and Reale in a new venture with investor Tiedemann (referred by Wheeler) they just needed to help steal the processes and be told which equipment was operating the processes. Reale claimed they would have to help them obtain the processes and the machines that were operating such processes and they would be rewarded for such actions. Such employee claim at first was unbelievable but then led to filed charges with Boca PD for the stolen equipment and stolen cash used to bribe to steal IP and processes, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Frenden Sworn Statement. This statement and corroboration by other witnesses, acted as a basis for the charges filed against Utley and Reale of Embezzlement with Boca PD, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Boca PD Embezzlement Case. Utley and Reale were found in possession of equipment they had stolen, equipment employees had told them was highly valuable and essential to the processes.
Further evidence and employee statements now also were of stolen investor funds from the companies, including funds from the SBA investments with Crossbow. In fact, the machines stolen were the machines employees had shown Utley and Reale to be key to the proprietary processes. The stolen equipment was later returned to the company through police investigation and formal charges were unbeknownst to Iviewit, waived by Kasser, without company authority or consent. In fact Iviewit was under the impression Kasser and Miller were pressing charges and filing additional charges. This was never completed, although Kasser had stated such new investigations were under way with Boca PD. Iviewit has recently asked Boca PD to re-open the charges in the embezzlement case and press charges, as well as filing charges for other crimes later discovered. Additional charges were filed with Boca P.D., after learning Kasser had not filed them. The new charges are currently not under investigation by the Boca PD and the matters have been escalated to Honorable Andrew J. Scott, III, Chief of Police for possible internal corruption as evidenced in the Boca PD investigation documents cited herein and documents filed with the Florida Supreme Court, Exhibit "" - FSC Motion.
In fact, once charges were filed and it was found Utley and Reale had the initial stolen machines, Kasser informed the company we would be pressing charges and filing additional charges with Boca PD for other equipment and machines found missing, after inventorying the equipment purchased versus what had been transferred to California. Kasser was acting as bookkeeper for the company and handling the closing of the offices in Florida and transference of materials with Miller. Miller was acting as interim CEO and legal consultant and at the time it was not known he was a close personal friend of Wheeler. Iviewit was informed by Florida employees and others document destruction and computer file destruction was happening in Boca and Utley had begun shredding documents with former employees. Bernstein upon hearing such news called Iviewit Shareholders, Barry Becker and Andrew Dietz, whom Bernstein had worked in the high priority shipping business for the entertainment and music industry years earlier, at a company Rock-It Cargo USA, Inc. ("Rock-It"). It was decided Rock-It Cargo would send a crew to load up the entirety of the Florida offices and all remaining equipment and documents and move them overnight to California, so as to prevent further destruction in the final days of Utley, Reale, Proskauer, Foley and others.
Utley began a series of steps to rid the company of James F. Armstrong for several reasons. First, Armstrong was an eyewitness to the events that led to the uncovering of the second set of patent books and had discovered the bad math, inventor errors, and owner errors with Bernstein. Second, Armstrong began a series of correspondences with S. Bernstein for validation of the assignments, owners and inventors, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - 2000 09 08 Armstrong Assignment Letter. Third, Armstrong began a series of correspondences regarding his loans with Iviewit and this would have led to further uncovering of corporate malfeasances, yet undiscovered, he had to go. Utley began a smear campaign on Armstrong, circulating letters Armstrong was sending viruses to Foley and Iviewit and trying to sabotage the company computers.
Utley then stated Crossbow had demanded the closing of the New York office Armstrong ran, and if the office was not closed, no further funding would ensue. Utley then fired Armstrong, Bernstein's thirty-year friend, and Utley and other Proskauer referred, management proceeded to block Armstrong from any information he requested. As a founding shareholder and investor Armstrong had rights to disclosure but a coordinated series of events was instituted to prevent such disclosure. Bernstein contacted members of Crossbow after Armstrong's termination and found Utley had lied regarding Crossbow demanding the closure of the New York office. Armstrong retained counsel and Wheeler and Utley were to secure the requested information and yet another blocking occurred whereby Armstrong's attorney was also precluded from gaining access to the information.
Crossbow then began a series of discussions with limited board members, mainly Kane (formerly of Goldman), Buchsbaum and Powell, regarding how to protect the IP and the Shareholders and what exactly to do to investigate the matters fully. Crossbow and Iviewit later find after hiring counsel BSTZ to audit the work of Foley, Proskauer and Joao, to the amazement of Iviewit Shareholders Utley had indeed been patenting core technologies into his name with Dick's patent team at Foley, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - BSTZ IP Document - Utley Patents. Seeing Utley listed as sole inventor on two patent applications with no assignments is completely contradicted by Utley's direct deposition testimony whereby he states no digital camera patent applications or any other applications were filed in his sole name and if they were they were assigned to Iviewit both materially false statements. Utley further states all inventions had been properly assigned to Iviewit Holdings, Inc., also false according to the USPTO and further evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Utley Deposition Statements No Camera Patents In My Name. Direct evidence from patent filings contradict these statements, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Filed US Patent for Zoom and Pan on a Digital Camera Utley and also in attorney dockets of BSTZ as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - BSTZ Patent Portfolio Docket with Utley. Further Utley perjures himself when asked about patents by saying any patents in his name were all assigned to Iviewit, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Utley Deposition on Assignments. This is categorically and irrefutably proven false, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - BSTZ Patent Portfolio with Utley Unassigned Patents and from conversations with the USPTO where we find unassigned Utley patent applications, contradictory to his sworn statements.
The patent offices refusal to release information regarding Utley's patent to Iviewit, is because Iviewit, nor the inventors, are found listed on the patent in any capacity, in contradiction to attorney IP dockets and again in contradiction to Utley's deposition, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - USPTO Letter of Refusal to Disclose Information to Iviewit on Utley Patents as Iviewit is not listed as an Assignee or Owner and the True Inventors are not listed. This is irrefutable evidence of perjury and other federal crimes including fraud on the USPTO as evidenced herein and in exhibit. Foley in a response to Dick's VSB bar complaint submits a patent portfolio, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Foley Patent Portfolio Submitted to Virginia Bar which shows patent applications Foley supposedly filed for Iviewit. Concerning patent application 60/233,341 listed as Iviewit's property and according to the USPTO it is not Iviewit or any of the Inventors property. This information was shown to the VSB who failed to investigate proof of false statements to a tribunal by Dick and certainly at minimum warranted investigation. This is no small oversight, the Utley applications are for concepts such as Zoom and Pan On a Digital Camera and the Zoom and Pan Imaging Design Tool, which are the core technologies of how digital zoom on a digital camera works. This technology discovered by the Inventors is now found on almost every digital camera made in the world.
It was from these early discoveries of patent malfeasances, where evidence was surfacing fast, and Proskauer, Foley and MLGWS were being called upon to provide answers to the Board for all of these issues, that a series of events occurred intended to force Iviewit from pursuing further investigation into the matters and destroying the companies. Bernstein at the bequest of board members and with finances from Crossbow retained Irell & Manella LLP ("Irell") to review the patents and replace Foley. After discovery of the patent problems, Irell referred Iviewit to BSTZ to audit the patent portfolio and review the work of Foley, which according to Irell the patents seemed to completely miss the inventions. Crossbow financed and was privy to the work of BSTZ's investigation and BSTZ opined they had found patents in Utley's sole name. They presented an "audited" portfolio that appeared to have two sets of almost identical patents found. One set had Utley and one set did not. This was the first time Iviewit learned of such Foley filings for Utley. Such work by BSTZ led to BSTZ being retained to fix such errors and report such fraud to the proper tribunals. Iviewit and Crossbow were otherwise led to believe BSTZ was undertaking such tasks.
Proskauer eventually recruited BSTZ in the furtherance of the crimes and to aid and abet in the cover up of the past crimes. BSTZ then begins a pattern of false and misleading Iviewit IP dockets to Iviewit, unbeknownst to Iviewit to be incorrect, until recent conversations with the USPTO. Such conversations with the USPTO led to evidence showing BSTZ's patent portfolios were almost entirely false when compared to what was actually on file with the USPTO. BSTZ further misdirects Iviewit to think Utley is being removed from the patents and inventors Bernstein, Friedstein, Shirajee, Rosario and Bernstein on behalf of Utley, sign documents to execute such changes. After review with the USPTO, the EPO and JPO it is found the changes were never made, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - BSTZ Patent Review Opinion. Further it is now found even after discovering Utley had committed fraud and was long fired, BSTZ filed additional patent applications listing Utley as an inventor and falsifying the IP dockets. Charges were filed with the USPTO OED Director Moatz for BSTZ's recently uncovered part in the conspiracy. Complaints were filed with OED Director Moatz regarding certain allegations of document destruction by BSTZ and further patent attorney violations of the patent act. Recent evidence points to collusion by BSTZ with Proskauer, Foley and MLGWS to further perpetrate the crimes and continue to the patent fraud.
BSTZ actually further files patents in Utley's name, knowing Utley is no longer with the company and is being reported for criminal allegations in several investigations by Iviewit. BSTZ was charged as Iviewit's counsel with notifying the USPTO of the reasons for the Inventor fraud and other discoveries of fraud on the USPTO and foreign patent agencies. BSTZ again misdirected Iviewit that the matters were being reported and the patents corrected and it is later learned they failed to report any of their findings to the proper authorities. BSTZ destroyed, through loss, the files transferred to them from Foley, MLGWS and Proskauer, including original patent materials and filings. Such loss by BSTZ comes after they are requested to contact Moatz at OED and transfer the patent files as evidence to certain federal, international and state investigators of the crimes, evidenced in Exhibit “” - Iviewit [eib12] Letter to BSTZ to Transfer Iviewit Files to Authorities.
BSTZ was retained to investigate the patent deficiencies discovered at Foley and correct them and report the crimes discovered. BSTZ assured Iviewit they were correcting the flaws in the patents filed, changing the inventors and owners and further proffered false and misleading IP dockets with materially false and misleading information, to show completion. Upon speaking with foreign patent counsel Molyneaux it was determined to correct the errors across the pond, the EPO would have to be notified of the fraud. Corrective actions would have to be taken to determine ownership and inventorship, prior to answering patent office actions, that were coming due in Europe that week. BSTZ was requested to make such filing of fraud by Iviewit in Europe and failed to transmit the documents to WHAD. Upon contacting WHAD, Iviewit gave Molyneaux a copy of what BSTZ had failed to file for filing with the EPO. Molyneaux volunteered to submit such request based on the situation and BSTZ was not responding to repeated requests.
Upon filing of such statement of fraud upon the European Patent Office and fraud upon Iviewit, similar to EXHIBIT “” - USPTO fraud filing, Iviewit made a request for suspension of all applications pending investigation into the patent thefts. Further, upon being noticed by Molyneaux that WHAD had filed Iviewit's response to the office action, BSTZ realized Molyneaux “had let the cat out of the bag” and began a series of steps to attempt to cover up for their deceits. BSTZ then lost all of Iviewit's patent files, spawning five years, three prior law firms, original art dating the inventions, and all records that had been transferred to them from Proskauer, MLGS and Foley. This loss of files was done deliberately to cover up and attempt to destroy records of Iviewit's crucial to securing the IP and all with no authority or records confirming the documents receipt by Iviewit.
Upon submitting the IP dockets of Foley, Proskauer and BSTZ to Moatz, at the USPTO, it was discovered much of the information told to Iviewit by Foley, Proskauer and now BSTZ, was materially false. Further, the work BSTZ stated they were performing, in fact was never done. This leads one to believe somehow BSTZ became part of the cover up through some form of bribery which caused them to act in such coordinated conspiratorial manner. Iviewit, in discussions with the USPTO on or about February 1, 2004, finds patent information different from every IP docket delivered to Iviewit by every retained patent counsel, as to inventors, assignments, and, in particular, one or more patent applications in the name of Utley with no assignment to Iviewit. According to the USPTO, Iviewit presently holds no rights, titles, or interest in particular patent applications. Such patent issues have caused Iviewit, in conjunction with its largest investor, Crossbow (the largest South Florida venture fund) and Stephen J. Warner, the Co-Founder, former Chairman of the Board and CEO, to file a complaint with the USTPO alleging charges of Fraud Upon the USPTO, now causing the Commissioner after review to put a six-month suspension on all Iviewit's U.S. patent applications, while investigations are proceeding into the attorney criminal activity alleged and evidenced herein.
16. OH DEAR G-D THE PATENT ATTORNEY Joao HAS 90 PATENTS IN HIS NAME - MANY STOLEN FROM THE COMPANY AND ITS INVENTORS. A CRIME BEYOND BELIEF AND WHY
This seems like the strangest and most brazen attempt at theft and without hindsight, at the time it made no sense. Why would Joao patent ideas in his own name, why not his mother, an alias, or even a shell company? Why did Rubenstein and Proskauer choose Joao, why is Joao's crime of a patent attorney patenting his clients' ideas in his own name so frightening? So obscene as to cause a total lack of confidence in the patent system and the attorneys representing inventors before the USPTO. Such crime threatens the very fabric of the USPTO and is a direct violation of the federal codes regulating patent attorney misconduct.
Why did the criminal enterprise need Joao and patents when they were stealing the core assets through the complex patent and corporate shadow play? The time to steal the patents would take years, to get rid of Iviewit and have the shell companies change names after it was gone. ,and this thing had legs and was pouring in monies into MPEGLA, LLC, the criminal organization, and the only way to get royalties out of the Pools was to have patents submitted that could be approved by Rubenstein, the sole gatekeeper, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Rubenstein Sole Decision Maker for MPEGLA Patents” and then paid out to bogus inventors like Joao, Utley, RYJO and others.
So, how does one get patents approved equal to what the inventors share would have been to get royalty from the Pools? Legal fees cannot be the end game as they are not the lions share of the royalty one would receive for owning core patents. It would look strange if the legal entity licensing inventions was making more than inventors or pool participants. So you get Joao to write patents for every concept under the sun using the patents, and you have them submitted to Rubenstein for approval and inclusion into the Pools, paying Joao would be paying the criminal organization out the back door. Perhaps this is why Utley, RYJO, DiStream and others may have copied patents for submission to the criminal enterprise MPEG, all to get a bigger share of the pie. The pie of MPEGLA is simple to cut, every patent included gets an equal share of the pie. So 90+ patents of Joao's, worthless or not, approved by Rubenstein, with Joao inventor was the perfect plan if nobody found out. Nobody thought they would get caught and it was as if a lucky bird of fortune notified the company Joao was secretly writing patents in his name, a tip that sent the Bad Guys reeling. The Supreme Court of New York: First Department has ordered an investigation of Joao, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - First Dept Ordered Investigation of Joao.
Now think of what is pending against Joao, also under investigation by Commissioner of Patents and the OED Director Moatz personally, FRAUD AGAINST THE USPTO. Joao breaks every oath as a patent attorney, as if he studied the law like a criminal with intent to violate it, and his oath under G-d meant very little. Those sworn inventor oaths to the patent office are serious business and federal offenses crimes of the highest degree almost a treason against the United States. The law is set so those who swear oath to the USPTO, face federal crimes if such oaths are violated in the commission of crimes, Joao has made false oath in violation of federal law as evidenced herein and in exhibit.
17. CONTINUATION OF THE FORMATION OF SHADOW COMPANIES AND SHADOW PATENTS TO EFFECTUATE THE THEFT OF THE IVIEWIT IP
Upon the discovery of what appeared to be two sets of patent books with additional patents funneling into Utley's name, prepared by Foley and confiscated from Utley, no correlation was made at the time by Iviewit that these separate patent books were being funneled into two separate and distinct companies. It appears Foley began to file a series of US applications and EPO applications, working with Proskauer, as Joao had, to move the original inventions into unauthorized companies. Such collusion of events is not separate and distinct actions as it first appeared but part of the larger picture conspiratorial play between IP counsel from Foley and Proskauer to continue the theft of the core patents. Some of the companies were formed post Joao and there exist a multitude of similarly named companies. Certain of Iviewit's patents have ended up in such shadow companies, all again not revealed until recent conversations with the USPTO OED Director Moatz.
We now find Foley prepared IP dockets, for institutional and private investors, with materially false and misleading information. Foley worked with Proskauer to further file false patent applications with the USPTO, a federal offense and continue fraud on the EPO.
18. ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY THE IVIEWIT COMPANIES, TO OBTAIN THE IP OF THE SHADOW COMPANIES & OTHER ATTEMPTED PATENT THEFTS
Upon learning the “gig was up” and they were being relieved of their positions with Iviewit, Foley, Proskauer, Utley, Reale, Intel/R3D, all began a series of steps to:
1. destroy the Iviewit companies,
2. to attempt to rid the evidence of the shadow companies and gain the stolen patents by:
· frivolous and fraudulent lawsuit against shadow companies with stolen patents
· frivolous and fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy against shadow companies with stolen patents
· directly attempting to steal the inventions into Intel/R3D, Tiedemann and Utley through a series of fraudulent documents filed with the USPTO and others, as well as falsified business contracts
· falsified accounting records
3. to destroy the evidence of their corporate and patent frauds,
4. to create a series of fraudulent documents to cover up for the crimes,
5. to destroy the evidence of the inventions,
6. to destroy the life of the main inventor Bernstein and his family,
7. to interfere and derail Iviewit business relations so as to prevent further investment and raise concern over the welfare of the core assets, the patents,
8. to steal the funds in Iviewit, leaving the Iviewit Shareholders with no funds to defend themselves, and
9. to attempt insurance fraud on existing director and officer policies to carve themselves out of the reach of the insurance policies protecting the Iviewit Shareholders.
Upon getting caught, Wheeler, Rubenstein, Dick, Boehm, Becker, Foley, Proskauer and Utley, began a deliberate series of attacks on Iviewit with the intent of causing those reviewing the matters to believe this was somehow the fault of Iviewit. Proskauer began an unbelievable attempt to deny their involvement in the IP for Iviewit and attempted to deny Rubenstein had even known of Iviewit, other than to give a referral to Joao and his former firm MLGWS. Rubenstein, despite his pining he is the target of harassment by Iviewit, even if he had only referred Joao and his former firm, would be equally culpable for the crimes of his referrals. Yet, this is not the case, Rubenstein was direct oversight for the entire IP department of Proskauer which was Iviewit was knee deep in work for Iviewit for patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets and licensing contracts for the technologies. As if Rubenstein thinks by stating he did not handle the patents directly, which is proven herein and in exhibit to be “patently” false, Proskauer and the MPEGLA LLC pool and other Pools Proskauer has now created will be immune from the conflicts of representing both clients with no conflict waivers or “Chinese Wall” between them. Rubenstein and the Proskauer IP department that now represent MPEGLA, LLC had full access to all of Iviewit's processes and no separations across any IP work was established. It matters not whether the conflict emanated from the patent work, the copyright work, the trademark work or the trade secret work they preformed and billed for and Proskauer's argument rests on their claim they did no "patent" work forgetting to state they billed hundred of thousands of dollars for other IP work, trying to separate patent filings they referred to other counsel.
To derail certain licenses, investment opportunities, strategic alliances and other Iviewit business relations, Proskauer, Foley, Utley, Rubenstein began a series of attempts to derail such deals and Rubenstein began to act as if he never heard of the company, when companies such as AOLTW/WB who had prior relied upon his opinion.
Utley, Wheeler and Proskauer engaged in the transfer of a loan from a group of Proskauer referred investors and such loan transacted without approval from the Board of Directors or Crossbow and without full and complete documentation of the transaction ever being properly completed and no bank records produced to correspond to such transaction.
Upon learning of such loan transaction and requesting auditing of such transaction, Iviewit found missing records and further, employee eyewitness testimony show a large briefcase of cash, claimed to be from Proskauer referred investors, was used to attempt to bribe employees to steal trade secrets and proprietary equipment. Further such equipment was stolen off with by Proskauer's management team led by Utley, as he was being fired with cause when he was found to be misappropriating patents into his name. This alleged theft of between Six Hundred Thousand Dollars ($600,000.00) and One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) by Proskauer and their management referrals, of money loaned to the Company, is currently under investigation by the Boca Raton Police Department in conjunction with the SEC and the FBI.
Upon being fired for cause, Utley and Reale began a series of steps to attempt to hide their crimes and:
1. steal the proprietary processes,
2. steal the machines running such processes,
3. bribe employees to aid and abet them in crimes and recruit them to a company that would be the receiver of the stolen equipment and stolen monies,
4. destroy documents to cover up their crimes,
5. falsify and alter documents to cover up their crimes,
6. attempt to lock out Iviewit from their computer records,
7. steal funds from the Iviewit accounts.
Were it not for Iviewit employees and officers that witnessed such actions, Utley, Reale & Hersh would have succeeded in their plans. Upon information from employees as to what was transpiring, it was decided by inventor Bernstein, to recruit the aid of Iviewit Shareholders, Dietz and Becker, to move the entire offices immediately. To the surprise of Utley, Reale and Hersh, movers from Rock-It Cargo, USA, Inc. in Miami showed up at the Iviewit Boca Raton offices to pull everything out and put it on a charter to Los Angeles. Despite the protests of Utley and Reale, the equipment was taken in entirety, except for certain documents Miller and Kasser retained and was flown overnight to Los Angeles. This was the end of the employment of Utley, Reale and Hersh. Much of the equipment and documentation recovered had mass evidence of the attempted document alterations and computer hijacking.
Several attempts to abscond with the patents were made through various violations of business contracts and in certain instances direct theft by individuals aided by Foley attorneys. Investor Tiedemann was conspiring with Wheeler, Utley and Reale to abscond with IP, trade secrets, proprietary processes and equipment engineered for such processes, and Utley and Reale were found by the Boca Raton PD to have embezzled equipment and moved such equipment to New Jersey to a company Prolow was a board member and investor for and Tiedemann was an Iviewit director.
Wheeler, Utley and Intel/R3D have worked together in a conspiratorial nature to deprive Iviewit Shareholders of the core imaging and video applets and source codes and on information and belief, members under contract for Intel/R3D, have applied with false applications for IP owned by Iviewit and they were under various signed and binding contracts with Iviewit prohibiting such theft.
As soon as evidence began to surface patent thefts were taking place and Proskauer was called by the Board to explain and define the liabilities caused. Proskauer began to attempt to rid the shadow companies in a lawsuit instigated without knowledge of Iviewit aided by another Proskauer friend, Ross Miller, Esq. ("Miller"). Miller came to replace Utley as interim CEO and Miller acted in a conspiratorial role with Proskauer to hide such litigation from Iviewit Shareholders, concealing his close Proskauer ties. The litigation was accidentally discovered by a member of AOLTW/WB while conducting due diligence on Iviewit for a twenty million dollar (U.S. $20,000,000.00) investment and at such time Iviewit did not know about such litigation proceedings.
Proskauer referred management and others attempted and involuntary bankruptcy to reclaim patents in another fraudulent company where stolen IP now appears. Again, the IB was discovered by AOLTW/WB doing due-diligence and such proceeding was taking place without Iviewit knowledge. Upon discovering these legal actions Iviewit fired counsel that had be representing Iviewit at the proceedings. Again, one must step back and see that Iviewit thought these identically named companies and similarly named entities in the legal actions were their companies. Once new counsel Selz was retained and production requests were submitted, it was discovered the management did not even have claims to the company they were attempting to bankrupt, and had given a federal bankruptcy court materially false and misleading information in preparing their filing. Once confronted with the fact they did not have claims to the company, they withdrew the involuntary. What is interesting to note is at the time it was discovered the wrong company was being bankrupted by these former employees and Intel/R3D had taken actions fraudulently; Iviewit thought they had erred and made a mistake in the filing, where there were thought to be no assets in the company. What later was learned in discussions with the USPTO was inapposite IP portfolios submitted by counsel to Iviewit, such company did in fact have unauthorized patent applications. With evidence surfacing that would have blown the lid on the entire matter, the involuntary bankruptcy was withdrawn by former management.
Utley, Reale, Hersh, Intel/R3D in another attempt to steal patents and dissolve other shadow companies through felonious bankruptcy filings, again tried to steal off with patents Iviewit Shareholders were unaware such companies held. This constitutes yet more federal offenses against the Bankruptcy court
19. THE UNRAVELING OF THE CONSPIRACY BY CAROLINE PROCHOTSKA ROGERS, ESQ. AND STEVEN SELZ, ESQ.
Upon learning of the IB and Litigation against Iviewit from the kind folks at AOLTW/WB, inventor Bernstein contacted a longtime friend, angel and attorney, Rogers. Bernstein asked Rogers to find out if legal actions had been taken against Iviewit and determine why Iviewit management and Iviewit Shareholders were unaware of the actions. Rogers found Iviewit was in both proceedings and appeared to have counsel already working on behalf of Iviewit, somehow. Upon learning of the suits and counsel was representing the company; a series of calls took place with counsel representing Iviewit, leading to their immediate replacements, a one Spencer Sachs and Bart Houston. Counsel for Iviewit in both proceeding initially was Sachs, Sax & Klein, P.A., and on information and belief, Spencer Sachs is a longtime friend of Wheeler, and it appears Sachs was working in cahoots with Proskauer to attempt to abscond with the processes. Later in the IB, Furr & Cohen took over the proceedings and when confronted with the fact several of the claimants had no contracts or debt with the company in the bankruptcy, they abandoned the filing. Yet they had already provided false and fraudulent information on shadow companies to the Federal Bankruptcy Court and in violation of the federal code as evidenced herein and in exhibit.
It was found such counsel claimed to have acted on Iviewit's behalf, but upon examining the cases, it was found the cases in both matters appeared to be against the wrong companies. In the Proskauer billing dispute, the companies Proskauer sued, Proskauer had no billings for. In the IB, several of those involved had no claims or employment contracts with the company they were suing. For a while it was thought they had to be awful stupid lawyers and Plaintiff's, as they sued and were going after companies holding no IP rights and had no assets in some instances. It was not until 2004 when it would be discovered after conversations with Moatz and a team he had arranged to put the patents in suspension, the companies sued and attempted to be bankrupted actually did have IP in them. It became clear after talks with members of the USPTO the attorney dockets tendered by the attorneys from Proskauer, MLGWS, Foley and BSTZ were false and misleading and were in fact hiding the truth of patent ownership, inventorship and assignment. Upon confirming such, the patent office moved to suspend the IP in the United States and have gone from a six-month suspension to a renewed six-month suspension while investigations into fraud upon the USPTO and Iviewit is investigated.
It later became evident, upon learning where the patents truly were, the Litigation and the IB were attempts to gain control of the patents hidden away in the shadow companies. With the bankruptcy proceeding thwarted, counsel Selz then began working on the Proskauer v. Iviewit litigation and it became apparent Proskauer had sued companies were they had no retainer or bills. Selz, having to replace the efforts of prior counsel, efforts that appeared to limit Iviewit's rights in the case to favor Proskauer, needed time to understand what exactly was taking place. After reviewing literally thousands of pieces of evidence, showing crimes committed filed a counter complaint against Proskauer based on what little was known at the time, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit Counter Complaint. The Counter Complaint, although denied by the Judge on the account of what prior counsel had done and timing, was a complete surprise to Proskauer and from that point on a cover up began to attempt to get out of the proceedings. Evidenced herein and in exhibit, it will be shown to get out of the case, Proskauer and the court had to go through a series of highly unethical procedures, to derail Selz and Iviewit Shareholders from having their day in court.
Although Proskauer finagled their way out of a trial through unethical conduct by Labarga, they Proskauer left a trail of further evidence on their way to a default judgment in the case. From nowhere, Selz not only launched a Counter Complaint but a series of depositions on Wheeler, Rubenstein and Lewin. These depositions will be evidenced herein and in exhibit to contain countless perjured statements. Perjured statements:
1. in direct opposition to statements given under oaths to the state bar associations,
2. in countless documents that prove their sworn statements false
3. directly conflicting witness statements,
4. contradicting resumes submitted to financial institutions, the SBA, Iviewit Shareholders and countless others,
5. regarding the filed patents,
6. regarding the corporations set up,
7. contradicting even their own and each others sworn statements
So caught off guard in the depositions, attorney Rubenstein, attempts to claim Iviewit is harassing him in a sworn statement to Labarga, stating that he knows nothing about Iviewit, the fleeing his own deposition, in the Proskauer instigated lawsuit? In the middle of deposition Rubenstein refuses to answer direct deposition questions whereby evidence was presented that proved him a liar. Upon fleeing his deposition, Rubenstein challenges the company to have the judge force him back to answer a series of questions and Labarga rules to have him come back and answer the questions. And then something happened that Labarga began a deliberate series of events to usurp Iviewit legal rights and protect Proskauer.
Wheeler under deposition caught off guard by Selz, cannot answer almost all of the questions regarding the Iviewit transactions and corporate structure posed to him which he handled and he is unable to remember the companies or his own corporate structure, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Wheeler Deposition on Corporate Structure, and further is found perjuring himself regarding his referral to Utley and their past. Countless examples are contained herein and in exhibit, showing all of these perjured statements were transmitted to the proper authorities including the tribunals where the perjuries were committed and then completely ignored.
Utley commits perjury and even confuses his own statements to the Virginia Bar in defense of Dick with his own deposition statements. Over two days of deposition, with Proskauer acting as Utley's quasi counsel he commits multitudes of perjured statements and many of these statements are regarding the stolen patents. Utley's deposition contradicts the deposition statements made by: Wheeler, Rubenstein, Lewin, his own sworn statements to VSB, Rubenstein's response to the New York bar complaint, Joao's response to the New York bar complaint, Rubenstein's response to the New York bar complaint and Wheeler's response to TFB. Utley even contradicts his own resume crafted by him and Wheeler. Utley reveals his past with Dick and Wheeler and there were allegations at his former employer of IP theft leading to his termination. Utley's deposition is more a treatise of perjury than a deposition.
Rogers hired Greenberg Traurig to audit the Iviewit patents, power of attorney was granted, and further fraudulent errors were discovered and confirmed in the patent dockets prepared by former counsel. BSTZ was aware of many of the fraudulent errors and was at the time supposed to be correcting the errors and had taken Bernstein, Rosario, Shirajee and Friedstein's signatures and falsely conveyed such changes were made. Later, again in conversations with the OED for the USPTO, it was learned none of the changes BSTZ was charged with performing had been completed. Other evidence began surfacing that BSTZ was also up to no good, and somehow, Iviewit counsel again was working against Iviewit. Once it was fully understood what BSTZ had done or not done, charges were filed with OED at the USPTO, notice was given to federal, state and international authorities of their involvement and soon to be filed charges are forthcoming with the state bar association of California. BSTZ for their involvement and furtherance of the crimes, was included in the filings of fraud upon the USPTO, filed with the USPTO.
It can only be assumed that at some point BSTZ and perhaps Irell (although no information currently suggests Irell's involvement, other than the referral to counsel BSTZ) were recruited by the Defendants. Conspiratorial involvement is evidenced in the fact that BSTZ was fully aware of the claims Iviewit was making into fraudulent filings by prior counsel and others and convinced Iviewit they were correcting and notifying the authorities. BSTZ failed to do anything, and in fact, it will be evidenced herein, they further perpetuated the former frauds and filed applications that were materially false and misleading in Japan and at the EPO. It was the misinformation in the BSTZ dockets sent to the USPTO where evidence was first found that the IP dockets were materially false.
20. THE SCHIFFRIN AND BARROWAY AFFAIR AND THE COVER UP AT LABARGA'S COURT
SB was brought to the company while M. Welsch was acting as USB representative to look at both financing the company and providing legal services for the multitudes of claims against the various law firms and other perpetrators. SB entered into the following signed and binding letter of understanding, after over a year of due diligence including meetings with other Iviewit counsel Greenberg Traurig, Selz, Garber and BSTZ regarding the crimes, they signed up to defend and fund Iviewit as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - SB Binding Letter of Understanding ("LOU").
Iviewit alleges SB became involved and signed the attached agreement after working with Iviewit counsel Prochotska and several other leading law firms. After reviewing all allegations and evidence against the perpetrators, SB committed to two million dollars of funding upon signing which they breached shortly after signing only paying Iviewit a minuscule amount of the LOU terms. Immediately prior to signing the LOU, SB made unauthorized contact with Proskauer partners Leon Gold ("Gold") and others, and then notified Iviewit Proskauer had agreed to an enormous settlement. Based on this information they were immediately signed the LOU. SB further stated immediate funding of the company would take place upon signing and a buyout of Crossbow/DiStream was to be funded as promised repeatedly to Rogers who requested such confirmation prior to funding the legal fees necessary to effectuate the deal. SB began immediately taking over as Iviewit counsel in the Litigation in Florida and filed a motion to be counsel accepted by Labarga and clearly allowed for in the legal retainer portion of the LOU.
Suddenly, after signing the LOU and prior to funding all but a few dollars of their investment commitment and acting as legal counsel they began failing almost immediately on their funding and LOU commitments. Then SB did an about face and proposed it would be best to settle with Proskauer for no damages? Iviewit would give a full release of Proskauer from liability and there would be no economic gain to Iviewit Shareholders as promised. Red flags were immediately raised by counsels, Garber of Flaster representing Bernstein personally, Prochotska acting as advisor and Selz representing Iviewit. Proskauer and SB then proposed the following settlement document, drafted and controlled by Proskauer, Exhibit “” - SB Proposed Proskauer Litigation Settlement. It is interesting to note the companies Proskauer has listed for release fail to include Iviewit Technologies, Inc. f.k.a Iviewit Holdings, Inc. Telling it is, in that it would have raised enormous red flags at the time of settlement to show this company, as no one knew two Iviewit Holdings, Inc. existed and no Board or management, not named herein as conspirators, knew of this transaction.
The settlement was given to Bernstein a day before the scheduled trial in the Litigation, with the order from SB, to sign immediately leaving Bernstein a few hours to review the settlement. Immediately upon review of the settlement, Bernstein noticed the settlement asked for release from parties not even a party to the Litigation and whom were not sent copies for review or signature. Bernstein noted in the original draft there were no protections in place for the patents. In fact, the document would have released Proskauer from any damages caused the patents by their actions. The settlement attempted to additionally release them from the state bar actions filed against them.
Bernstein noted the document clearly stated all signors must have the document reviewed by counsel prior to signing and Bernstein called for counsel both personally and corporately, since SB was precluded when asked how they were representing all the parties, including themselves as one of the largest shareholders under the LOU without conflict. SB in negotiating the settlement, negotiated for people with no authority and who were not knowledgeable they had been personally included. Bernstein was asked to sign personally, although not personally involved in the Litigation. Upon requesting counsel, threats began by SB partner Narine, who claimed if the settlement was not signed without review, funding would not be forthcoming on the already signed and binding LOU, that called for two million dollars and unlimited legal fees to commenced upon signing.
Bernstein further demanded counsel for all parties named in the settlement, only to find several parties did not even know they were named in such document and had not had representation. Since the language demanded parties be counseled, Bernstein demanded counsel and SB agreed to retain Flaster for Bernstein personally and Selz to review for the Iviewit Shareholders. Other individuals named without authorization were Simon Bernstein and P. Stephen Lamont both who had no counsel representing them personally and who were in no way personally involved in the Litigation.
Upon review of the document from Selz and Garber it was immediately noted the signing of the document by an officer of the company would involve rectifying hosts of legal issues first, such as Iviewit needed a board and officers, that had legal responsibility to sign. None existed and it was pointed out to represent a severe liability to anyone signing and a criminal act potentially. Further, since the settlement inured no benefit to Iviewit Shareholders instead putting them at total risk to the Proskauer caused damage to the patents. All this for no money after being promised the moon was highly unethical and anyone representing the company in such worthless settlement with potential catastrophic liability was at risk. Garber and Selz wanted a patent opinion regarding the potential liabilities to Iviewit Shareholders and Bernstein and both insisted such document would have to carve out of the release damages caused to the patents by Proskauer. It was shown that without thorough due-diligence to protect the Iviewit Shareholders the officers signing such settlement document would have to be assured all corporate governance and compliance issues that had gone south illegally would have to be executed first and it could be several months to complete such governance issues if possible considering the circumstances. The fact the Board may have improperly disbanded due to the Proskauer caused circumstances and other issues under investigation, posed problems that had to be resolved before any settlement could be signed. Finally both Selz, Rogers and Garber questioned how SB could be negotiating a settlement as counsel for Iviewit conflict waivers in place for the too numerous conflicts SB was already representing.
Upon Garber and Selz contacting Narine, it was decided the settlement was impossible to sign in a few hours. Narine stated SB was going to plan to go to trial with Proskauer the next day and begin representing Iviewit in the Litigation in conjunction with Selz. After failing to settle with Proskauer, unable to answer a single legal issue raised by Selz or Garber, SB stated they were representing Iviewit at trial the next day with Selz. Selz and Bernstein showed up for trial the next day only to find out the trial had been postponed unilaterally by Proskauer and Labarga, and SB, Selz and Iviewit were not notified of the cancellation. SB then ordered Selz to stand down stating they were taking over the case entirely and SB paid Selz's fees in entirety, again acting under the LOU. SB then took possession, through payment of a copy service bill, again acting under the LOU, for copies of the Proskauer files that had been court ordered for production and where at Sir Speedy to begin a cram session with Selz of the Litigation matters.
A hearing was scheduled to reschedule the trial usurped and here is where things began an effort to subterfuge Iviewit of legal rights and access to fair and impartial due process, knowing they could face the witnesses and evidence against them in any court of law, any court that could not be purchased or infiltrated to derail any legal actions. At the rehearing to reschedule, Selz's motion to withdraw was granted. In a surprise motion, SB also motioned to withdraw, stating falsely Selz would be representing Iviewit and failing to inform the court they were in a binding legal retainer LOU to provide representation or represent Iviewit directly and further they had given Selz written orders to stand down. Labarga granted both Selz and SB motions to withdraw from the case and rescheduled the trial, leaving Iviewit with no legal representation.
SB then advised Selz to not turn over the Proskauer files to Iviewit, although they legally were Iviewit's and attempted to deprive Iviewit of the files necessary for their case. Selz was unreachable for some time after and when Iviewit finally reached him, there was very little time to trial, and without case files from either Selz, or the Proskauer files obtained in production it was impossible to find counsel to represent Iviewit days before the trial. Selz, although his bill was paid in full for services, suddenly declined to represent Iviewit and gave no further reason. Selz then tried to preclude Bernstein from gaining access to the Proskauer files and Bernstein showed up at Selz's offices unannounced and demanded the return of the Iviewit files that were not in any way the property of Selz. Bernstein showed Selz the files were paid for under an Iviewit bill and SB had no right or interest in the files at that point having breached their contract causing disastrous consequences to Shareholders and depriving Iviewit of counsel. Selz called Narine to get approval to release the document and Narine attempted to have Selz not turn over the Proskauer files. These files were necessary for Iviewit to find new counsel and prepare for a trial rescheduled only days away by Labarga, whereby Bernstein began to simply remove all nine or so large boxes.
Iviewit pleaded with the court to find time to get counsel, then motioned the court to recluse Labarga for his actions in granting two Iviewit counsels to withdraw on the eve of trial under false pretenses and leaving Iviewit without representation. Labarga was cited as violating a number of judicial canons, including failure to report Rubenstein's perjury and others. Labarga denied the motion to recluse himself. Labarga refused to allow Iviewit time to secure new counsel and entered a default judgment for failure to obtain replacement counsel. Effectively this was a denial of counsel by Labarga, a railroading of the trial where the evidence in the counter complaint would have come out and Rubenstein and Triggs were already being cited for perjured statements to the court. Other evidence presented to Labarga were clear and convincing, and Rubenstein had been requested by Labarga himself to resume his deposition and answer the questions he had refused in the first one. Where it was obvious when Labarga ordered Rubenstein back to answer more questions, Rubenstein had perjured himself to Labarga when he wrote he knew nothing and was being harassed. Here was absolute proof his claims were false and such re-deposition would have revealed further the totality of the claims alleged in the counter complaint were true and Labarga instead hands Proskauer a default? Had Labarga acted the onion would have peeled and the irrefutable fact Rubenstein had perjured himself exposed, there was no defense.
Wheeler on the eve of trial, drops off 800 pages of new documents, many even implicating of Rubenstein's involvement now that he was caught, and Wheeler states they are newly found. Months after production was due, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Motion for Trial Continuation. After reviewing the documents submitted five days before trial, Selz offers this message to Iviewit after reviewing some of the evidence, EXHIBIT “” - Selz Taped Message. Selz predicated his opinion on these new documents that contained Proskauer's own records indicating Rubenstein's involvement, involvement in review of the patents and patent meetings.
Rubenstein knowing he committed perjury and knowing he is going to be re-deposed now starts writing statements to Labarga trying to explain some of his involvement, proof his first statement to that court of knowing nothing and being harassed by Iviewit was false and felonious, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Rubenstein Statement to Labarga. Rubenstein's own statements here, constitute enough evidence he had more knowledge than stated in his first statement to the court and such affidavit presents unlimited questions as to why he now has knowledge. Labarga should have cited him for contempt and perjury and at minimum reported the crimes to the authorities.
Rubenstein's statement stands entirely in diametric opposition to his statements to the First Department DDC as well, also given under oath in official proceedings. Rubenstein claimed on the one hand initially he had no involvement with Iviewit other than a referral to Joao in both proceedings and now his deposition and statements to Labarga conflicted these entirely. First Department DDC was sent direct evidence, in rebuttal to Rubenstein's response to the initial bar complaint against him, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit Rebuttal to Rubenstein Bar Complaint Response, showing to that Tribunal perjury and false and misleading information had been given in his response to his bar complaint. There were major conflicts at the disciplinary departments in Florida and New York and Triggs was also in conflict in the Litigation in conflict with public office rules, all unknown at the time but it was getting obvious that somehow all of this was getting overlooked.
TFB was also notified Wheeler had perjured himself and had transmitted false information and statements in his response to his bar complaint in regards to Rubenstein's involvement. There were now verifiably false statements conflicting at every tribunal and somehow they continued to evade prosecution. Clear and concise evidence, similar to what is contained herein and in exhibit was presented to Labarga, to TFB and First Department DDC, now including crimes committed against the United States and foreign nations. Rubenstein was confronted with billings over a three year period fraught with his name, evidence from senior AOLTW/WB advanced technologists claiming they had spoke to Rubenstein and he opined favorably regarding the Iviewit technologies, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - AOLTW Letter Rubenstein Opined On Iviewit Technologies. Evidence from former Iviewit CEO Lamont showed meetings with Rubenstein, Rubenstein admits to many meetings in deposition inapposite his former statements, evidence shows him listed as an advisor to the Board in a Wachovia Private Placement used for SBA loan compliance. Rubenstein begins to recollect meetings but refuses to answer questions regarding them claiming conflict, when if he were not counsel what conflict. From his deposition you see Rubenstein had far more knowledge and involvement than his prior sworn statements to Labarga. This constitutes clear and convincing evidence of false statements to tribunals and then perjury. Rubenstein attempts to wrangle out of explanation after explanation of his proven involvement submitting insane and out of order letters to the court trying to cover his ass. When asked about specific references to his involvement in specific Proskauer billings (keep in mind, this is Proskauer's billing case) Rubenstein refuses to answer why he is talking to investors and receiving patent portfolios in the bills. Why his name is even in the bill over the years makes his former statements false. From Rubenstein's prior statement to the judge, he never was involved in any Iviewit account bills and he did nothing other than refer the patent work to his former firm and Joao. The bills, as evidenced herein and in exhibit, reveal far more involvement by Rubenstein and Wheeler including sending patent portfolios to Rubenstein, for review for investor meetings. AOLTW/WB claims in writing Rubenstein opined on the patents and it is evidenced Utley is sending Rubenstein patent office actions as an “Advisor to the board. The testimony of Board members and investors directly states Rubenstein was on the Advisory Board and whose opinion was most relied on to induce their investments.
After the refusal of the counter complaint filed by Iviewit, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit Counter Complaint on a time technicality, even though initially Iviewit was unaware there was an action being represented by unauthorized counsel. This denial of the counter complaint represents the first denial, in a long list of denials of due process and stripping of legal rights and access to the courts. Evidence reveals Proskauer sued companies in the litigation and such companies were opened without authorization of the company and are not owned by the Shareholders. Patents now appear to have been improperly and fraudulently assigned or written to such companies. From the Arthur Andersen audit it now appears Proskauer may own these companies entirely and the suits. The counter complaint was filed by licensed attorney Selz and Prochotska who had worked over a year in understanding the evidence presented and attempting to unravel the conspiracy and it's components. The allegations of the counter complaint contain evidence of fraud on the USPTO by Proskauer and all the claims of criminal activity occur before the fee dispute case, Labarga was obligated to report such findings to the proper authorities and failed his judicial canons in concealing the crimes. Iviewit was unable due to the denial of due process and denial of counsel to file proper appeals and Selz further refused to represent Iviewit, with no sound rational. SB under the signed and binding LOU was signed into such legal service retainer to provide counsel and funds to the company. SB derailed other investors and other legal remedies available and then after committing and signing the LOU abandoned Iviewit, with no counsel and no funds, inapposite of the signed and binding LOU.
It is presumed by Iviewit based on SB's actions, the actions of Upon production of all of their files, Proskauer fails to provide evidence of Iviewit Shareholders interests in Iviewit Holdings, Inc. f/k/a Uview.com, Inc. and this supports the Andersen audit information showing they too could not find ownership and no records prove the existence of an Iviewit ownership interest. Andersen failed to find stock certificates and records for this transaction, Proskauer failed to provide them under court ordered production. This represents fraud not only on Iviewit Shareholders but on government agencies, including but not limited to the federally backed SBA, the USPTO, securities fraud and fraud on state corporate formation departments. All of these crimes have been reported to federal authorities and further additional federal filings are soon to take place across a host of state, federal and international authorities based on this new and recently discovered information. Crossbow's Warner signing of fraud charges against these law firms and others has been transmitted to federal and state authorities as further corroborates evidence of Iviewit's account of events.
No longer did this case transcend to Iviewit's responsibility to press the claims, but now such responsibility fell on the investigatory bodies and courts presented with clear and convincing evidence of fraud upon the United States and international governments. A fraud perpetrated and covered in civil court that represents an attempt to deny Inventors their rights to their inventions and then deny Inventors due process and finally deny investigation into fraud on government agencies.
21. THE CONTINUATION AND PERPETUATION OF FRAUD ON THE EPO AND NEW FRAUD ON THE JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE
22. THE BUSTING OF BSTZ
BSTZ further comes under scrutiny as Iviewit becomes aware of certain evidence foreign and US authorities had not been notified of the crimes by either BSTZ or foreign associate Molyneaux, as they had claimed they were doing and all to the surprise of Iviewit. Molyneaux further claims he is unaware of filings given by Iviewit to BSTZ, that include the allegations against the former attorneys, for filing in the EPO. Molyneaux claims other than from initial conversations with inventor Bernstein and BSTZ when he was first retained, he was not ever given further directions on what to do regarding the inventor fraud. Iviewit had prepared filings for responses to office actions at the EPO asking for extensions on the responses, until the matters of fraud, wrong inventors and assignments could be investigated in the USPTO by Moatz. Iviewit was led to believe BSTZ had filed the fraud allegations and extensions with Molyneaux and believed Molyneaux had filed such responses. With the filing date looming for action, BSTZ suddenly refuses call after call from Iviewit regarding sending over confirmation of the filings. Iviewit therefore contacted Molyneaux directly in London and Molyneaux with no time left before filing was due, stated to send the filing of fraud to him and he would file the charges. Additionally, he claimed he was going to file a separate response directed at the claims in the office action, that BSTZ had forwarded him, but made no mention of the fraud or changes necessary to correct inventorship and the likes prior to making action. On information and belief, Molyneaux performed his duties of candor and filed the claims of fraud and all after review of the problems inherent in the filings, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Molyneaux Files Charges of Fraud Upon the EPO on Behalf of Iviewit.
Immediately after filing such charges BSTZ becomes hostile with Iviewit and claims to know nothing about the charges of fraud. These claims are contradicted by a mass of evidence and witnesses, including lawyers reviewing the matters for Iviewit over a two year period. All stand in opposition to such claim of ignorance and providing another link to BSTZ's conspiratorial role in covering up and further aiding and abetting Defendants. Only a few days after the filing in Europe, BSTZ knew the filing was a major catastrophe, and it exposed they were not following client orders and were in fact misleading Iviewit. Molyneaux, with no prior notice, suddenly leaves his firm in London and the firm WHAD closes their London patent offices, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Molyneaux Departure Letter. Again this left Iviewit without counsel through improper withdrawal as patent counsel where actions are due imminently and false statements were made as to the reason WHAD was withdrawing the eve of filings due and immediately after filing fraud charges. BSTZ once they realize Molyneaux had let the “cat out of the bag” and they were being requested to transfer copies of the patent files to several investigatory agencies, attempts to claim, after two years, they know nothing about past patent problems. BSTZ then jumps ship on Iviewit as counsel in attempts to sabotage the US filings, withdrawing as counsel based on false and misleading information. Failing to disclose the true reason for their withdrawal, all in violation of multitudes ethical and criminal misconduct as defined further herein.
BSTZ then takes steps to destroy, through loss, the Iviewit patent records of three prior law firms as they find Iviewit has contacted Moatz directly, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - 2003 11 14 Lamont Request for IP Docket and EXHIBIT “” - 2004 01 10 Iviewit to BSTZ Letter. Iviewit similarly called the JPO and again what was unearthed was unbelievable. In Japan, the filings were made post Utley's termination and BSTZ already knew Utley was not an inventor, even with this knowledge they filed additional new patents in Utley's name. This was most fascinating, as BSTZ's own patent portfolios suddenly change, as Iviewit requests a portfolio for investigators and Moatz and this now verifies evidence of further fraud that had been concealed up to that point, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - BSTZ Portfolio Showing Japanese Patent Applications In Utley's Name. This IP docket, provides new evidence of filings in Utley's name but BSTZ attempts to state they were filed in August of 2000. The JPO filing information states they were not filed by BSTZ until approximately January of 2002, long after Utley was terminated in early 2001 and after BSTZ was supposed to be removing Utley from patents. The JPO information directly contradicts the BSTZ portfolio information, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Japanese Filing Information Utley Patents, this evidence was submitted to Moatz and is currently under investigation. Further, when one looks at the JPO filings, one sees submitted with the application a document with a blanked out date stamp, which the JPO rejects and wants additional information. Such document was sent to Moatz for investigation and clarification, since the document was filed in the United States originally, imagine a patent confirmation document with the date intentionally blanked out. Such information is pending investigation from the USPTO and the obvious blanking out of the document suggests further fraud on the USPTO. The document represents simultaneous claims of fraud on the USPTO, as well as the JPO, as reported in the OED complaint filings under investigation. The JPO has been advised of the fraud and investigations are pending and information submitted.
23. INVESTIGATIONS AT THE PATENT OFFICE
24. CONSPIRATORIAL RING TWO (CROSSBOW VENTURES AND DISTREAM INTERACTIVE, INC.) OR CONTINUATION OF CONSPIRACY ONE
Crossbow, having gained valuable inside information, from both their Board involvement and investment due diligence proceeded to use such information to the detriment of the Iviewit Shareholders. Crossbow attempted to derail the Iviewit companies through a series of actions intended to cause damage to the business and at the same time saddle the company with secured debt. Crossbow and Kane, sold to the Board a plan to secure the patents with loans of one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000.00). Such securitization of the investment was intended to protect the Iviewit Shareholders in the event actions were taken against the company by all of those terminated and being investigated, including but not limited to, Utley, Reale, Hersh, Buchsbaum, Proskauer, Foley and MLGWS.
Crossbow, after finding out from AOLTW/WB, Sony and others, Iviewit technologies were to be used for a major five studio digital download project, and both companies were exploring hardware/software licenses with Iviewit, then began a series of actions, to knock out the Iviewit Shareholders and finish off the companies through a series of more illegal actions including: fraud on the SBA, fraudulent sale of the company while writing off the SBA loans, fraudulent patent assignments
25. FRAUD UPON AIG AND GENERAL RE - INSURANCE FRAUD ON THE D&O POLICY
26. THE FILING OF BAR COMPLAINTS WITH THE STATES OF NEW YORK, FLORIDA AND VIRGINIA
27. THE FILING OF PATENT BAR COMPLAINTS WITH THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE AGAINST IVIEWIT PATENT COUNSEL
Upon learning of the patent problems, and at every uncovering of further information, Moatz was contacted, apprised of the situation, and evidence submitted including:
1. Joao patenting Iviewit inventions in his name,
2. information regarding the two sets of patents,
3. Utley's threat on Bernstein's life,
4. BSTZ's continued perpetuation of the crimes
5. the EPO was notified of similar crimes and,
6. BSTZ's attempt to destroy the records of three law firms.
Finally, upon the gathering of enough evidence, formal complaints were filed with Moatz, against each of the attorneys and others involved in the perpetuating fraud not only against the Iviewit Shareholders and Inventors but fraud upon the USPTO. Moatz requested formal complaints be filed against the attorneys with his offices and OED was sent complaints. Such complaints have moved into an investigatory phase with Director Moatz handling them directly and so began the investigation of what exactly had been filed with the USPTO and by whom. The complaints are all still under investigation. Charges of fraud upon the USPTO have been levied and are under investigation of the following patent and trademark applications, EXHIBIT “” - List of Patent and Trademark Suspensions.
Attorney complaints have been filed with the USPTO OED on the following attorneys and law firms and attorneys: Proskauer, MLGWS, Foley, BSTZ, CW, SB, Rubenstein, Joao, Dick, Boehm, Becker, Coester, Zafman, Ahmini, Wheeler, Utley, Huisman, Intel/R3D. Attorney complaints led to the patent office assembling a team of representatives to aid Iviewit who is now not represented by any counsel before the USPTO. Moatz aided moving the patents into six-month suspensions so as to prevent further damages, and has revived several abandoned patent applications and several more are under consideration by the Commissioner for suspensions, while all matters are under investigation.
The USPTO has confirmed patent applications invested in by investors have no rights inuring to them as certain patent applications are not property of Iviewit, as was told to investors and Inventors by the Defendants. EXHIBIT “” - USPTO Letter Regarding Non-Ownership)
The patent office information led to the uncovering the shell game of corporations and shell game of patents. This is when the various pieces of crime all began to piece together to show just how elaborate of a scheme this really was. Now that this evidence exists and that patents are suspended, Iviewit Shareholder's have repeatedly demanded answers to the questions of just why the patent office has suspended the patents and demanded accounting and transactional papers for all the thirteen or so Iviewit entities known to exist. Yet all have failed to provide such information to Shareholders, even after being made aware of ongoing state and federal investigations.
28. FILINGS WITH FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITIES
The Boca PD was first contacted by Kasser and Miller. Iviewit was under the impression far more was being reported and did not know Kasser and Miller were working to obstruct justice and fraud the Iviewit Shareholders.
The Long Beach Federal Bureau of Investigation and Rancho Palos Verdes Police Department were notified of the Utley stolen patents and the threats on inventor Bernstein's life.
Upon learning of the bogus lawsuit and involuntary bankruptcy, evidence began to surface leading to formal complaints with several investigatory and regulatory agencies. Evidence had to be gathered and reviewed and compared for fraud, complaints then had to be generated for each crime uncovered in a variety of jurisdictions.
Once such review showed initial crimes and conspiracy, charges were then made in the counter complaint filed in the Litigation.
Labarga's refusal to accept the counter complaint led to complaints being filed against Labarga for failing to notify the authorities in violation of his ethical cannons.
Complaints were then filed with the state bars against attorneys Wheeler, Joao and Rubenstein, the main known conspirators at the time. A complaint was later filed against Dick in Virginia.
A complaint was filed with the West Palm Beach Federal Bureau of Investigation who has now brought such complaint to the United States Attorney for the southern district of Florida and is working with the USPTO.
It was found that Kasser and Miller had not followed through with the complaints with Boca PD on behalf of the Iviewit Shareholders as was told to management. New management filed two additional complaints for stolen patents and stolen investment funds.
Boca PD in conjunction with the district attorney of Florida then supposedly brought the complaints to the SEC for joint investigation according to Boca PD. The truth of these claims by Boca PD is now in question as the SEC denied knowledge of being informed, directly claiming that the information that Boca PD claimed was false. A complaint was filed with the Chief of Police and internal affairs of Boca PD, all failing to follow through with investigation or disclose if they are conflicted or have acted wrongfully.
A complaint was filed with the EPO against all conspirators known at that time.
A complaint was filed with the AICPA against Goldstein, Lewin and E. Lewin
A complaint was filed with Department of Business and Professional Regulation against Lewin and E. Lewin
A complaint was filed with the SBA Inspector General and they are beginning to audit their investment starting with Crossbow,
Complaints pending filing include:
1. Internal Revenue Service
2. State department of Delaware
3. State Department of Florida - Boca Raton PD notified
4. New York PD
5. The Commission on Ethics for the state of Florida
6. The Commission on Ethics for the state of New York
7. The Virginia Supreme Court
8. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
9. The California Bar
29. THE UNCOVERING OF CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AT THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK - FIRST DEPT, SECOND DEPARTMENT & COURT OF APPEALS. CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH KAYE AND Krane FORMER NEW YORK BAR PRESIDENT
Recently, Proskauer opened an ethics department to go with their newly formed patent department. The head of the ethics department, Krane, is caught in a conflict of interest, directly acting as counsel for Proskauer in bar complaints against Proskauer and its partners, while having a public office position with the department investigating the charges. Krane represents his partners while having duties as the President of the New York State Bar Association, in violation of his public offices and in violation of New York law. All of this and more ahead, as one learns of the enormity of the crimes and volume of federal, state and international laws broken in the commission and cover-up of such crimes. Crimes where attorneys trusted to patent inventions for Inventors are the culpable criminals, the laws work against the Inventors and against the intent of the Constitution. Article I, Section VIII, Clause VIII, is intended to protect the small inventor and guarantee rights to any inventor in their inventions. Those entrusted to uphold such laws have violated the rules to allow the corrupted attorneys to further their crimes and further suppress the Inventors' of their rights. Conflicts of interest and appearances of impropriety are found and ordered by Supreme Court orders for investigations against Krane and such investigations have been denied due process, even when court ordered. The legal system becoming accomplice to such crimes against the very Constitution where oaths under G-D were taken to uphold such symbol of our freedom. The lawmakers and law enforcers have become further corrupted attempting to skirt the laws of their states and have looked the other way at crimes were the evidence have been conclusive and overwhelming. Those thrashing the Constitution and its intent are as knowledgeable of upholding it, as breaking it. Were at every turn, diabolical and devious ploys have been instituted by those accused, with the intent of not only stealing the Inventions but destroying the Inventors and Iviewit Shareholders of their rights to their inventions.
The attorneys who have stolen the Inventions are the largest benefactors of the technologies and even when caught, and direct and confirmed evidence has been presented to the authorities, somehow they allude formal prosecution. The crimes committed not only are against the Inventors and Iviewit Shareholders but are also against the United States and its agencies. Perhaps making this the saddest story in American history of invention one that will cause disastrous loss of public confidence in the patent office, patent attorneys, state bar agencies and thereby threaten the very fabric of the Constitution leaving the country with a distaste and distrust of the entirety of the legal system. The inability to prosecute attorneys by state bars and other legal means causes loss of confidence in the state bars showing they have failed in the internal regulation of their members. Such internal regulation appears to have corrupted to such a level as to become accomplice in stealing the Inventions and the greed of those entrusted to protect such system have failed and become the very criminals they once sought to protect against. One wonders why have a Constitution, if those charged with upholding it are violating it. When the public becomes aware of the crimes and those involved in committing them and covering them up and how they denied due process to evade prosecution, faith in the system will crumble. The Forefathers in creating the Constitution placed the Inventors' rights at the very beginning of the Constitution for it is fundamental our freedom and democracy.
Public office corruption exposed, now appears to be covered up by further public office corruption when Krane is caught,. The rules regulating the First Department state Krane as a member of the First Department DDC, must be investigated and respond to the evidence against him. It is in the public interest to have public officers respond when caught in conflict and such public office violations are violations of New York state laws no matter your prominence in the courts. Yet, it appears one as prominent as Krane, with so much influence in the Supreme Court of New York disciplinary agencies, with national public office roles that influence attorney disciplinary rules was able to allude such investigation and escape prosecution or even response. Until the end of 2004, it seemed Krane was the key to the cover up for Proskauer and with Krane exposed such fair and impartial due process was only a moment away. One wonders how Krane alluded investigation, what could now be protecting him? Until only a few months ago, it remained a mystery. Nobody in the departments handling the complaints happened to disclose for two years of the investigatory process, the link to Proskauer's legal shield to cloak themselves from the law. The link to Iviewit, the link to Proskauer, the link to Krane, the link to the New York Supreme Courts and the link to the disciplinary departments, the only link having the power and personal interests to quash Iviewit Shareholders from due process in New York. The answer, Chief Judge of the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division, Judith Kaye. Kaye knows Krane who was her former law clerk. Kaye is married to none other than a senior Proskauer partner Stephen Kaye, a partner for no reason in the newly formed IP department at Proskauer. Through her direct marital interests to S. Kaye, Kaye owns, on information and belief, an interest in the Proskauer partnership. Through ownership interests in Proskauer, Kaye owns a small percentage of Iviewit stock. Kaye's husband S. Kaye is one of Proskauer's newly appointed IP partners at Proskauer, the department now specializing in Pools directly infringing on Iviewit Inventions. Kaye has a special conflict of interest because a conviction for Iviewit of Krane, Rubenstein, Proskauer and her husband in the disciplinary process in New York, equals catastrophic financial ruins for her personally and her husband, and possible lengthy federal prison sentences for the crimes and cover-ups. Kaye finally has been found promoting Proskauer from the pundit as the "in" firm to work for in New York.
In the petition by Iviewit it is asked of the Supreme Court First Department in a petition to move the complaints, by Chief Counsel of the First Department DDC and Iviewit, to move the complaints to “the next highest level of review void of conflict and the appearance of impropriety”.
After over a year of stagnation due to the conflicts and subterfuge created by Kane, Kaye and Proskauer, it became apparent why First Department DDC failed to investigate and even allowed Krane to further respond for Proskauer once he was confronted in conflict with his office position. In fact, while a member of the First Department DDC, undisclosed and concealed, Krane acts as counsel in the complaint against himself and Rubenstein and writes a death sentence letter when he fails to disclose his role and act as if he did not have conflict with the department. In fact, he would be found lying by Clerk of the First Department, Catherine Wolfe, she knew Krane from a First Department DDC committee role he was serving on at the same time he claimed not to have a role. At the time of the petition, Kaye is mentioned simply as a possible conflict with Krane through the former clerking relation. Iviewit was unaware of her larger conflicts, yet the rest of the disciplinary departments personnel involved must have known this conflict, as Krane and Kaye are the dominant forces of the departments and courts. The only party that did not know this was Iviewit, perhaps because everyone directly handling the complaints failed to disclose their conflicts up front and further evidence shows they intentionally concealed them. Upon discovering the Kaye conflict and contacting the newly appointed Second Department of New York, charged by the First Department orders to investigate, to inquire how Krane's investigation was proceeding, it further became evidenced by admission of the next reviewer, she had conflict with Krane, undisclosed prior to her review. As Chief Judge of the New York Courts Kaye not only has influence but oversight of the Supreme Court disciplinary departments. Kaye and Krane are two of the most prominent members of the New York courts and further at the top of its disciplinary agencies, thus it should not startle one to see in order to elevate from conflict in the New York courts, one must elevate outside of New York and Proskauer's controls.
30. FIRST DEPARTMENT ORDERED INVESTIGATION OF KRANE, Rubenstein AND Joao
A petition, EXHIBIT “” - Cahill motion to move Rubenstein and Joao) was filed by the Chief Counsel of the First Dept., Thomas J. Cahill ("Cahill"), in the matter of attorneys and counselors at law Rubenstein, Case 2003.0531 ("Rubenstein Complaint") & Joao, Case 2003.0532 ("Joao Complaint") in a motion to move the matter from conflict of interest and the appearance of impropriety caused by Krane, Case 2004.1883 ("Krane Complaint"). Conflict that appears to have led to the complaints being denied due-process for eighteen months. Krane being one of the most influential members of the First Dept with Departmental positions undisclosed during his response on behalf of Rubenstein and on behalf of himself, pro-se. This matter has now been submitted to a panel of five justices of the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division First Department for review. (EXHIBIT “” - Cahill Motion).
A petition, EXHIBIT “” - July 12th 2004 Cahill Motion to Move Krane was filed by Cahill, in the matter of attorney and counselor at law Krane regarding a conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety in the Krane Complaint, in a motion to move the matter from the conflict of interest and the appearance of impropriety caused by Krane, in the Krane Complaint. This matter has now been submitted to a panel of five justices of the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division: First Department for review.
A petition, EXHIBIT “” - July 8th 2004 Iviewit Motion to move Rubenstein, Joao, Krane, Proskauer & Meltzer Complaints has been filed by Iviewit, in the matter of attorneys and counselors at law Rubenstein, Joao, in a motion to move the matter from conflict of interest and the appearance of impropriety caused by Krane. The series of events in New York have shown the appearance of impropriety at the First Dept. and have led to a Complaint against Chief Counsel, Cahill, Inquiry Number 2004.1122, EXHIBIT “” - ("Cahill Complaint"), which has now been transferred from Paul J. Curran ("Curran"), Chairman of the First Dept., transferred in accordance with the NYCCR rules via a letter dated, EXHIBIT “” - June 26th 2004 Letter from Curran to Gold re Cahill Complaint to special counsel for the First Dept., Martin R. Gold ("Gold"). A complaint was filed with the First Dept. a petition, Iviewit petition to move complaint against Cahill for Conflict and Appearance of Impropriety in the matter of the Cahill Complaint EXHIBIT “” - Cahill Complaint.
The series of events in New York have shown the appearance of impropriety at the First Dept. and have led to a Complaint against Krane, EXHIBIT “” - ("Krane Complaint 1") including charges of conflict of interest, appearance of impropriety and abuse of public offices. This led to a response by Krane whereby he authored a response to the complaint lodged against him at the First Department and authored such response while holding a current undisclosed position at the First Department, EXHIBIT “” - May 21st 2004 - Krane Response.
This response led to a rebuttal and another formal complaint, EXHIBIT “” - ("Krane Complaint 2") - Complaint filed with Paul Curran, Chairman, First Dept and finally, once the conflict was acknowledged this led to Cahill and Iviewit both motioning the First Department to have the matters moved due to conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety.
The series of events in New York have shown the appearance of impropriety at the First Dept and have led to a further complaints against Rubenstein, et al. including charges of conflict of interest and abuse of public offices, EXHIBIT “” - ("Rubenstein Complaint").
The series of events regarding the stolen patents have led to a complaint filed at the First Dept. against Joao, EXHIBIT “” - (Joao Complaint).
The series of events in New York have shown the appearance of impropriety caused by conflicts of interest and abuses of public offices at the First Dept by Proskauer partners and has led to a complaint against Proskauer Rose LLP ("Proskauer Complaint") pending docket number with the First Dept.
Forcing the complaints against Rubenstein, Joao and now a complaint against Krane to be moved from the conflict for immediate investigation and a New York minute has long past, one must ask how. Chief Counsel of the First Department DDC filed a motion, alongside Iviewit and upon discovering the conflict, First Department ordered the complaints moved for “investigation” by a panel of five justices concurring on the matter of Krane, Rubenstein and Joao. Unbelievably, upon being transferred for investigation, Krane miraculously is spared investigation, for the moment, by failure to enforce the court order, again Iviewit Shareholders are denied due process. A refusal to the transferred investigatory agency, the Second Department DDC to investigate despite court order whereby Krane is dismissed without investigation and without a single question asked or answered, and not a single piece of evidence reviewed.
31. THE UNCOVERING OF CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AT FLORIDA SUPREME COURT & THE FLORIDA BAR
EXHIBIT “” - Florida Supreme Court Case - SC04-1078 in the matter of Iviewit Holdings, Inc., v. The Florida Bar has resulted from the finding of yet another Proskauer partner involved in a conflict of interest that conveys the appearance of impropriety and further exemplifies another abuse of public office, a public office which the Florida Supreme Court has direct oversight responsibility for.
A complaint was filed with The Florida Bar against Wheeler, The Florida Bar case no. 2003-51,109 (15C), EXHIBIT “” - ("Wheeler Complaint") containing charges relating to the theft of patents and a multiplicity of other ethical, criminal and civil charges against Wheeler.
The finding of a conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety resulting from a conflicted public official and partner of Wheeler, tendering a response for Wheeler in the first complaint has led to a second Florida Bar complaint against Wheeler, The Florida Bar case no., pending assignment EXHIBIT “” - ("Wheeler Complaint 2").
Due to the conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety caused in the Wheeler Complaint, Iviewit has filed with The Florida Bar a complaint against Triggs, for violations of conflicts of interest with his public office position of Grievance Committee Member with The Florida Bar, resulting in a complaint against Triggs for conflict of interest, appearance of impropriety, and abuse of public office. The complaint which evidences that Triggs made representation for Wheeler during a one year blackout period and Triggs was prohibited from representing any party during that time. Triggs within that period began representing Wheeler, a clear violation. Triggs also has personal interests in the matter since he is a Proskauer partner that certainly will suffer loss if Wheeler and Proskauer are found of wrongdoing at TFB, in any disciplinary action. The violation is in a case where the nexus of events leads to ruins for the firm of Proskauer as the case contains allegations of Wheeler committing fraud against state and federal agencies in violation of his professional conduct code and state and federal code, it is without doubt that the violation of office is far more serious than meets the eye initially.
Triggs at the time he acts in violation of his Grievance Committee Member rules, acts further in conflict by even accepting a case for Wheeler at TFB. Triggs is in a private civil litigation against Iviewit and further takes the Wheeler case at TFB, while still considered to be a former member of Grievance Committee under TFB policy. Triggs has conflicting interests in both cases against Iviewit and merely violates the conflict rules as if they do not exist. The blackout period is to prevent such occurrences as this giving Triggs has access to private government files at TFB for use in a private civil matter. Several other potential conflicts were noted in a complaint filed with TFB on Triggs, yet TFB refused to accept the complaint. Prior to even docketing it they attempted to dismiss the Wheeler case and rushed to destroy the files prior to reviewing the Triggs violations, which would have voided all prior review of the case against Wheeler. Triggs and Wheeler should have been cited for the conflict, an intentional conflict and for the appearance of impropriety which is overwhelming. Under the circumstances described herein, it would appear the conflict was intentional to gain influence at TFB and influence the outcome of the Wheeler Complaint already under review for faulty reviews by TFB. Had the Wheeler Complaint file been dismissed and the file destroyed with all records, it would have been far more difficult to prosecute Triggs without the records and events. TFB became more an attorney protection agency it appeared than a consumer agency and in refusing to accept complaints that were delivered to their offices and file or docket them procedurally, in affect, TFB was denying due process and denying the public the opportunity to bring complaints against attorneys and public officers, stopping them before they reached the door, all inapposite of Florida Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, Florida code and the Florida Constitution's intent in creating a state bar. The complaint is of public office violations of members of the Supreme Court agency TFB, this was an attempt to obstruct justice through the file destruction.
Iviewit contacted the FSC with the complaint against TFB and their efforts to deny due process, suppress evidence and obstruct justice. The FSC then accepted a Petition from Iviewit regarding the events, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - SC04-1078 Petition. In an emergency hearing to block the destruction of the file, the FSC ruled until further order of the court the file should be maintained, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - SC04-1078 Ruling.
That court, after a long delay and no response from TFB to the Petition, ordered TFB to respond to the Petition, evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - SC04-1078 Order. TFB in their response fails to respond to the charges in the Petition of public office violations and conflicts reaching the President of TFB. The President of TFB works in a small law firm with Wheeler's brother and was accepting months of emails from Iviewit regarding the private filings with TFB and never stated conflict may exist. When Triggs was found in conflict, we suddenly get a call from TFB legal counsel stating the President can no longer be involved and after researching her background the answer has an appearance of impropriety far reaching when viewed next to the same set of circumstances with NYSBA former bar president Krane. It almost appears knowing of the complaints against them, Proskauer not only formed an ethics department but then went ahead and had the most conflicted people either handle the complaints or aid in the railroading of the complaints.
TFB tenders a response void of answers to the allegations contained in the Petition and counsel for TFB, Eric Turner, tenders a response failing to even address the court properly or any of the parties, and then merely puts forth the prior review work of TFB on the Wheeler file stating the work product was done well. TFB fails to state a response to the Triggs conflicts, to the violations of public office and their refusal to accept a complaint. They do not respond either with affirmation or denial to charges of employee conflicts and hosts of other issues, as if they did not exist, evidenced EXHIBIT “” - TFB Response to Petition.
In response to such non-response, Iviewit filed a rebuttal that contained a request from the court for default, citing failure of TFB to respond to the petition items the court had ordered, evidenced EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit Rebuttal to TFB Response.
So one may ask, with evidence abundant of crimes against the United States in several allegations, with ongoing federal, state and international investigations open, with patents suspended by the Commissioner of Patents pending charges of fraud on the USPTO, how did the court then rule to abandon the case? How did that court then deny to hear further the petition, failing to force TFB to accept the Triggs complaint for disposition? How did that court aid in the suppression of evidence and obstruction in the following ruling where the FSC, after learning of their members in conflict now appears in a hurry, after reviewing the facts, to destroy the files. Files that are vital to showing public office violations of their members, their intent clear in the following ruling, evidenced in EXHIBIT [eib16] “” - SC04-1078 Denial of Petition.
In effect, the FSC denied Iviewit the ability to compel TFB, a Florida organization set up by the Florida Constitution and with FSC over sight, to investigate attorney misconduct, from disallowing the public to put forth a complaint against department members in clear violation of their office positions. Protecting the exposed members from even responding to allegations against them.
Due to the conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety in the Wheeler complaint, Iviewit filed with TFB a bar complaint against Eric Montel Turner, Chief Branch Discipline Counsel of TFB, EXHIBIT “” - ("Turner Complaint"), for possible involvement with Wheeler and Triggs in his handling of the Wheeler Complaint, whereby TFB, chose not file the complaint as a bar complaint but an internal employee affair. Turner thus alluded a response to the charges in his complaint, yet again another denial of due process, another instance where the public cannot make complaints against attorneys and have proper procedure applied, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Boggs/Iviewit Letters Regarding Turner Complaint.
Iviewit has found the President of The Florida Bar, Kelly Overstreet Johnson, is directly over sighted by J. Wheeler, brother of Wheeler, and this position may have been sought as a further mechanism to provide confidential government information in Iviewit's cases or to further bury and deny due process to Iviewit's complaints with TFB. In light of the Triggs conflict of interest and the appearance of impropriety this creates, this claim of executive office manipulation has added merit. In light of the Krane conflict of interest, the fact that this conflict penetrates to the highest levels also gives credibility and shows that Proskauer and other Defendants were positioning well within the state bar disciplinary departments to bury and keep buried, Iviewit's complaints.
32. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE SC04-1078 - ELIOT I. BERNSTEIN AND P. STEPHEN LAMONT V. THE FLORIDA BAR
33. THE COVER UP AT THE STATE SUPREME COURTS AND AFFILIATED BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN NEW YORK AND FLORIDA
34. THE FIRST DEPARTMENT DDC
35. THE SECOND DEPARTMENT
The matters of attorney complaints against Joao, Krane and Rubenstein have been transferred by the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division: First Department pending charges of conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety.
Second Department DDC upon orders from First Department to “investigate”, chooses to ignore the court ordered investigation, and has attempted to dismiss the complaint without investigation based on a cursory review. Review and investigation are materially different and investigation is demanded not only by the court but by the rules regulating the First Department DDC, when departmental conflicts are alleged against members. In a response to the transferred complaint on Krane, it is admitted that review was substituted for investigation, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Second Department Review of Krane. The letter shows the admitted failure to “investigate”, where First Department had already found evidence strong enough against Krane to “investigate”. The question was who was now pulling these strings to railroad the court ordered investigation of Krane. Krane did not even respond to the allegations, as to conflicts cited against him with his public office to the Second Department DDC, we find instead the attorney disciplinary departments which he controls put up a defense for him.
Upon calling Kearse at Second Department DDC it was found Kearse had personal and professional conflicts with Krane not disclosed prior to her handling of the case. When asked to explain her relationship to Krane in fair disclosure, Kearse refused and asked Iviewit to put the questions in writing and she would respond. Iviewit then filed a response to the Second Department DDC decision and requested disclosure of the conflicts of Kearse, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit Rebuttal to Second Department and Request for Conflict Disclosure. Before having to disclose the conflicts. admitted by Kearse, in call with attorney for Iviewit, Garber, former CEO Lamont, and Inventor Bernstein, Second Department attempts to hurry the complaints out the door, failing to follow the court order for investigation. Upon written complaint against Kearse for failure to disclose, she refuses to docket her complaint. The disclosure never came of Kearse's conflicts, because the Lawrence DiGiovanna ("DiGiovanna") Chairman of the Second Department DDC then writes a letter attempting to bury the whole affair, by affirming Kearse's decision and ignoring her conflicts and refusal to file and docket a complaint against her according to New York state law and in violating of the New York Constitution. DiGiovanna could not have relied on Kearse's decision without first disclosure of her conflict with Krane and Kaye and answers to how she had evaded a court ordered investigation of Krane. Evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Second Department Review by Chairman DiGiovanna.
This response by Second Department DDC is evidence that further denies due process to a court ordered investigation and therefore Iviewit filed the following response to the DiGiovanna letter with complaints against both he and Kearse for such failures of their duties and violations of court orders, as evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Iviewit Complaint and/or Inquiries Kearse and DiGiovanna. Investigation was ordered by First Department after reviewing charges of conflicts of interest and appearances of impropriety filed in addition to Iviewit by Cahill and First Department found enough to investigate it is impossible for an investigation to not take place other than unknown forces preventing due process.
This is when Iviewit learns Kaye is not only conflicted but that all investigators prior failed to elevate the matters out of the reach of Kaye and Krane and it is presumed that all the Justices that reviewed the matters knew that Kaye was married to S. Kaye, a Proskauer partner, who is a member of the newly formed Proskauer IP department. In the Iviewit petition to the First Department it was requested that the Justices move the complaints out of Krane's influence and at the time of the petition it was pointed out this would have to also elevate beyond Kaye's influence in that Krane was her former clerk. At the time of the petition, Kaye's marriage to a Proskauer partner being accused was unbeknownst to Iviewit. Kaye's marriage provides Kaye with direct ownership interest not only in Proskauer through the partnership but Kaye now owns via marriage a direct interest in Iviewit stock held by the Proskauer partners.
The reader once again must ask, how Krane has been able evade even a response explaining his actions.
36. THE VIRGINIA BAR
The Virginia State Bar has refuses to acknowledge that Dick has provided factually incorrect, false and misleading information in his response to a filed bar complaint. VSB has taken an adversarial position toward Iviewit, leading one to question if similar to New York and Florida conflicts and controls exist there. Again, since Krane has national recognition and influence, VSB may already have conflicts. Iviewit has filed a complaint against Dick of Foley, for his part in theft of patents and other ethical, criminal and civil matters with the Virginia State Bar ("VSB") in the Matter of Dick - VSB Docket No. 04-052-1366 ("Dick Complaint"). Iviewit states this matters outcome was tainted by the New York and Florida conflicts of interest discovered at the supreme court bar agencies, which were sent to Virginia with materially false and misleading information. The information influenced the decision of VSB regarding Dick, and Iviewit has contacted the VSB regarding such conflicts and is waiting for correspondence regarding same.
37. LABARGA
38. PERPETUATING THE ABUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST - AIDING AND ABETTING THE CRIMES
39. DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND INTERFERENCE WITH COUNSEL AND LEGAL SYSTEM
40. DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IN PROSECUTING PUBLIC OFFICE COMPLAINTS - LOSS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE - PERPETUATES CRIME
41. INTERFERENCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FURTHERED BY ABUSES OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND LOWER COURTS MANIPULATED BY CORRUPT ATTORNEYS
The integrity of the entire legal system is at stake and violations of the Constitution by those entrusted to uphold it are involved in perhaps the largest criminal infiltration into the legal system ever, where the patent office integrity of protecting the lowly inventor and upholding it's constitutionally sanctioned authority to do so stands to fail, causing failure in democracy, caused by those sworn to uphold it, no other court in the entire world is capable of the power to protect democracy, protect invention, protect inventors and protect the legal system from criminal infiltration by smart and educated criminal lawyers (not to be confused with lawyers who are studied and practicing criminal law) but thieves, common scum, scum that can permanently stain the reputation of the courts and the country to succeed in their crimes. As a pro-se litigant, let it be said there is no greater reason than all of those contained herein, to beg this Court to have original jurisdiction in these matters. The Constitution places the rights of the inventor before the creation of lower courts and this was done with intent. Without a patent system and protection and freedom of invention, we are not a democracy worth writing a constitution. We are no greater than Saddam Hussein taking everything for the king and starving the people, like any other corrupt leadership or corrupt dictatorship, the people stop inventing because it's not yours anyway. Our forefathers in designing the Constitution had thought to the pieces and there placement, you are now asked as the only Court, to uphold and save this mess from continuing. Iviewit has been to lawyers and they have corrupted and l-rd knows, with the stolen monies, the criminal lawyers have been able to entice others to further the scam. Iviewit has been to corrupted court rooms with judges that acted insane and usurped the right to counsel the day after canceling trials without notice. Iviewit has done the right thing and reported these crimes to the appropriate state bars only to find conflict and corruption. These criminal attorneys have blocked all forms of legal due process and at the same time have used every trick in the book, violated every ethical vow and oath under g-d that they have taken, to hurt and harm the Inventors and destroy Iviewit using the law and legal system as if the Constitution were toilet paper. These criminal attorneys need to be disciplined by nothing other than this Court for their crimes and to show the world that the legal system will not tolerate those who violate such g-d sworn oaths and commit federal, state and international crime abusing the legal system and then covering up with the law. To leave this open at lower courts allows so many more innocent people to be swayed by corruption or legitimate entities like the bars to be infiltrated to deny due process through more crimes and open the door for more damages, this Court must intervene. No more challenging case has been presented to this Court with the entirety of free commerce and the legal system at stake.
42. DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS CAUSES LOSS OF INVENTOR RIGHTS
The government and the courts and the rest of the world are using the inventions of the Inventors which has occurred due to the criminal organization proliferating them, even the government and courts stand to be issued cease and desists for their unauthorized uses of the technologies for much of the imaging and video on their sites. The government through Lockheed and others learned of the technologies with companies they are affiliated with.
43. DEFENDANT DEFENSES - STATED UNDER DEPOSITION AND IN SWORN STATEMENTS TO SUPREME COURT STATE BAR AGENCIES
a. Defendant Proskauer Defense
1. Proskauer - The crux of the Proskauer defense rests on the claims they did not do patent work, claim made under deposition in their law suit, claims to civil courts and claims to state Supreme Court bar associations. Claims that stand inapposite the entirety of evidence and witness statements. Attempting to claim they do not know about the technology and what is, denying they know the companies and the technologies and then being caught in perjured statements to Supreme Court State bars, state courts and under deposition. This argument is an attempt to distance Proskauer from the obvious conflicts Iviewit has with MPEGLA LLC and their interests in MPEGLA that stand inapposite of the interests of their former client. Such defense fails in that Proskauer not only did do the IP work through Rubenstein's newly acquired department from MLGWS but Proskauer billed for hours of such work through his department and Rubenstein in the bill which Iviewit claims is a fraud, even includes Rubenstein far more than his claim of a simple referral to Joao as the extent of his involvement and shows him involved at some of the most crucial junctures. Rubenstein as the partner in charge of the department had direct access to the patents and evidence shows Wheeler sent Rubenstein copies of the patent portfolios and inventors sent Rubenstein directly the initial disclosures.
2. Failed dot com
3. Eliot I. Bernstein - Disgruntled or crazed
o EIB friends list and statements
o EIB clients list and letters
o EIB college and education
4. Simon Bernstein caught between believing son is crazy or his friends (i.e. Lewin and Wheeler) are felons, making golfing at the club impossible. Bernstein's mother does not talk to him caught in the same.
5. Friedstein poses family problems because it is presumed GS and Kane are intricate conspiratorial players. Kane has ran off with products, all GS clients using without pay. Kane and Friedstein have loss of memory, causes rift with inventor Bernstein sister and family.
44. UNSUNG HEROES
Some people upon getting involved in various aspects have done the right thing and never did a wrong. Such valiancy is admired and yet in some cases outright dangerous. Often before one can blink, the entire history has shifted in favor of Iviewit and left Class I Defendants reeling. Being friend or even family to inventor Bernstein has extreme risks, helping and validating the evidence against the perpetrators has serious ramifications. Due to the dangers perceived by Bernstein and others, inventor Bernstein remains not only in fear of his own life, the life of spouse and children, but for everyone of the following witnesses to the crimes and for their efforts may have unknowingly at the time put them in harms way. Being inventor Bernstein's acquaintance at this point brings with it approximately several thousand adversaries and thus inventor Bernstein, to keep others from getting heroic, has become hermit, a “house proud town mouse”.
Shirajee, Rosario, Armstrong, Yarbrough, Wolfe, Frenden, Colter, Thagard, Brunelas, Becker, Dietz, Epstein, Mulrooney, Iantoni, Moatz, Lucchesi, Caroline, Selz
45. WITNESSES
a. Not Hostile
b. Hostile
Waiting A Safe Harbor To Come Forth With Evidence And Statements
46. QUESTIONS, MORE QUESTIONS AND NO ANSWERS
Evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Wheeler Questions
Evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Rubenstein Questions
Evidenced in EXHIBIT “” - Lewin Questions
47. CLOSING
So one may ask regarding the facts detailed herein: why is it only Proskauer and people they brought in are directly inuring profits from the technologies? To the detriment of all of the other Iviewit Shareholders, including the federally backed SBA? Proskauer referred management is seen attempting to steal off with patents written into their names without assignment, one must ask how they have evaded formal investigation at the state bars while under federal investigation at the patent bar. Proskauer states that Rubenstein and Proskauer were never counsel to Iviewit and did not handle patent work, against a mass of evidence to the contrary and eyewitnesses, one must ask how? Proskauer referred management is seen by Iviewit employees who submit sworn statements to Boca PD that such management stole off with a briefcase of cash and proprietary equipment and they are caught stealing the computers, (the cash is still under investigation at Boca PD), one must ask how they have evaded formal investigation and prosecution Proskauer lawyers are found perjuring themselves in depositions and state bar tribunals, one must ask how they have evaded investigation and prosecution? Proskauer partners are caught in conflicts of interest, appearances of impropriety and abuses of public offices in the complaints against them, while holding office with the investigation departments, one must ask how they have evaded investigation and prosecution? Proskauer now is a leading IP firm, specializing in Inventors' Inventions and prior to meeting Inventors Proskauer was a two hundred year old real-estate firm without a patent department, one must ask why? Joao is caught after and during his representation of Iviewit, filing 80+ patents into his name. Patents bearing direct resemblance to Inventors' Inventions and some of the problems and missing content from the Iviewit patents end up in patents in Joao's name, one must throw up. Proskauer referred management are caught filing an IB against companies they had no claims with, submitting false papers, a violation of federal bankruptcy code, one must ask how they have evaded investigation and prosecution. Investor Crossbow representing SBA loans has along with Iviewit filed charges against Proskauer and a variety of leading law firms and others named hereinto be conspirators committing fraud upon the USPTO and such charges have resulted in suspension of the patents, one must how this was overlooked by the state courts and disciplinary departments, the same evidence was shared with everyone? One must ask why all of these problems exist, they exist at all when leading national law firms and accounting firms handled all the transactions from a-z. One must ask what has happened since reporting such crimes against the government, crimes against Inventors constitutional rights' to their inventions, crimes against Iviewit Shareholders and crimes committed by lawyers using the law as the mechanism to both steal the Inventions and then cover up?
Part of the answer, as with any conspiracy, remains unknown. How a crime as hideous as attempting to steal ones inventions could be commissioned by those who are charged with upholding the law. Attorneys licensed with the patent office under oaths to protect the Inventor and the Inventions and caught filing patents violating federal patent law. Falsifying patent applications as if they would never be caught, corporate attorneys falsifying corporate records to swindle Iviewit Shareholders, crimes that reach to levels yet unknown as investigations are underway in a multitude of state, federal and international agencies, leaving it is to early to tell if the Defendants will ultimately succeed in beating their own legal system.
If this were all a conspiracy theorists wildest phantasmagorical theory, investigation of the evidence should be simple to dispel the conspiracy theory. To dispel such theory the evidence supporting the conspiracy would have to be given fair and impartial due process, free of conflict and such investigation of the evidence would prove either conspiracy or conspiracy theory. No matter how unbelievable the facts before you may seem, until they are tested through investigation, against the evidence to support conspiracy no conclusions can be drawn. It is most astonishing that the accused are large law firms and if there is nothing to hide, why do they keep running from their accusers and hiding from the evidence. Why allow a theory to persist that centers your law firm at the center of a conspiracy against not only Iviewit but also the United States government. Since the conspirators have alluded to manipulating the legal system at every turn with conflicts, appearances of impropriety and abuses of public office, all in violation of law and legal ethics, one must ask why. Why would conflict, appearance of impropriety or abuse of Supreme Court disciplinary agencies public officers be found, if you are innocent, this would be the last thing you would want surfacing.
Why all the public office corruption and conflicts of interests and failures to report such to the proper authorities and failure to follow the laws in blatant disregard of the publics interest in allegations of fraud on government agencies as sacred of the patent office, why the fear of the court room. Why the continued denial of due process and suppression of evidence and why not just get it over, if there were nothing to hide simply clear the air and prove the conspiracy false by confronting the evidence. Pick up any of the thousands of pieces of evidence, call the eye witnesses, give both sides a chance to fair and impartial justice of the facts, and then decide if it is conspiracy theory or conspiracy. The evidence will leave only one question, how high did the cover-up go, who at the top pulled the political strings necessary to effectuate and cover up fraud on the patent office and fraud on supreme courts? This begets the question of who has interests in the Inventions and who is profiting from their proliferation and perhaps whose campaigns were funded in each of the many departments where evidence was supplied and no investigation in the public interest and according to law was preformed.
These are high crimes against the government involving misappropriation of federal SBA funds, where such funds were invested by the SBA for rights in Inventions and the evidence contained herein and exhibit shows certain of the core inventions were absconded with in shadow companies which appear owned by Proskauer and not the Iviewit Shareholders. It certainly seems that it is in the publics best interest to have Proskauer and others explain the evidence against them and prove beyond reasonable doubt that they are not guilty of said allegations contained herein and in exhibit. Once these crimes and evidence were reported to the authorities and some irrefutable evidence submitted, including false oath's on inventions, a federal crime, it is the authorities job, not the job of Iviewit, to verify the validity of the evidence and contact witnesses. Especially when the crimes involve public office violations of top members of supreme court agencies and such conflicts are involved in a case where crimes against the government are concerned.
The following crimes are the crimes that were committed to steal such Inventions that are alleged to have taken place based on information and belief and a limited understanding of such laws. The crimes have occurred in a multi-jurisdictional and international level to unheard of proportion. Due to the political power of these thousands of Defendants who stand to lose it all, is a small group of Inventors and investors that need the protections of this Court and immediate due process to save the remaining IP.
F. CURRENT STATE & FEDERAL INVESTIGATIONS
1. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE INVESTIGATIONS:
a. Exhibit “” - Sept 23, 2003 - Patent Office Of Enrollment & Discipline Statement Of Iviewit
b. Exhibit “” - Change Of Inventor Request Us Serial No. 09 522 721 Pursuant To 37 CFR 1.48 Intent To Deceive And Commit Fraud Upon The USPTO - Signed By Stephen Warner, Former CEO And Co-Founder, Crossbow And Iviewit
d. Exhibit “” - March 25, 2004 - Patent Office Review Of Attorney Dockets Showing False And Misleading Information On Owners, Assignees And Inventors
e. Exhibit “” - March 29, 2004 Patent Commissioner Patent Suspension Notices Based On Review Of Allegations Of Fraud Upon The USPTO By Proskauer And Others
f. Exhibit “” - Full Document Set USPTO And FBI Investigations - Copies Available Upon Written Request - (Supreme Court Justices Click Here To Be Transported)
g. Exhibit “” - Patent Attorney Documents - available upon written request
h. Exhibit “” - BSTZ File Destruction Documents
2. NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST DEPARTMENT ("FIRST DEPT") ACTIONS - CONFLICT OF INTEREST DISCOVERED - Krane AND CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE
a. Exhibit “” - 2004 08 11 Supreme Court First Department Order To Transfer Krane, Rubenstein And Joao For Investigation (Not Review)
d. Exhibit “” - May 19, 2004 - Complaint Against Krane And Request To Remove Krane Responses From Rubenstein Due To Conflicts Of Interest
e. Exhibit “” - May 21, 2004 - Krane Response To Bar Complaint Against Himself And His Partner Rubenstein In Multiple Conflicts Of Interest
f. Exhibit “” - May 26, 2004 - First Dept Disciplinary - Iviewit Response To Krane Response For Krane And Rubenstein Exposing Conflict Of Interest
g. Exhibit “” - July 2, 2003 First Dept Disciplinary - Iviewit Rebuttal To Rubenstein Response To Initial Bar Complaint
h. Exhibit “” - April 11, 2003 Rubenstein Response To Bar Complaint - Krane Authors In Conflict With Public Office Position With NY First Dept
3. STATE OF NEW YORK GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE FOR SECOND AND ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
a. Exhibit “” - 2004 08 11 Supreme Court First Department Order To Transfer Krane, Rubenstein And Joao For Investigation (Not Review)
b. Exhibit “” - 2004 10 05 - Second Department DDC - Letter Denying Court Ordered Investigation Of Krane - Kearse
c. Exhibit “” - 2004 10 27 - Iviewit Response To Second Department
d. Exhibit “” - 2004 11 09 - Second Department DDC Response To Iviewit Response To Review Case
e. Exhibit “” - 2004 12 20 Second Department Chairman Digiovanna Refusal To Investigate Krane
g. Exhibit “” - 2005 02 23 Clerk Of Second Department Letter Moving Cases Inapposite Rules And With No Jurisdiction To Chief Justice Now For Review
j. Exhibit “” - 2005 03 18 Lost And Not Received Until April 7, 2005 Dismissal Of Joao And Rubenstein Without Investigation Inapposite Court Order
k. Exhibit “” - Iviewit Appeal New York - Coming Soon
4. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT CASE #SC04-1078 - ELIOT I. BERNSTEIN AND P. STEPHEN LAMONT V. THE FLORIDA BAR
The Florida Bar In The Matter Of Wheeler And Triggs - Conflict Of Interest, Appearance Of Impropriety And Abuse Of Public Office Discovered
a. Exhibit “” - 2005 04 24 Sco4-1078 Florida Supreme Court Denial Of Motion For Rehearing, Clarification & Certification
b. Exhibit “” - 2005 01 26 Motion For Rehearing, Clarification & Certification
c. Exhibit “” - 2004 10 13 Supreme Court Of Florida Sc04-1078 Docket Update Showing The Motion For Protective Custody That Later Gets Removed From The Docket
f. Exhibit “” - July 29, 2004 Supreme Court Ruling In Iviewit Favor For Florida Bar Not To Destroy The Files Of Wheeler In Emergency Hearing
i. Exhibit “” - July 16, 2004 - The Florida Bar Response Confirming Conflict Of Interest In Wheeler Case With Triggs
j. Exhibit “” - July 13, 2004 - Second Bar Complaint Filed Against Christopher Clark Wheeler, After Discovery Of A Conflict Of Interest In His First Response
l. Exhibit “” - June 30, 2004 Eric Turner Bar Complaint
m. Exhibit “” - May 21, 2004 The Florida Bar Review Of Wheeler Complaint - Turner Illiterate And Unintelligible Letter
5. FEDERAL SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION ("SBA") FRAUD
Recently the SBA Inspector General's Office has begun an audit of their monies and what happened to their interests in the patents they invested in.
6. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ("FBI")
A complaint has been filed with the FBI - West Palm Beach Florida Division, Special Agent Stephen Lucchesi - Pending Investigation. The United States Attorney was presented the case by the FBI.
7. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ("SEC") AND THE BOCA RATON POLICE DEPARTMENT ("BOCA PD")
c. Exhibit “” - August 28, 2003 - Boca Raton Police - Iviewit Written Statement - Stolen Securities
d. Exhibit “” - August 28, 2003 - Boca Raton Police - Iviewit Written Statement - Stolen IP
e. Exhibit “” - June 20, 2001 - Utley/Reale Police Report - Embezzlement And Stolen Proprietary Equipment
The Boca Raton Police Department, Detective Robert Flechaus ("Flechaus"), in conjunction with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), have been submitted formal written statements, EXHIBIT “” - Boca Police Department - Written Statement 1 - Stolen Funds and EXHIBIT “” - Boca Police Department - Written Statement 2 - Stolen Patents for investigation. That the Boca PD may have been influenced to skirt investigation and falsify statements that the SEC was investigating the matters.
8. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS ("AICPA")
a. Exhibit “” - April 30, 2004 - Iviewit Response To AICPA Request For Information
b. Exhibit “” - March 16, 2004 - AICPA Response Goldstein, Lewin & E. Lewin AICPA Complaint
Iviewit has filed charges regarding the patent thefts and matters relating to the stolen cash, against former accountant to Iviewit, Iviewit board member and Iviewit shareholder, Lewin, his daughter E. Lewin and Goldstein, in matters now before the AICPA complaint number TNS 2004-038, EXHIBIT “” - ("Lewin Complaint") and EXHIBIT “” - AICPA Response and Iviewit Response in the complaint against Lewin, E. Lewin and the accounting firm of Goldstein.
9. VIRGINIA STATE BAR ("VSB")
a. Exhibit “” - 2004 09 21 Notice Of False Information Submitted By Dick And Request For Appeal Or Review
b. Exhibit “” - 2004 08 25 Notice Of False Information Submitted By Dick And Request For Appeal Or Review
c. Exhibit “” - 2004 08 19 Notice Of False Information Submitted By Dick And Request For Appeal Or Review
d. Exhibit “” -2004 03 12 Dick Virginia Bar Complaint Response - Bookmarked
e. Exhibit “” - 2003 10 30 Response To Virginia Bar Request For Information
10. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ("DOJ")
a. Iviewit has filed a complaint with the Department of Justice which is pending submission of further evidence to reviewing Officer, Thomas H. Liddle, Litigation III In the matter, Re: MPEG LA Joint Patent Licensing Business REVIEW (1997)
b. Exhibit “” - DOJ Letter
c. Exhibit “” - 2003 10 29 - DOJ Complaint
11. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ("IRS")
Iviewit has contacted the Internal Revenue Service in order to have an audit conducted and to secure accounting records from former Iviewit accountants Goldstein, pending initiation of investigation.
12. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE INVESTIGATION ("USCO")
Iviewit has filed with the USPTO a complaint related to missing or stolen copyrights, similar to what has occurred with the patent applications and is pending investigation.
13. UNITED STATES FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY COURT FRAUD
Iviewit has recently learned of a
complex corporate and patent shell game in which Defendants were
absconding with other IP. Certain
illegal
corporations
became involved in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding by former Proskauer
referred management and Proskauer referred strategic alliance partner
Intel/R3D
and were attempting to bankrupt shell companies and false and misleading
information was transmitted to a federal bankruptcy court.
a. Exhibit “” - Involuntary Bankruptcy Documents
14. FLORIDA JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMMISSION
Injured Parties have a filed a complaint with the Judicial Qualifications Commission ("JQC") against Judge Jorge Labarga. It is now learned Triggs argued such case Proskauer v. Iviewit, in conflict with his public office position as a member of a TFB Grievance Committee and in violation of laws regulating conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety as detailed herein and in exhibits. The entirety of the billing dispute litigation must now be questioned in consideration of the recently uncovered conflicts.
a. Exhibit “” - JQC - Docket 03352
b. Exhibit “” - 2003 12 05 JQC Iviewit Response - Docket 03352
c. Exhibit “” - Proskauer [Eib20]V. Iviewit
d. Exhibit “” - Motion For Mistrial - Remove Labarga For Violation Of Judicial Canons
e. Exhibit “” - Proskauer Default Judgment
15. PENNSYLVANIA BAR
16. INSURANCE FRAUD - AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP ("AIG")
a. Exhibit “” - Aig Internal Affairs & Fraud Dept
Iviewit upon threats of shareholder suits, when it was discovered patent rights were not proper and the rights in such patents was improper, caused Iviewit to review the Director and Officer policy put in place by Proskauer and it appears the Iviewit company insured, is not a valid company, EXHIBIT “” - AIG Policy Face Page. This has led to investigation of fraud currently with the fraud department and internal affairs unit of AIG, whereby a Director and Officers policy appears to be issued on a non-existent company.
17. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION - FLORIDA
A statement has been filed and is pending investigation.
a. Exhibit “” - 2004 10 13 - Department Of Business And Professional Regulation Filing - Goldstein, Lewin & E. Lewin
b. Exhibit “” - 2004 11 04 Department Of Business And Professional Regulation - Florida Response
18. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE ("EPO") INVESTIGATIONS
a. Exhibit “” - September 23, 2004 Response From Epo Beginning Investigation Into Claims Of Fraud On The Epo And Fraud On Iviewit
b. Exhibit “” - November 11, 2003 Filing Of Fraud Upon The European Patent Office
Charges similar to Fraud upon the USPTO were filed in Europe prior, and are pending investigation.
19. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE ("JPO") INVESTIGATION
a. Exhibit “” - Japanese Patent Office
Iviewit is currently filing charges of Fraud upon the Japanese Patent & Trademark Office similar to those filed in Europe and the US.
G. Federal crimes
1. VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED INVENTOR RIGHTS - ARTICLE I, SECTION VIII, CLAUSE VIII THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
a. Conspiracy I - All Class I Defendants
b. Conspiracy I Or II - Crossbow & DiStream
This is an action for violations of constitutionally protected rights under Article I, Section VIII, Clause VIII of the United States Constitution.
Iviewit re-alleges and hereby incorporates the allegations of Paragraphs 1 through __ as if fully set forth herein.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated Inventors' constitutional rights under;
ARTICLE I, SECTION VIII, CLAUSE VIII OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE Power...To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USEFUL ARTS, BY securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries
Iviewit states Defendants have violated The Federal Code under;
Conspiracy I - All Class I Defendants Excluding WHAD
Utley uses threats and intimidation to attempt to keep Bernstein quite regarding the uncovering of stolen patents and threatens life of Bernstein. Utley states Proskauer and Foley will destroy the companies if Bernstein exposes anything further and they then succeed in carrying out such threats.
Utley/Reale/Hersh/ Intel/R3D - Harass with involuntary bankruptcy in an attempt to abscond with constitutionally protected Inventions of Inventors.
Conspiracy II - Crossbow & DiStream
Defendants consist of two or more persons conspiring to deny constitutionally protected rights, through a series of criminal activities whereby the intent was to steal inventions. When it was discovered that investors and Inventors were not correct, a further series of threats, intimidations, harassments followed to destroy Iviewit companies and deny inventors of their inventions. The inventors whose rights have been violated by such actions are as follows; Eliot I. Bernstein, Jude Rosario, Zakirul Shirajee, Jeffrey Friedstein, James Armstrong, Matthew Mink, Patricia Daniels and Anthony Frenden (collectively “Inventors") and they have been denied the free exercise or enjoyment of their rights and privileges secured to them by the Constitution, under Article 1 Section 8 Clause 8 of the laws of the United States. Class I Defendant's have conspired to deprive Inventors' of their inventions through a series of disingenuous schemes including fraud upon the USPTO, fraud upon Iviewit and violations of federal and state laws including but not limited to laws of Florida, New York, Delaware, Wisconsin, Virginia and California.
Iviewit states the crimes described herein will reveal a series of criminal activities to deny Inventors of their inventions, crimes committed by what are supposed to be trusted attorneys at law and protectors of these individual rights. In fact, the violation of civil rights involved, involves patent attorneys across the nation, from multiple law firms, involved in committing fraud not only upon the Inventors who trusted their inventions to them, but fraud upon the USPTO, fraud Upon the United States Copyright Offices, abuses of Supreme Court public office positions discovered in Florida and New York, to cover such crime and hosts of crimes committed in the commission of the theft of the IP. The IP have been valued to be worth billions of dollars annually and have already profoundly changed markets and created new markets. It is impossible to imagine patent attorneys, representatives of a cabinet level agency such as the Untied States Patent & Trademark Office, using the legal system and their law degrees, to commit crimes, when it was their sole (soul) duty to protect the rights of the inventors to their discoveries we instead find them using the law to steal them, cloaked in all colors of law and further attempting to manipulate the government and its agencies. Further, once evidence began to surface of such crimes, to suppress the evidence, they began a series of steps to manipulate Supreme Court agencies, such as The Florida Bar and the New York First Department, agencies meant to regulate the unprofessional conduct of attorneys. Through a series of conflicts of interest, with highly conflicted individuals using influence and perhaps other methods to deny due process to complaints against the attorneys for these crimes and which conflicts have now led to the appearance of impropriety, impropriety which jeopardizes and disgraces the very fabric of law in this country. A crime so diabolical in its misuse of the legal system, that upon public exposure of these crimes, could cause people lose faith in the patent system, patent attorneys, a loss of faith in state Supreme Courts and the state bar associations, fearful patent attorneys will steal from the them and then use legal tactics to cloak their crimes.
Iviewit states Defendants made a coordinated series of efforts to steal technology of which the inventions have been likened to “digital electricity” and the “holy grail” of video and imaging and have paved the way for a new world of multimedia. When initially discovered, industry leaders reveled, engineers were astonished and not by just one major invention but by four successive series of advancements that have already affected these industries globally. What the Inventors and Iviewit have not had is enjoyment of the royalties amassing from the inventions for the last five years. These matters and the outcome of these matters may have impact on society and greatly affect current standards in the market.
Upon discovery of the problems in Joao's work and that Joao was writing patents in his own name benefiting from Inventors Inventions, Wheeler and Utley referred the patent matters for correction to Dick of Foley. Dick was also a close personal friend of Utley and who had been involved, unbeknownst and undisclosed to Iviewit at the time, in the diversion of patents to Utley at his former employer DTE, perhaps with Wheeler, to the detriment of DTE, thereby establishing a pattern of patent thefts, which shows intent and organization.
Joao, Utley, Wheeler, Dick, Rubenstein, Boehm, Becker, Proskauer, MLGWS and Foley conspired to transfer and assign patents to companies with similar names to the Iviewit companies, the formations of which were unauthorized by the Iviewit Board of Directors or Iviewit Shareholders. Through such corporate and patent shell game, Proskauer may now have full ownership of such patents and companies.
Utley, Wheeler, Dick, Rubenstein, Boehm, Becker, Proskauer and Foley conspired to commit theft of the Inventions by the filing of new patent applications, unbeknownst to Iviewit or Iviewit Shareholders, into Utley's sole name and fraudulent corporations. Dick delegated such unauthorized filings with his underlings at Foley, Boehm and Becker, naming Utley as the sole holder of multiple patents, patents for ideas he did not invent and applied for fraudulently. Certain inventions are not assigned to Iviewit, when in fact such inventions were and arose from the Inventions developed by Inventors and were supposed to be held by Iviewit Shareholders. These schemes to defraud the Iviewit Shareholders are strikingly similar to the series of events that occurred at DTE with Dick and Utley, whereby they attempted to steal off with DTE inventions out the “back door”.
Joao, Utley, Wheeler, Dick, Rubenstein, Boehm, Becker, Proskauer, MLGWS and Foley conspired to purposely fail to list proper Inventors and fraudulently added Utley to patent applications.
These patent thefts evidenced herein and in exhibit now constitute charges pending before the Commissioner of Patents ("Commissioner") of fraud upon the USPTO committed by these attorneys. Such filing was instigated by OED Director Moatz and was filed by Iviewit and its largest investor Crossbow. The charges claim failure of the patents to include their rightful and lawful inventors, claims now confirmed in conversations and correspondence with the USPTO. The wrong inventors have led to Inventors and Iviewit Shareholders not having proper and full ownership in the patents, and in some cases NO ownership at all.
Joao, Utley, Wheeler, Dick, Rubenstein, Boehm, Becker, Proskauer, MLGWS and Foley conspired to fail to properly apply for the inventions and then fraudulently conveyed to Iviewit Shareholders knowingly false and misleading IP dockets. The IP dockets illustrate false and misleading information concerning the inventors, assignees and owners of the Inventions and until direct conversations with the USPTO were thought to be correct. The wrong assignments may lead to Iviewit Shareholders not having proper and full ownership in the patents.
Joao, Utley, Wheeler, Dick, Rubenstein, Boehm, Becker, Proskauer, MLGWS and Foley conspired to ensure that the patent applications for the Inventions did not contain all necessary and pertinent information relevant to the Inventions, as required by federal patent law.
Joao, Utley, Wheeler, Dick, Rubenstein, Boehm, Becker, Proskauer, MLGWS and Foley conspired to fail to secure copyright protections and trade secret protection, although billing for such services. Further failing to complete copyright work for the source code for the Inventions and other IP.
Iviewit states Class I Defendants have violated;
Class I Defendant Brian G. Utley directly threatens Bernstein to protect Class I Defendants Proskauer, Wheeler, Dick, Foley, Boehm, Becker, Rubenstein, MLGWS, and Joao.
By force or threat of force willfully injured, intimidated and interfered with in order to intimidate such persons from participating in and enjoying their constitutionally protected rights under the United States Constitution.
2. VIOLATION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Class I Defendants - Proskauer, Foley, MLGWS, BSTZ, Utley in the commission of crimes against the United States Government.
SBA Loans were secured using false information
Patent thefts result in theft from the SBA who has ownership interests (largest investor) in Iviewit.
Fraud on patent office
Crossbow and DiStream - May have committed fraud on the SBA
This may be an action for violations of the false claims act.
Defendants have violated the false claims act in perpetrating crimes against United States government agencies as evidenced herein and in exhibit, including but not limited to the following agencies:
1. The USPTO - Class I Defendants (Proskauer, Foley, Meltzer, BSTZ, Utley, Joao and pending investigation other unknowns)
2. The Small Business Administration (Crossbow, Proskauer, Foley, Rubenstein, Wheeler & Utley and pending investigation other unknowns)
3. ANTITRUST CIVIL PROCESS
Conspiracy I
Class I Defendants subdivided as follows
· PATENT POOLS (MPEGLA, LLC., DVD6C, etc.)
· AGENTS OF POOLS (Proskauer, Rubenstein, Foley, Weisberg, SB, Utley, Joao, etc.)
This is an action for violations antitrust civil process and violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Iviewit re-alleges and hereby incorporates the allegations of Paragraphs 1 through __ as if fully set forth herein.
Agents of the Pools acted in dual capacity to both quash the patents for Iviewit on the one hand and simultaneously on the other walk the patents out of Iviewit for future possible submission to the Pools free of the Iviewit Shareholders. Agents of the Pools were writing bad patents into Iviewit and also writing good patents into false inventors names and companies and Iviewit Shareholders held no interest. Agents of the Pools worked to suppress Iviewit in a variety of illegal ways as will be described herein and in exhibit, including but not limited to;
Misappropriation & Conversion of Funds
Falsification of patent applications
Abuse of Processes to gain control of stolen patents
Fraudulent Bankruptcy Filing
Frivolous Law Suit with fraudulent intent
Fraudulent Corporate Formations
Conspiracy II
Crossbow/DiStream - Takes patents and may have revenues generated from said Pools through DiStream or other unknowns and they further once obtaining the patents through bogus assignments, and perhaps after catching Proskauer in Conspiracy I, Crossbow subsequently starts Conspiracy II and make actions to further force Iviewit business.
This is an action for antitrust liability.
Iviewit re-alleges and hereby incorporates the allegations of Paragraphs 1 through __ as if fully set forth herein.
This lawsuit seeks to compel the Defendants to comply with their legal obligations under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act ("Tunney Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 16.
The Pools act as an anticompetitive mechanism to block Inventions' to allow the further proliferation of their Pools' patents to the detriment of Iviewit Shareholders and Inventors.
Class I Defendant's known and unknown, conspired to deliberately attempt to sabotage Inventors' Inventions and company and commit fraud and other crimes to steal such inventions for themselves and evidence points to instances where the patents were applied for through false oath to the patent office and such fraud constitutes fraud on Iviewit and the USPTO. Rubenstein and Proskauer have conflict of interest in representation of MPEGLA LLC and other Pools and simultaneous representation of Iviewit. Inventors' Inventions represented a competitive threat of obsolescence of the Pools and that Defendants conspired to steal Iviewit technologies while simultaneously proliferating and monopolizing them through the patenting pooling scheme for their benefit, all forms of anti-competitive behavior, all to the detriment of Iviewit Shareholders and the Inventors.
Under Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. FMC Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) there is an antitrust claim for fraud on the USPTO, analogous to the Iviewit's allegations of fraud as evidenced herein.
Under City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991) and California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), the court upheld the "sham" exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity, when the defendants' activities were a direct effort to impair a competitor's activity in the marketplace through the use of government processes as opposed to the outcome of the process, analogous to Iviewit's allegations of impairment of the Inventions as described herein.
Under PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture v. National Broadcasting Co., 219 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2000), the court upheld allegations of antitrust liability under “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity where the defendants' filings were frivolous and intended solely to impose expense and delay on the entry of an emergent competitor, analogous to the Iviewit's allegations of intentions to impose expense and delay of the Inventions as evidenced herein to deprive Inventors' their Inventions.
According to the allegations described herein, competition was restrained by conspiratorial activity under 15 U.S.C. Sherman Antitrust Act Section §1 and in which monopoly power was sought in an attempt to monopolize and conspire to monopolize under 15 U.S.C. Sherman Antitrust Act Section §2, and sought to achieve monopolization under 15 U.S.C. Sherman Antitrust Act Section §2.
As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant's conspiring to deprive Iviewit of Inventions, such conduct constitutes damage and are to the detriment of Iviewit.
Defendants violated;
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THROUGH A COURSE OF ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT THAT MAINTAINED ITS PATENT POOL SYSTEM OF MONOPOLIZATION OF STOLEN IP
This case involves the application of familiar and fundamental tenets of antitrust law. Class I Defendant's recognized that Iviewit's emerging technologies posed a threat to patent pools created and overseen by Rubenstein and concluded that competition on the merits would not defeat that threat. Defendants then mounted a campaign to maintain its monopoly power through anticompetitive means and in fact steal Iviewit's technologies in an elaborate scheme of controlling the Inventions' of Inventors and blocking inventions from the inclusion to the Pools controlled and overseen by Rubenstein and Proskauer. These Pools unlawfully maintain a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
The Offense Of Monopolization
The offense of monopolization is
(1) the willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power
(2) by the use of anticompetitive conduct "to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992), quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); see also United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945). Such conduct is labeled "exclusionary" or "predatory." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985).
The Supreme Court has described exclusionary conduct as conduct that "'not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.'" Aspen, 472 U.S. at 605 n.32, quoting 3 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶ 626b, at 78 (1978). If "valid business reasons" do not justify conduct that tends to impair the opportunities of a monopolist's rivals, that conduct is exclusionary. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483; Aspen, 472 U.S. at 605. The courts assess the legality of the defendant's conduct in light of, among other things, the defendant's proffered justifications, and the consistency of those justifications with the defendant's actions and assertions, and the sufficiency of those justifications to explain the full extent of conduct. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-85.
Defendants have used tactics which involves aggression against business rivals through the use of business practices that would not be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation that (1) actual rivals will be driven from the market, or the entry of potential rivals blocked or delayed, so that the predator will gain or retain a market share sufficient to command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the predator finds threatening to its realization of monopoly profits.
Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.); accord Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 144-45 (1993) (noting that, in any realistic theory of predation, the predator views its costs of predation as "an investment in future monopoly profits"). Predatory conduct is, of course, exclusionary. Such conduct, "by definition as well as by nature, lacks procompetitive business motivation." CL at 38 (JA 2418).
The Supreme Court's decisions in Eastman Kodak and Aspen, and this Court's decision in Neumann, state settled antitrust law. Courts routinely define exclusionary or predatory conduct as conduct that would not make economic sense unless it eliminated or softened competition and thus permitted the costs of the conduct to be recouped through higher profits resulting from the lack of competition.
The products affected by the illegal activity of the Defendants are the delivery of video\imaging\data using proprietary scaling techniques; and, zooming and panning of digital images\video\data without degradation of quality in the digital image\video\data; and, the remote control of video cameras through communication networks using proprietary techniques; and, other trade secrets and pending patent application processes relating to such proprietary processes.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
The markets for the Inventions are highly concentrated and the illegal activities of the Defendants have substantially increased concentration. So much so, to remove the product from the market would have catastrophic effects on markets dependent on the Inventions. A short description of the saturation caused by Defendants is necessary to understand how absorbed into the marketplace Inventors' inventions have been proliferated. The following applications would have to pay proper royalties to the proper inventors or cease and desist using such applications for the following:
i. Digital Zoom - Applications such as digital camera's, DVD's, televisions and other screen zoom technologies would be limited to low resolution zoom, making certain applications such as digital zoom on a digital camera severely limited. The impact on the digital camera market or forced recall of such cameras would be historically significant.
ii. Scaled Video - Applications such as video over low bandwidth communications networks such as the Internet and video cell phones, would cease to exist. Applications such as HDDVD and other high bandwidth communications would take a serious loss in quality or not be achievable at all.
1. Cable companies would have to remove such technologies and this would decrease bandwidth by a remarkable 75% and would decrease programming channels and features.
2. Video Players - Windows Media, Real Player, Quicktime and other companies would be forced to remove such technologies from their products, rendering these markets crippled.
3. Websites - All websites using video created by Inventors' inventions would have to cease and desist display of such video and return to small postage stamp sized video at low frame rates and disharmonious, rendering it useless. This was compression technology such as MPEG technology before Inventors' inventions resolved these major hurdles.
4. Hosting and Serving Companies - Would suffer from loss of video streaming revenues, currently the largest revenue driver for these companies.
5. Telecommunications - Video cell phones would cease to exist at low bandwidth. Digital zoom and pan images would be severely limited in resolution.
6. Chips - Almost all chips today use Inventors' mathematical scaling formulas and recall would be devastating to these markets.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for judgment for damages and specific performance against Defendants and any remedies available under The United States Code, or any other applicable federal law, and any other state and/or federal civil remedies, together with court costs, interest, and such other further as this Court deems just and equitable.
Defendants have utilized Pools under a presumed approval from the DOJ, there are indications no such approval exists from the DOJ as evidenced herein, and allowing the Pools to create a dominant, persistent, and increasing market share supporting a finding of monopoly power gained through further illegal means.
Defendants have engaged In A Multifaceted Campaign Of Exclusionary Conduct That Maintained Its Monopoly Power and violated
SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
BY TYING through anticompetitive PATENT POOLS, iviewit PRODUCTS ARE SOLD IN COMBINATION OR IN MULTITUDE, WITH other PRODUCTS
Defendants Proskauer and Rubenstein and all Pools related to them are liable under The Supreme Court's Tying Decisions.
For purposes of tying analysis, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled "that the answer to the question whether one or two products is involved turns not on the functional relation between them, but rather on the character of the demand for the two items." Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19. The Court has focused on whether there is separate demand for the two items because the prohibition on tying is concerned with foreclosure of competition on the merits in the tied product, which can occur only if there can be such competition separate from competition in the tying product. Id. at 12-14, 19-22. The Supreme Court has accordingly condemned tying arrangements that link distinct markets that are "distinguishable in the eyes of buyers." Id. at 19, citing Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
The Jefferson Parish test inquires whether "there is a sufficient demand for the purchase of [the tied product] separate from [the tying product] to identify a distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer" the two products "separately." 466 U.S. at 21-22; accord Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462 ("sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to provide" them separately). This test requires the court to ask whether a supplier in a competitive market would provide the products separately, thus distinguishing situations in which the refusal to supply them separately is efficient from situations in which the refusal might be profitable only because of its adverse effect on competition. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462-63; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22.
First, the Jefferson Parish test reflects the Supreme Court's authoritative guidance on how to apply Section 1 to tying arrangements. The Supreme Court spoke clearly in Jefferson Parish, and the district court "was bound to follow its guidance," CL at 51 (JA 2431), unless and until that Court concludes that a different standard is more appropriate in particular circumstances. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). this Court, sitting en banc, is also obligated to follow Jefferson Parish, but it is not obligated to follow Microsoft II. See, e.g., LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Defendants Tying Had Significant Competitive Consequences
Standard-Setting Activities - In a related area, issues may arise in connection with standard-setting activities by members of an industry. Standard-setting issues are virtually inherent in e-business, since Internet communication is impossible unless participants have agreed to follow a universal set of protocols. Because the standards-setting process may be abused to provide a competitive advantage to a subset of competitors in the industry, standard setting should be undertaken in a structured manner that (a) ensures all key industry constituency groups an opportunity for meaningful participation, and (b) relies on objective data. Problems may also arise where, in the course of standard-setting proceedings, one participant fails to disclose to the standard-setting body IP rights held by the participant that may be infringed by a proposed standard. By failing to disclose IP rights relating to the standard, the participant may set the stage for infringement claims against all of the firms that design to the standard following its adoption.
Defendants maintained Exclusionary Agreements and control of the Pools to block Iviewit technology from being monetized by Iviewit and these agreements instead inured money to Defendants.
Applications Barrier To Entry
Defendant's Campaign to Eliminate the Iviewit and Inventor Invention Threats
Defendant's Efforts to Extinguish Inventors, Steal Inventions of Inventors and Iviewit Shareholders.
Effects of Defendant's Anticompetitive Conduct
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum relief of this Court under:
In the absence of preliminary relief, consumers will be deprived of their choice of technologies and consumers and the public will be deprived of the benefits of competition during the pendency of this action. Relief at the conclusion of this case cannot remedy the damage done to consumers and the public during the interim. In addition, the damage to competitors and competition during the pendency of this case that would occur in the absence of preliminary relief cannot practically be reversed later.
Claim for Relief: Unlawful Exclusive Dealing and Other Exclusionary Agreements in Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Claim for Relief: Unlawful Tying in Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act Third Claim for Relief: Monopolization of the Pools
Fourth Claim for Relief: Attempted Monopolization of the video and imaging technologies of Iviewit
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for civil investigative demands (a) Issuance; service; production of material; testimony Whenever the Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, has reason to believe that any person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material, or may have any information, relevant to a civil antitrust investigation or, with respect to the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (15 U.S.C. 6201 et seq.), an investigation authorized by section 3 of such Act (15 U.S.C. 6202), he may, prior to the institution of a civil or criminal proceeding by the United States thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce such documentary material for inspection any copying or reproduction, to answer in writing written interrogatories, to give oral testimony concerning documentary material or information, or to furnish any combination of such material, answers, or testimony. Whenever a civil investigative demand is an express demand for any product of discovery, the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division shall cause to be served, in any manner authorized by this section, a copy of such demand upon the person from whom the discovery was obtained and notify the person to whom such demand is issued of the date on which such copy was served. (b) Contents; return date for demand for product of discovery Each such demand shall - (1) state the nature of - (A) the conduct constituting the alleged antitrust violation, or (B) the activities in preparation for a merger, acquisition, joint venture, or similar transaction, which, if consummated, may result in an antitrust violation, which are under investigation and the provision of law applicable thereto; (2) if it is a demand for production of documentary material - (A) describe the class or classes of documentary material to be produced thereunder with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to be fairly identified; (B) prescribe a return date or dates which will provide a reasonable period of time within which the material so demanded may be assembled and made available for inspection and copying or reproduction; and (C) identify the custodian to whom such material shall be made available; or (3) if it is a demand for answers to written interrogatories - (A) propound with definiteness and certainty the written interrogatories to be answered; (B) prescribe a date or dates at which time answers to written interrogatories shall be submitted; and (C) identify the custodian to whom such answers shall be submitted; or (4) if it is a demand for the giving of oral testimony - (A) prescribe a date, time, and place at which oral testimony shall be commenced; and (B) identify an antitrust investigator who shall conduct the examination and the custodian to whom the transcript of such examination shall be submitted. Any such demand which is an express demand for any product of discovery shall not be returned or returnable until twenty days after a copy of such demand has been served upon the person from whom the discovery was obtained. (c) Protected material or information; demand for product of discovery superseding disclosure restrictions except trial preparation materials (1) No such demand shall require the production of any documentary material, the submission of any answers to written interrogatories, or the giving of any oral testimony, if such material, answers, or testimony would be protected from disclosure under - (A) the standards applicable to subpenas or subpenas duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation, or (B) the standards applicable to discovery requests under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that the application of such standards to any such demand is appropriate and consistent with the provisions and purposes of this chapter. (2) Any such demand which is an express demand for any product of discovery supersedes any inconsistent order, rule, or provision of law (other than this chapter) preventing or restraining disclosure of such product of discovery to any person. Disclosure of any product of discovery pursuant to any such express demand does not constitute a waiver of any right or privilege, including without limitation any right or privilege which may be invoked to resist discovery of trial preparation materials, to which the person making such disclosure may be entitled. (d) Service; jurisdiction (1) Any such demand may be served by any antitrust investigator, or by any United States marshal or deputy marshal, at any place within the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States. (2) any such demand or any petition filed under section 1314 of this title may be served upon any person who is not to be found within the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States, in such manner as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe for service in a foreign country. To the extent that the courts of the United States can assert jurisdiction over such person consistent with due process, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall have the same jurisdiction to take any action respecting compliance with this chapter by such person that such court would have if such person were personally within the jurisdiction of such court. (e) Service upon legal entities and natural persons (1) Service of any such demand or of any petition filed under section 1314 of this title may be made upon a partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity by - (A) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to any partner, executive officer, managing agent, or general agent thereof, or to any agent thereof authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on behalf of such partnership, corporation, association, or entity; (B) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the principal office or place of business of the partnership, corporation, association, or entity to be served; or (C) depositing such copy in the United States mails, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, duly addressed to such partnership, corporation, association, or entity at its principal office or place of business. (2) Service of any such demand or of any petition filed under section 1314 of this title may be made upon any natural person by - (A) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the person to be served; or (B) depositing such copy in the United States mails by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, duly addressed to such person at his residence or principal office or place of business. (f) Proof of service A verified return by the individual serving any such demand or petition setting forth the manner of such service shall be proof of such service. In the case of service by registered or certified mail, such return shall be accompanied by the return post office receipt of delivery of such demand. (g) Sworn certificates The production of documentary material in response to a demand served pursuant to this section shall be made under a sworn certificate, in such form as the demand designates, by the person, if a natural person, to whom the demand is directed or, if not a natural person, by a person or persons having knowledge of the facts and circumstances relating to such production, to the effect that all of the documentary material required by the demand and in the possession, custody, or control of the person to whom the demand is directed has been produced and made available to the custodian. (h) Interrogatories Each interrogatory in a demand served pursuant to this section shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the reasons for the objection shall be stated in lieu of an answer, and it shall be submitted under a sworn certificate, in such form as the demand designates, by the person, if a natural person, to whom the demand is directed or, if not a natural person, by a person or persons responsible for answering each interrogatory, to the effect that all information required by the demand and in the possession, custody, control, or knowledge of the person to whom the demand is directed has been submitted. (i) Oral examinations (1) The examination of any person pursuant to a demand for oral testimony served under this section shall be taken before an officer authorized to administer oaths and affirmations by the laws of the United States or of the place where the examination is held. The officer before whom the testimony is to be taken shall put the witness on oath or affirmation and shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction and in his presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be taken stenographically and transcribed. When the testimony is fully transcribed, the officer before whom the testimony is taken shall promptly transmit a copy of the transcript of the testimony to the custodian. (2) The antitrust investigator or investigators conducting the examination shall exclude from the place where the examination is held all other persons except the person being examined, his counsel, the officer before whom the testimony is to be taken, and any stenographer taking such testimony. The provisions of section 30 [1] of this title shall not apply to such examinations. (3) The oral testimony of any person taken pursuant to a demand served under this section shall be taken in the judicial district of the United States within which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, or in such other place as may be agreed upon by the antitrust investigator conducting the examination and such person. (4) When the testimony is fully transcribed, the antitrust investigator or the officer shall afford the witness (who may be accompanied by counsel) a reasonable opportunity to examine the transcript; and the transcript shall be read to or by the witness, unless such examination and reading are waived by the witness. Any changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered and identified upon the transcript by the officer or the antitrust investigator with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making such changes. The transcript shall then be signed by the witness, unless the witness in writing waives the signing, is ill, cannot be found, or refuses to sign. If the transcript is not signed by the witness within thirty days of his being afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine it, the officer or the antitrust investigator shall sign it and state on the record the fact of the waiver, illness, absence of the witness, or the refusal to sign, together with the reason, if any, given therefore. (5) The officer shall certify on the transcript that the witness was duly sworn by him and that the transcript is a true record of the testimony given by the witness, and the officer or antitrust investigator shall promptly deliver it or send it by registered or certified mail to the custodian. (6) Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the antitrust investigator shall furnish a copy of the transcript to the witness only, except that the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division may for good cause limit such witness to inspection of the official transcript of his testimony. (7) (A) Any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony pursuant to this section may be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel. Counsel may advise such person, in confidence, either upon the request of such person or upon counsel's own initiative, with respect to any question asked of such person. Such person or counsel may object on the record to any question, in whole or in part, and shall briefly state for the record the reason for the objection. An objection may properly be made, received, and entered upon the record when it is claimed that such person is entitled to refuse to answer the question on grounds of any constitutional or other legal right or privilege, including the privilege against self-incrimination. Such person shall not otherwise object to or refuse to answer any question, and shall not by himself or through counsel otherwise interrupt the oral examination. If such person refuses to answer any question, the antitrust investigator conducting the examination may petition the district court of the United States pursuant to section 1314 of this title for an order compelling such person to answer such question. (B) If such person refuses to answer any question on grounds of the privilege against self-incrimination, the testimony of such person may be compelled in accordance with the provisions of Part V of title 18. (8) Any person appearing for oral examination pursuant to a demand served under this section shall be entitled to the same fees and mileage which are paid to witnesses in the district courts of the United States.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum relief of this Court under;
As to Custodian of documents, answers and transcripts (a) Designation The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice shall designate an antitrust investigator to serve as custodian of documentary material, answers to interrogatories, and transcripts of oral testimony received under this chapter, and such additional antitrust investigators as he shall determine from time to time to be necessary to serve as deputies to such officer. (b) Production of materials Any person, upon whom any demand under section 1312 of this title for the production of documentary material has been duly served, shall make such material available for inspection and copying or reproduction to the custodian designated therein at the principal place of business of such person (or at such other place as such custodian and such person thereafter may agree and prescribe in writing or as the court may direct, pursuant to section 1314(d) [1] of this title) on the return date specified in such demand (or on such later date as such custodian may prescribe in writing). Such person may upon written agreement between such person and the custodian substitute copies for originals of all or any part of such material. (c) Responsibility for materials; disclosure (1) The custodian to whom any documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony are delivered shall take physical possession thereof, and shall be responsible for the use made thereof and for the return of documentary material, pursuant to this chapter. (2) The custodian may cause the preparation of such copies of such documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony as may be required for official use by any duly authorized official, employee, or agent of the Department of Justice under regulations which shall be promulgated by the Attorney General. Notwithstanding paragraph (3) of this subsection, such material, answers, and transcripts may be used by any such official, employee, or agent in connection with the taking of oral testimony pursuant to this chapter. (3) Except as otherwise provided in this section, while in the possession of the custodian, no documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony, or copies thereof, so produced shall be available for examination, without the consent of the person who produced such material, answers, or transcripts, and, in the case of any product of discovery produced pursuant to an express demand for such material, of the person from whom the discovery was obtained, by any individual other than a duly authorized official, employee, or agent of the Department of Justice. Nothing in this section is intended to prevent disclosure to either body of the Congress or to any authorized committee or subcommittee thereof. (4) While in the possession of the custodian and under such reasonable terms and conditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe, (A) documentary material and answers to interrogatories shall be available for examination by the person who produced such material or answers, or by any duly authorized representative of such person, and (B) transcripts of oral testimony shall be available for examination by the person who produced such testimony, or his counsel. (d) Use of investigative files (1) Whenever any attorney of the Department of Justice has been designated to appear before any court, grand jury, or Federal administrative or regulatory agency in any case or proceeding, the custodian of any documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony may deliver to such attorney such material, answers, or transcripts for official use in connection with any such case, grand jury, or proceeding as such attorney determines to be required. Upon the completion of any such case, grand jury, or proceeding, such attorney shall return to the custodian any such material, answers, or transcripts so delivered which have not passed into the control of such court, grand jury, or agency through the introduction thereof into the record of such case or proceeding. (2) The custodian of any documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony may deliver to the Federal Trade Commission, in response to a written request, copies of such material, answers, or transcripts for use in connection with an investigation or proceeding under the Commission's jurisdiction. Such material, answers, or transcripts may only be used by the Commission in such manner and subject to such conditions as apply to the Department of Justice under this chapter. (e) Return of material to producer If any documentary material has been produced in the course of any antitrust investigation by any person pursuant to a demand under this chapter and - (1) any case or proceeding before any court or grand jury arising out of such investigation, or any proceeding before any Federal administrative or regulatory agency involving such material, has been completed, or (2) no case or proceeding, in which such material may be used, has been commenced within a reasonable time after completion of the examination and analysis of all documentary material and other information assembled in the course of such investigation, the custodian shall, upon written request of the person who produced such material, return to such person any such material (other than copies thereof furnished to the custodian pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or made by the Department of Justice pursuant to subsection (c) of this section) which has not passed into the control of any court, grand jury, or agency through the introduction thereof into the record of such case or proceeding. (f) Appointment of successor custodians In the event of the death, disability, or separation from service in the Department of Justice of the custodian of any documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony produced under any demand issued pursuant to this chapter, or the official relief of such custodian from responsibility for the custody and control of such material, answers, or transcripts, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division shall promptly(1) designate another antitrust investigator to serve as custodian of such material, answers, or transcripts, and(2) transmit in writing to the person who produced such material, answers, or testimony notice as to the identity and address of the successor so designated. Any successor designated under this subsection shall have with regard to such material, answers, or transcripts all duties and responsibilities imposed by this chapter upon his predecessor in office with regard thereto, except that he shall not be held responsible for any default or dereliction which occurred prior to his designation.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendant through the Pools have attempted to monopolize the market for Inventors patent pending technologies in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; and
Defendant through the Pools has willfully maintained its monopoly in the market for Iviewit's technologies in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
Defendant through the Pools, all persons acting on their behalf or under direction or control, and all successors thereto, be preliminarily and permanently enjoined from:
i. Requiring any person to license or distribute Pools technologies from Defendants or any other product or service as a condition of licensing or distributing any Pools product or licenses;
ii. Requiring or inducing any person to agree not to license, distribute, or promote any non-Pools software, hardware or other product, or to do so on any disadvantageous, restrictive or exclusionary terms;
iii. Taking or threatening any action adverse to any person in whole or in part as a direct or indirect consequence of such person's failure to license or distribute Pools licenses or other software or hardware products, of such person's licensing or distributing any non-Pool or other product, or of such person's cooperation with the United States;
iv. This Court enter such other preliminary and permanent relief as is necessary and appropriate to restore competitive conditions in the markets affected by Defendants unlawful conduct;
v. This Court enter such additional relief as it may find just and proper;
vi. Iviewit recovers the costs of this action.
4. VIOLATIONS OF RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO)
Class I Defendants and Certain Class II Defendants
This is an action for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
Iviewit re-alleges and hereby incorporates the allegations of Paragraphs 1 through __ as if fully set forth herein.
As an additional step in the coordinated conspiracy of the Defendants, Rubenstein, Wheeler and others, undertook a knowing and willful series of introductions of the Inventions to proliferate the Inventions to potential licensees of Iviewit, including but not limited to; Intel/R3D, Silicon Graphics, Inc., Lockheed Martin, MPEGLA, AOL/Time Warner, SONY Corporation, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Paramount Pictures, Deutsche Telecom, Compaq Computer Corporation, Eastman Kodak, Universal Pictures, Hewlett Packard, and others, under non-disclosure agreements ("NDA's") and other strategic alliances and license agreements. Once the Technologies had been proliferated by Defendants in defiance of such agreements, Defendants now avoid enforcement of said NDA's and profits are directly realized by Defendants and not Iviewit's through this scheme.
As an additional step in the coordinated conspiracy of the Defendants and their progeny, Proskauer, Wheeler, Rubenstein, Foley, Dick, Becker, Boehm, and Utley and other unknowns, with such intent, they directed that certain patent rights be put in the name of Utley and/or such patent rights were modified or negligently pursued, so as to fail to provide protection of the IP. Failing to secure proper ownership of Inventions for Inventors and investors of Iviewit, resulting in the ability of Defendants to make use of such technologies without being liable to Iviewit for royalties normally arising from such use.
As an additional step in the coordinated conspiracy of the Defendants and their progeny, Joao undertook a knowing and willful course of conduct by writing and filing more than eighty patent applications, and listing Joao as inventor, based on concepts derived from Iviewit, thus depriving Iviewit IP royalties derived from the Inventions.
On or about January 2001, and in a California meeting between Utley and Bernstein, Utley threatens Bernstein should information further be taken to the authorities stating Wheeler, Dick and I (Utley) will take you and your company down brick by brick and upon returning to Boca Raton to watch his back. Bernstein resolved this statement as a threat on he and his family and immediately uprooted his family and moved them three thousand miles from Boca Raton, Florida overnight to a hotel in California. To flee imminent danger, as it had already been discovered patents were going into Utley's name with no authorization and allegations of other crimes including securities crimes were being unearthed, most disturbing to Bernstein was the fact he already had begun to silently notify authorities.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Which gives this Court jurisdiction in the disposition of the RICO claims and should be the designated federal court to hear these matters, as it is least likely court in the land to be influenced by the law firms and the political clout and political positioning of the two thousand or more lawyers that are Class I Defendants.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Definitions are met, and a classic RICO complaint meeting all criteria of an organized crime enterprise have been fulfilled, and, that Defendants met the definitions whereby the racketeering activities have involved acts and threats involving robbery and extortion., and further have involved the following acts which are indictable under the following provisions of Title 18:
vii. section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
Foley, Proskauer, Meltzer, Joao, BSTZ, Utley
viii. section 1343 (relating to wire fraud),
Foley, Proskauer, Meltzer, Joao, BSTZ, Utley
ix. section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice),
Proskauer, 15th Judicial Labarga, The Florida Bar, The Florida Supreme Court, First Department DDC, Second Department DDC, Krane, Triggs
x. section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations),
Detective Robert Flechaus
xi. section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement),
Proskauer, 15th Judicial Labarga, The Florida Bar, The Florida Supreme Court, First Department DDC, Second Department DDC, Krane, Triggs, Kearse, DiGiovanna, Cahill, Turner, Detective Robert Flechaus, etc.
xii. section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion),
1. Interference with Commerce see Conspiracy above
2. Robbery - Utley, Reale, Tiedemann, Hersh, Proskauer, Lewin
xiii. section 1952 (relating to racketeering),
All Class I Defendants - See Racketeering charge herein
xiv. section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity),
Class I Defendants
xv. 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property),
Pools, Proskauer, Foley, Meltzer, Joao, Utley, Tiedemann, etc.
xvi. section 2318 (relating to trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, computer programs or computer program documentation or packaging and copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works),
Pools, Proskauer, Foley, Meltzer, Joao, Utley,
xvii. section 2319 (relating to criminal infringement of a copyright),
Proskauer and Foley
And all persons' includes individuals and entities capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property; and all enterprises include individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, and other legal entity, and union or groups of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Prohibited activities have taken place and Defendants have received income derived, directly and/or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which such Defendant's have participated as principals to use and invest directly and or indirectly any part of such income and proceeds of such of income in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment and operation of, enterprise which is engaged in and the activities which effect, interstate and foreign commerce, and Defendant's pattern of racketeering activity acquired and maintained, directly and indirectly, an interest in and control of enterprises engaged in and the activities of which effect interstate and foreign commerce, and the Defendant's are employed by and associated with enterprises engaged in and the activities which affect interstate and foreign, and have conducted and participated, directly and indirectly in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering.
“That using or investing the proceeds of any income derived from a pattern of racketeering or the collection of an unlawful debt, in which that person participated as a principal, to establish, operate or acquire any interest in any enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce.”
Defendants did knowingly, unlawfully, and intentionally combine, confederate, conspire and agree together with each other, and with co-conspirators and others whose names are both known and unknown, to benefit and use proceeds from Defendants pattern of racketeering activity for the furtherance of the legitimate aspects of the organizations, as stockholder dividends, employee and executive salaries, bonuses and operating expenses, to purchase and acquire goods and services, direct the proceeds of the racketeering activity into the general funds of these Defendant organizations, their employees, their executives, their stockholders, their subcontractors and others. This violation was in concert with lax and/or corrupt regulatory and law enforcement agencies and officials, constituting an association in fact for the purpose of racketeering activity. After being apprized of the illegal activities by Iviewit, none of these regulatory and law enforcement agencies or individuals made adequate, if any, effort to investigate, report or remedy the illegal activities, although they are legally obligated by statute and fiduciary duty to do so.
“acquiring an interest in or control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of unlawful debt.”
Defendants did knowingly, unlawfully, and intentionally combine, confederate, conspire and agree together with each other, and with other co-conspirators whose names are both known and unknown, participate in a conspiracy to acquire and to maintain markets in the Iviewit's technologies markets through the a fraudulent series of events to acquire ownership interest and/or control of Inventors inventions, companies and other business enterprises; to unfairly compete with other vendors through Pools to gain market advantage through a pattern of racketeering activity; and to affect interstate and foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity. This violation was in concert with corrupt and/or inept regulatory and law enforcement officials, constituting an association in fact for the purpose of racketeering activity. After being apprized of the illegal activities by Iviewit, these persons made little, if any, effort to investigate, report or remedy the illegal activities, although they are legally obligated by statute and fiduciary duty to do so.
“conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt.”
Defendants in concert with all other defendants and each of them, did knowingly, unlawfully and intentionally combine, confederate, conspire, and agree together with each other, with named co-conspirators and with others whose names are both known and unknown, to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity to promote the affairs of the enterprise. After being apprized of the illegal activities by Iviewit, none of the defendants made reasonable effort to investigate, report or remedy the illegal activities, therefore condoning the activities.
“unlawful for any person to conspire to violate Sections 1962 (a), 1962 (b), and 1962 (c)”
Class I Defendants in concert will all other defendants and each of them, did knowingly, unlawfully and intentionally combine, confederate, conspire, and agree together with each other, with named co-conspirators and with others whose names are both known and unknown, commit violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and to prevent the conspiracy from becoming known to the public. After being apprized of the illegal activities by Iviewit, none of the defendants made reasonable effort to investigate, report or remedy the illegal activities, therefore engaging in a conspiracy by condoning the activities through their inactions.
This case contains a Civil RICO claim, filed in this Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sections 1961-1968. This Order has been designed to establish a uniform and efficient procedure for deciding RICO cases. The Iviewit's) shall file within 20 days of the entry of this order a RICO case statement (an original and one (1) copy). The statement shall include the facts Iviewit's rely upon to initiate this RICO complaint as a result of the "reasonable inquiry" required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II. In particular, the statement shall be in a form which uses the numbers and letters set forth below, unless filed as part of an amended and restated complaint (in which latter case, the allegations of the amended and restated complaint shall reasonably follow the organization set out below) and shall state in detail and with specificity the following information:
i. State whether the alleged unlawful conduct is in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1962(a), (b), (c), and/or (d). If you allege violations of more that on Section 1962 subsections, treat each as a separate RICO claim.
ii. List each defendant and state the alleged misconduct and basis of liability of each defendant.
iii. List the alleged wrongdoers, other than the defendants listed above, and state the alleged misconduct of each wrongdoer.
iv. List the alleged victims and state how each victim allegedly was injured.
v. Described in detail the pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt alleged for each RICO claim. A description of the pattern of racketeering activity shall include the following information:
vi. List the alleged predicate acts and the specific statutes allegedly violated;
vii. Provide the dates of the predicate acts, the participants in the predicate acts and a description of the facts surrounding each predicate act;
viii. If the RICO claim is based upon the predicated offenses of wire fraud, mail fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or fraud in connection with a case under U.S.C. Title II, the "circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be state with particularity," Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Identify the time, place and contents of the alleged misrepresentation or omissions, and the identity of persons to whom and by whom the alleged misrepresentations or omissions were made;
ix. Describe whether the alleged predicate acts relate to the enterprise as part of a common plan. If so, describe in detail.
x. Describe in detail the alleged enterprise for each RICO claim. A description of the enterprise shall include the following information:
xi. State the names of the individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations or other entities allegedly constituting the enterprise;
xii. Describe the structure, purpose, roles, function and course of conduct of the enterprise;
xiii. State whether any defendants are employees, officers or directors of the alleged enterprise;
xiv. State whether any defendants are associated with the alleged enterprise, and if so, how;
xv. State whether you allege that the defendants are individuals or entities separate form the alleged enterprise, or that the defendants are the enterprise itself, or members of the enterprise;
xvi. If you allege any defendants to be the enterprise itself, or members of the enterprise, explain whether such defendants are perpetrators, passive instruments, or victims of the alleged racketeering activity.
xvii. State whether you allege and describe in detail how the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate or have merged into one entity.
xviii. Describe the alleged relationship between the activities of the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity. Discuss how the racketeering activity differs from the usual and daily activities of the enterprise, if at all.
xix. Describe what benefits, if any, the alleged enterprise receives from the alleged pattern of racketeering activity.
xx. Describe the effect of the activities of the enterprise on interstate or foreign commerce.
xxi. If the complaint alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(a), provide the following information:
xxii. State who received the income derived form the pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt; and,
xxiii. Describe the use of investment of such income.
xxiv. If the complaint alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(b), provide the following information:
1. Describe in detail the acquisition or maintenance of any interest in or control of the alleged enterprise; and,
2. State whether the same entity is both the liable "person" and the "enterprise" under Section 1962(b).
xxv. If the complaint alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c), provide the following information:
1. State who is employed by or associated with the enterprise;
2. State whether the same entity is both the liable "person and the "enterprise" under Section 1962(c).
xxvi. If the complaint alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d), describe in detail the alleged conspiracy;
1. Describe the alleged injury to business or property;
2. Describe the relationship between the alleged injury and violation of the RICO statute.
3. List the damages sustained by reason of the violation of Section 1962, indicating the amount for which each defendant allegedly is liable.
4. List all other federal causes of action, if any, and provide the relevant statute numbers.
5. List all pendant state claims, if any.
6. Provide any additional information you feel would be helpful to the Court in processing your RICO claim.
This order was adopted by the court en banc at its meeting of June 3, 1987. The court has further directed it be entered in each RICO case at the time of filing.
Iviewit shows damages already at a minimum value to be estimated at EXHIBIT “” - SUMMARY OF DAMAGES - LOW ESTIMATE MAY VARY BY SEVERAL HUNDRED BILLION DOLLARS.
The aforesaid outrageous conduct by Defendants, and each of them, conspiratorially, was done intentionally for the purpose of depriving Iviewit of monies due and to inflict upon the lead inventor, Eliot Bernstein, severe emotional distress.
The above-mentioned acts of the Defendant, and all Defendants, inclusive, and each of them, are willful, wanton, unconscionable, malicious and oppressive, beyond all bounds of decency in a civil society, and justify the ordering of exemplary and punitive damages.
Bernstein is entitled to recover damages for intentionally inflicted emotional distress and has demonstrated that somehow he was able to withstand and rise above distress so severe and of such nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Bernstein having a fierce desire to protect Shareholder investments.
The Defendants have conspired to act against Iviewit in order to prevent discovery and disclosure of their illegal activities. This conspiracy resulted in the termination of Iviewit from his position as and further extortion, intimidation, and unjustified lawsuits after his termination in order to silence him. The enterprises accomplished this through a pattern of racketeering activities involving mail fraud, wire fraud, extortion, intimidation and constituting violations of the RICO statute.
As a direct and proximate result of Defendants and all of them, inclusive, Inventor Bernstein has suffered severe emotional distress including humiliation, mental anguish, emotional and physical distress and has been injured in mind and body, all to Iviewit's damages, including but not limited to those outlined herein below.
As a further direct and proximate result of the actions of Defendants, and all of them, inclusive, a series of events transpired which also deprived Iviewit of being able to avail the companies legal counsel, as he could not find any who was willing or financially able to take on these wealthy, powerful, politically influential and corrupt legal firms, in fact it is near impossible to feel any relief when it appears Defendants using their legal influences, can even control and manipulate Supreme Court bar agencies and are willing to commit fraud upon the USPTO. Bernstein has been forced, at great emotional and mental effort, to have to learn about the law and attempt to represent himself, Pro Se, in an environment that has proven to be unfamiliar and hostile again and again.
Iviewit has incurred expenses to investigate and litigate fraudulent actions against fraudulent companies so much so as to cause Bernstein personal loss so extreme as to force his family into welfare. It is alleged that Bernstein will incur additional expenses and emotional distress in bringing this case to trial.
Defendants, and all of them, and each of them, by their extreme and outrageous conduct intended to cause severe emotional distress to another, the possibility of bodily harm resulting as a result of this distress, as a means to silence Iviewit from disclosing information about Defendants' illegal and corrupt conduct.
The Defendants knew, or should have known being attorneys at law (there should further be no excuse of ignorance and no relief in penalty), that their intentional conduct as described herein is outrageous, illegal and beyond all bounds of decency and civilized behavior, utterly intolerable in a civilized community, unconscionable, extremely malicious and would cause Bernstein to suffer the highest levels of emotional distress, shock, horror, fear, grief, anger, mental humiliation, distress of mind, alarm, disappointment, despair, worry, physical injury and illness and might have led to suicide. Defendants were well aware that their conduct would cause distress so severe and of such a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it and, in fact, that was one of their goals.
Defendants, and each of them and all of them, subjected Iviewit to repeated harassments, compounding the outrageousness of their crimes.
Emotional distress was a foreseeable and direct result of the Defendants' acts and were meant to cause intentional infliction of emotional distress on inventor Bernstein and others.
There are and were no other factors in Iviewit's life, being that he had a stable income and family life, educational funds for children, medical insurances, life insurance, and had managed to save adequate amounts over the years for a comfortable retirement, capable of causing the emotional distress and fear he endured at the hands of the Defendants, and each of them and all of them.
As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts, Iviewit suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress including anxiety, worry, fear, mental anguish, torment, despair, and emotional and physical distress, lives in almost poverty after companies have been destroyed and forced to struggle with Iviewit Shareholders and Iviewit investors worried about stolen and lost monies and their rights to IP they invested in. Harassments have caused a lack of ability to raise capital based on the patent suspensions and other investor worries, rightfully so, as to the ownership of the US and foreign patents and if such rights can be recovered.
Pain and suffering to Inventor Bernstein's family and friends is unparalleled in the annals of invention or law. The legal system designed to protect the Inventors has in fact become the enemy of the Inventors, albeit wrongfully by the influence and actions of a few. Nonetheless, this has caused a denial of due process and such loss causes further damage not only to Bernstein but to all of the Iviewit Shareholders. Defendant's, in a psychotic attempt to steal the Inventors' Inventions as their own, have in fact attempted the most perverse stealing imagined, to attempt to steal the thoughts and minds of others and claim falsely inventions as their own, a most horrific crime.
Krane and Triggs through conflicted responses to Florida and New York Supreme Court State Bar Associations tried to cast a spell of insanity on Inventor Bernstein, so as to create a false belief that Bernstein was a conspiracy theorist, a person looking for someone to blame for a failed dot com, that they knew nothing or handled nothing to do with IP. Yet concealed was the fact that these responses were done by lawyers tainted in conflict of interests with their public offices with the state bars investigating the matters against their partners. The only way to cover up such crimes and hide from the volumes of damning evidence was to use the influence of the most conflicted partners at Proskauer and buy and derail justice. Once recruited, Krane and Triggs violated their state bar office positions and prepared a smear campaign of ridicule against Bernstein, while denying due process of the complaints against their partners. This happened almost identically in two state bar associations indicating no coincidence and conveying an appearance of impropriety in all matters related. Evidence that these are real actions of Defendant's and not a paranoia of Inventor Bernstein are further corroborated in the filing of the fraud upon the USPTO charges signed by Crossbow CEO Warner supporting the claims herein. The fact that patent applications are being suspended and information preliminarily obtained indicates fraud both on the USPTO and Iviewit, also gives cause to believe that the Inventor is not mad and it is those who attempted to steal such inventions that are mad. In their desperation Defendants have attempted to cover up and have in fact become delusional in their attempts to alter the truth and the timeline of history. In addition, Iviewit has multitudes of witnesses that confound Defendants surrealistic phantasmagorical account of history. Inventor Bernstein most has suffered in the denial of time, discovering and preparing for this action and delays of time caused by denial of due process through conflicts, in the ability to love his wife and see his three children, ages six, four and one grow, and the pain and suffering it has brought to their lives.
Defendants, in concert will all other defendants and each of them, did knowingly, unlawfully and intentionally combine, confederate, conspire, and agree together with each other, with named co-conspirators and with others whose names are both known and unknown, commit violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and to prevent the conspiracy from becoming known to the public. After being apprized of the illegal activities by Iviewit, none of the defendants made reasonable effort to investigate, report or remedy the illegal activities, therefore engaging in a conspiracy by condoning the activities through their inactions.
Defendants, in concert with all other defendants and each of them, did knowingly, unlawfully and intentionally combine, confederate, conspire, and agree together with each other, with named co-conspirators and with others whose names are both known and unknown, to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity to promote the affairs of the enterprise. After being apprized of the illegal activities by Iviewit, none of the defendants made reasonable effort to investigate, report or remedy the illegal activities, therefore condoning the activities. The same entities are the same liable “persons” and the “enterprise”.
Defendants, did knowingly, unlawfully, and intentionally combine, confederate, conspire and agree together with each other, and with other co-conspirators whose names are both known and unknown, participate in a conspiracy to maintain and acquire markets to gain market advantage through a pattern of racketeering activity; and affected interstate and foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity. This violation was in concert with corrupt and/or inept, and at times and in certain instances successful at manipulating regulatory and law enforcement officials to deny due process to Iviewit, constituting an association in fact for the purpose of racketeering activity. After being apprized of the illegal activities by Iviewit, these persons made little, if any, effort to investigate, report or remedy the illegal activities, although they are legally obligated by statute and fiduciary duty to do so.
Defendants' motives were at all times financial. Iviewit believes through the discovery process and the production of documents a preponderance of evidence to support this allegation will be presented to this Court. Defendants, benefited financially from the Inventions and benefited financially from not paying Iviewit royalties.
Defendants' schemes are multitudinous. Viewed from an “outsider's” perspective, they may appear random but viewed from an “insider's” perspective and with insider knowledge and experience with many similar claims handled by these Defendant enterprises, two obvious and predictable patterns emerge:
There was collusion among the Defendants, the purpose of which is to increase their profits through exclusion of Iviewit to the inventions by means of relentless economic and psychological harassment; deceptions, delays, and falsification of documents, forcing claimants to give up, accept less, or sue; and then further using the legal system for extortion and duress. The schemes and tactics used almost always involve lies, fraud, distortions, delays, deceit, and misrepresentations, among other things; the end result being extortion, and extortion by color of official right, of money and benefits rightfully owed the claimant.
The Pools are not currently separate entities with Defendants, although certain entities may have ownership or management interests in other related enterprises. The acquisition by Proskauer of Rubenstein and the Pools has caused Proskauer and the Pools to have merged as Defendants now have control of such Pools and profit from such Pools.
At all times material to this complaint, Defendants, and in many instances their law firms, together with the Pools are each “enterprises,” as that term is defined in Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1961 (4), which enterprise was engaged in, and the activities of which affected interstate and foreign commerce. These “enterprises” conduct their affairs against legitimate claimants by fraud, deceit, deception, harassment, delays, intimidation, implicit and explicit threats; the goal of which is to induce fear, despair, and economic hardship in claimants so they will drop their claims or settle for less than they are rightfully owed. There is every indication these “enterprises” will continue indefinitely, and continue to spread to other companies through mergers, acquisitions, and corrupt influence.
These “enterprises” fall under the definition of a RICO “enterprise” as “a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct,” and as an “ongoing organization, formal or informal [with] . . . various associates function[ing] as a continuing unit.” In fact, in finding a similar set of circumstances involving a similar cast of initial characters pre-existed Iviewit's claims and such circumstances forced closure of business over patent malfeasances of similar nature, causing a multi-million dollar loss, establishes this is a group that may pray upon inventors to steal technologies and have now taken such crimes through the Pools which act as a front, to peek at technologies and then use them, and apply unfair competitive tactics as described herein to drive the small inventor either out of business or worse, steal the ideas through others such as Joao and Utley writing them into their own names or worse. These are the very reasons as a country that pooling of patents has been broken up before by the Department of Justice. As mentioned herein, the Pools created by Rubenstein are touted as having been approved by the DOJ, as if they have opined.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum relief under;
Iviewit asks for civil remedies and requests this Court request the Attorney General institute proceedings under this section. In the interim and pending final determination thereof, Iviewit prays that this Court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper. Iviewit has been injured in business and property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter and prays for recovery of threefold the damages and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for this Court under Sec. 1966 to expedite actions in the civil action instituted herein in the United States in this Court, and asks the Attorney General to file with the clerk of this Court a certificate stating that in his opinion the case is of general public importance. A Copy of that certificate be furnished immediately by such clerk to the chief judge or in his absence to the presiding district judge of the district in which such action is pending. Further, upon receipt of such copy, such judge shall designate immediately a judge of that district to hear and determine action.
WHEREFORE, under Sec 1968 Iviewit prays for this Court to begin Civil investigative demand whereby asking the Attorney General to see reason to believe Defendants are in possession, custody, or control of documentary materials relevant to this racketeering investigation, and prior to the institution of a civil or criminal proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon all such Defendants a civil investigative demand requiring all such persons and entities produce such materials for examination stating the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged racketeering violation which is under investigation and the provision of law applicable thereto; and describing the class or classes of documentary material produced thereunder with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to be fairly identified; and state that the demand is returnable forthwith or prescribe a return date which will provide a reasonable period of time within which the material so demanded may be assembled and made available for inspection and copying or reproduction; and identify the custodian to whom such material shall be made available; require the production of any/all documentary evidence which would be privileged from disclosure if demanded by a subpena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation of such alleged racketeering violation.
Iviewit states this Court has proper venue whenever any petition is filed in any district court of the United States under this section, such court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter so presented, and to enter such order or orders as may be required to carry into effect the provisions of this section
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for this Court to further prevent and restrain violations of Iviewit's of Section 1962 by issuing appropriate immediate orders including but not limited to ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, directly and indirectly in any enterprise, imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities of or interests of any persons, including but not limited to prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which effect interstate and foreign commerce and ordering dissolution and reorganization of any enterprise making the provision for the rights of innocent persons.
5. CONSPIRACY
Conspiracy I
Conspiracy II
Iviewit states Defendants have violated:
In addition, Defendants have committed offenses to defraud United States in a multitude of acts against the following agencies:
i USPTO
ii UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICES
iii FEDERALLY BACKED SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
iv STATE SUPREME COURTS
v FLORIDA - THE FLORIDA BAR & FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
vi NEW YORK - FIRST DEPARTMENT AND SECOND DEPARTMENT
vii VIRGINIA STATE BAR
viii PENNSYLVANIA BAR
ix 15C
x SECRETARY OF STATES IN FLORIDA AND DELAWARE
xi FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF Corporations
xii DELAWARE DEPARTMENT Corporations
xiii INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
xiv FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY COURT - FLORIDA
Two or more Defendant's have conspired and further conspire to commit offenses against the United States, and to defraud the United States, and agencies thereof in manner and purpose, and one or more of such persons did acts to effect the object of the conspiracy.
Sec. 2071. - Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally
Sec. 2073. - False entries and reports of moneys or securities
Sec. 2112. - Personal property of United States
Sec. 2114. - Mail, money, or other property of United States
(b) Receipt, Possession, Concealment, or Disposal of Property.
Sec. 2314. - Transportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys, fraudulent State tax stamps, or articles used in counterfeiting
Sec. 2319. - Criminal infringement of a copyright
6. SUPREME COURT AGENCY PUBLIC OFFICE ABUSE, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST DEPT AND THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
Defendants - Krane, Triggs, Cahill, Judith Kaye, Kearse, DiGiovanna, First Dept Five Justices, Turner, Hoffman, Marvin, Boggs, Five Justices of Florida, Rubenstein, Wheeler, Joao
Defendants, Proskauer, Rubenstein, Triggs, Joao, Krane have manipulated state bar agencies which are sub-divisions of the state Supreme Courts and have done so with conspiratorial intent so as to obstruct justice and due process and have caused shame and disgrace on such courts through conflicted partners using influence pedaling and the likes in violation of departmental rules and public office positions within such esteemed state courts. This has posed additional liabilities on state supreme courts under insurance contracts covering such public officers and caused conflict between the courts and Iviewit.
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as:
i. Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
ii. Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
iii. Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
7. RACKETEERING
Defendant Utley for threats
Defendants - All Class I Defendants
Pools
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendants have interfered with commerce by threats and obstructed, delayed, and affected commerce and the movement of articles and commodity in commerce, by robbery and extortion and further conspired so to do, and committed and threatened physical violence to Bernstein and to Inventors property in furtherance of a plan with the intended purpose a violate this section.
Iviewit states Defendants have committed robbery in the unlawful taking and obtaining of personal property from Inventors and Iviewit's. Defendant's have committed extortion in the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. Conspiracy involves commerce within the District of Columbia and Territories and Possessions of the United States; involving commerce between points in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and points outside thereof; and commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State; and other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Through Interstate and foreign travel and transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises conspirators have traveled in interstate and foreign commerce and used the mail an facilities in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent; distributing the proceeds of unlawful activities; and otherwise promoted, managed, established, carry on, facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, unlawful activities and thereafter the acts described in paragraph (1) or (3).
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum fines under this title.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated and committed unlawful activities in business enterprise involving extortion and bribery in violation of the laws of the States in which committed and the Federal Code, and acts which are indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, or under section 1956 or 1957 of this title.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendants - Pools
Defendants - Tiedemann Transaction - Utley Hersh, Wheeler, Proskauer
Defendants have laundered monetary instruments (a) (1) knowing that the property is involved in a financial transaction representing the proceeds of unlawful activity, conduct and attempts to conduct a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity - (A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; and with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; and to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. Defendants have transported, transmitted, transferred, attempted to transport, transmitted, and transferred a monetary instrument and funds from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States and to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; knowing that the monetary instrument and funds involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; and to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum liability for civil penalties of not more than the greater of - (A) the value of the property, funds, or monetary instruments involved in the transaction; or (B) $10,000. (2) Jurisdiction over foreign persons. - For purposes of adjudicating an action filed or enforcing a penalty ordered under this section, the district courts shall have jurisdiction over any foreign person, including any financial institution authorized under the laws of a foreign country, against whom the action is brought, if service of process upon the foreign person is made under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the laws of the country in which the foreign person is found, and - (A) the foreign person commits an offense under subsection (a) involving a financial transaction that occurs in whole or in part in the United States; (B) the foreign person converts, to his or her own use, property in which the United States has an ownership interest by virtue of the entry of an order of forfeiture by a court of the United States; or (C) the foreign person is a financial institution that maintains a bank account at a financial institution in the United States. (3) Court authority over assets. - A court described in paragraph (2) may issue a pretrial restraining order or take any other action necessary to ensure that any bank account or other property held by the defendant in the United States is available to satisfy a judgment under this section. (4) Federal receiver. - (A) In general. - A court described in paragraph (2) may appoint a Federal Receiver, in accordance with subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, to collect, marshal, and take custody, control, and possession of all assets of the defendant, wherever located, to satisfy a civil judgment under this subsection, a forfeiture judgment under section 981 or 982, or a criminal sentence under section 1957 or subsection (a) of this section, including an order of restitution to any victim of a specified unlawful activity. (B) Appointment and authority. - A Federal Receiver described in subparagraph (A) - (i) may be appointed upon application of a Federal prosecutor or a Federal or State regulator, by the court having jurisdiction over the defendant in the case; (ii) shall be an officer of the court, and the powers of the Federal Receiver shall include the powers set out in section 754 of title 28, United States Code; and (iii) shall have standing equivalent to that of a Federal prosecutor for the purpose of submitting requests to obtain information regarding the assets of the defendant - (I) from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury; or (II) from a foreign country pursuant to a mutual legal assistance treaty, multilateral agreement, or other arrangement for international law enforcement assistance, provided that such requests are in accordance with the policies and procedures of the Attorney General. (c) As used in this section - (1) the term ''knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity'' means that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such activity is specified in paragraph (7); (2) the term ''conducts'' includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating, or concluding a transaction; (3) the term ''transaction'' includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, use of a safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means effected; (4) the term ''financial transaction'' means(A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments, or(iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or(B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree; (5) the term ''monetary instruments'' means(i) coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or(ii) investment securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery; (6) the term ''financial institution'' includes - (A) any financial institution, as defined in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, or the regulations promulgated thereunder; and (B) any foreign bank, as defined in section 1 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101). (7) the term ''specified unlawful activity'' means - (A) any act or activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1) of this title except an act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31; (B) with respect to a financial transaction occurring in whole or in part in the United States, an offense against a foreign nation involving - (i) the manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (as such term is defined for the purposes of the Controlled Substances Act); (ii) murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, destruction of property by means of explosive or fire, or a crime of violence (as defined in section 16); (iii) fraud, or any scheme or attempt to defraud, by or against a foreign bank (as defined in paragraph 7 of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978)); [1] (iv) bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by or for the benefit of a public official; (v) smuggling or export control violations involving - (I) an item controlled on the United States Munitions List established under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778); or (II) an item controlled under regulations under the Export Administration Regulations (15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774); or (vi) an offense with respect to which the United States would be obligated by a multilateral treaty, either to extradite the alleged offender or to submit the case for prosecution, if the offender were found within the territory of the United States; (C) any act or acts constituting a continuing criminal enterprise, as that term is defined in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848); (D) an offense under section 32 (relating to the destruction of aircraft), section 37 (relating to violence at international airports), section 115 (relating to influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member), section 152 (relating to concealment of assets; false oaths and claims; bribery), section 215 (relating to commissions or gifts for procuring loans), section 351 (relating to congressional or Cabinet officer assassination), any of sections 500 through 503 (relating to certain counterfeiting offenses), section 513 (relating to securities of States and private entities), section 541 (relating to goods falsely classified), section 542 (relating to entry of goods by means of false statements), section 545 (relating to smuggling goods into the United States), section 549 (relating to removing goods from Customs custody), section 641 (relating to public money, property, or records), section 656 (relating to theft, embezzlement, or misapplication by bank officer or employee), section 657 (relating to lending, credit, and insurance institutions), section 658 (relating to property mortgaged or pledged to farm credit agencies), section 666 (relating to theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds), section 793, 794, or 798 (relating to espionage), section 831 (relating to prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials), section 844(f) or (i) (relating to destruction by explosives or fire of Government property or property affecting interstate or foreign commerce), section 875 (relating to interstate communications), section 922(l) (relating to the unlawful importation of firearms), section 924(n) (relating to firearms trafficking), section 956 (relating to conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure certain property in a foreign country), section 1005 (relating to fraudulent bank entries), 1006 [2] (relating to fraudulent Federal credit institution entries), 1007 (FOOTNOTE 2) (relating to Federal Deposit Insurance transactions), 1014 (FOOTNOTE 2) (relating to fraudulent loan or credit applications), section 1030 (relating to computer fraud and abuse), 1032 (FOOTNOTE 2) (relating to concealment of assets from conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent of financial institution), section 1111 (relating to murder), section 1114 (relating to murder of United States law enforcement officials), section 1116 (relating to murder of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons), section 1201 (relating to kidnapping), section 1203 (relating to hostage taking), section 1361 (relating to willful injury of Government property), section 1363 (relating to destruction of property within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction), section 1708 (theft from the mail), section 1751 (relating to Presidential assassination), section 2113 or 2114 (relating to bank and postal robbery and theft), section 2280 (relating to violence against maritime navigation), section 2281 (relating to violence against maritime fixed platforms), section 2319 (relating to copyright infringement), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in counterfeit goods and services),, (FOOTNOTE 3) section 2332 (relating to terrorist acts abroad against United States nationals), section 2332a (relating to use of weapons of mass destruction), section 2332b (relating to international terrorist acts transcending national boundaries), or section 2339A or 2339B (relating to providing material support to terrorists) of this title, section 46502 of title 49, United States Code,, [3] a felony violation of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 (relating to precursor and essential chemicals), section 590 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1590) (relating to aviation smuggling), section 422 of the Controlled Substances Act (relating to transportation of drug paraphernalia), section 38(c) (relating to criminal violations) of the Arms Export Control Act, section 11 (relating to violations) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 206 (relating to penalties) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, section 16 (relating to offenses and punishment) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, any felony violation of section 15 of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (relating to food stamp fraud) involving a quantity of coupons having a value of not less than $5,000, any violation of section 543(a)(1) of the Housing Act of 1949 (relating to equity skimming), any felony violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, or any felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; or ''section''. ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES (E) a felony violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.), the Ocean Dumping Act (33 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.), the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (33 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.), or the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.). (F) Any [4] act or activity constituting an offense involving a Federal health care offense. (8) the term ''State'' includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. (d) Nothing in this section shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this section. (e) Violations of this section may be investigated by such components of the Department of Justice as the Attorney General may direct, and by such components of the Department of the Treasury as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct, as appropriate and, with respect to offenses over which the United States Postal Service has jurisdiction, by the Postal Service. Such authority of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postal Service shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Postal Service, and the Attorney General. Violations of this section involving offenses described in paragraph (c)(7)(E) may be investigated by such components of the Department of Justice as the Attorney General may direct, and the National Enforcement Investigations Center of the Environmental Protection Agency. (f) There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this section if - (1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a non-United States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States; and (2) the transaction or series of related transactions involves funds or monetary instruments of a value exceeding $10,000. (g) Notice of Conviction of Financial Institutions. - If any financial institution or any officer, director, or employee of any financial institution has been found guilty of an offense under this section, section 1957 or 1960 of this title, or section 5322 or 5324 of title 31, the Attorney General shall provide written notice of such fact to the appropriate regulatory agency for the financial institution. (h) Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy. (i) Venue. - (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a prosecution for an offense under this section or section 1957 may be brought in - (A) any district in which the financial or monetary transaction is conducted; or (B) any district where a prosecution for the underlying specified unlawful activity could be brought, if the defendant participated in the transfer of the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity from that district to the district where the financial or monetary transaction is conducted. (2) A prosecution for an attempt or conspiracy offense under this section or section 1957 may be brought in the district where venue would lie for the completed offense under paragraph (1), or in any other district where an act in furtherance of the attempt or conspiracy took place. (3) For purposes of this section, a transfer of funds from 1 place to another, by wire or any other means, shall constitute a single, continuing transaction. Any person who conducts (as that term is defined in subsection (c)(2)) any portion of the transaction may be charged in any district in which the transaction takes place
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendants have engaged in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity knowingly engaged and attempted to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, the punishment for an offense under this section is a fine under title 18, United States Code, or imprisonment for not more than ten years or both. The court may impose an alternate fine to that imposable under paragraph (1) of not more than twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction. In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government is not required to prove the defendant knew that the offense from which the criminally derived property was derived was specified unlawful activity. That the offenses under this section take place in the United States and in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; that the offense under this section takes place outside the United States and such special jurisdiction, but the defendant is a United States person (as defined in section 3077 of this title, but excluding the class described in paragraph (2)(D) of such section). Violations of this section may be investigated by such components of the Department of Justice as the Attorney General may direct, and by such components of the Department of the Treasury as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct, as appropriate and, with respect to offenses over which the United States Postal Service has jurisdiction, by the Postal Service. Such authority of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postal Service shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Postal Service, and the Attorney General. That the term ''monetary transaction'' means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument (as defined in section 1956(c)(5) of this title) by, through, or to a financial institution (as defined in section 1956 of this title), including any transaction that would be a financial transaction under section 1956(c)(4)(B) of this title, but such term does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution; that conspirators have ''criminally derived property'' property constituting, and derived from, proceeds obtained from criminal offenses; and that Defendants have engaged in ''specified unlawful activity'' given in section 1956 of this title.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Personal property of United States, which Defendants have robbed and attempted to rob Iviewit and Inventors of personal property belonging to the United States. SBA Monies were secured through fraud and misrepresentation. SBA loans were quasi collateralized with the patents but the patents were supposed to be supporting the IP are not.
Defendants -
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not to be imprisoned more than fifteen years.
8. COMMERCE AND TRADE
Iviewit states Defendants have violated every contract, combination in the form of trust our otherwise, have conspired, in the restraint of trade and commerce among the States and with foreign nations, and Defendants have further monopolized, and combined to conspire with a multitude of persons, to monopolize trade of the commerce among the States and foreign nations is therefore declared to be illegal.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendant's have used Trusts, etc., in the restraint of trade; and penalty that every contract, combination in the form of trust and otherwise has been used in conspiracy, in restraint of trade and commerce among the several States, and with foreign nations, and Defendants made contracts and or engaged in combinations and conspiracy declared to be illegal.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays this Court deem those guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, and, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. Iviewit prays this Court grant maximum relief under;
Defendant's monopolized trade, which is a felony and imposes penalty on every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court Iviewit prays this Court grant maximum relief under;
Concerning the forfeiture of property in transit. Property owned under contract and/or by any combination, and pursuant to conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section 1 of this title, and in the course of transportation from one State to another, and to foreign countries, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays this Court grant maximum relief under;
Through Conduct involving trade and commerce with foreign nations Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless - (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect - (A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or (B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and (2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section. If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendants - NDA Violators, Pools
Through sale, etc., on agreement not to use goods of competitor. Defendant's are engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale and/or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, and/or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays this Court grant suits by persons injured for (a) Amount of recovery; prejudgment interest Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The court may award under this section, pursuant to a motion by such person promptly made, simple interest on actual damages for the period beginning on the date of service of such person's pleading setting forth a claim under the antitrust laws and ending on the date of judgment, or for any shorter period therein, if the court finds that the award of such interest for such period is just in the circumstances. In determining whether an award of interest under this section for any period is just in the circumstances, the court shall consider only - (1) whether such person or the opposing party, or either party's representative, made motions or asserted claims or defenses so lacking in merit as to show that such party or representative acted intentionally for delay, or otherwise acted in bad faith; (2) whether, in the course of the action involved, such person or the opposing party, or either party's representative, violated any applicable rule, statute, or court order providing for sanctions for dilatory behavior or otherwise providing for expeditious proceedings; and (3) whether such person or the opposing party, or either party's representative, engaged in conduct primarily for the purpose of delaying the litigation or increasing the cost thereof. (b) Amount of damages payable to foreign states and instrumentalities of foreign states (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who is a foreign state may not recover under subsection (a) of this section an amount in excess of the actual damages sustained by it and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. (2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a foreign state if - (A) such foreign state would be denied, under section 1605(a)(2) of title 28, immunity in a case in which the action is based upon a commercial activity, or an act, that is the subject matter of its claim under this section; (B) such foreign state waives all defenses based upon or arising out of its status as a foreign state, to any claims brought against it in the same action; (C) such foreign state engages primarily in commercial activities; and (D) such foreign state does not function, with respect to the commercial activity, or the act, that is the subject matter of its claim under this section as a procurement entity for itself or for another foreign state. (c) Definitions For purposes of this section - (1) the term ''commercial activity'' shall have the meaning given it in section 1603(d) of title 28, and (2) the term ''foreign state'' shall have the meaning given it in section 1603(a) of title 28
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Through acquisition by one corporation of stock of another, Defendant's engaged in commerce and in activities affecting commerce and acquired, directly and/or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. This section shall not apply to persons purchasing such stock solely for investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. Nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce from causing the formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their immediate lawful business, or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof, or from owning and holding all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen competition. Nor shall anything herein contained be construed to prohibit any common carrier subject to the laws to regulate commerce from aiding in the construction of branches or short lines so located as to become feeders to the main line of the company so aiding in such construction or from acquiring or owning all or any part of the stock of such branch lines, nor to prevent any such common carrier from acquiring and owning all or any part of the stock of a branch or short line constructed by an independent company where there is no substantial competition between the company owning the branch line so constructed and the company owning the main line acquiring the property or an interest therein, nor to prevent such common carrier from extending any of its lines through the medium of the acquisition of stock or otherwise of any other common carrier where there is no substantial competition between the company extending its lines and the company whose stock, property, or an interest therein is so acquired. Nothing contained in this section shall be held to affect or impair any right heretofore legally acquired: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be held or construed to authorize or make lawful anything heretofore prohibited or made illegal by the antitrust laws, nor to exempt any person from the penal provisions thereof or the civil remedies therein provided. Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by the Secretary of Transportation, Federal Power Commission, Surface Transportation Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 79j of this title, the United States Maritime Commission, or the Secretary of Agriculture under any statutory provision vesting such power in such Commission, Board, or Secretary.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendants have used interlocking directorates and officers (a) (1) No person shall, at the same time, serve as a director or officer in any two corporations (other than banks, banking associations, and trust companies) that are - (A) engaged in whole or in part in commerce; and (B) by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws; if each of the corporations has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $10,000,000 as adjusted pursuant to paragraph (5) of this subsection. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), simultaneous service as a director or officer in any two corporations shall not be prohibited by this section if - (A) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $1,000,000, as adjusted pursuant to paragraph (5) of this subsection; (B) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than 2 per centum of that corporation's total sales; or (C) the competitive sales of each corporation are less than 4 per centum of that corporation's total sales. For purposes of this paragraph, ''competitive sales'' means the gross revenues for all products and services sold by one corporation in competition with the other, determined on the basis of annual gross revenues for such products and services in that corporation's last completed fiscal year. For the purposes of this paragraph, ''total sales'' means the gross revenues for all products and services sold by one corporation over that corporation's last completed fiscal year. (3) The eligibility of a director or officer under the provisions of paragraph (1) shall be determined by the capital, surplus and undivided profits, exclusive of dividends declared but not paid to stockholders, of each corporation at the end of that corporation's last completed fiscal year. (4) For purposes of this section, the term ''officer'' means an officer elected or chosen by the Board of Directors. (5) For each fiscal year commencing after September 30, 1990, the $10,000,000 and $1,000,000 thresholds in this subsection shall be increased (or decreased) as of October 1 each year by an amount equal to the percentage increase (or decrease) in the gross national product, as determined by the Department of Commerce or its successor, for the year then ended over the level so established for the year ending September 30, 1989. As soon as practicable, but not later than January 31 of each year, the Federal Trade Commission shall publish the adjusted amounts required by this paragraph. (b) When any person elected or chosen as a director or officer of any corporation subject to the provisions hereof is eligible at the time of his election or selection to act for such corporation in such capacity, his eligibility to act in such capacity shall not be affected by any of the provisions hereof by reason of any change in the capital, surplus and undivided profits, or affairs of such corporation from whatever cause, until the expiration of one year from the date on which the event causing ineligibility occurred.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated as a corporation the penal provisions of the antitrust laws, and such violation is deemed to be also of the individual directors, officers, and agents of such corporation who shall have authorized, ordered, and done any of the acts constituting in whole or in part such violation.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum relief from this Court under such violation deemed a misdemeanor, and upon conviction therefor of any such director, officer, or agent he shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or by both, in the discretion of the court.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum relief from this Court under;
Iviewit prays this Court grant immediate injunctive relief for private parties; exception; costs and that the persons, firms, corporations, or associations shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in the Court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage, and loss and damage, by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or association, except the United States, to bring suit for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board under subtitle IV of title 49. In any action under this section in which the Iviewit substantially prevails, the court shall award the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, to such Iviewit. Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Through unfair methods of competition; Iviewit requests prevention by Commission (a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices; inapplicability to foreign trade and Defendant's have used and continue to use unfair methods of competition in and affecting commerce, and unfair and deceptive acts and practices in and affecting commerce. The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, and persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended (7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.), except as provided in section 406(b) of said Act (7 U.S.C. 227(b)), from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated unfair methods of competition involving commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) as such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on import commerce with foreign nations; or on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such commerce in the United States; and such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this subsection, other than this paragraph. If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the operation of subparagraph (A)(ii), this subsection shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States. Proceeding by Commission; modifying and setting aside orders
WHEREFORE, Iviewit states the Commission shall have reason to believe such persons, partnerships, and corporations has been or is using any unfair method of competition and unfair and deceptive act and practice in and affecting commerce, and it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and containing a notice of a hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least thirty days after the service of said complaint. The persons, partnerships, and corporations so complained of shall have the right to appear at the place and time so fixed and show cause why an order should not be entered by the Commission requiring such persons, partnerships, and corporations to cease and desist from the violations of the laws so charged in said complaint. That Defendant's are persons, partnerships, and corporations and may make application, and upon good cause shown may be allowed by the Commission to intervene and appear in said proceeding by counsel or in person. The testimony in any such proceeding shall be reduced to writing and filed in the office of the Commission. If upon such hearing the Commission shall be of the opinion that the method of competition or the act or practice in question is prohibited by this subchapter, it shall make a report in writing in which it shall state its findings as to the facts and shall issue and cause to be served on such persons, partnerships, and corporations an order requiring such persons, partnerships, and corporations to cease and desist from using such methods of competition and acts and practices. Until the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time, or, if a petition for review has been filed within such time then until the record in the proceeding has been filed in a court of appeals of the United States, as hereinafter provided, the Commission may at any time, upon such notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any report or any order made or issued by it under this section. After the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time, the Commission may at any time, after notice and opportunity for hearing, reopen and alter, modify, or set aside, in whole or in part any report or order made or issued by it under this section, whenever in the opinion of the Commission conditions of fact or of law have so changed as to require such action or if the public interest shall so require, except that in the case of an order, the Commission shall reopen any such order to consider whether such order (including any affirmative relief provision contained in such order) should be altered, modified, or set aside, in whole or in part, if the person, partnership, or corporation involved files a request with the Commission which makes a satisfactory showing that changed conditions of law or fact require such order to be altered, modified, or set aside, in whole or in part. The Commission shall determine whether to alter, modify, or set aside any order of the Commission in response to a request made by a person, partnership, or corporation under paragraph [1] (2) not later than 120 days after the date of the filing of such request. Review of order; rehearing. Any person, partnership, or corporation required by an order of the Commission to cease and desist from using any method of competition or act or practice may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States, within any circuit where the method of competition or the act or practice in question was used or where such person, partnership, or corporation resides or carries on business, by filing in the court, within sixty days from the date of the service of such order, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Commission, and thereupon the Commission shall file in the court the record in the proceeding, as provided in section 2112 of title 28. Upon such filing of the petition the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein concurrently with the Commission until the filing of the record and shall have power to make and enter a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order of the Commission, and enforcing the same to the extent that such order is affirmed and to issue such writs as are ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary in its judgment to prevent injury to the public or to competitors pendente lite. The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. To the extent that the order of the Commission is affirmed, the court shall thereupon issue its own order commanding obedience to the terms of such order of the Commission. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper. The Commission may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive, and its recommendation, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order, with the return of such additional evidence. The judgment and decree of the court shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari, as provided in section 1254 of title 28. Jurisdiction of court upon the filing of the record with it the jurisdiction of the court of appeals of the United States to affirm, enforce, modify, or set aside orders of the Commission shall be exclusive. Exemption from liability no order of the Commission or judgment of court to enforce the same shall in anywise relieve or absolve any person, partnership, or corporation from any liability under the Antitrust Acts. Service of complaints, orders and other processes; return Complaints, orders, and other processes of the Commission under this section may be served by anyone duly authorized by the Commission, either by delivering a copy thereof to the person to be served, or to a member of the partnership to be served, or the president, secretary, or other executive officer or a director of the corporation to be served; or by leaving a copy thereof at the residence or the principal office or place of business of such person, partnership, or corporation; or by mailing a copy thereof by registered mail or by certified mail addressed to such person, partnership, or corporation at his or its residence or principal office or place of business. The verified return by the person so serving said complaint, order, or other process setting forth the manner of said service shall be proof of the same, and the return post office receipt for said complaint, order, or other process mailed by registered mail or by certified mail as aforesaid shall be proof of the service of the same. Finality of order an order of the Commission to cease and desist shall become final upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time; but the Commission may thereafter modify or set aside its order to the extent provided in the last sentence of subsection except as to any order provision subject to paragraph, upon the sixtieth day after such order is served, if a petition for review has been duly filed; except that any such order may be stayed, in whole or in part and subject to such conditions as may be appropriate, by - the Commission; an appropriate court of appeals of the United States, if a petition for review of such order is pending in such court, and an application for such a stay was previously submitted to the Commission and the Commission, within the 30-day period beginning on the date the application was received by the Commission, either denied the application or did not grant or deny the application; or the Supreme Court, if an applicable petition for certiorari is pending. For purposes of subsection (m)(1)(B) of this section and of section 57b(a)(2) of this title, if a petition for review of the order of the Commission has been filed - upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed or the petition for review has been dismissed by the court of appeals and no petition for certiorari has been duly filed; upon the denial of a petition for certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed or the petition for review has been dismissed by the court of appeals; or upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of issuance of a mandate of the Supreme Court directing that the order of the Commission be affirmed or the petition for review be dismissed. In the case of an order provision requiring a person, partnership, or corporation to divest itself of stock, other share capital, or assets, if a petition for review of such order of the Commission has been filed - upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed or the petition for review has been dismissed by the court of appeals and no petition for certiorari has been duly filed; upon the denial of a petition for certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed or the petition for review has been dismissed by the court of appeals; or upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of issuance of a mandate of the Supreme Court directing that the order of the Commission be affirmed or the petition for review be dismissed. (h) Modification or setting aside of order by Supreme Court If the Supreme Court directs that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside, the order of the Commission rendered in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court shall become final upon the expiration of thirty days from the time it was rendered, unless within such thirty days either party has instituted proceedings to have such order corrected to accord with the mandate, in which event the order of the Commission shall become final when so corrected. Modification or setting aside of order by Court of Appeals if the order of the Commission is modified or set aside by the court of appeals, and if the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari has expired and no such petition has been duly filed, or the petition for certiorari has been denied, or the decision of the court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, then the order of the Commission rendered in accordance with the mandate of the court of appeals shall become final on the expiration of thirty days from the time such order of the Commission was rendered, unless within such thirty days either party has instituted proceedings to have such order corrected so that it will accord with the mandate, in which event the order of the Commission shall become final when so corrected. Rehearing upon order or remand if the Supreme Court orders a rehearing; or if the case is remanded by the court of appeals to the Commission for a rehearing, and if the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari has expired, and no such petition has been duly filed, or the petition for certiorari has been denied, or the decision of the court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, then the order of the Commission rendered upon such rehearing shall become final in the same manner as though no prior order of the Commission had been rendered. ''Mandate'' defined As used in this section the term ''mandate'', in case a mandate has been recalled prior to the expiration of thirty days from the date of issuance thereof, means the final mandate.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit seeks Penalties for violation of order; injunctions and other appropriate equitable relief against Defendants as persons, partnerships, and corporations who violate an order of the Commission after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney General of the United States. Each separate violation of such an order shall be a separate offense, except that in a case of a violation through continuing failure to obey or neglect to obey a final order of the Commission, each day of continuance of such failure or neglect shall be deemed a separate offense. In such actions, the United States district courts are empowered to grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further equitable relief as they deem appropriate in the enforcement of such final orders of the Commission. Civil actions for recovery of penalties for knowing violations of rules and cease and desist orders respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices; jurisdiction; maximum amount of penalties; continuing violations; de novo determinations; compromise or settlement procedure. The Commission may commence a civil action to recover a civil penalty in a district court of the United States against any person, partnership, or corporation which violates any rule under this chapter respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices (other than an interpretive rule or a rule violation of which the Commission has provided is not an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of subsection (a)(1) of this section) with actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule. In such action, such person, partnership, or corporation shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. If the Commission determines in a proceeding under subsection (b) of this section that any act or practice is unfair or deceptive, and issues a final cease and desist order, other than a consent order, with respect to such act or practice, then the Commission may commence a civil action to obtain a civil penalty in a district court of the United States against any person, partnership, or corporation which engages in such act or practice after such cease and desist order becomes final (whether or not such person, partnership, or corporation was subject to such cease and desist order), and with actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is unlawful under subsection (a)(1) of this section. In such action, such person, partnership, or corporation shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. in the case of a violation through continuing failure to comply with a rule or with subsection (a)(1) of this section, each day of continuance of such failure shall be treated as a separate violation, for purposes of subparagraphs (A) and (B). In determining the amount of such a civil penalty, the court shall take into account the degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require. If the cease and desist order establishing that the act or practice is unfair or deceptive was not issued against the defendant in a civil penalty action under paragraph (1)(B) the issues of fact in such action against such defendant shall be tried de novo. Upon request of any party to such an action against such defendant, the court shall also review the determination of law made by the Commission in the proceeding under subsection (b) of this section that the act or practice which was the subject of such proceeding constituted an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of subsection (a) of this section. The Commission may compromise or settle any action for a civil penalty if such compromise or settlement is accompanied by a public statement of its reasons and is approved by the court. Standard of proof; public policy consideration the Commission shall have no authority under this section or section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum relief of this Court under;
Iviewit prays for civil actions for violations of rules and prays for cease and desist orders respecting unfair and deceptive acts and practices, for suits by Commission against persons, partnerships, and corporations; jurisdiction; relief for dishonest or fraudulent acts. Defendant's violate rules under this subchapter respecting unfair and deceptive acts and practices (other than an interpretive rule, or a rule violation of which the Commission has provided is not an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of section 45(a) of this title), then the Commission may commence a civil action against such persons, partnerships, and corporations for relief under subsection (b) of this section in a United States district court or in any court of competent jurisdiction of a State. Defendant's are persons, partnerships, and corporation engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices (within the meaning of section 45(a)(1) of this title) with respect to which the Commission has issued a final cease and desist order which is applicable to such person, partnership, or corporation, then the Commission may commence a civil action against such person, partnership, or corporation in a United States district court or in any court of competent jurisdiction of a State. If the Commission satisfies the court that the act or practice to which the cease and desist order relates is one which a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent, the court may grant relief under subsection (b) of this section. (b) Nature of relief available The court in an action under subsection (a) of this section shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers or other persons, partnerships, and corporations resulting from the rule violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be. Such relief may include, but shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or return of property, the payment of damages, and public notification respecting the rule violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be; except that nothing in this subsection is intended to authorize the imposition of any exemplary or punitive damages. (c) Conclusiveness of findings of Commission in cease and desist proceedings; notice of judicial proceedings to injured persons, etc. (1) If(A) a cease and desist order issued under section 45(b) of this title has become final under section 45(g) of this title with respect to any person's, partnership's, or corporation's rule violation or unfair or deceptive act or practice, and(B) an action under this section is brought with respect to such person's, partnership's, or corporation's rule violation or act or practice, then the findings of the Commission as to the material facts in the proceeding under section 45(b) of this title with respect to such person's, partnership's, or corporation's rule violation or act or practice, shall be conclusive unless(i) the terms of such cease and desist order expressly provide that the Commission's findings shall not be conclusive, or(ii) the order became final by reason of section 45(g)(1) of this title, in which case such finding shall be conclusive if supported by evidence. (2) The court shall cause notice of an action under this section to be given in a manner which is reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances, to apprise the persons, partnerships, and corporations allegedly injured by the defendant's rule violation or act or practice of the pendency of such action. Such notice may, in the discretion of the court, be given by publication. (d) Time for bringing of actions No action may be brought by the Commission under this section more than 3 years after the rule violation to which an action under subsection (a)(1) of this section relates, or the unfair or deceptive act or practice to which an action under subsection (a)(2) of this section relates; except that if a cease and desist order with respect to any person's, partnership's, or corporation's rule violation or unfair or deceptive act or practice has become final and such order was issued in a proceeding under section 45(b) of this title which was commenced not later than 3 years after the rule violation or act or practice occurred, a civil action may be commenced under this section against such person, partnership, or corporation at any time before the expiration of one year after such order becomes final. (e) Availability of additional Federal or State remedies; other authority of Commission unaffected Remedies provided in this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission under any other provision of law
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Concerning Export trade and antitrust legislation. Nothing contained in the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) shall be construed as declaring to be illegal an association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and actually engaged solely in such export trade, or an agreement made or act done in the course of export trade by such association, provided such association, agreement, or act is not in restraint of trade within the United States, and is not in restraint of the export trade of any domestic competitor of such association: Provided, That such association does not, either in the United States or elsewhere, enter into any agreement, understanding, or conspiracy, or do any act which artificially or intentionally enhances or depresses prices within the United States of commodities of the class exported by such association, or which substantially lessens competition within the United States or otherwise restrains trade therein.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
In the pursuit of unfair methods of competition in export trade The prohibition against ''unfair methods of competition'' and the remedies provided for enforcing said prohibition contained in the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) shall be construed as extending to unfair methods of competition used in export trade against competitors engaged in export trade, even though the acts constituting such unfair methods are done without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
9. VIOLATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendant's have infringed and are infringing on copyrights. Defendant's violate the exclusive rights of the copyright owners as provided by sections 106 through 121 and of the author as provided in section 106A(a). For purposes of this chapter (other than section 506), any reference to copyright shall be deemed to include the rights conferred by section 106A(a). used in this subsection, the term ''anyone'' includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. (b) The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it. The court may require such owner to serve written notice of the action with a copy of the complaint upon any person shown, by the records of the Copyright Office or otherwise, to have or claim an interest in the copyright, and shall require that such notice be served upon any person whose interest is likely to be affected by a decision in the case. The court may require the joinder, and shall permit the intervention, of any person having or claiming an interest in the copyright. (c) For any secondary transmission by a cable system that embodies a performance or a display of a work which is actionable as an act of infringement under subsection (c) of section 111, a television broadcast station holding a copyright or other license to transmit or perform the same version of that work shall, for purposes of subsection (b) of this section, be treated as a legal or beneficial owner if such secondary transmission occurs within the local service area of that television station. (d) For any secondary transmission by a cable system that is actionable as an act of infringement pursuant to section 111(c)(3), the following shall also have standing to sue:(i) the primary transmitter whose transmission has been altered by the cable system; and(ii) any broadcast station within whose local service area the secondary transmission occurs. (e) With respect to any secondary transmission that is made by a satellite carrier of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission and is actionable as an act of infringement under section 119(a)(5), a network station holding a copyright or other license to transmit or perform the same version of that work shall, for purposes of subsection (b) of this section, be treated as a legal or beneficial owner if such secondary transmission occurs within the local service area of that station. (f) (1) With respect to any secondary transmission that is made by a satellite carrier of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission and is actionable as an act of infringement under section 122, a television broadcast station holding a copyright or other license to transmit or perform the same version of that work shall, for purposes of subsection (b) of this section, be treated as a legal or beneficial owner if such secondary transmission occurs within the local market of that station.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for remedies for infringement: Injunctions (a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright. (b) Any such injunction may be served anywhere in the United States on the person enjoined; it shall be operative throughout the United States and shall be enforceable, by proceedings in contempt or otherwise, by any United States court having jurisdiction of that person. The clerk of the court granting the injunction shall, when requested by any other court in which enforcement of the injunction is sought, transmit promptly to the other court a certified copy of all the papers in the case on file in such clerk's office.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
For remedies for infringement: Impounding and disposition of infringing articles (a) At any time while an action under this title is pending, the court may order the impounding, on such terms as it may deem reasonable, of all copies or phonorecords claimed to have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced. (b) As part of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the destruction or other reasonable disposition of all copies or phonorecords found to have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for remedies for infringement: Damages and profits (a) In General. - Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of copyright is liable for either - (1) the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or (2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c). (b) Actual Damages and Profits. - The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work. (c) Statutory Damages. - (1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just. For the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work. (2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was:(i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself, which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; or(ii) a public broadcasting entity which or a person who, as a regular part of the nonprofit activities of a public broadcasting entity (as defined in subsection (g) of section 118) infringed by performing a published nondramatic literary work or by reproducing a transmission program embodying a performance of such a work. (d) Additional Damages in Certain Cases. - In any case in which the court finds that a defendant proprietor of an establishment who claims as a defense that its activities were exempt under section 110(5) did not have reasonable grounds to believe that its use of a copyrighted work was exempt under such section, the plaintiff shall be entitled to, in addition to any award of damages under this section, an additional award of two times the amount of the license fee that the proprietor of the establishment concerned should have paid the plaintiff for such use during the preceding period of up to 3 years.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for remedies for infringement: Further for costs and attorney's fees in any civil action under this title, the Court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for Criminal offenses (a) Criminal Infringement. - Defendant's have infringed copyrights willfully for purposes of commercial advantage and private financial gain, and by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000, shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, United States Code. For purposes of this subsection, evidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement. (b) Forfeiture and Destruction. - When any person is convicted of any violation of subsection (a), the court in its judgment of conviction shall, in addition to the penalty therein prescribed, order the forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all infringing copies or phonorecords and all implements, devices, or equipment used in the manufacture of such infringing copies or phonorecords. (c) Fraudulent Copyright Notice. - Any person who, with fraudulent intent, places on any article a notice of copyright or words of the same purport that such person knows to be false, or who, with fraudulent intent, publicly distributes or imports for public distribution any article bearing such notice or words that such person knows to be false, shall be fined not more than $2,500. (d) Fraudulent Removal of Copyright Notice. - Any person who, with fraudulent intent, removes or alters any notice of copyright appearing on a copy of a copyrighted work shall be fined not more than $2,500. (e) False Representation. - Any person who knowingly makes a false representation of a material fact in the application for copyright registration provided for by section 409, or in any written statement filed in connection with the application, shall be fined not more than $2,500. (f) Rights of Attribution and Integrity. - Nothing in this section applies to infringement of the rights conferred by section 106A(a).
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for limitations on actions (a) Criminal Proceedings. - Except as expressly provided otherwise in this title, no criminal proceeding shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within 5 years after the cause of action arose. Civil Actions. - No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for notification of filing and determination of actions (a) Within one month after the filing of any action under this title, the clerks of the courts of the United States shall send written notification to the Register of Copyrights setting forth, as far as is shown by the papers filed in the court, the names and addresses of the parties and the title, author, and registration number of each work involved in the action. If any other copyrighted work is later included in the action by amendment, answer, or other pleading, the clerk shall also send a notification concerning it to the Register within one month after the pleading is filed. (b) Within one month after any final order or judgment is issued in the case, the clerk of the court shall notify the Register of it, sending with the notification a copy of the order or judgment together with the written opinion, if any, of the court. (c) Upon receiving the notifications specified in this section, the Register shall make them a part of the public records of the Copyright Office.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for Seizure and forfeiture of all copies or phonorecords manufactured, reproduced, distributed, sold, or otherwise used, intended for use, or possessed with intent to use in violation of section 506(a), and all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced, and all electronic, mechanical, or other devices for manufacturing, reproducing, or assembling such copies or phonorecords may be seized and forfeited to the United States. (b) The applicable procedures relating to (i) the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage for violations of the customs laws contained in title 19, (ii) the disposition of such vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage or the proceeds from the sale thereof, (iii) the remission or mitigation of such forfeiture, (iv) the compromise of claims, and (v) the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures, shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this section; except that such duties as are imposed upon any officer or employee of the Treasury Department or any other person with respect to the seizure and forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage under the provisions of the customs laws contained in title 19 shall be performed with respect to seizure and forfeiture of all articles described in subsection (a) by such officers, agents, or other persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose by the Attorney General.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for remedies for alteration of programming by cable systems (a) In any action filed pursuant to section 111(c)(3), the following remedies shall be available: (1) Where an action is brought by a party identified in subsections (b) or (c) of section 501, the remedies provided by sections 502 through 505, and the remedy provided by subsection (b) of this section; and (2) When an action is brought by a party identified in subsection (d) of section 501, the remedies provided by sections 502 and 505, together with any actual damages suffered by such party as a result of the infringement, and the remedy provided by subsection (b) of this section. (b) In any action filed pursuant to section 111(c)(3), the court may decree that, for a period not to exceed thirty days, the cable system shall be deprived of the benefit of a statutory license for one or more distant signals carried by such cable system.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for Liability of States, instrumentalities of States, and State officials for infringement of copyright (a) In General. - Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner provided by sections 106 through 121, for importing copies of phonorecords in violation of section 602, or for any other violation under this title. (b) Remedies. - In a suit described in subsection (a) for a violation described in that subsection, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for the violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in a suit against any public or private entity other than a State, instrumentality of a State, or officer or employee of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Such remedies include impounding and disposition of infringing articles under section 503, actual damages and profits and statutory damages under section 504, costs and attorney's fees under section 505, and the remedies provided in section 510.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for limitations on liability relating to material online (a) Transitory Digital Network Communications. - A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or providing connections, if - (1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a person other than the service provider; (2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by the service provider; (3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the material except as an automatic response to the request of another person; (4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of connections; and (5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without modification of its content. (b) System Caching. - (1) Limitation on liability. - A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the intermediate and temporary storage of material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider in a case in which - (A) the material is made available online by a person other than the service provider; (B) the material is transmitted from the person described in subparagraph (A) through the system or network to a person other than the person described in subparagraph (A) at the direction of that other person; and (C) the storage is carried out through an automatic technical process for the purpose of making the material available to users of the system or network who, after the material is transmitted as described in subparagraph (B), request access to the material from the person described in subparagraph (A), if the conditions set forth in paragraph (2) are met. (2) Conditions. - The conditions referred to in paragraph (1) are that - (A) the material described in paragraph (1) is transmitted to the subsequent users described in paragraph (1)(C) without modification to its content from the manner in which the material was transmitted from the person described in paragraph (1)(A); (B) the service provider described in paragraph (1) complies with rules concerning the refreshing, reloading, or other updating of the material when specified by the person making the material available online in accordance with a generally accepted industry standard data communications protocol for the system or network through which that person makes the material available, except that this subparagraph applies only if those rules are not used by the person described in paragraph (1)(A) to prevent or unreasonably impair the intermediate storage to which this subsection applies; (C) the service provider does not interfere with the ability of technology associated with the material to return to the person described in paragraph (1)(A) the information that would have been available to that person if the material had been obtained by the subsequent users described in paragraph (1)(C) directly from that person, except that this subparagraph applies only if that technology - (i) does not significantly interfere with the performance of the provider's system or network or with the intermediate storage of the material; (ii) is consistent with generally accepted industry standard communications protocols; and (iii) does not extract information from the provider's system or network other than the information that would have been available to the person described in paragraph (1)(A) if the subsequent users had gained access to the material directly from that person; (D) if the person described in paragraph (1)(A) has in effect a condition that a person must meet prior to having access to the material, such as a condition based on payment of a fee or provision of a password or other information, the service provider permits access to the stored material in significant part only to users of its system or network that have met those conditions and only in accordance with those conditions; and (E) if the person described in paragraph (1)(A) makes that material available online without the authorization of the copyright owner of the material, the service provider responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing upon notification of claimed infringement as described in subsection (c)(3), except that this subparagraph applies only if - (i) the material has previously been removed from the originating site or access to it has been disabled, or a court has ordered that the material be removed from the originating site or that access to the material on the originating site be disabled; and (ii) the party giving the notification includes in the notification a statement confirming that the material has been removed from the originating site or access to it has been disabled or that a court has ordered that the material be removed from the originating site or that access to the material on the originating site be disabled. (c) Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of Users. - (1) In general. - A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider - (A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. (2) Designated agent. - The limitations on liability established in this subsection apply to a service provider only if the service provider has designated an agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement described in paragraph (3), by making available through its service, including on its website in a location accessible to the public, and by providing to the Copyright Office, substantially the following information: (A) the name, address, phone number, and electronic mail address of the agent. (B) other contact information which the Register of Copyrights may deem appropriate. The Register of Copyrights shall maintain a current directory of agents available to the public for inspection, including through the Internet, in both electronic and hard copy formats, and may require payment of a fee by service providers to cover the costs of maintaining the directory. (3) Elements of notification. - (A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement must be a written communication provided to the designated agent of a service provider that includes substantially the following: (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (B) (i) Subject to clause (ii), a notification from a copyright owner or from a person authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner that fails to comply substantially with the provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be considered under paragraph (1)(A) in determining whether a service provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. (ii) In a case in which the notification that is provided to the service provider's designated agent fails to comply substantially with all the provisions of subparagraph (A) but substantially complies with clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) of subparagraph (A), clause (i) of this subparagraph applies only if the service provider promptly attempts to contact the person making the notification or takes other reasonable steps to assist in the receipt of notification that substantially complies with all the provisions of subparagraph (A). (d) Information Location Tools. - A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link, if the service provider - (1) (A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity is infringing; (B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or (C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in subsection (c)(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity, except that, for purposes of this paragraph, the information described in subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be identification of the reference or link, to material or activity claimed to be infringing, that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate that reference or link. (e) Limitation on Liability of Nonprofit Educational Institutions. - (1) When a public or other nonprofit institution of higher education is a service provider, and when a faculty member or graduate student who is an employee of such institution is performing a teaching or research function, for the purposes of subsections (a) and (b) such faculty member or graduate student shall be considered to be a person other than the institution, and for the purposes of subsections (c) and (d) such faculty member's or graduate student's knowledge or awareness of his or her infringing activities shall not be attributed to the institution, if - (A) such faculty member's or graduate student's infringing activities do not involve the provision of online access to instructional materials that are or were required or recommended, within the preceding 3-year period, for a course taught at the institution by such faculty member or graduate student; (B) the institution has not, within the preceding 3-year period, received more than two notifications described in subsection (c)(3) of claimed infringement by such faculty member or graduate student, and such notifications of claimed infringement were not actionable under subsection (f); and (C) the institution provides to all users of its system or network informational materials that accurately describe, and promote compliance with, the laws of the United States relating to copyright. (2) For the purposes of this subsection, the limitations on injunctive relief contained in subsections (j)(2) and (j)(3), but not those in (j)(1), shall apply. (f) Misrepresentations. - Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section - (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it. (g) Replacement of Removed or Disabled Material and Limitation on Other Liability. - (1) No liability for taking down generally. - Subject to paragraph (2), a service provider shall not be liable to any person for any claim based on the service provider's good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing. (2) Exception. - Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to material residing at the direction of a subscriber of the service provider on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider that is removed, or to which access is disabled by the service provider, pursuant to a notice provided under subsection (c)(1)(C), unless the service provider - (A) takes reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the material; (B) upon receipt of a counter notification described in paragraph (3), promptly provides the person who provided the notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) with a copy of the counter notification, and informs that person that it will replace the removed material or cease disabling access to it in 10 business days; and (C) replaces the removed material and ceases disabling access to it not less than 10, nor more than 14, business days following receipt of the counter notice, unless its designated agent first receives notice from the person who submitted the notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) that such person has filed an action seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider's system or network. (3) Contents of counter notification. - To be effective under this subsection, a counter notification must be a written communication provided to the service provider's designated agent that includes substantially the following: (A) A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber. (B) Identification of the material that has been removed or to which access has been disabled and the location at which the material appeared before it was removed or access to it was disabled. (C) A statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber has a good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification of the material to be removed or disabled. (D) The subscriber's name, address, and telephone number, and a statement that the subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of Federal District Court for the judicial district in which the address is located, or if the subscriber's address is outside of the United States, for any judicial district in which the service provider may be found, and that the subscriber will accept service of process from the person who provided notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) or an agent of such person. (4) Limitation on other liability. - A service provider's compliance with paragraph (2) shall not subject the service provider to liability for copyright infringement with respect to the material identified in the notice provided under subsection (c)(1)(C). (h) Subpoena To Identify Infringer. - (1) Request. - A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the owner's behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged infringer in accordance with this subsection. (2) Contents of request. - The request may be made by filing with the clerk - (A) a copy of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A); (B) a proposed subpoena; and (C) a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena is sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only be used for the purpose of protecting rights under this title. (3) Contents of subpoena. - The subpoena shall authorize and order the service provider receiving the notification and the subpoena to expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner or person authorized by the copyright owner information sufficient to identify the alleged infringer of the material described in the notification to the extent such information is available to the service provider. (4) Basis for granting subpoena. - If the notification filed satisfies the provisions of subsection (c)(3)(A), the proposed subpoena is in proper form, and the accompanying declaration is properly executed, the clerk shall expeditiously issue and sign the proposed subpoena and return it to the requester for delivery to the service provider. (5) Actions of service provider receiving subpoena. - Upon receipt of the issued subpoena, either accompanying or subsequent to the receipt of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A), the service provider shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner or person authorized by the copyright owner the information required by the subpoena, notwithstanding any other provision of law and regardless of whether the service provider responds to the notification. (6) Rules applicable to subpoena. - Unless otherwise provided by this section or by applicable rules of the court, the procedure for issuance and delivery of the subpoena, and the remedies for noncompliance with the subpoena, shall be governed to the greatest extent practicable by those provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the issuance, service, and enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum. (i) Conditions for Eligibility. - (1) Accommodation of technology. - The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider - (A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers; and (B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures. (2) Definition. - As used in this subsection, the term ''standard technical measures'' means technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works and - (A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process; (B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or networks. (j) Injunctions. - The following rules shall apply in the case of any application for an injunction under section 502 against a service provider that is not subject to monetary remedies under this section: (1) Scope of relief. - (A) With respect to conduct other than that which qualifies for the limitation on remedies set forth in subsection (a), the court may grant injunctive relief with respect to a service provider only in one or more of the following forms: (i) An order restraining the service provider from providing access to infringing material or activity residing at a particular online site on the provider's system or network. (ii) An order restraining the service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the service provider's system or network who is engaging in infringing activity and is identified in the order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder that are specified in the order. (iii) Such other injunctive relief as the court may consider necessary to prevent or restrain infringement of copyrighted material specified in the order of the court at a particular online location, if such relief is the least burdensome to the service provider among the forms of relief comparably effective for that purpose. (B) If the service provider qualifies for the limitation on remedies described in subsection (a), the court may only grant injunctive relief in one or both of the following forms: (i) An order restraining the service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the service provider's system or network who is using the provider's service to engage in infringing activity and is identified in the order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder that are specified in the order. (ii) An order restraining the service provider from providing access, by taking reasonable steps specified in the order to block access, to a specific, identified, online location outside the United States. (2) Considerations. - The court, in considering the relevant criteria for injunctive relief under applicable law, shall consider - (A) whether such an injunction, either alone or in combination with other such injunctions issued against the same service provider under this subsection, would significantly burden either the provider or the operation of the provider's system or network; (B) the magnitude of the harm likely to be suffered by the copyright owner in the digital network environment if steps are not taken to prevent or restrain the infringement; (C) whether implementation of such an injunction would be technically feasible and effective, and would not interfere with access to noninfringing material at other online locations; and (D) whether other less burdensome and comparably effective means of preventing or restraining access to the infringing material are available. (3) Notice and ex parte orders. - Injunctive relief under this subsection shall be available only after notice to the service provider and an opportunity for the service provider to appear are provided, except for orders ensuring the preservation of evidence or other orders having no material adverse effect on the operation of the service provider's communications network. (k) Definitions. - (1) Service provider. - (A) As used in subsection (a), the term ''service provider'' means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received. (B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term ''service provider'' means a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in subparagraph (A). (2) Monetary relief. - As used in this section, the term ''monetary relief'' means damages, costs, attorneys' fees, and any other form of monetary payment. (l) Other Defenses Not Affected. - The failure of a service provider's conduct to qualify for limitation of liability under this section shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the service provider that the service provider's conduct is not infringing under this title or any other defense. (m) Protection of Privacy. - Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on - (1) a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure complying with the provisions of subsection (i); or (2) a service provider gaining access to, removing, or disabling access to material in cases in which such conduct is prohibited by law. (n) Construction. - Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) describe separate and distinct functions for purposes of applying this section. Whether a service provider qualifies for the limitation on liability in any one of those subsections shall be based solely on the criteria in that subsection, and shall not affect a determination of whether that service provider qualifies for the limitations on liability under any other such subsection.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for Determination of reasonable license fees for individual proprietors In the case of any performing rights society subject to a consent decree which provides for the determination of reasonable license rates or fees to be charged by the performing rights society, notwithstanding the provisions of that consent decree, an individual proprietor who owns or operates fewer than 7 non-publicly traded establishments in which nondramatic musical works are performed publicly and who claims that any license agreement offered by that performing rights society is unreasonable in its license rate or fee as to that individual proprietor, shall be entitled to determination of a reasonable license rate or fee as follows: (1) The individual proprietor may commence such proceeding for determination of a reasonable license rate or fee by filing an application in the applicable district court under paragraph (2) that a rate disagreement exists and by serving a copy of the application on the performing rights society. Such proceeding shall commence in the applicable district court within 90 days after the service of such copy, except that such 90-day requirement shall be subject to the administrative requirements of the court. (2) The proceeding under paragraph (1) shall be held, at the individual proprietor's election, in the judicial district of the district court with jurisdiction over the applicable consent decree or in that place of holding court of a district court that is the seat of the Federal circuit (other than the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) in which the proprietor's establishment is located. (3) Such proceeding shall be held before the judge of the court with jurisdiction over the consent decree governing the performing rights society. At the discretion of the court, the proceeding shall be held before a special master or magistrate judge appointed by such judge. Should that consent decree provide for the appointment of an advisor or advisors to the court for any purpose, any such advisor shall be the special master so named by the court. (4) In any such proceeding, the industry rate shall be presumed to have been reasonable at the time it was agreed to or determined by the court. Such presumption shall in no way affect a determination of whether the rate is being correctly applied to the individual proprietor. (5) Pending the completion of such proceeding, the individual proprietor shall have the right to perform publicly the copyrighted musical compositions in the repertoire of the performing rights society by paying an interim license rate or fee into an interest bearing escrow account with the clerk of the court, subject to retroactive adjustment when a final rate or fee has been determined, in an amount equal to the industry rate, or, in the absence of an industry rate, the amount of the most recent license rate or fee agreed to by the parties. (6) Any decision rendered in such proceeding by a special master or magistrate judge named under paragraph (3) shall be reviewed by the judge of the court with jurisdiction over the consent decree governing the performing rights society. Such proceeding, including such review, shall be concluded within 6 months after its commencement. (7) Any such final determination shall be binding only as to the individual proprietor commencing the proceeding, and shall not be applicable to any other proprietor or any other performing rights society, and the performing rights society shall be relieved of any obligation of nondiscrimination among similarly situated music users that may be imposed by the consent decree governing its operations. (8) An individual proprietor may not bring more than one proceeding provided for in this section for the determination of a reasonable license rate or fee under any license agreement with respect to any one performing rights society. (9) For purposes of this section, the term ''industry rate'' means the license fee a performing rights society has agreed to with, or which has been determined by the court for, a significant segment of the music user industry to which the individual proprietor belongs.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendants through false Oaths and acknowledgments have committed unconceivable crimes. Oaths and acknowledgments required by this chapter may be made before any person in the United States authorized by law to administer oaths; and when made in a foreign country, before any diplomatic or consular officer of the United States authorized to administer oaths, and before any official authorized to administer oaths in the foreign country concerned, whose authority shall be proved by a certificate of a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States; and shall be valid if they comply with the laws of the State or country where made. Written Declaration in Lieu of Oath. The Administrator may by rule prescribe that any document which is to be filed under this chapter in the Office of the Administrator and which is required by any law, rule, or other regulation to be under oath, may be subscribed to by a written declaration in such form as the Administrator may prescribe, and such declaration shall be in lieu of the oath otherwise required. Whenever a written declaration under paragraph (1) is used, the document containing the declaration shall state that willful false statements are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, pursuant to section 1001 of title 18, and may jeopardize the validity of the application or document or a registration resulting therefrom.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for penalties for false markings. Defendants for the purpose of deceiving the public, marks upon, applies to, or uses in advertising in connection with an article made, used, distributed, or sold, a design which is not protected under this chapter, a design notice specified in section 1306, or any other words or symbols importing that the design is protected under this chapter, knowing that the design is not so protected, shall pay a civil fine of not more than $500 for each such offense. Suit by Private Persons. - Any person may sue for the penalty established by subsection (a), in which event one-half of the penalty shall be awarded to the person suing and the remainder shall be awarded to the United States.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for Penalties for false representations. Defendants, knowingly make false representations materially affecting the rights obtainable under this chapter for the purpose of obtaining registration of a design under this chapter shall pay a penalty of not less than $500 and not more than $1,000, and any rights or privileges that individual may have in the design under this chapter shall be forfeited
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
in relation to design patent law The issuance of a design patent under title 35, United States Code, for an original design for an article of manufacture shall terminate any protection of the original design under this chapter.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
in Common law and other rights unaffected Nothing in this chapter shall annul or limit - (1) common law or other rights or remedies, if any, available to or held by any person with respect to a design which has not been registered under this chapter; or (2) any right under the trademark laws or any right protected against unfair competition.
10. FRAUD UPON THE USPTO
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
in falsifying declarations in lieu of oaths such written declarations were used fraudulently and Class I Defendants made willful false statements to the USPTO, and similarly The World IP Organization ("WIPO") and the Japanese Patent Office.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
regarding Oaths of applicants. The applicants made false oaths on patent applications, intentionally claiming the wrong individuals to be the original and first inventors of Iviewit processes, before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States authorized to administer oaths and before officers having an official seal and authorized to administer oaths in the foreign country in which the applicant may be, or apostille of an official designated by a foreign country which, by treaty or convention, accords like effect to apostilles of designated officials in the United States, and such oath is invalid as it does not comply with the laws of the state and country where made. For purposes of this section, a consular officer shall include any United States citizen serving overseas, authorized to perform notarial functions pursuant to section 1750 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (22 U.S.C. 4221)
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
and the laws regarding proper Inventors. Inventions were made by two or more persons jointly, and they did not apply for the patent jointly and each did not make the required oaths, due to intentional actions caused by Class I Defendants. Through no error and with malice and intent were wrong persons named in applications for patents as the inventors, through no error and with malice and intent are inventors not named in applications, and Defendants caused such errors with deceptive intent.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
regarding ownership and assignments of patents and since inventors are wrong, assignments and ownerships are also incorrect and have caused damages to Iviewit. Loss of rights invested in the patents to investors, and in some instances loss of patent rights entirely in inventions. Patents have all the attributes of personal property. Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States. An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Iviewit states Defendants have violated and caused damage under;
by improper application for international patent applications. An international application designating the United States, shall not be accepted by the Patent and Trademark Office for the national stage if it was filed by anyone not qualified under chapter 11 of this title to be an applicant for the purpose of filing a national application in the United States.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Class I Defendants with license to practice before the USPTO have failed to include all material pertinent to Inventor inventions and this was done knowingly, with malice and intent. Under section §1.56(a) it states that “each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section. The duty to disclose information exists with respect to each pending claim until the claim is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the application becomes abandoned. Information material to the patentability of a claim that is cancelled or Jan. 21, 2004 R-52 withdrawn from consideration need not be submitted if the information is not material to the patentability of any claim remaining under consideration in the application. There is no duty to submit information which is not material to the patentability of any existing claim. The duty to disclose all information known to be material to patentability is deemed to be satisfied if all information known to be material to patentability of any claim issued in a patent was cited by the Office or submitted to the Office in the manner prescribed by §§ 1.97(b)-(d) and 1.98. However, no patent will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct.”
Under §1.56 (c) Individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application are:
(1) Each inventor named in the application;
(2) Each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application; and
(3) Every other person who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application.
(e) In any continuation-in-part application, the duty under this section includes the duty to disclose to the Office all information known to the person to be material to patentability, as defined in paragraph (b) of this section, which became available between the filing date of the prior application and the national or PCT international filing date of the continuation-in-part application.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Whereby, (a) An oath or declaration filed under § 1.51(b)(2) as a part of a nonprovisional application must: (1) Be executed, i.e., signed, in accordance with either § 1.66 or § 1.68. There is no minimum age for a person to be qualified to sign, but the person must be competent to sign, i.e., understand the document the person is signing;
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
by knowingly and with intent and malice failing to;
(2) Identify each inventor by full name;
(3) Identify the country of citizenship of each inventor; and
by knowingly and with intent and malice falsely stating ;
(4)…the person making the oath or declaration believes the named inventor or inventors to be the original and first inventor or inventors of the subject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is sought.
by knowingly and with intent and malice failing to;
(b) In addition to meeting the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, the oath or declaration must also:
(1) Identify the application to which it is directed;
by knowingly and with intent and malice falsely stating ;
(2)…the person making the oath or declaration has reviewed and understands the contents of the application, including the claims, as amended by any amendment specifically referred to in the oath or declaration; and
by failing in their duties as attorney agents of the Iviewit and failing to disclose pertinent information to the patent applications to a tribunal under section;
(3) State that the person making the oath or declaration acknowledges the duty to disclose to the Office all information known to the person to be material to patentability as defined in § 1.56.
(c) Unless such information is supplied on an application data sheet in accordance with § 1.76, the oath or declaration must also identify:
(1) The mailing address, and the residence if an inventor lives at a location which is different from where the inventor customarily receives mail, of each inventor; and
by failing to secure new oaths and declarations that were proper and correct with corrected information upon filing of nonprovisional applications at the one year filing from provisional status to nonprovisional, even after being fully apprised of the corrections necessary, and further continuing said fraud upon USPTO and Iviewit, as new oaths and declarations were required by section;
(d)(1) A newly executed oath or declaration is not required under § 1.51(b)(2) and § 1.53(f) in a continuation or divisional application, provided that:
(i) The prior nonprovisional application contained an oath or declaration as prescribed by paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section;
(ii) The continuation or divisional application was filed by all or by fewer than all of the inventors named in the prior application;
(iii) The specification and drawings filed in the continuation or divisional application contain no matter that would have been new matter in the prior application; and
(3) Where the executed oath or declaration of which a copy is submitted for a continuation or divisional application was originally filed in a prior application accorded status under § 1.47, the copy of the executed oath or declaration for such prior application must be accompanied by:
(i) A copy of the decision granting a petition to accord §1.47 status to the prior application, unless all inventors or legal representatives have filed an oath or declaration to join in an application accorded status under § 1.47 of which the continuation or divisional application claims a benefit under 35 U.S.C. 120, 121, or 365(c); and
(5) A newly executed oath or declaration must be filed in a continuation or divisional application naming an inventor not named in the prior application.
(e) A newly executed oath or declaration must be filed in any continuation-in-part application, which application may name all, more, or fewer than all of the inventors named in the prior application.
Iviewit states Class I Defendants have violated;
The actual inventors were not included in applications for inventions they created and were substituted knowingly, with malice and intent with false inventors who took false oath and without consent or knowledge of the actual inventors and Iviewit.
(a) The oath or declaration (§ 1.63), including any supplemental oath or declaration (§ 1.67), must be made by all of the actual inventors except as provided for in §§ 1.42, 1.43, 1.47, or § 1.67.
(b) If the person making the oath or declaration or any supplemental oath or declaration is not the inventor (§§ 1.42, 1.43, 1.47, or § 1.67), the oath or declaration shall state the relationship of the person to the inventor, and, upon information and belief, the facts which the inventor is required to state.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendants knowingly and with malice and intent failed to include an adequate written description of the invention or discovery and of the manner and process of making and using the same, and it was not in full, clear, concise, and in exact terms, so as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which the invention or discovery appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.
(b) The specification did not set forth the precise invention for which a patent is solicited, in such manner as to distinguish it from other inventions and from what is old. It must describe completely a specific embodiment of the process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter or improvement invented, and must explain the mode of operation or principle whenever applicable. The best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention must be set forth.
(c) In the case of an improvement, the specification must particularly point out the part or parts of the process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter to which the improvement relates, and the description should be confined to the specific improvement and to such parts as necessarily cooperate with it or as may be necessary to a complete understanding or description of it.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit has had to petition the Commissioner due to Class I Defendants actions under;
The Commissioner has revived abandoned patents to then place them into a six month suspension pending the outcome of certain investigations into the problems created by Class I Defendants.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
through statements and entries generally, patent attorneys for the Iviewit, acting as licensed patent attorneys before the USPTO whom may qualify as part of the judicial branch of government and have falsified, concealed and cover up by trick, scheme and device, material facts and have made materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statements and representations. Further, Class I Defendants have made and used false writings and documents knowing the same to contain materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and entries.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays this Court for maximum civil remedies and criminal penalties which under this section states they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
through Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally. It is alleged certain patent applications, signed by the inventors and sent to the USPTO directly, were intercepted or removed from the patent office, either by Class I Defendants, or Class I Defendants working with USPTO personnel to remove such records. A records search for the missing documents has been formally requested by Iviewit to OED Director, Moatz, and further information may surface as investigations continue into these matters.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays this Court for maximum civil remedies and criminal penalties, which under this section state;
(a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
(b) Whoever, having the custody of any such record, proceeding, map, book, document, paper, or other thing, willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, falsifies, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both; and shall forfeit his office and be disqualified from holding any office under the United States. As used in this subsection, the term “office” does not include the office held by any person as a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the United States.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated Section 10 of;
Class I Defendants filed in the USPTO in patent, trademark, and other non-patent matters correspondences filed by Iviewit practitioners in the Patent and Trademark Office which contained false certifications that;
(1) All statements made therein of the party's own knowledge were true, all statements made therein on information and belief were believed to be true, and all statements made therein were made with the knowledge that whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the Patent and Trademark Office, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be subject to the penalties set forth under 18 U.S.C. 1001, and that violations of this paragraph may jeopardize the validity of the application or document, or the validity or enforceability of any patent, trademark registration, or certificate resulting therefrom; and (2) To the best of the party's knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, that — (i) The paper is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass someone or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of prosecution before the Office; (ii) The claims and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (iii) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (iv) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence, or if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. (c) Violations of paragraph (b)(1) of this section by a practitioner or non-practitioner may jeopardize the validity of the application or document, or the validity or enforceability of any patent, trademark registration, or certificate resulting therefrom. Violations of any of paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (iv) of this section are, after notice and reasonable opportunity to respond, subject to such sanctions as deemed appropriate by the Commissioner, or the Commissioner's designee, which may include, but are not limited to, any combination of — (1) Holding certain facts to have been established; (2) Returning papers; (3) Precluding a party from filing a paper, or presenting or contesting an issue; (4) Imposing a monetary sanction; (5) Requiring a terminal disclaimer for the period of the delay; or (6) Terminating the proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office. (d) Any practitioner violating the provisions of this section may also be subject to disciplinary action. See § 10.23(c)(15).
WHEREFORE, Class I Defendants have caused permanent and irreparable damages to Iviewit under certain inventions and have caused loss of revenue estimated to be valued at billions of dollars annually, and further over a 20-year patent life and which may not be recoverable through other remedies than maximum civil penalties granted by this Court.
Class I Defendants licensed to practice before the USPTO have failed in their duties and violated;
and failed to assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession, and in fact have so abused such privileges so as to cause a potential lapse in faith of the patent office by the general public, which jeopardizes the very fabric of our democracy and country.
Class I Defendants licensed to practice before the USPTO have failed in their duties and violated;
and have engaged in disreputable and gross misconduct. They have violated a multiplicity of Disciplinary Rules; Circumvented Disciplinary Rules through actions of another; engaged in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude; engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; engaged in other conduct that adversely reflects on the practitioner's fitness to practice before the USPTO; engaged in conduct which constitutes a violation of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section including, but not limited to: (2) Knowingly giving false or misleading information or knowingly participating in a material way in giving false or misleading information, to: (i) A client in connection with any immediate, prospective, or pending business before the Office. (ii) The Office or any employee of the Office. (4) Directly or indirectly improperly influencing, attempting to improperly influence, offering or agreeing to improperly influence, or attempting to offer or agree to improperly influence an official action of any employee of the Office by: (i) Use of threats, false accusations, duress, or coercion, (ii) An offer of any special inducement or promise of advantage, or (iii) Improperly bestowing of any gift, favor, or thing of value. (7) Knowingly withholding from the Office information identifying a patent or patent application of another from which one or more claims have been copied. See §§ 1.604(b) and 1.607(c) of this subchapter. (8) Failing to inform a client or former client or failing to timely notify the Office of an inability to notify a client or former client of correspondence received from the Office or the client's or former client's opponent in an inter partes proceeding before § 10.23 the Office when the correspondence (i) could have a significant effect on a matter pending before the Office, (ii) is received by the practitioner on behalf of a client or former client and (iii) is correspondence of which a reasonable practitioner would believe under the circumstances the client or former client should be notified. (9) Knowingly misusing a “Certificate of Mailing or Transmission” under § 1.8 of this chapter. (10) Knowingly violating or causing to be violated the requirements of § 1.56 or § 1.555 of this subchapter. (11) Except as permitted by § 1.52(c) of this chapter, knowingly filing or causing to be filed an application containing any material alteration made in the application papers after the signing of the accompanying oath or declaration without identifying the alteration at the time of filing the application papers. (13) Knowingly preparing or prosecuting or providing assistance in the preparation or prosecution of a patent application in violation of an undertaking signed under § 10.10(b). (14) Knowingly failing to advise the Director in writing of any change which would preclude continued registration under § 10.6. (15) Signing a paper filed in the Office in violation of the provisions of § 10.18 or making a scandalous or indecent statement in a paper filed in the Office. (16) Willfully refusing to reveal or report knowledge or evidence to the Director contrary to § 10.24 or paragraph (b) of § 10.131.
(18) In the absence of information sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that fraud or inequitable conduct has occurred, alleging before a tribunal that anyone has committed a fraud on the Office or engaged in inequitable conduct in a proceeding before the Office. (20) Knowing practice by a Government employee contrary to applicable Federal conflict of interest laws, or regulations of the Department, agency, or commission employing said individual. (d) A practitioner who acts with reckless indifference to whether a representation is true or false is chargeable with knowledge of its falsity. Deceitful statements of half-truths or concealment of material facts shall be deemed actual fraud within the meaning of this part.
Class I Defendants have all known and conspired to cause deceit upon the USPTO by knowingly and with malice and intent, failing to disclose improper behavior by other practitioners, through a series of frauds on the USPTO and Iviewit. Certain Class I Defendants, had full knowledge of the fraud being committed and in fact were charged with correcting such fraud, and although such changes were conveyed to Iviewit, such changes were knowingly and with malice and intent withheld from the USPTO.
Class I Defendants representing Iviewit before the USPTO have failed to provide legal counsel and in the case of SB and BSTZ, it is alleged with malice and intent counsel has been usurped at critical times essential to patent prosecution before the USPTO with the intent of causing the patents to lapse or go abandoned. SB has retained binding contractual legal obligations to provide legal representation before the USPTO for Iviewit and with malice and intent has failed to perform under the binding, EXHIBIT “” - LOU, which serves also as a legal retainer for services before the USPTO. This sabotaging of patent counsel, led to OED Director, Moatz, releasing all prior counsel from access to the patents and has allowed the patent applications to be suspended while investigations continue. Iviewit seeks to retain new counsel, which under the SB binding LOU was to be provided upon signing of the LOU and which had a leading patent law firm, EXHIBIT “” - Greenberg Traurig, P.C.'s September 22, 2002 Patent Evaluation as a basis for SB funding such counsel and which failure to perform by SB upon signing, along with breaches on every other contract clause damaging the Company into the millions of dollars of loss and opportunities, has caused permanent and fatal damages to Iviewit on patent rights to inventions with annual royalties estimated into the billions of dollars. Iviewit has demanded specific performances and/or damages from SB by serving upon them an EXHIBIT “” - August 13, 2003 SB Demand Letter.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays this Court order specific performance of SB under the binding LOU and Legal Service Agreement, so as to prevent further damages from occurring from these breaches, whereby all parties involved, including representative insurance carriers and state agencies affected may all suffer increased damages without such patent counsel services instituted immediately. Moatz and the Commissioner, would be greatly served by patent counsel being instituted in place of the current inventors acting as pro-se patent counsel, per se, before such highly specialized tribunal whereby Inventors are not knowledgeable or proficiently versed in such law so as to adequately represent Iviewit. This violates section;
Iviewit practitioners should have assisted the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available to Iviewit and in fact acted in diametric opposition in an attempt to deny counsel.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(a) No practitioner shall with respect to any prospective business before the Office, by word, circular, letter, or advertising, with intent to defraud in any manner, deceive, mislead, or threaten any prospective applicant or other person having immediate or prospective business before the Office.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
A practitioner may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the practitioner has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person, or otherwise, when a significant motive for the practitioner's doing so is the practitioner's pecuniary gain under circumstances evidencing undue influence, intimidation, or overreaching. The term “solicit” includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient.
Class I Defendants violated section;
Iviewit practitioners withdrew from employment in a proceeding before the Office without permission from the Office (see §§ 1.36 and 2.19 of this subchapter) and in any event, Iviewit practitioners withdrew from employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the Iviewit, including failing to give due notice to Iviewit to allow time for employment of another practitioner, failing to deliver to Iviewit all papers and property to which Iviewit is entitled, and failing to comply with applicable laws and rules, in fact in regards to BSTZ it is alleged that a coordinated effort was made by BSTZ to destroy Iviewit patent records, including records forwarded directly to them by Proskauer, Foley, and Foley transferred all of the MLGWS files to BSTZ, whereby BSTZ upon learning Moatz and foreign patent offices had been notified of fraud began to obstruct justice through document destruction and loss.
Class I Defendants have flagrantly violated section;
Iviewit practitioners failed to preserve the confidences and secrets of Iviewit, leading to a mass proliferation of Iviewit Inventions by Defendants, whereby Iviewit's attorneys have proliferated such Inventions to their advantage to the detriment of Iviewit Shareholders and Inventors.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Where “Confidence” refers to information protected by the attorney-client or agent-client privilege under applicable law. “Secret” refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client and Defendant practitioners knowingly: (1) Revealed confidences and secrets of Iviewit. (2) Used confidences and secrets of Iviewit to the disadvantage of the Iviewit, (3) Used confidences and secrets of Iviewit's for the advantage of the practitioner and of third parties without client consent or even disclosure. Defendant Rubenstein in fact violated multiple conflicts of interest whereby Rubenstein was Iviewit patent counsel and charged with the confidentiality of certain patent inventions of Iviewit and maintained a conflict with Pools he was direct counsel for and he transcended attorney-client privileges and confidences to thousands of patent pool members who now all utilize Iviewit Inventions due to Rubenstein' failure to maintain such confidences with malice and intent and to inure profits for himself and the partners of Proskauer. Since Rubenstein and Proskauer are now profiting from Iviewit Technologies.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Iviewit patent practitioners failed to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client and instead had personal financial interests motivating their actions inapposite to their clients.
Iviewit states Class I Defendant Rubenstein and Proskauer accepted stock in patent companies which according to statements under deposition of Proskauer partners, the acquisition was a gift, and not tied to fees or services, inapposite to section;
Iviewit patent practitioners acquired a proprietary interest in the subject matter of a proceeding before the Office which the practitioner was conducting for a client. It was not acquired as a lien granted by law to secure the practitioner's fee or expenses; or by contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee; and further it is alleged the interest was directly in the patent, as part of Rubenstein and Proskauer's fees. Further, such stock was accepted after thorough review and analysis by Rubenstein on behalf of Proskauer, while acting as patent counsel for Iviewit with promises of royalties from the patents being adopted by Rubenstein's Pools, stated as Proskauer's motive for taking such stock for consideration.
Rubenstein opined EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer Opinion to Hassan Miah and EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer Patent Opinion and again in opinion to H. Wayne Huizenga, Jr. the seed investor in Iviewit, EXHIBIT “” - Proskauer/Huizenga Opinion Letter Dated July 23, 1999 on behalf of Iviewit for investment. Based on these opinions of the novel aspects of the inventions by Proskauer, investments were made and in a series of sworn statements, investors and prior board members attest to Rubenstein as a pivotal factor in their investment, although it is clear in the Huizenga letter Wheeler mistakenly makes a Freudian slip and calls Iviewit's technology Proskauer's technology. Such documents illustrated were transmitted by Proskauer to prospective investors, investors including the Federal Small Business Administration loan documents whereby the SBA has financial interest in Iviewit through investment generated by Crossbow. In contrast to all current denials of Proskauer and Rubenstein regarding involvement with the patents, such documents were transmitted naming Rubenstein as patent counsel for Iviewit in a EXHIBIT “” - Rubenstein listings in Wachovia Securities Private Placement Memorandum, for a full text of the Wachovia PPM, EXHIBIT “” - click here a document reviewed, billed for and disseminated by Proskauer and further disseminated to investor Crossbow for compliance with an SBA Loan, EXHIBIT “” - Small Business Administration Form for securing such Federal funds. If Proskauer's current claim of non-involvement holds true, than this document contained materially false and misleading information to both Wachovia Securities and a Federal Agency both constituting additional crimes as further described herein. Finally, such stock taken by Proskauer was to further to postpone payment of fees until such royalties were realized.
Iviewit states Rubenstein, Proskauer and Joao have entered into business transactions with Iviewit while having multitudes of conflicting personal and professional conflicts of interest and none of these were ever waived or disclosed. Rubenstein and Proskauer now claim to control Pools and to have created such Pools, which all stand with direct differing interests and Joao in written statements to a tribunal, the First Dept states, Iviewit is infringing upon his inventions and Joao has taken a series of patents, approximately 80 per his own admissions, all in violation of section;
Iviewit patent practitioners entered into business transactions with Iviewit while they had differing interests therein and Iviewit never consented and Defendants failed to disclose such conflicts or seek waiver. In fact, it is unclear by either the deposition of Wheeler or Rubenstein if a conflicts check was ever done before accepting Iviewit and Inventors as clients and Rubenstein and Wheeler have provided no evidence of such check ever being performed or any waivers secured. This failure to secure protection of Iviewit and Inventors and coupled with Proskauer now perjured statements regarding their non-involvement with the Iviewit patent work, in opposition to masses of evidence contrary and sworn statements by multitudes of witnesses to the contrary, which is an attempt to deny culpability as to how Pools now controlled by a former real-estate firm are all in violation of Iviewit IP.
Whether Proskauer attempts to distance themselves in their defense despite evidence to the contrary fails to deal with the fact Proskauer and the Patent Department of Proskauer preformed all the Trademark and Copyright work for the company and billed excessively for such services. These services provided Proskauer and Rubenstein who oversights such department entire source codes for the Iviewit inventions and all disclosures of all patent materials and inventions for the prosecution of these matters and still Rubenstein has no distance between himself and Iviewit, no China Wall. In fact, as evidenced by an interoffice correspondence that turned up in the Florida Litigation months after production and after Rubenstein's deposition, it is clear Rubenstein was directly in receipt of the entire patent portfolio EXHIBIT “” - August 25, 2000 Wheeler transferring patents to Rubenstein
Rubenstein in representing both Iviewit and the Pools violated section;
As Iviewit patent practitioner Rubenstein should have declined proffered employment where the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of Iviewit was likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, and were it likely involved the practitioner in representing differing interests. Further, Rubenstein should not have continued multiple employment since the exercise of the practitioner's independent professional judgment on behalf of Iviewit was adversely affected by the practitioner's representation of another client, the Pools, and it clearly involved the practitioner in representing differing interests.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(a) Except with the consent of the practitioner's client after full disclosure, a practitioner shall not: (1) Accept compensation from one other than the practitioner's client for the practitioner's legal services to or for the client. (2) Accept from one other than the practitioner's client any thing of value related to the practitioner's representation of or the practitioner's employment by the client. (b) A practitioner shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the practitioner to render legal services for another, to direct or regulate the practitioner's professional judgment in rendering such legal services. (c) A practitioner shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if a non-practitioner has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a practitioner.
Class I Defendants licensed to practice before the USPTO, all failed their duties to protect client IP under section;
Each and every patent counselor for the Company failed to represent Iviewit competently and they further violated section;
Defendants have violated;
Iviewit's patent counsel neglected legal matters entrusted to them by Iviewit.
Defendants have violated;
A practitioner shall not attempt to exonerate himself or herself from, or limit his or her liability to, a client for his or her personal malpractice.
Class I Defendants licensed to practice before the USPTO, all failed their duties to protect client IP under section;
Iviewit's patent counsel failed to represent Iviewit as a client zealously and within the bounds of the law.
Class I Defendants licensed to practice before the USPTO, all failed their duties to protect client IP under section;
With malice and intent did they fail to seek the lawful objectives of Iviewit through reasonable available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules. They have failed to carry out a contract of employment entered into with Iviewit for professional services. They have prejudiced and damaged Iviewit during the course of the professional relationships.
Class I Defendants licensed to practice before the USPTO, all failed their duties to protect client IP under section;
Iviewit patent practitioners delayed proceedings on behalf of Iviewit patent applications before the Office and took other actions on behalf of the Iviewit, when the practitioners knew and it is now obvious such actions served merely to harass and maliciously injure Iviewit. Iviewit patent practitioners concealed and knowingly failed to disclose that which the practitioner is required by law to reveal. Iviewit patent practitioners knowingly used perjured testimony and false evidence to tribunals such as the USPTO and the US Supreme Court Bar Associations and knowingly made false statements of law and fact. Iviewit patent practitioners participated in the creation and preservation of evidence when the practitioners knew the evidence was false and presented such false evidence to not only the USPTO but supreme court bar associations in numerous states as discussed herein. Iviewit patent practitioners knowingly engaged in other illegal conduct and conduct contrary to many disciplinary rules as well as a variety of state, federal and international crimes. Further Iviewit's subsequent patent practitioners received information clearly establishing other attorneys had perpetrated a fraud upon tribunals and failed to reveal such frauds to the tribunals. Rubenstein was to correct Joao errors and then Dick came in to file and fix and did nothing but further the fraud, and when discovered BSTZ was brought in to correct and fix the patents and failed to carry out these tasks and further failed to report the fraud. Even after BSTZ informed Iviewit they had made corrections and notification and then further falsified documents and patent portfolio's with materially false and misleading information.
The conspiratorial and coordinated efforts at both using the legal system to attempt theft of patents, which endangers constitutionally protected rights by the very institution created by congress to uphold such rights for the citizens as ARTICLE 1, SECTION 8, CLAUSE 8 OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTION PROVIDES and which the USPTO acts as the agency to provide such rights.
Defendants have violated;
Iviewit patent practitioners have failed to assist in improving the legal system and perhaps may have catastrophically created harm to the general publics confidence in such system which could lead to a failure to trust patent attorneys, a further harm to legal profession.
The actions of Iviewit's patent practitioners taken alone or together are of such high crimes against the USPTO, Iviewit, Supreme Court agencies and others as to constitute further a violation of section;
Iviewit patent practitioners have not avoided even the appearance of professional impropriety and have in fact committed multitudes of professional improprieties in the commission of such crimes as described herein.
Class I Defendants licensed to practice before the USPTO, all failed their duties to protect client IP under section;
Iviewit patent practitioners failed to maintain the IP files of the Company which all prior patent practitioners claim that all original materials were transferred to BSTZ and BSTZ upon learning OED and international agencies had been alerted to the crimes, attempted to claim a transfer of the patent materials to Iviewit. There was no proper or formal written requests to transfer such files and there was no written receipt for transfer of such properties. Records were lost whereby such properties have not been identified and labeled properly and the practitioners failed to maintain complete records of all properties of Iviewit coming into the possession of the practitioner and there was no accounting to the client regarding the properties and now BSTZ claims to have no accounting for all such properties. Iviewit had requested BSTZ to promptly deliver to several investigatory agencies the necessary files for investigation and BSTZ then suddenly claimed they had transferred such proprietary and highly confidential and pertinent patent document to Iviewit with no notice or receipt of such transfer and such parcels never were transferred.
11. VIOLATIONS OF PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
Class I Defendants have violated;
Defendants have committed economic espionage intending and knowing the offenses will benefit a foreign agent and knowingly stole, and without authorization appropriated, took, carried away, and concealed, and by fraud, artifice, and deception obtained trade secrets; further and without authorization copied, duplicated, sketched, drew, photographed, downloaded, uploaded, altered, destroyed, photocopied, replicated, transmitted, delivered, sent, mailed, communicated, and conveyed trade secrets; and received, bought and possess trade secrets, knowing the same to have been stolen and appropriated, obtained, and converted without authorization; and attempted to commit offenses described in paragraphs (1) through (3); and (5) and conspired with one or more other persons and committed offenses described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons did acts to effect the object of the conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent where except as provided in subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. (b) Organizations. - Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $10,000,000.
Defendants have violated;
Defendants have committed theft of trade secrets with intent to convert trade secrets, related to and included in products produced for and placed in interstate and foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of others than the owner thereof, and intended and knowing the offenses would, injure the owners of trade secrets, knowingly steals, and without authorization appropriated, took, carried away, and concealed, and/or by fraud, artifice, and deception obtained such information; and without authorization copied, duplicated, sketched, drew, photographed, downloaded, uploaded, altered, destroyed, photocopied, replicated, transmitted, delivered, sent, mailed, communicated, and conveyed such information; and received, bought, possesses such information, knowing the same to have been stolen and appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; and attempted to commit offenses described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5) and conspired with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons in acts to effect the object of the conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. (b) Any organization commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $5,000,000
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for Criminal forfeiture (a) The court, in imposing sentence on a person for a violation of this chapter, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed, that the person forfeit to the United States - (1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; and (2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate the commission of such violation, if the court in its discretion so determines, taking into consideration the nature, scope, and proportionality of the use of the property in the offense. (b) Property subject to forfeiture under this section, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation thereto, shall be governed by section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except for subsections (d) and (j) of such section, which shall not apply to forfeitures under this section.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief in addition, under;
Iviewit prays for orders to preserve confidentiality. In any prosecution or other proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enter such orders and take such other action as may be necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws. An interlocutory appeal by the United States shall lie from a decision or order of a district court authorizing or directing the disclosure of any trade secret
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief in addition under;
For applicability to conduct outside the United States as the matters apply to conduct occurring outside the United States and the some of the offenders are natural persons who are citizens and permanent resident aliens of the United States, and organizations organized under the laws of the United States or a State and an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum civil relief and additional relief under;
Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief to order immediate injunctive relief. Jurisdiction; service, the several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this chapter shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office or to prevent a violation under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of section 1125 of this title. Any such injunction may include a provision directing the defendant to file with the court and serve on the plaintiff within thirty days after the service on the defendant of such injunction, or such extended period as the court may direct, a report in writing under oath setting forth in detail the manner and form in which the defendant has complied with the injunction. Any such injunction granted upon hearing, after notice to the defendant, by any district court of the United States, may be served on the parties against whom such injunction is granted anywhere in the United States where they may be found, and shall be operative and may be enforced by proceedings to punish for contempt, or otherwise, by the court by which such injunction was granted, or by any other United States district court in whose jurisdiction the defendant may be found. Transfer of certified copies of court papers. The said courts shall have jurisdiction to enforce said injunction, as provided in this chapter, as fully as if the injunction had been granted by the district court in which it is sought to be enforced. The clerk of the court or judge granting the injunction shall, when required to do so by the court before which application to enforce said injunction is made, transfer without delay to said court a certified copy of all papers on file in his office upon which said injunction was granted. Notice to Director it shall be the duty of the clerks of such courts within one month after the filing of any action, suit, or proceeding involving a mark registered under the provisions of this chapter to give notice thereof in writing to the Director setting forth in order so far as known the names and addresses of the litigants and the designating number or numbers of the registration or registrations upon which the action, suit, or proceeding has been brought, and in the event any other registration be subsequently included in the action, suit, or proceeding by amendment, answer, or other pleading, the clerk shall give like notice thereof to the Director, and within one month after the judgment is entered or an appeal is taken the clerk of the court shall give notice thereof to the Director, and it shall be the duty of the Director on receipt of such notice forthwith to endorse the same upon the file wrapper of the said registration or registrations and to incorporate the same as a part of the contents of said file wrapper. Civil actions arising out of use of counterfeit marks in the case of a civil action arising under section 1114(1)(a) of this title or section 220506 of title 36 with respect to a violation that consists of using a counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services, the court may, upon ex parte application, grant an order under subsection (a) of this section pursuant to this subsection providing for the seizure of goods and counterfeit marks involved in such violation and the means of making such marks, and records documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt of things involved in such violation. As used in this subsection the term ''counterfeit mark'' means - counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use, whether or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such mark was so registered; or a spurious designation that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a designation as to which the remedies of this chapter are made available by reason of section 220506 of title 36; but such term does not include any mark or designation used on or in connection with goods or services of which the manufacture or producer was, at the time of the manufacture or production in question authorized to use the mark or designation for the type of goods or services so manufactured or produced, by the holder of the right to use such mark or designation. The court shall not receive an application under this subsection unless the applicant has given such notice of the application as is reasonable under the circumstances to the United States attorney for the judicial district in which such order is sought. Such attorney may participate in the proceedings arising under such application if such proceedings may affect evidence of an offense against the United States. The court may deny such application if the court determines that the public interest in a potential prosecution so requires. The application for an order under this subsection shall - be based on an affidavit or the verified complaint establishing facts sufficient to support the findings of fact and conclusions of law required for such order; and contain the additional information required by paragraph (5) of this subsection to be set forth in such order. The court shall not grant such an application unless - the person obtaining an order under this subsection provides the security determined adequate by the court for the payment of such damages as any person may be entitled to recover as a result of a wrongful seizure or wrongful attempted seizure under this subsection; and the court finds that it clearly appears from specific facts that - an order other than an ex parte seizure order is not adequate to achieve the purposes of section 1114 of this title; the applicant has not publicized the requested seizure; the applicant is likely to succeed in showing that the person against whom seizure would be ordered used a counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services; an immediate and irreparable injury will occur if such seizure is not ordered; the matter to be seized will be located at the place identified in the application; the harm to the applicant of denying the application outweighs the harm to the legitimate interests of the person against whom seizure would be ordered of granting the application; and the person against whom seizure would be ordered, or persons acting in concert with such person, would destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court, if the applicant were to proceed on notice to such person. An order under this subsection shall set forth - the findings of fact and conclusions of law required for the order; a particular description of the matter to be seized, and a description of each place at which such matter is to be seized; the time period, which shall end not later than seven days after the date on which such order is issued, during which the seizure is to be made; the amount of security required to be provided under this subsection; and a date for the hearing required under paragraph (10) of this subsection. The court shall take appropriate action to protect the person against whom an order under this subsection is directed from publicity, by or at the behest of the plaintiff, about such order and any seizure under such order. Any materials seized under this subsection shall be taken into the custody of the court. The court shall enter an appropriate protective order with respect to discovery by the applicant of any records that have been seized. The protective order shall provide for appropriate procedures to assure that confidential information contained in such records is not improperly disclosed to the applicant. An order under this subsection, together with the supporting documents, shall be sealed until the person against whom the order is directed has an opportunity to contest such order, except that any person against whom such order is issued shall have access to such order and supporting documents after the seizure has been carried out. The court shall order that service of a copy of the order under this subsection shall be made by a Federal law enforcement officer (such as a United States marshal or an officer or agent of the United States Customs Service, Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, or Post Office) or may be made by a State or local law enforcement officer, who, upon making service, shall carry out the seizure under the order. The court shall issue orders, when appropriate, to protect the defendant from undue damage from the disclosure of trade secrets or other confidential information during the course of the seizure, including, when appropriate, orders restricting the access of the applicant (or any agent or employee of the applicant) to such secrets or information. The court shall hold a hearing, unless waived by all the parties, on the date set by the court in the order of seizure. That date shall be not sooner than ten days after the order is issued and not later than fifteen days after the order is issued, unless the applicant for the order shows good cause for another date or unless the party against whom such order is directed consents to another date for such hearing. At such hearing the party obtaining the order shall have the burden to prove that the facts supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to support such order are still in effect. If that party fails to meet that burden, the seizure order shall be dissolved or modified appropriately. In connection with a hearing under this paragraph, the court may make such orders modifying the time limits for discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure as may be necessary to prevent the frustration of the purposes of such hearing. A person who suffers damage by reason of a wrongful seizure under this subsection has a cause of action against the applicant for the order under which such seizure was made, and shall be entitled to recover such relief as may be appropriate, including damages for lost profits, cost of materials, loss of good will, and punitive damages in instances where the seizure was sought in bad faith, and, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances, to recover a reasonable attorney's fee. The court in its discretion may award prejudgment interest on relief recovered under this paragraph, at an annual interest rate established under section 6621(a)(2) of title 26, commencing on the date of service of the claimant's pleading setting forth the claim under this paragraph and ending on the date such recovery is granted, or for such shorter time as the court deems appropriate.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for recovery for violation of rights (a) Profits; damages and costs; attorney fees When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, shall have been established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles of equity, to recover(1) defendant's profits,(2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and(3) the costs of the action. The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same to be assessed under its direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty. The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. (b) Treble damages for use of counterfeit mark In assessing damages under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances, enter judgment for three times such profits or damages, whichever is greater, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, in the case of any violation of section 1114(1)(a) of this title or section 220506 of title 36 that consists of intentionally using a mark or designation, knowing such mark or designation is a counterfeit mark (as defined in section 1116(d) of this title), in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services. In such cases, the court may in its discretion award prejudgment interest on such amount at an annual interest rate established under section 6621(a)(2) of title 26, commencing on the date of the service of the claimant's pleadings setting forth the claim for such entry and ending on the date such entry is made, or for such shorter time as the court deems appropriate. (c) Statutory damages for use of counterfeit marks In a case involving the use of a counterfeit mark (as defined in section 1116(d) of this title) in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services, the plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits under subsection (a) of this section, an award of statutory damages for any such use in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services in the amount of - (1) not less than $500 or more than $100,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed, as the court considers just; or (2) if the court finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was willful, not more than $1,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed, as the court considers just. (d) Statutory damages for violation of section 1125(d)(1) In a case involving a violation of section 1125(d)(1) of this title, the plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in the amount of not less than $1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for civil liabilities for false or fraudulent registration. Defendant's procured registration in the Patent and Trademark Office of marks by false and fraudulent declarations and representations, orally and in writing, and by false means and are therefore liable in a civil action by Iviewit whom has been injured and thereby for any damages sustained in consequence thereof.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for relief under;
for false designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden. Civil actions. Defendant's who, on or in connection with goods and services, and on containers for goods, uses\use in commerce words, terms, names, symbols, and devices, any combinations thereof, and false designations of origin, false and misleading description of facts, and false or misleading representations of facts, which causes confusion, and cause mistakes, and to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, and association of such person with another person, and as to the origin, sponsorship, and approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, and in commercial advertising and promotion, misrepresented the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, and shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. As used in this subsection, the term ''any person'' includes any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. (3) In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional. (b) Importation Any goods marked or labeled in contravention of the provisions of this section shall not be imported into the United States or admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States. The owner, importer, or consignee of goods refused entry at any customhouse under this section may have any recourse by protest or appeal that is given under the customs revenue laws or may have the remedy given by this chapter in cases involving goods refused entry or seized. (c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks (1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to - (A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. (2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116 of this title unless the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and 1118 of this title, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity. (3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that is brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement. (4) The following shall not be actionable under this section: (A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark. (B) Noncommercial use of a mark. (C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. (d) Cyberpiracy prevention (1) (A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person - (i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that - (I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark; (II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark; or (III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of title 18 or section 220506 of title 36. (B) (i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to - (I) the trademark or other IP rights of the person, if any, in the domain name; (II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person; (III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services; (IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; (V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site; (VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the parties; and (IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c)(1) of this section. (ii) Bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A) shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful. (C) In any civil action involving the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name under this paragraph, a court may order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark. (D) A person shall be liable for using a domain name under subparagraph (A) only if that person is the domain name registrant or that registrant's authorized licensee. (E) As used in this paragraph, the term ''traffics in'' refers to transactions that include, but are not limited to, sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration. (2) (A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located if - (i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c) of this section; and (ii) the court finds that the owner - (I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or (II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by - (aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail address provided by the registrant to the registrar; and (bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly after filing the action. (B) The actions under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall constitute service of process. (C) In an in rem action under this paragraph, a domain name shall be deemed to have its situs in the judicial district in which - (i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located; or (ii) documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the court. (D) (i) The remedies in an in rem action under this paragraph shall be limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark. Upon receipt of written notification of a filed, stamped copy of a complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a United States district court under this paragraph, the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority shall - (I) expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the court's control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name to the court; and (II) not transfer, suspend, or otherwise modify the domain name during the pendency of the action, except upon order of the court. (ii) The domain name registrar or registry or other domain name authority shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary relief under this paragraph except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard, which includes a willful failure to comply with any such court order. (3) The civil action established under paragraph (1) and the in rem action established under paragraph (2), and any remedy available under either such action, shall be in addition to any other civil action or remedy otherwise applicable. (4) The in rem jurisdiction established under paragraph (2) shall be in addition to any other jurisdiction that otherwise exists, whether in rem or in personam
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays of this Court for maximum relief under;
for International conventions. Register of marks communicated by international bureaus The Director shall keep a register of all marks communicated to him by the international bureaus provided for by the conventions for the protection of industrial property, trademarks, trade and commercial names, and the repression of unfair competition to which the United States is or may become a party, and upon the payment of the fees required by such conventions and the fees required in this chapter may place the marks so communicated upon such register. This register shall show a facsimile of the mark or trade or commercial name; the name, citizenship, and address of the registrant; the number, date, and place of the first registration of the mark, including the dates on which application for such registration was filed and granted and the term of such registration; a list of goods or services to which the mark is applied as shown by the registration in the country of origin, and such other data as may be useful concerning the mark. This register shall be a continuation of the register provided in section 1(a) of the Act of March 19, 1920. (b) Benefits of section to persons whose country of origin is party to convention or treaty Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair competition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapter. (c) Prior registration in country of origin; country of origin defined No registration of a mark in the United States by a person described in subsection (b) of this section shall be granted until such mark has been registered in the country of origin of the applicant, unless the applicant alleges use in commerce. For the purposes of this section, the country of origin of the applicant is the country in which he has a bona fide and effective industrial or commercial establishment, or if he has not such an establishment the country in which he is domiciled, or if he has not a domicile in any of the countries described in subsection (b) of this section, the country of which he is a national. (d) Right of priority An application for registration of a mark under section 1051, 1053, 1054, or 1091 of this title or under subsection (e) of this section, filed by a person described in subsection (b) of this section who has previously duly filed an application for registration of the same mark in one of the countries described in subsection (b) of this section shall be accorded the same force and effect as would be accorded to the same application if filed in the United States on the same date on which the application was first filed in such foreign country: Provided, That - (1) the application in the United States is filed within six months from the date on which the application was first filed in the foreign country; (2) the application conforms as nearly as practicable to the requirements of this chapter, including a statement that the applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce; (3) the rights acquired by third parties before the date of the filing of the first application in the foreign country shall in no way be affected by a registration obtained on an application filed under this subsection; (4) nothing in this subsection shall entitle the owner of a registration granted under this section to sue for acts committed prior to the date on which his mark was registered in this country unless the registration is based on use in commerce. In like manner and subject to the same conditions and requirements, the right provided in this section may be based upon a subsequent regularly filed application in the same foreign country, instead of the first filed foreign application: Provided, That any foreign application filed prior to such subsequent application has been withdrawn, abandoned, or otherwise disposed of, without having been laid open to public inspection and without leaving any rights outstanding, and has not served, nor thereafter shall serve, as a basis for claiming a right of priority. (e) Registration on principal or supplemental register; copy of foreign registration A mark duly registered in the country of origin of the foreign applicant may be registered on the principal register if eligible, otherwise on the supplemental register in this chapter provided. Such applicant shall submit, within such time period as may be prescribed by the Director, a true copy, a photocopy, a certification, or a certified copy of the registration in the country of origin of the applicant. The application must state the applicant's bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, but use in commerce shall not be required prior to registration. (f) Domestic registration independent of foreign registration The registration of a mark under the provisions of subsections (c), (d), and (e) of this section by a person described in subsection (b) of this section shall be independent of the registration in the country of origin and the duration, validity, or transfer in the United States of such registration shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter. (g) Trade or commercial names of foreign nationals protected without registration Trade names or commercial names of persons described in subsection (b) of this section shall be protected without the obligation of filing or registration whether or not they form parts of marks. (h) Protection of foreign nationals against unfair competition Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to effective protection against unfair competition, and the remedies provided in this chapter for infringement of marks shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair competition. (i) Citizens or residents of United States entitled to benefits of section Citizens or residents of the United States shall have the same benefits as are granted by this section to persons described in subsection (b) of this section.
12. FRAUD UPON THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICES
Defendants have committed fraud upon the United States Copyright Offices by failing to secure copyright protection and other acts under, including but not limited to:
Chapter 1. Subject Matter And Scope Of Copyright
Chapter 2. Copyright Ownership And Transfer
Chapter 3. Duration Of Copyright
Chapter 4. Copyright Notice, Deposit, And Registration
Chapter 5. Copyright Infringement And Remedies
Chapter 6. Manufacturing Requirements And Importation
Chapter 7. Copyright Office
Chapter 8. Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels
Chapter 9. Protection Of Semiconductor Chip Products
Chapter 10. Digital Audio Recording Devices And Media
Chapter 11. Sound Recordings And Music Videos
Chapter 12. Copyright Protection And Management Systems
Chapter 13. Protection Of Original Designs
WHEREFORE,
13. VIOLATION OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
By Definition and Sec. 152. Defendants have concealed assets and falsified oaths and claims and further caused embezzlement against estate and under Sec. 154 Defendants had adverse interests and conduct unbecoming officers and under Sec. 155 Fee agreements in cases under title 11 and receiverships and under Sec. 156 had knowing disregard of bankruptcy law or rule and under Sec. 157 have committed bankruptcy fraud and Defendants concealed assets and made false oaths and claims and who knowingly and fraudulently concealed from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court charged with the control or custody of property, or, in connection with a case under title 11, from creditors or the United States Trustee, properties belonging to the estate of a debtor; knowingly and fraudulently made false oaths or accounts in and in relation to a case under title 11; knowingly and fraudulently made false declarations, certificates, verifications, and statements under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, in and in relation to a case under title 11; knowingly and fraudulently presented false claims for proof against the estate of a debtor, and uses any such claim in a case under title 11, in a personal capacity or as or through an agent, proxy, or attorney; knowingly and fraudulently received any material amount of property from a debtor after the filing of a case under title 11, with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11; knowingly and fraudulently gave, offered, received, and attempted to obtain any money or property, remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or promise thereof by acting and forbearing to act in a case under title 11; in a personal capacity or as an agent or officer of a person and corporation, in contemplation of a case under title 11 by or against the person or any other person or corporation, or with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11, knowingly and fraudulently transferred and concealed property or the property of such other person or corporation; after the filing of a case under title 11 and in contemplation thereof, knowingly and fraudulently concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, and made false entries in recorded information (including books, documents, records, and papers) relating to the property or financial affairs of a debtor; or after the filing of a case under title 11, knowingly and fraudulently withholds from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court or a United States Trustee entitled to its possession, any recorded information (including books, documents, records, and papers) relating to the property or financial affairs of a debtor.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 5 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Defendants have violated;
and
Defendants have violated Sec. 157 and through bankruptcy fraud Defendant's have devised and intended to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and for the purpose of executing and concealing such a scheme and artifice and attempting to do so and filed a petition under title 11; and filed documents in a proceeding under title 11; and makes a false or fraudulent representation, claim, or promise concerning or in relation to a proceeding under title 11, at any time before or after the filing of the petition, or in relation to a proceeding falsely asserted to be pending under such title.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 5 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(a) In this section -
(1) (j) (2) (A) In an action under paragraph (1), if the court finds that -
(i) a bankruptcy petition preparer has -
(I) engaged in conduct in violation of this section or of any provision of this title a violation of which subjects a person to criminal penalty;
(III) engaged in any other fraudulent, unfair, or deceptive conduct; and
(ii) injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent the recurrence of such conduct,
the court may enjoin the bankruptcy petition preparer from engaging in such conduct.
(B) The court shall award to a debtor, trustee, or creditor that brings a successful action under this subsection reasonable attorney's [1] fees and costs of the action, to be paid by the bankruptcy petition preparer. ''.
(k) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit activities that are otherwise prohibited by law, including rules and laws that prohibit the unauthorized practice of law
14. COUNTERFEITING AND FORGERY
Defendants have violated;
By committing counterfeit acts committed outside the United; and Sec. 471. - in regard to obligations and securities of United States Defendant's, with intent to defraud, falsely made, forged, counterfeited, and altered an obligation or other security of the United States.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 20 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Defendants have violated;
By dealing in counterfeit obligations or securities and Defendant's bought\buy, sold\sell, received\receive, and \delivered\deliver false, forged, counterfeited, and altered obligations and other securities of the United States, with the intent that the same be passed, published, or used as true and genuine.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 20 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Defendants have violated;
in regard to Contractors' bonds, bids, and public records. Defendant's falsely made, altered, forged, and counterfeited security, public record, affidavit, or other writing for the purpose of defrauding the United States; and Defendant's uttered and published as true and possessed with intent to utter or publish as true, false, forged, altered, and counterfeited writing, knowing the same to be false, forged, altered, or counterfeited; and Defendants transmitted to, and presented at offices and officers of the United States, false, forged, altered, or counterfeited writing, knowing the same to be false, forged, altered, or counterfeited.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 10 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Defendants have violated;
in regards to contracts, deeds, and powers of attorney and falsely made, altered, forged, and counterfeited deeds, power of attorneys, orders, certificates, receipts, contracts, and other writings, for the purpose of obtaining and receiving, and of enabling other persons, directly and/or indirectly, in obtaining and receiving from the United States and\or officers and agents thereof, any sum of money; Defendants have uttered and published as true false, forged, altered, or counterfeited writings, with intent to defraud the United States, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited; and Defendants have transmitted to, and presented at offices and officers of the United States, writings in support of, and in relation to, any account or claim, with intent to defraud the United States, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 10 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court to all of the above violations not be imprisoned less than the maximum and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Sec. 513. - Securities of the States and private entities
Sec. 514. - Fictitious obligations
15. FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS
In the commission of certain crimes against the USPTO and state Corporate laws, documents were falsified for; patent applications, corporate formation and other corporate documents; billing statements, foreign patent applications, investment documents and other documents currently under investigations as outlined herein.
Defendants have violated;
Defendants made statements or entries generally and in matters within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully falsified, concealed, and covered up by trick, scheme, and device material facts; and made materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and representations; and made and used false writings and documents knowing the same to contain materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and entries.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 5 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative branch; or any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate
Defendants have violated;
Defendants have committed major fraud against the United States and knowingly executed, and attempted to execute, schemes and artifices with the intent to defraud the United States; and obtained money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, in the procurement of property and services as a prime contractor with the United States or as a subcontractor or supplier on a contract in which there is a prime contract with the United States.
16. MALICIOUS MISCHIEF VIOLATION
Defendants have violated;
Defendants violated Government property and contracts and that Defendant's willfully injured and committed depredation against properties of the United States, and departments and agencies thereof, and property which has been or is being manufactured or constructed for the United States, or any department or agency thereof, and attempted to commit the foregoing offenses.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court so that Defendants not be imprisoned less than the maximum 10 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit over five years with malice and intent, where punishment shall be as follows: That the damage and attempted damage to such property exceeds the sum of $1,000, by a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
17. ROBBERY AND BURGLARY
Defendants have violated;
Defendant's have robbed and attempted to rob Iviewit of personal property belonging to the United States.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum civil remedies from this Court.
Defendants have violated;
Defendants through mail, money, and other property of United States and are in receipt, possession, concealment, and disposal of Property. - Defendant's have received, possess, conceal, and dispose of money and other property obtained in violation of this section, knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum fines under this title.
18. STOLEN PROPERTY
Defendants have violated;
through illegal actions and defined, ''Money'' means the legal tender of the United States or of any foreign country, or any counterfeit thereof; ''Securities'' includes any note, stock certificate, bond, debenture, check, draft, warrant, traveler's check, letter of credit, warehouse receipt, negotiable bill of lading, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate; certificate of interest in property, tangible or intangible; instrument or document or writing evidencing ownership of goods, wares, and merchandise, or transferring or assigning any right, title, or interest in or to goods, wares, and merchandise; or, in general, any instrument commonly known as a ''security'', or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, warrant, or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing, or any forged, counterfeited, or spurious representation of any of the foregoing; ''Tax stamp'' includes any tax stamp, tax token, tax meter imprint, or any other form of evidence of an obligation running to a State, or evidence of the discharge thereof; ''Value'' means the face, par, or market value, whichever is the greatest, and the aggregate value of all goods, wares, and merchandise, securities, and money referred to in a single indictment shall constitute the value thereof.
Defendants have violated;
Defendants have participated in the transportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys, or articles used in counterfeiting and Defendant's have transported, transmitted, and made transfers in interstate and foreign commerce of goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted and taken by fraud; and having devised and intended to devise schemes and artifices to defraud, and for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, transported and caused to be transported, and induced persons to travel in, and to be transported in interstate and foreign commerce in the execution and concealment of schemes and artifices to defraud that person or those persons of money or property having a value of $5,000 or more; and, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transported in interstate and foreign commerce falsely made, forged, altered, and counterfeited securities, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, and counterfeited; and, with unlawful and fraudulent intent.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum fines under this title or imprisonment not more than ten years, or both. This section shall not apply to any falsely made, forged, altered, counterfeited or spurious representation of an obligation or other security of the United States, or of an obligation, bond, certificate, security, treasury note, bill, promise to pay or bank note issued by any foreign government. This section also shall not apply to any falsely made, forged, altered, counterfeited, or spurious representation of any bank note or bill issued by a bank or corporation of any foreign country which is intended by the laws or usage of such country to circulate as money.
Defendants have violated;
and are in sale and receipt of stolen goods, securities, moneys, and receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, and dispose of goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, and money of the value of $5,000 or more, and pledges or accepts as security for a loan any goods, wares, or merchandise, or securities, of the value of $500 or more, which have crossed a State or United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken; and receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, and dispose of falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities, or pledges or accepts as security for a loan any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities, moving as, and which are a part of, and which constitute interstate and foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been so falsely made, forged, altered, and counterfeited; and receive in interstate and foreign commerce, and conceals, store, barter, sell and dispose of, any tool, implement, or thing used or intended to be used in falsely making, forging, altering, or counterfeiting any security or tax stamp, or any part thereof, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce, knowing that the same is fitted to be used, or has been used, in falsely making, forging, altering, or counterfeiting any security or tax stamp, or any part thereof - Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. This section shall not apply to any falsely made, forged, altered, counterfeited, or spurious representation of an obligation or other security of the United States or of an obligation, bond, certificate, security, treasury note, bill, promise to pay, or bank note, issued by any foreign government. This section also shall not apply to any falsely made, forged, altered, counterfeited, or spurious representation of any bank note or bill issued by a bank or corporation of any foreign country which is intended by the laws or usage of such country to circulate as money. For purposes of this section, the term ''State'' includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States
Defendants have violated;
While trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, copies of computer programs or computer program documentation or packaging, and copies of motion pictures or other audio visual works, and trafficking in counterfeit computer program documentation or packaging and knowingly traffic in counterfeit label affixed or designed to be affixed to a phonorecord, or a copy of a computer program or documentation or packaging for a computer program, or a copy of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, and whoever, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (c) of this section, knowingly traffics in counterfeit documentation or packaging for a computer program.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum fines under this title or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both. The term ''counterfeit label'' means an identifying label or container that appears to be genuine, but is not; (2) the term ''traffic'' means to transport, transfer or otherwise dispose of, to another, as consideration for anything of value or to make or obtain control of with intent to so transport, transfer or dispose of; and (3) the terms ''copy'', ''phonorecord'', ''motion picture'', ''computer program'', and ''audiovisual work'' have, respectively, the meanings given those terms in section 101 (relating to definitions) of title 17. (c) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) of this section are - (1) the offense is committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States (as defined in section 46501 of title 49); (2) the mail or a facility of interstate or foreign commerce is used or intended to be used in the commission of the offense; (3) the counterfeit label is affixed to or encloses, or is designed to be affixed to or enclose, a copy of a copyrighted computer program or copyrighted documentation or packaging for a computer program, a copyrighted motion picture or other audiovisual work, or a phonorecord of a copyrighted sound recording; or (4) the counterfeited documentation or packaging for a computer program is copyrighted. (d) When any person is convicted of any violation of subsection (a), the court in its judgment of conviction shall in addition to the penalty therein prescribed, order the forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all counterfeit labels and all articles to which counterfeit labels have been affixed or which were intended to have had such labels affixed. (e) Except to the extent they are inconsistent with the provisions of this title, all provisions of section 509, title 17, United States Code, are applicable to violations of subsection (a).
Defendants have violated;
Defendants have violated 506(a) through Criminal infringement of copyrights and having violated section 506(a) (relating to criminal offenses) of title 17 shall be punished as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section and such penalties shall be in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or any other law. (b) Any person who commits an offense under section 506(a)(1) of title 17 - (1) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of at least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $2,500; (2) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense under paragraph (1); and (3) shall be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, in any other case. (c) Any person who commits an offense under section 506(a)(2) of title 17, United States Code - (1) shall be imprisoned not more than 3 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution of 10 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of $2,500 or more; (2) shall be imprisoned not more than 6 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense under paragraph (1); and (3) shall be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000. (d) (1) During preparation of the presentence report pursuant to Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, victims of the offense shall be permitted to submit, and the probation officer shall receive, a victim impact statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim, including the estimated economic impact of the offense on that victim. (2) Persons permitted to submit victim impact statements shall include - (A) producers and sellers of legitimate works affected by conduct involved in the offense; (B) holders of IP rights in such works; and (C) the legal representatives of such producers, sellers, and holders. (e) As used in this section - (1) the terms ''phonorecord'' and ''copies'' have, respectively, the meanings set forth in section 101 (relating to definitions) of title 17; and (2) the terms ''reproduction'' and ''distribution'' refer to the exclusive rights of a copyright owner under clauses (1) and (3) respectively of section 106 (relating to exclusive rights in copyrighted works), as limited by sections 107 through 120, of title 17
Defendants have violated;
Defendants have been trafficking in counterfeit goods or services (a) Whoever intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services shall, if an individual, be fined not more than $2,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, and, if a person other than an individual, be fined not more than $5,000,000. In the case of an offense by a person under this section that occurs after that person is convicted of another offense under this section, the person convicted, if an individual, shall be fined not more than $5,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if other than an individual, shall be fined not more than $15,000,000. (b) Upon a determination by a preponderance of the evidence that any articles in the possession of a defendant in a prosecution under this section bear counterfeit marks, the United States may obtain an order for the destruction of such articles. (c) All defenses, affirmative defenses, and limitations on remedies that would be applicable in an action under the Lanham Act shall be applicable in a prosecution under this section. In a prosecution under this section, the defendant shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, of any such affirmative defense. (d) (1) During preparation of the presentence report pursuant to Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, victims of the offense shall be permitted to submit, and the probation officer shall receive, a victim impact statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim, including the estimated economic impact of the offense on that victim. (2) Persons permitted to submit victim impact statements shall include - (A) producers and sellers of legitimate goods or services affected by conduct involved in the offense; (B) holders of intellectual property rights in such goods or services; and (C) the legal representatives of such producers, sellers, and holders. (e) For the purposes of this section - (1) the term ''counterfeit mark'' means - (A) a spurious mark - (i) that is used in connection with trafficking in goods or services; (ii) that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark was so registered; and (iii) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (B) a spurious designation that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a designation as to which the remedies of the Lanham Act are made available by reason of section 220706 [1] of title 36; ''220506''. but such term does not include any mark or designation used in connection with goods or services of which the manufacturer or producer was, at the time of the manufacture or production in question authorized to use the mark or designation for the type of goods or services so manufactured or produced, by the holder of the right to use such mark or designation; (2) the term ''traffic'' means transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another, as consideration for anything of value, or make or obtain control of with intent so to transport, transfer, or dispose of; and (3) the term ''Lanham Act'' means the Act entitled ''An Act to provide for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the provisions of certain international conventions, and for other purposes'', approved July 5, 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.). (f) Beginning with the first year after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Attorney General shall include in the report of the Attorney General to Congress on the business of the Department of Justice prepared pursuant to section 522 of title 28, an accounting, on a district by district basis, of the following with respect to all actions taken by the Department of Justice that involve trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, copies of computer programs or computer program documentation or packaging, copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works (as defined in section 2318 of title 18), criminal infringement of copyrights (as defined in section 2319 of title 18), unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances (as defined in section 2319A of title 18), or trafficking in goods or services bearing counterfeit marks (as defined in section 2320 of title 18): (1) The number of open investigations. (2) The number of cases referred by the United States Customs Service. (3) The number of cases referred by other agencies or sources. (4) The number and outcome, including settlements, sentences, recoveries, and penalties, of all prosecutions brought under sections 2318, 2319, 2319A, and 2320 of title 18.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum fines under this title, for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
19. SECURITIES VIOLATIONS
Iviewit states Defendants have violated multiple securities frauds.
WHEREFORE,
20. BRIBERY, GRAFT, AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
NOT SURE HOW THIS SECTION WORKS
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Sec. 201. Bribery of public officials and witnesses
Sec. 225. - Continuing financial crimes enterprise
Defendants have violated the following;
i. Sec. 205. - Activities of officers and employees in claims against and other matters affecting the Government
ii. Sec. 208. - Acts affecting a personal financial interest
iii. Sec. 210. - Offer to procure appointive public office
iv. Sec. 225. - Continuing financial crimes enterprise
WHEREFORE,
21. PERJURY
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
By committing acts of perjury generally and further having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in cases in which laws of the United States authorize oaths to be administered, that Defendant's testify, declare, depose, and certify truly, that written testimonies, declarations, depositions, and certificates subscribed, is true, and Defendant's willfully and contrary to such oaths stated and subscribed material matters which they did not believe to be true; and in declarations, certificates, verifications, and statements under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribed as true material matters which they do not believe to be true; and is therefore guilty of perjury.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 5 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
by subornation of perjury.
Defendant's procured others to commit perjury and therefore are guilty of
subornation of perjury.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 5 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Iviewit states Defendants have violated;
Defendants have made false declarations before a court and under oath (and in
declarations, certificates, verifications, and statements under penalty of
perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) in
proceedings before or ancillary to any court of the United States and knowingly
made false material declarations and made and use other information, including
books, papers, documents, records, recordings, and other materials, knowing the
same to contain false material declarations.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum fines under this title, for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent (b) This section is applicable whether the conduct occurred within or without the United States.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit requests this Court indict for violations of this section alleging that, in proceedings before or ancillary to any court of the United States, the Defendants under oath have knowingly made two or more declarations, which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false, need not specify which declaration is false if each declaration was material to the point in question, and each declaration was made within the period of the statute of limitations for the offense charged under this section. In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in the indictment or information shall be established sufficient for conviction by proof that the defendant while under oath made irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to the point in question in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury. It shall be a defense to an indictment or information made pursuant to the first sentence of this subsection that the defendant at the time he made each declaration believed the declaration was true. (d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. (e) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of evidence.
DEPOSITIONS
TO STATE SUPREME COURTS
22. MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD
Defendants have violated;
Defendants have devised and intended to devise schemes and artifices to defraud, and for obtaining money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and\or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, furnish and\or procure for unlawful uses counterfeit or spurious obligation, security, and other articles, and represented to be and intimated and held out to be counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such schemes and artifices and attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, matters or things sent and delivered by the Postal Service, and deposited and caused to be deposited matters and things to be sent and delivered by private and commercial interstate carriers, and took and received therefrom, such matters and things, and knowingly caused to be delivered by mail and such carrier according to the direction thereon, and at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matters or things.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 5 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both
Defendants have violated;
In the use of fictitious names and addresses, Defendants for the purpose of conducting, promoting, and carrying on by means of the Postal Service, schemes and devices mentioned in section 1341 of this title and other unlawful business, used and assumed, and requested to be addressed by, any fictitious, false, or assumed title, name, and address and name other than his own proper name, or takes or receives from any post office or authorized depository of mail matter, any letter, postal card, package, and other mail matter addressed to any such fictitious, false, or assumed title, name, address, name other than his own proper name.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum fines under this title for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Defendants have violated;
and committed fraud by wire, radio, or television and Defendants have devised and intended to devise schemes and artifices to defraud, and for obtaining money and property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, transmitted and caused to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds for the purpose of executing such schemes and artifices.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum fines under this title for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Defendants have violated;
and have committed bank fraud by knowingly executing, and attempting to execute, schemes and artifices to defraud a financial institution; and to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum fines under this title for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Defendants have violated;
Defendants meet the definition of ''scheme or artifice to defraud'' including schemes and artifices to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.
WHEREFORE, Defendants have violated;
and Defendants pray for this Court to institute injunctions against fraud as Defendant's are violating and about to violate this chapter or section 287, 371 (insofar as these violations involve conspiracy to defraud the United States and any agencies thereof), or 1001 of this title; and committing or about to commit a banking law violation (as defined in section 3322(d) of this title), and is alienating or disposing of property, or intends to alienate or dispose of property, obtained as a result of a banking law violation (as defined in section 3322(d) of this title) and property which is traceable to such violation, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any Federal court - to enjoin such alienation or disposition of property; and for a restraining order to - prohibit any person from withdrawing, transferring, removing, dissipating, or disposing of any such property or property of equivalent value; and appoint a temporary receiver to administer such restraining order. Issues a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order granted without bond. That the Court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination of such actions, and before final determination, enter such a restraining order or prohibition, and take such other actions, as is warranted to prevent a continuing and substantial injury to the United States or to any person and class of persons for whose protection these actions are brought. A proceeding under this section is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that, if an indictment has been returned against the respondent, discovery is governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
23. VIOLATIONS OF POSTAL SERVICE
Defendants have violated;
Defendants have obstructed mails generally, knowingly and willfully obstructing and retarding the passage of the mail, and carrier and conveyance carrying the mail.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum six months and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
Defendants have violated;
and have obstructed correspondences and taken letters, postal cards, and packages out of a post office and a authorized depository for mail matters, and from any letter or mail carrier, or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, had designs to obstruct the correspondences, and to pry into the businesses and secrets of others, and opened, secreted, embezzled, and destroyed the same.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 5 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent.
24. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE VIOLATIONS
Defendants have violated numerous federal and state tax codes including;
Defendants engaged in illegal activities in reporting taxes and preparing statements.
WHEREFORE,
25. EMBEZZLEMENT AND THEFT
Iviewit states the Defendants have violated;
In regard to public money, property or records, Defendants have embezzled, stolen, purloined, and knowingly converted to their use and the uses of others, and without authority, sell, convey and disposed of records, vouchers, moneys, and things of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, and in property made and being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof; and Defendants have received, concealed, and retained the same with intent to convert it to their use and gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit prays for maximum sentences and relief from this Court not be imprisoned less than the maximum 10 years and maximum fines under this title, or both for damages inflicted upon Iviewit's over five years with malice and intent and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. The word ''value'' means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, whichever is greater.
26. TITLE 15 CH 22 SUBCH IV SUBCHAPTER IV - THE MADRID PROTOCOL
27. CONTEMPT
Defendants have violated the following in the abuse of Supreme Court disciplinary agencies and a Florida civil circuit court;
Sec. 401. - Power of court
Sec. 201. - Bribery of public officials and witnesses
Sec. 205. - Activities of officers and employees in claims against and other matters affecting the Government
Sec. 208. - Acts affecting a personal financial interest
Sec. 210. - Offer to procure appointive public office
WHEREFORE,
28. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Defendants have violated;
Iviewit prays this Court to grant the following relief:
i. accept jurisdiction over certain matters and any other matters turn over to the appropriate court or other suitable third party oversight, a venue presumed free of conflict and undue influences,
ii. grant an expedited hearing due to the delays caused by conflicts and the urgency required in the matters before the USPTO and that this Court issue injunctions or other equitable relief to prevent further loss ASAP,
iii. award Iviewit monetary damages,
iv. award the Iviewit's attorney fees and other litigation costs,
v. award punitive damages,
vi. grant a jury trial for issues so triable in this Court, although against traditional policy,
vii. grant compensatory damages from the defendants,
viii. grant permanent injunctive relief barring the unauthorized use by any third parties of the Iviewit Inventions, until all criminal investigations have concluded and freeze any actions on all Iviewit IP both in the United States and abroad through international treatise to prevent violation of Article 1, Section 8, Clause rights,
ix. grant reasonable attorney's fees and level the playing field of a small group of Iviewit against thousands of attorneys by appointing and/or arranging compensation of Iviewit's attorney, for one attorney, with no conflict. Under this Court's protection and offer Class I Defendants no option other than to have third party representation due to past conflicts. This will cease further conflicts and embarrassments to our state supreme courts and be spared from these attorneys desperate attempts at usurping law through conflict and violation of public office, that this Court award or grant any other relief it deems appropriate.
H. new York state crimes
1. New York Conspiracy
Defendants have committed a conspiracy within the state of New York and under;
and Defendants have violated:
i. Section 105.00 Conspiracy in the sixth degree.
ii. 105.05 Conspiracy in the fifth degree.
iii. 105.10 Conspiracy in the fourth degree.
iv. 105.13 Conspiracy in the third degree.
v. 105.15 Conspiracy in the second degree.
vi. 105.17 Conspiracy in the first degree.
vii. 105.20 Conspiracy; pleading and proof; necessity of overt act.
viii. 105.25 Conspiracy; jurisdiction and venue.
ix. 105.30 Conspiracy; no defense.
x. 105.35 Conspiracy; enterprise corruption: applicability.
xi. S 105.00 Conspiracy in the sixth degree.
2. VIOLATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICES NEW YORK SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST DEPARTMENT
Defendants have violated;
under Sections:
i. Section 200.00 Bribery in the third degree.
ii. 200.03 Bribery in the second degree.
iii. 200.04 Bribery in the first degree.
iv. 200.05 Bribery; defense.
v. 200.10 Bribe receiving in the third degree.
vi. 200.11 Bribe receiving in the second degree.
vii. 200.12 Bribe receiving in the first degree.
viii. 200.15 Bribe receiving; no defense.
ix. 200.20 Rewarding official misconduct in the second degree.
x. 200.22 Rewarding official misconduct in the first degree.
xi. 200.25 Receiving reward for official misconduct in the second degree.
xii. 200.27 Receiving reward for official misconduct in the first degree.
xiii. 200.30 Giving unlawful gratuities.
xiv. 200.35 Receiving unlawful gratuities.
xv. 200.40 Bribe giving and bribe receiving for public office; definition of term.
xvi. 200.45 Bribe giving for public office.
xvii. 200.50 Bribe receiving for public office.
xviii. S 200.00 Bribery in the third degree.
A person is guilty of bribery in the third degree when he confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon a public servant upon an agreement or understanding that such public servant's vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced. Bribery in the third degree is a class D felony.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of bribery in the second degree when he confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit valued in excess of ten thousand dollars upon a public servant upon an agreement or understanding that such public servant`s vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced. Bribery in the second degree is a class C felony.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of bribery in the first degree when he confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon a public servant upon an agreement or understanding that such public servant`s vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced in the investigation, arrest, detention, prosecution or incarceration of any person for the commission or alleged commission of a class A felony defined in article two hundred twenty of the penal law or an attempt to commit any such class A felony. Bribery in the first degree is a class B felony.
Defendants have violated;
In any prosecution for bribery, it is a defense that the defendant conferred or agreed to confer the benefit involved upon the public servant involved as a result of conduct of the latter constituting larceny committed by means of extortion, or an attempt to commit the same, or coercion, or an attempt to commit coercion.
Defendants have violated;
A public servant is guilty of bribe receiving in the third degree when he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced. Bribe receiving in the third degree is a class D felony.
Defendants have violated;
A public servant is guilty of bribe receiving in the second degree when he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit valued in excess of ten thousand dollars from another person upon an agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced. Bribe receiving in the second degree is a class C felony.
Defendants have violated;
A public servant is guilty of bribe receiving in the first degree when he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced in the investigation, arrest, detention, prosecution or incarceration of any person for the commission or alleged commission of a class A felony defined in article two hundred twenty of the penal law or an attempt to commit any such class A felony. Bribe receiving in the first degree is a class B felony.
Defendants have violated;
ii. The crimes of (a) bribe receiving, and (b) larceny committed by means of extortion, attempt to commit the same, coercion and attempt to commit coercion, are not mutually exclusive, and it is no defense to a prosecution for bribe receiving that, by reason of the same conduct, the defendant also committed one of such other specified crimes.
iii. It is no defense to a prosecution pursuant to the provisions of this article that the public servant did not have power or authority to perform the act or omission for which the alleged bribe, gratuity or reward was given.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of rewarding official misconduct in the second degree when he knowingly confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon a public servant for having violated his duty as a public servant. Rewarding official misconduct in the second degree is a class E felony.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of rewarding official misconduct in the first degree when he knowingly confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon a public servant for having violated his duty as a public servant in the investigation, arrest, detention, prosecution, or incarceration of any person for the commission or alleged commission of a class A felony defined in article two hundred twenty of the penal law or the attempt to commit any such class A felony. Rewarding official misconduct in the first degree is a class C felony.
Defendants have violated;
A public servant is guilty of receiving reward for official misconduct in the second degree when he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person for having violated his duty as a public servant. Receiving reward for official misconduct in the second degree is a class E felony.
Defendants have violated;
A public servant is guilty of receiving reward for official misconduct in the first degree when he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person for having violated his duty as a public servant in the investigation, arrest, detention, prosecution, or incarceration of any person for the commission or alleged commission of a class A felony defined in article two hundred twenty of the penal law or the attempt to commit any such class A felony. Receiving reward for official misconduct in the first degree is a class C felony.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of giving unlawful gratuities when he knowingly confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon a public servant for having engaged in official conduct which he was required or authorized to perform, and for which he was not entitled to any special or additional compensation. Giving unlawful gratuities is a class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
A public servant is guilty of receiving unlawful gratuities when he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit for having engaged in official conduct which he was required or authorized to perform, and for which he was not entitled to any special or additional compensation. Receiving unlawful gratuities is a class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
As used in sections 200.45 and 200.50, "party officer" means a person who holds any position or office in a political party, whether by election, appointment or otherwise.
A person is guilty of bribe giving for public office when he confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any money or other property upon a public servant or a party officer upon an agreement or understanding that some person will or may be appointed to a public office or designated or nominated as a candidate for public office. Bribe giving for public office is a class D felony.
Defendants have violated;
A public servant or a party officer is guilty of bribe receiving for public office when he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any money or other property from another person upon an agreement or understanding that some person will or may be appointed to a public office or designated or nominated as a candidate for public office. Bribe receiving for public office is a class D felony.
Defendants have violated;
under Sections:
i. 175.00 Definitions of terms.
ii. 175.05 Falsifying business records in the second degree.
iii. 175.10 Falsifying business records in the first degree.
iv. 175.15 Falsifying business records; defense.
v. 175.20 Tampering with public records in the second degree.
vi. 175.25 Tampering with public records in the first degree.
vii. 175.30 Offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree.
viii. 175.35 Offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree.
ix. 175.40 Issuing a false certificate.
x. 175.45 Issuing a false financial statement.
xi. S 175.00 Definitions of terms.
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. "Enterprise" means any entity of one or more persons, corporate or otherwise, public or private, engaged in business, commercial, professional, industrial, eleemosynary, social, political or governmental activity.
2. "Business record" means any writing or article, including computer data or a computer program, kept or maintained by an enterprise for the purpose of evidencing or reflecting its condition or activity.
3. "Written instrument" means any instrument or article, including computer data or a computer program, containing written or printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information, or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of falsifying business records in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, he:
1. Makes or causes a false entry in the business records of an enterprise; or
2. Alters, erases, obliterates, deletes, removes or destroys a true entry in the business records of an enterprise; or
3. Omits to make a true entry in the business records of an enterprise in violation of a duty to do so which he knows to be imposed upon him by law or by the nature of his position; or
4. Prevents the making of a true entry or causes the omission thereof in the business records of an enterprise. Falsifying business records in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of falsifying business records in the first degree when he commits the crime of falsifying business records in the second degree, and when his intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof. Falsifying business records in the first degree is a class E felony.
Defendants have violated;
In any prosecution for falsifying business records, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant was a clerk, bookkeeper or other employee who, without personal benefit, merely executed the orders of his employer or of a superior officer or employee generally authorized to direct his activities.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of tampering with public records in the second degree when, knowing that he does not have the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, he knowingly removes, mutilates, destroys, conceals, makes a false entry in or falsely alters any record or other written instrument filed with, deposited in, or otherwise constituting a record of a public office or public servant. Tampering with public records in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of tampering with public records in the first degree when, knowing that he does not have the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, and with intent to defraud, he knowingly removes, mutilates, destroys, conceals, makes a false entry in or falsely alters any record or other written instrument filed with, deposited in, or otherwise constituting a record of a public office or public servant. Tampering with public records in the first degree is a class D felony.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree when, knowing that a written instrument contains a false statement or false information, he offers or presents it to a public office or public servant with the knowledge or belief that it will be filed with, registered or recorded in or otherwise become a part of the records of such public office or public servant. Offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree when, knowing that a written instrument contains a false statement or false information, and with intent to defraud the state or any political subdivision, public authority or public benefit corporation of the state, he offers or presents it to a public office, public servant, public authority or public benefit corporation with the knowledge or belief that it will be filed with, registered or recorded in or otherwise become a part of the records of such public office, public servant, public authority or public benefit corporation. Offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree is a class E felony.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of issuing a false certificate when, being a public servant authorized by law to make or issue official certificates or other official written instruments, and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another person, he issues such an instrument, or makes the same with intent that it be issued, knowing that it contains a false statement or false information. Issuing a false certificate is a class E felony.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of issuing a false financial statement when, with intent to defraud:
1. He knowingly makes or utters a written instrument which purports to describe the financial condition or ability to pay of some person and which is inaccurate in some material respect; or
2. He represents in writing that a written instrument purporting to describe a person's financial condition or ability to pay as of a prior date is accurate with respect to such person's current financial condition or ability to pay, whereas he knows it is materially inaccurate in that respect. Issuing a false financial statement is a class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
Section 1. Members of the legislature, and all officers, executive and judicial, except such inferior officers as shall be by law exempted, shall, before they enter on the duties of their respective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of New York, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of ............, according to the best of my ability; "
S 5. Provision shall be made by law for the removal for misconduct or malversation in office of all officers, except judicial, whose powers and duties are not local or legislative and who shall be elected at general elections, and also for supplying vacancies created by such removal.
S 2. Definitions. The term "state officer" includes every officer for whom all the electors of the state are entitled to vote, members of the legislature, justices of the supreme court, regents of the university, and every officer, appointed by one or more state officers, or by the legislature, and authorized to exercise his official functions throughout the entire state, or without limitation to any political subdivision of the state, except United States senators, members of congress, and electors for president and vice-president of the United States. The term "local officer" includes every other officer who is elected by the electors of a portion only of the state, every officer of a political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state, and every officer limited in the execution of his official functions to a portion only of the state. The office of a state officer is a state office. The office of a local officer is a local office.
Defendants have violated;
ARTICLE 2 Appointment and Qualification of Public Officers - ARTICLE 15 ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS
S 466. Attorney's oath of office. Each person, admitted as prescribed in this chapter must, upon his admission, take the constitutional oath of office in open court, and subscribe the same in a roll or book, to be kept in the office of the clerk of the appellate division of the supreme court for that purpose.
Wherefore Iviewit prays for relief from;
1. The court of appeals shall appoint a board of trustees to administer the lawyers` fund for client protection of the state of New York established pursuant to section ninety-seven-t of the state finance law.
2. The board shall have the power to receive, hold, manage and distribute the funds collected hereunder for the purpose of maintaining the integrity and protecting the good name of the legal profession by reimbursing, in the discretion of the trustees to the extent they may deem proper and reasonable, losses caused by the dishonest conduct of attorneys admitted to practice in this state. For purposes of this section, the term "dishonest conduct" shall mean misappropriation or willful misapplication of clients` money, securities, or other property, by an attorney admitted to practice in this state.
3. The board of trustees shall adopt regulations for the administration of the lawyers` fund for client protection of the state of New York and the procedures for presentation, consideration, allowance and payment of claims, including the establishment of a maximum limitation for awards to claimants.
4. The board of trustees shall have the sole discretion to determine the merits of claims presented for reimbursement, the amount of such reimbursement and the terms under which such reimbursement shall be made. Such terms of reimbursement shall require that the claimant execute such instruments, take such action or enter into such agreements as the board of trustees shall require, including assignments, subrogation agreements and promises to cooperate with the board of trustees in making claims against the attorney whose dishonest conduct resulted in the claim.
8. All payments from the lawyers` fund for client protection of the state of New York shall be made by the state comptroller upon certification and authorization of the board of trustees of said fund.
9. Acceptance of an award of reimbursement from the lawyers` fund for client protection shall, to the extent of such award, (a) subrogate the fund to any right or cause of action that accrued to the claimant as a consequence of the dishonest conduct that resulted in the claimant's award and (b) create a lien in favor of the fund that shall attach to any money asset that is designated to be paid to the claimant from, or on behalf of, the attorney who caused the claimant's loss. If the fund fully reimburses the claimant's loss, as determined by the board of trustees, the lien shall be in the amount of the fund's award. If the claimant's loss exceeds the fund's award, the lien shall not extend to the claimant's right to recover additional restitution from the attorney for the claimant's unreimbursed loss. In the event of a recovery by the fund, a claimant shall be entitled to any money recovered in excess of the fund's award of reimbursement to the claimant.
Wherefore Iviewit prays for relief for;
Whereby:
1. The attorney-general may maintain an action upon his own information or upon the complaint of a private person or of a bar association organized and existing under the laws of this state against any person, partnership, corporation, or association, and any employee, agent, director, or officer thereof who commits any act or engages in any conduct prohibited by law as constituting the unlawful practice of the law. The term "unlawful practice of the law" as used in this article shall include, but is not limited to, (a) any act prohibited by penal law sections two hundred seventy, two hundred seventy-a, two hundred seventy-e, two hundred seventy-one, two hundred seventy-five, two hundred seventy-five-a, two hundred seventy-six, two hundred eighty or fourteen hundred fifty-two, or (b) any other act forbidden by law to be done by any person not regularly licensed and admitted to practice law in this state, or (c) any act punishable by the Supreme Court as a criminal contempt of court under section seven hundred fifty-B of this chapter.
2. Such an action may also be maintained by a bar association organized and existing under the laws of the state of New York, upon an application to the supreme court of the state of New York, or a justice thereof, for leave to bring the same by such bar association on good cause shown therefor and proof that a written request was made upon the attorney-general to bring such an action and that more than twenty days have elapsed since the making of such request and he has failed or refused to bring such an action.
Wherefore Iviewit prays for relief for a;
Whereby, in an action brought as prescribed in section four hundred seventy-six-a, the final judgment in favor of the plaintiff shall perpetually restrain the defendant from the commission or continuance of the act complained of. A temporary restraining order to restrain the commission or continuance thereof may be granted upon proof, by affidavit, that the defendant has violated any of the provisions of such section. The provisions of statute or rule relating generally to injunctions as provisional remedies in actions apply to such a temporary restraining order and the proceedings thereupon, except that the plaintiff shall not be required to file any undertaking before the issuance of such temporary restraining order, shall not be liable for costs and shall not be liable for damages sustained by reason of the restraining order in cases where judgment is rendered in favor of the person, firm or corporation sought to be enjoined.
Wherefore Iviewit prays for relief for;
Whereby:
1. The attorney-general is empowered to conduct an investigation of any complaint of unlawful practice of the law and in connection therewith, the attorney-general, his deputy, assistant, special assistant or other officer designated by him for such purpose is empowered to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, examine them under oath before him or the supreme court of the state of New York, or a justice thereof, and require the production of any books or papers which he deems relevant or material to the inquiry. Such power of subpoena and of examination shall not abate or terminate by reason of the commencement or pendency of any action or proceeding brought by the attorney-general under section four hundred seventy-six-a.
2. No person shall be excused from attending such inquiry in pursuance to the mandates of a subpoena, or from producing a paper or book, or from being examined or required to answer a question on the ground of failure of tender or payment of a witness fee or mileage, unless at the time of such appearance or production, as the case may be, such witness makes demand for such payment as a condition precedent to the offering of testimony or production required by the subpoena and unless such payment is not thereupon made. Such provisions for payment of witness fee or mileage do not apply to any officer, director or person in the employ of any person, partnership, corporation, company, trust or association whose conduct or practices are being investigated.
3. It shall be the duty of all public officers, their deputies, assistants, subordinates, clerks or employees and all other persons to render and furnish to the attorney-general, his deputy or other designated officer when requested all information and assistance in their possession or within their power. Any officer participating in such inquiry who shall disclose to any person other than the attorney-general the name of any witness examined or any other information obtained upon such inquiry except as directed by the attorney-general shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
An attorney or counselor who:
1. Is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party; or,
2. Willfully delays his client's suit with a view to his own gain; or, willfully receives any money or allowance for or on account of any money which he has not laid out, or becomes answerable for, Is guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition to the punishment prescribed therefore by the penal law, he forfeits to the party injured treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
An attorney or counselor shall not:
1. Directly or indirectly, buy, take an assignment of or be in any manner interested in buying or taking an assignment of a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other thing in action, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action thereon.
2. By himself, or by or in the name of another person, either before or after action brought, promise or give, or procure to be promised or given, a valuable consideration to any person, as an inducement to placing, or in consideration of having placed, in his hands, or in the hands of another person, a demand of any kind, for the purpose of bringing an action thereon, or of representing the claimant in the pursuit of any civil remedy for the recovery thereof. But this subdivision does not apply to an agreement between attorneys and counselors, or either, to divide between themselves the compensation to be received.
3. An attorney or counselor who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
S 494. Attorneys may defend themselves. The last section does not prohibit an attorney from defending himself in person, as attorney or as counsel, when prosecuted either civilly or criminally.
S 498. Professional referrals. 1. There shall be no cause of action for damages arising against any association or society of attorneys and counselors at law authorized to practice in the state of New York for referring any person or persons to a member of the profession for the purpose of obtaining legal services, provided that such referral was made without charge and as a public service by said association or society, and without malice, and in the reasonable belief that such referral was warranted, based upon the facts disclosed.
2. For the purposes of this section, "association or society of attorneys or counselors at law" shall mean any such organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which offers professional referrals as an incidental service in the normal course of business, but which business does not include the providing of legal services.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
1. Confidential information privileged. The confidential relations and communications between a member or authorized agent of a lawyer assistance committee sponsored by a state or local bar association and any person, firm or corporation communicating with such committee, its members or authorized agents shall be deemed to be privileged on the same basis as those provided by law between attorney and client. Such privilege may be waived only by the person, firm or corporation which has furnished information to the committee.
2. Immunity from liability. Any person, firm or corporation in good faith providing information to, or in any other way participating in the affairs of, any of the committees referred to in subdivision one of this section shall be immune from civil liability that might otherwise result by reason of such conduct. For the purpose of any proceeding, the good faith of any such person, firm or corporation shall be presumed.
Defendants have violated;
Section 73. Business or professional activities by state officers and employees and party officers. 1. As used in this section:
(a) The term "compensation" shall mean any money, thing of value or financial benefit conferred in return for services rendered or to be rendered. With regard to matters undertaken by a firm, corporation or association, compensation shall mean net revenues, as defined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as defined by the state ethics commission or legislative ethics committee in relation to persons subject to their respective jurisdictions.
(b) The term "licensing" shall mean any state agency activity, other than before the division of corporations and state records in the department of state, respecting the grant, denial, renewal, revocation, enforcement, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, recall, cancellation or amendment of a license, permit or other form of permission conferring the right or privilege to engage in (i) a profession, trade, or occupation or (ii) any business or activity regulated by a regulatory agency as defined herein, which in the absence of such license, permit or other form of permission would be prohibited.
(c) The term "legislative employee" shall mean any officer or employee of the legislature but it shall not include members of the legislature.
(d) The term "ministerial matter" shall mean an administrative act carried out in a prescribed manner not allowing for substantial personal discretion.
(e) The term "regulatory agency" shall mean the banking department, insurance department, state liquor authority, department of agriculture and markets, department of education, department of environmental conservation, department of health, division of housing and community renewal, department of state, other than the division of corporations and state records, department of public service, the industrial board of appeals in the department of labor and the department of law, other than when the attorney general or his agents or employees are performing duties specified in section sixty-three of the executive law.
(f) The term "representative capacity" shall mean the presentation of the interests of a client or other person pursuant to an agreement, express or implied, for compensation for services.
(g) The term "state agency" shall mean any state department, or division, board, commission, or bureau of any state department, any public benefit corporation, public authority or commission at least one of whose members is appointed by the governor, or the state university of New York or the city university of New York, including all their constituent units except community colleges of the state university of New York and the independent institutions operating statutory or contract colleges on behalf of the state.
(i) The term "state officer or employee" shall mean:
(ii) officers and employees of statewide elected officials;
(iii) officers and employees of state departments, boards, bureaus, divisions, commissions, councils or other state agencies other than officers of such boards, commissions or councils who receive no compensation or are compensated on a per diem basis; and
(iv) members or directors of public authorities, other than multistate authorities, public benefit corporations and commissions at least one of whose members is appointed by the governor, who receive compensation other than on a per diem basis, and employees of such authorities, corporations and commissions.
(b) No state officer or employee who is required to file an annual statement of financial disclosure pursuant to the provisions of section seventy-three-a of this article, and is not otherwise subject to the provisions of this section, shall receive, directly or indirectly, or enter into any agreement express or implied, for any compensation, in whatever form, for the appearance or rendition of services by himself or another against the interest of the state agency by which he is employed or affiliated in relation to any case, proceeding, application or other matter before, or the transaction of business by himself or another with, the court of claims.
5. No statewide elected official, state officer or employee, individual whose name has been submitted by the governor to the senate for confirmation to become a state officer or employee, member of the legislature or legislative employee shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, accept or receive any gift having a value of seventy-five dollars or more whether in the form of money, service, loan, travel, entertainment, hospitality, thing or promise, or in any other form, under circumstances in which it could reasonably be inferred that the gift was intended to influence him, or could reasonably be expected to influence him, in the performance of his official duties or was intended as a reward for any official action on his part. No person shall, directly or indirectly, offer or make any such gift to a statewide elected official, or any state officer or employee, member of the legislature or legislative employee under such circumstances.
8. (a) (i) No person who has served as a state officer or employee shall within a period of two years after the termination of such service or employment appear or practice before such state agency or receive compensation for any services rendered by such former officer or employee on behalf of any person, firm, corporation or association in relation to any case, proceeding or application or other matter before such agency.
(ii) No person who has served as a state officer or employee shall after the termination of such service or employment appear, practice, communicate or otherwise render services before any state agency or receive compensation for any such services rendered by such former officer or employee on behalf of any person, firm, corporation or other entity in relation to any case, proceeding, application or transaction with respect to which such person was directly concerned and in which he or she personally participated during the period of his or her service or employment, or which was under his or her active consideration.
Ordinarily, employees who leave State service may not, for two years, appear or practice before their former agency or receive compensation for rendering services on a matter before their former agency. However, because of this certification, you may be exempt from this restriction.
If you were not designated as a Policymaker by your agency, you are automatically exempt. You may, upon leaving State service, immediately appear, practice or receive compensation for services rendered before your former agency.
If you were designated as a Policymaker by your agency, you are eligible to apply for an exemption to the State Ethics Commission at 39 Columbia Street, Albany, New York 12207.
Even if you are or become exempt from the two year bar, the lifetime bar of the revolving door statute will continue to apply to you. You may not appear, practice, communicate or otherwise render services before any State agency in relation to any case, proceeding, application or transaction with respect to which you were directly concerned and in which you personally participated during your State service, or which was under your active consideration.
(ii) The provisions of subparagraph (i) of this paragraph shall not apply to any such officer or employee who at the time of or prior to such termination had served in a policymaking position as determined by the appointing authority, which determination had been filed with the state ethics commission, provided that such officer or employee may so appear or practice or receive such compensation with the prior approval of the state ethics commission. In determining whether to grant such approval the state ethics commission shall consider:
A. whether the employee's prior job duties involved substantial decision-making authority over policies, rule or contracts;
B. the nature of the duties to be performed by the employee for the prospective employer;
C. whether the prospective employment is likely to involve substantial contact with the employee's former agency and the extent to which any such contact is likely to involve matters where the agency has the discretion to make decisions based on the work product of the employee;
D. whether the prospective employment may be beneficial to the state or the public; and
E. the extent of economic hardship to the employee if the application is denied.
(d) Nothing contained in this subdivision shall prohibit any state agency from adopting rules concerning practice before it by former officers or employees more restrictive than the requirements of this subdivision.
(e) This subdivision shall not apply to any appearance, practice, communication or rendition of services before any state agency, or either house of the legislature, or to the receipt of compensation for any such services, rendered by a former state officer or employee or former member of the legislature or legislative employee, which is made while carrying out official duties as an elected official or employee of a federal, state or local government or one of its agencies.
10. Nothing contained in this section, the judiciary law, the education law or any other law or disciplinary rule shall be construed or applied to prohibit any firm, association or corporation, in which any present or former statewide elected official, state officer or employee, or political party chairman, member of the legislature or legislative employee is a member, associate, retired member, of counsel or shareholder, from appearing, practicing, communicating or otherwise rendering services in relation to any matter before, or transacting business with a state agency, or a city agency with respect to a political party chairman in a county wholly included in a city with a population of more than one million, otherwise proscribed by this section, the judiciary law, the education law or any other law or disciplinary rule with respect to such official, member of the legislature or officer or employee, or political party chairman, where such statewide elected official, state officer or employee, member of the legislature or legislative employee, or political party chairman does not share in the net revenues, as defined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles by the state ethics commission or by the legislative ethics committee in relation to persons subject to their respective jurisdictions, resulting there from, or, acting in good faith, reasonably believed that he or she would not share in the net revenues as so defined; nor shall anything contained in this section, the judiciary law, the education law or any other law or disciplinary rule be construed to prohibit any firm, association or corporation in which any present or former statewide elected official, member of the legislature, legislative employee, full-time salaried state officer or employee or state officer or employee who is subject to the provisions of section seventy-three-a of this chapter is a member, associate, retired member, of counsel or shareholder, from appearing, practicing, communicating or otherwise rendering services in relation to any matter before, or transacting business with, the court of claims, where such statewide elected official, member of the legislature, legislative employee, full-time salaried state officer or employee or state officer or employee who is subject to the provisions of section seventy-three-a of this chapter does not share in the net revenues, as defined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles by the state ethics commission or by the legislative ethics committee in relation to persons subject to their respective jurisdictions, resulting therefrom, or, acting in good faith, reasonably believed that he or she would not share in the net revenues as so defined.
11. Notwithstanding any provision of the judiciary law, the education law or any other law or disciplinary rule to the contrary:
(a) Conduct authorized pursuant to subdivision eight of this section by a person who has served as a member of the legislature or as a legislative employee shall not constitute professional misconduct or grounds for disciplinary action of any kind;
(b) No member of the legislature or former member of the legislature shall be prohibited from appearing, practicing, communicating or otherwise rendering services in relation to any matter before, or transacting business with, any state agency solely by reason of any vote or other action by such member or former member in respect to the confirmation or election of any member, commissioner, director or other person affiliated with such state agency, but nothing in this paragraph shall limit the prohibition contained in subdivision eight of this section;
(c) The appearance, practice, communication or rendition of services in relation to any matter before, or transaction of business with a state agency, or with the court of claims, or the promotion or opposition to the passage of bills or resolutions by either house of the legislature, by a member, associate, retired member, of counsel or shareholder of a firm, association or corporation, in accordance with subdivision ten of this section, is hereby authorized and shall not constitute professional misconduct or grounds for disciplinary action of any kind solely by reason of the professional relationship between the statewide elected official, state officer or employee, political party chairman, member of the legislature, or legislative employee and any firm, association, corporation or any member, associate, retired member, of counsel, or shareholder thereof, or by reason of the appearance created by any such professional relationship.
12. A statewide elected official, state officer or employee, or a member of the legislature or legislative employee, or political party chairman, who is a member, associate, retired member, of counsel to, or shareholder of any firm, association or corporation which is appearing or rendering services in connection with any case, proceeding, application or other matter listed in paragraph (a) or (b) of subdivision seven of this section shall not orally communicate, with or without compensation, as to the merits of such cause with an officer or an employee of the agency concerned with the matter.
13. For the purposes of this section, a statewide elected official or state officer or employee or member of the legislature or legislative employee or political party chairman who is a member, associate, retired member, of counsel to, or shareholder of any firm, association or corporation shall not be deemed to have made an appearance under the provisions of this section solely by the submission to a state agency or city agency of any printed material or document bearing his or her name, but unsigned by him or her, such as by limited illustrations the name of the firm, association or corporation or the letterhead of any stationery, which pro forma serves only as an indication that he or she is such a member, associate, retired member, of counsel to, or shareholder.
14. In addition to any penalty contained in any other provision of law, any person who knowingly and intentionally violates the provisions of subdivisions two through five or subdivision seven, eight or twelve of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars. Assessment of a civil penalty hereunder shall be made by the state ethics commission or the legislative ethics committee, as the case may be, with respect to persons subject to their respective jurisdictions. The state ethics commission acting pursuant to subdivision thirteen of section ninety-four of the executive law, or the legislative ethics committee acting pursuant to subdivision twelve of section eighty of the legislative law, as the case may be, may, in lieu of a civil penalty, with respect to a violation of subdivisions two through five or subdivision seven or eight of this section, refer a violation of any such subdivision to the appropriate prosecutor and upon such conviction, but only after such referral, such violation shall be punishable as a class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
Sec. 74. Code of ethics. 1. Definition. As used in this section: The term "state agency" shall mean any state department, or division, board, commission, or bureau of any state department or any public benefit corporation or public authority at least one of whose members is appointed by the governor.
The term "legislative employee" shall mean any officer or employee of the legislature but it shall not include members of the legislature.
2. Rule with respect to conflicts of interest. No officer or employee of a state agency, member of the legislature or legislative employee should have any interest, financial or otherwise, direct or indirect, or engage in any business or transaction or professional activity or incur any obligation of any nature, which is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his duties in the public interest.
3. Standards.
a. No officer or employee of a state agency, member of the legislature or legislative employee should accept other employment which will impair his independence of judgment in the exercise of his official duties.
b. No officer or employee of a state agency, member of the legislature or legislative employee should accept employment or engage in any business or professional activity which will require him to disclose confidential information which he has gained by reason of his official position or authority.
c. No officer or employee of a state agency, member of the legislature or legislative employee should disclose confidential information acquired by him in the course of his official duties nor use such information to further his personal interests.
d. No officer or employee of a state agency, member of the legislature or legislative employee should use or attempt to use his official position to secure unwarranted privileges or exemptions for himself or others.
e. No officer or employee of a state agency, member of the legislature or legislative employee should engage in any transaction as representative or agent of the state with any business entity in which he has a direct or indirect financial interest that might reasonably tend to conflict with the proper discharge of his official duties.
f. An officer or employee of a state agency, member of the legislature or legislative employee should not by his conduct give reasonable basis for the impression that any person can improperly influence him or unduly enjoy his favor in the performance of his official duties, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, position or influence of any party or person.
g. An officer or employee of a state agency should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which he has reason to believe may be directly involved in decisions to be made by him or which will otherwise create substantial conflict between his duty in the public interest and his private interest.
h. An officer or employee of a state agency, member of the legislature or legislative employee should endeavor to pursue a course of conduct which will not raise suspicion among the public that he is likely to be engaged in acts that are in violation of his trust.
j. If any officer or employee of a state agency shall have a financial interest, direct or indirect, having a value of ten thousand dollars or more in any activity which is subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency, he should file with the secretary of state a written statement that he has such a financial interest in such activity which statement shall be open to public inspection.
4. Violations. In addition to any penalty contained in any other provision of law any such officer, member or employee who shall knowingly and intentionally violate any of the provisions of this section may be fined, suspended or removed from office or employment in the manner provided by law.
WHEREFORE,
3. NEW YORK STATE CONSOLIDATED LAWS TITLE X ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT ARTICLE 460 ENTERPRISE CORRUPTION
Defendants have violated the following laws of the State of New York under Sections;
i. 460.00 Legislative findings.
ii. 460.10 Definitions.
iii. 460.20 Enterprise corruption.
iv. 460.25 Enterprise corruption; limitations.
v. 460.30 Enterprise corruption; forfeiture.
vi. 460.40 Enterprise corruption; jurisdiction.
vii. 460.50 Enterprise corruption; prosecution.
viii. 460.60 Enterprise corruption; consent to prosecute.
ix. 460.70 Provisional remedies.
x. 460.80 Court ordered disclosure.
xi. S 460.00 Legislative findings.
That organized crime in New York state involves highly sophisticated, complex and widespread forms of criminal activity. The diversified illegal conduct engaged in by organized crime, rooted in the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption, constitutes a major drain upon the state's economy, costs citizens and businesses of the state billions of dollars each year, and threatens the peace, security and general welfare of the people of the state.
That organized crime continues to expand its corrosive influence in the state through illegal enterprises engaged in such criminal endeavors as the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, arson for profit, hijacking, labor racketeering, loansharking, extortion and bribery, the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes, syndicated gambling, trafficking in stolen securities, insurance and investment frauds, and other forms of economic and social exploitation.
That the money and power derived by organized crime through its illegal enterprises and endeavors is increasingly being used to infiltrate and corrupt businesses, unions and other legitimate enterprises and to corrupt our democratic processes. This infiltration takes several forms with legitimate enterprises being employed as instrumentalities, injured as victims, or taken as prizes. Through such infiltration the power of an enterprise can be diverted to criminal ends, its resources looted, or it can be taken over entirely, either on paper or de facto. Thus, for purposes of making both criminal and civil remedies available to deal with the corruption of such enterprises, the concept of criminal enterprise should not be limited to traditional criminal syndicates or crime families, and may include persons who join together in a criminal enterprise, as defined by subdivision three of section 460.10 of this article, for the purpose of corrupting such legitimate enterprises or infiltrating and illicitly influencing industries.
That one major cause of the continuing growth of organized criminal activities within the state is the inadequacy and limited nature of sanctions and remedies available to state and local law enforcement officials to deal with this intricate and varied criminal conduct.
That existing penal law provisions are primarily concerned with the commission of specific and limited criminal acts without regard to the relationships of particular criminal acts or the illegal profits derived therefrom, to legitimate or illicit enterprises operated or controlled by organized crime. Further, traditional penal law provisions only provide for the imposition of conventional criminal penalties, including imprisonment, fines and probation, for entrenched organized crime enterprises. Such penalties are not adequate to enable the state to effectively fight organized crime. Instead, new penal prohibitions and enhanced sanctions, and new civil and criminal remedies are necessary to deal with the unlawful activities of persons and enterprises engaged in organized crime. Comprehensive statutes enacted at the federal level and in a number of other states with significant organized crime problems, have provided law enforcement agencies with an effective tool to fight organized crime. Such laws permit law enforcement authorities:
(i) to charge and prove patterns of criminal activity and their connection to ongoing enterprises, legitimate or illegal, that are controlled or operated by organized crime, and
(ii) to apply criminal and civil penalties designed to prevent and eliminate organized crime's involvement with such enterprises. The organized crime control act is a statute of comparable purpose but tempered by reasonable limitations on its applicability, and by due regard for the rights of innocent persons. Because of its more rigorous definitions, this act will not apply to some situations encompassed within comparable statutes in other jurisdictions. This act is vital to the peace, security and general welfare of the state. In part because of its highly diverse nature, it is impossible to precisely define what organized crime is. This article, however, does attempt to define and criminalize what organized crime does. This article focuses upon criminal enterprises because their sophistication and organization make them more effective at their criminal purposes and because their structure and insulation protect their leadership from detection and prosecution. At the same time, this article is not intended to be employed to prosecute relatively minor or isolated acts of criminality which, while related to an enterprise and arguably part of a pattern as defined in this article, can be adequately and more fairly prosecuted as separate offenses. Similarly, particular defendants may play so minor a role in a criminal enterprise that their culpability would be unfairly distorted by prosecution and punishment for participation in the enterprise. The balance intended to be struck by this act cannot readily be codified in the form of restrictive definitions or a categorical list of exceptions. General, yet carefully drawn definitions of the terms "pattern of criminal activity" and "criminal enterprise" have been employed. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 5.00 of this chapter these definitions should be given their plain meaning, and should not be construed either liberally or strictly, but in the context of the legislative purposes set forth in these findings. Within the confines of these and other applicable definitions, discretion ought still be exercised. Once the letter of the law is complied with, including the essential showing that there is a pattern of conduct which is criminal under existing statutes, the question whether to prosecute under those statutes or for the pattern itself is essentially one of fairness. The answer will depend on the particular situation, and is best addressed by those institutions of government which have traditionally exercised that function: the grand jury, the public prosecutor, and an independent judiciary.
The following definitions are applicable to this article.
1. "Criminal act" means conduct constituting any of the following crimes, or conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the following felonies:
(a) Any of the felonies set forth in this chapter: sections 120.05, 120.10 and 120.11 relating to assault; sections 125.10 to 125.27 relating to homicide; sections 130.25, 130.30 and 130.35 relating to rape; sections 135.20 and 135.25 relating to kidnapping; section 135.65 relating to coercion; sections 140.20, 140.25 and 140.30 relating to burglary; sections 145.05, 145.10 and 145.12 relating to criminal mischief; article one hundred fifty relating to arson; sections 155.30, 155.35, 155.40 and 155.42 relating to grand larceny; article one hundred sixty relating to robbery; sections 165.45, 165.50, 165.52 and 165.54 relating to criminal possession of stolen property; sections 170.10, 170.15, 170.25, 170.30, 170.40, 170.65 and 170.70 relating to forgery; sections 175.10, 175.25, 175.35, 175.40 and 210.40 relating to false statements; sections 176.15, 176.20, 176.25 and 176.30 relating to insurance fraud; sections 178.20 and 178.25 relating to criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions; sections 180.03, 180.08, 180.15, 180.25, 180.40, 180.45, 200.00, 200.03, 200.04, 200.10, 200.11, 200.12, 200.20, 200.22, 200.25, 200.27, 215.00, 215.05 and 215.19 relating to bribery; sections 190.40 and 190.42 relating to criminal usury; section 190.65 relating to schemes to defraud; sections 205.60 and 205.65 relating to hindering prosecution; sections 210.10, 210.15, and 215.51 relating to perjury and contempt; section 215.40 relating to tampering with physical evidence; sections 220.06, 220.09, 220.16, 220.18, 220.21, 220.31, 220.34, 220.39, 220.41, 220.43, 220.46, 220.55 and 220.60 relating to controlled substances; sections 225.10 and 225.20 relating to gambling; sections 230.25, 230.30, and 230.32 relating to promoting prostitution; sections 235.06, 235.07 and 235.21 relating to obscenity; section 263.10 relating to promoting an obscene performance by a child; sections 265.02, 265.03, 265.04, 265.11, 265.12, 265.13 and the provisions of section 265.10 which constitute a felony relating to firearms and other dangerous weapons; and sections 265.14 and 265.16 relating to criminal sale of a firearm; and section 275.10, 275.20, 275.30, or 275.40 relating to unauthorized recordings; and sections 470.05, 470.10, 470.15 and 470.20 relating to money laundering;
or
(b) Any felony set forth elsewhere in the laws of this state and defined by the tax law relating to alcoholic beverage, cigarette, gasoline and similar motor fuel taxes; title seventy-one of the environmental conservation law relating to water pollution, hazardous waste or substances hazardous or acutely hazardous to public health or safety of the environment; article twenty-three-a of the general business law relating to prohibited acts concerning stocks, bonds and other securities or article twenty-two of the general business law concerning monopolies.
2. "Enterprise" means either an enterprise as defined in subdivision one of section 175.00 of this chapter or criminal enterprise as defined in subdivision three of this section.
3. "Criminal enterprise" means a group of persons sharing a common purpose of engaging in criminal conduct, associated in an ascertainable structure distinct from a pattern of criminal activity, and with a continuity of existence, structure and criminal purpose beyond the scope of individual criminal incidents.
4. "Pattern of criminal activity" means conduct engaged in by persons charged in an enterprise corruption count constituting three or more criminal acts that:
(a) were committed within ten years of the commencement of the criminal action;
(b) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and connected in point of time or circumstance of commission as to constitute a criminal offense or criminal transaction, as those terms are defined in section 40.10 of the criminal procedure law; and
(c) are either: (i) related to one another through a common scheme or plan or (ii) were committed, solicited, requested, importuned or intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof and associated with or in the criminal enterprise.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
1. A person is guilty of enterprise corruption when, having knowledge of the existence of a criminal enterprise and the nature of its activities, and being employed by or associated with such enterprise, he:
(a) intentionally conducts or participates in the affairs of an enterprise by participating in a pattern of criminal activity; or
(b) intentionally acquires or maintains any interest in or control of an enterprise by participating in a pattern of criminal activity; or
(c) participates in a pattern of criminal activity and knowingly invests any proceeds derived from that conduct, or any proceeds derived from the investment or use of those proceeds, in an enterprise.
2. For purposes of this section, a person participates in a pattern of criminal activity when, with intent to participate in or advance the affairs of the criminal enterprise, he engages in conduct constituting, or, is criminally liable for pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter, at least three of the criminal acts included in the pattern, provided that:
(a) Two of his acts are felonies other than conspiracy;
(b) Two of his acts, one of which is a felony, occurred within five years of the commencement of the criminal action; and
(c) Each of his acts occurred within three years of a prior act.
1. For purposes of this section, the enterprise corrupted in violation of subdivision one of this section need not be the criminal enterprise by which the person is employed or with which he is associated, and may be a legitimate enterprise.
Enterprise corruption is a class B felony.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
1. For purposes of subdivision one of section 460.20 of this article, a person does not acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise by participating in a pattern of criminal activity when he invests proceeds derived from a pattern of criminal activity in such enterprise.
2. For purposes of subdivision one of section 460.20 of this article, it shall not be unlawful to:
(a) purchase securities on the open market with intent to make an investment, and without the intent of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of criminal activity do not amount in the aggregate to five percent of the outstanding securities of any one class and do not confer, either in the law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer;
(b) make a deposit in an account maintained in a savings and loan association, or a deposit in any other such financial institution, that creates an ownership interest in that association or institution;
(c) purchase shares in co-operatively owned residential or commercial property;
(d) purchase non-voting shares in a limited partnership, with intent to make an investment, and without the intent of controlling or participating in the control of the partnership.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
1. Any person convicted of enterprise corruption may be required pursuant to this section to criminally forfeit to the state:
(a) any interest in, security of, claim against or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise whose affairs he has controlled or in which he has participated in violation of subdivision one of section 460.20 of this article and for which he was convicted and the use of which interest, security, claim or right by him contributed directly and materially to the crime for which he was convicted unless such forfeiture is disproportionate to the defendant's gain from his association or employment with the enterprise, in which event the jury may recommend forfeiture of a portion thereof;
(b) any interest, including proceeds, he has acquired or maintained in an enterprise in violation of subdivision one of section 460.20 of this article and for which he was convicted unless such forfeiture is disproportionate to the conduct he engaged in and on which the forfeiture is based, in which event the jury may recommend forfeiture of a portion thereof; or
(c) any interest, including proceeds he has derived from an investment of proceeds in an enterprise in violation of subdivision one of section 460.20 of this article and for which he was convicted unless such forfeiture is disproportionate to the conduct he engaged in and on which the forfeiture is based, in which event the jury may recommend forfeiture of a portion thereof.
2. (a) Forfeiture may be ordered when the grand jury returning an indictment charging a person with enterprise corruption has received evidence legally sufficient to establish, and providing reasonable cause to believe, that the property or other interest is subject to forfeiture under this section. In that event, the grand jury shall file a special information, not to be disclosed to the jury in the criminal action prior to verdict on the criminal charges, specifying the property or other interest for which forfeiture is sought and containing a plain and concise factual statement which sets forth the basis for the forfeiture.
Alternatively, where the defendant has waived indictment and consented to be prosecuted by superior court information pursuant to article one hundred ninety-five of the criminal procedure law, the prosecutor may file, in addition to the superior court information charging enterprise corruption, a special information specifying the property or other interest for which forfeiture is sought and containing a plain and concise factual statement which sets forth the basis for the forfeiture.
(b) After returning a verdict of guilty on an enterprise corruption count or counts, the jury shall be given the special information and hear any additional evidence which is relevant and legally admissible upon the forfeiture count or counts of the special information. After hearing such evidence, the jury shall then deliberate upon the forfeiture count or counts and, based upon all the evidence received in connection with the indictment or superior court information and the special information, may, if satisfied by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the property or other interest, or a portion thereof, is subject to forfeiture under this section return a verdict determining such property or other interest, or portion thereof, is subject to forfeiture, provided, however, where a defendant has waived a jury trial pursuant to article three hundred twenty of the criminal procedure law, the court may hear and receive all of the evidence upon the indictment or superior court information and the special information and render a verdict upon the enterprise corruption count or counts and the forfeiture count or counts.
(c) After the verdict of forfeiture, the court shall hear arguments and may receive additional evidence upon a motion of the defendant that the verdict of forfeiture (i) is against the weight of the evidence, or (ii) is, with respect to a forfeiture pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision one of this section, disproportionate to the defendant's gain from his association or employment with the enterprise, or, with respect to a forfeiture pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c) of subdivision one of this section, disproportionate to the conduct he engaged in on which the forfeiture is based. Upon such a finding the court may in the interests of justice set aside, modify, limit or otherwise condition an order of forfeiture.
3. (a) An order of criminal forfeiture shall authorize the prosecutor to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is not exercisable or transferable for value by the prosecutor, it shall expire and shall not revert to the convicted person. The court ordering any forfeiture may remit such forfeiture or any portion thereof. (b) No person shall forfeit any right, title or interest in any property or enterprise under this article who has not been convicted of a violation of section 460.20 of this article. Any person other than the convicted person claiming an interest in forfeited property or other interest may bring a special proceeding to determine that claim, before or after trial, pursuant to section thirteen hundred twenty-seven of the civil practice law and rules, provided, however, that if such an action is brought before trial, it may, upon motion of the prosecutor, and in the court's discretion, be postponed by the court until completion of the trial. In addition, any person claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture may petition for remission as provided in subdivision seven of section thirteen hundred eleven of such law and rules.
4. All property and other interests which are criminally forfeited following the commencement of an action under this article, whether by plea, verdict or other agreement, shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of section thirteen hundred forty-nine of the civil practice law and rules. In any case where one or more of the counts upon which a person is convicted specifically includes as a criminal act a violation of any offense defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter, the court shall determine what portion of that property or interest derives from or relates to such criminal act, and direct that distribution of that portion be conducted in the manner prescribed for actions grounded upon offenses in violation of article two hundred twenty.
5. Any person convicted of a violation of section 460.20 of this article through which he derived pecuniary value, or by which he caused personal injury or property damage or other loss, may be sentenced to pay a fine not in excess of three times the gross value he gained or three times the gross loss he caused, whichever is greater. Moneys so collected shall be paid as restitution to victims of the crime for medical expenses actually incurred, loss of earnings or property loss or damage caused thereby. Any excess after restitution shall be paid to the state treasury. In any case where one or more of the counts upon which a person is convicted specifically includes as a criminal act a violation of any offense defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter, the court shall determine what proportion of the entire pattern such criminal acts constitute and distribute such portion in the manner prescribed by section three hundred forty-nine of the civil practice law and rules for forfeiture actions grounded upon offenses in violation of article two hundred twenty. When the court imposes a fine pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the gross value gained or the gross loss caused. If the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. In imposing a fine, the court shall consider the seriousness of the conduct, whether the amount of the fine is disproportionate to the conduct in which he engaged, its impact on victims and the enterprise corrupted by that conduct, as well as the economic circumstances of the convicted person, including the effect of the imposition of such a fine upon his immediate family.
6. The imposition of an order of criminal forfeiture pursuant to subdivision one of this section, a judgment of civil forfeiture pursuant to article thirteen-A of the civil practice law and rules, or a fine pursuant to subdivision five of this section or paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 80.00 of this chapter, shall preclude the imposition of any other such order or judgment of forfeiture or fine based upon the same criminal conduct, provided however that where an order of criminal forfeiture is imposed pursuant to subdivision one of this section, an action pursuant to article thirteen-A of the civil practice law and rules may nonetheless be brought, and an order imposed in that action, for forfeiture of the proceeds of a crime or the substituted proceeds of a crime where such proceeds are not subject to criminal forfeiture pursuant to subdivision one of this section. The imposition of a fine pursuant to subdivision five of this section or paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 80.00 of this chapter, shall preclude the imposition of any other fine pursuant to any other provision of this chapter.
7. Other than as provided in subdivision six, the imposition of a criminal penalty, forfeiture or fine under this section shall not preclude the application of any other criminal penalty or civil remedy under this article or under any other provision of law.
8. Any payment made as restitution to victims pursuant to this section shall not limit, preclude or impair any liability for damages in any civil action or proceeding for an amount in excess of such payment.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
A person may be prosecuted for enterprise corruption:
1. in any county in which the principal place of business, if any, of the enterprise was located at the time of the offense, and, if the enterprise had a principal place or business located in more than one county, then in any such county in which any conduct occurred constituting or requisite to the completion of the offense of enterprise corruption; or
2. in any county in which any act included in the pattern of criminal activity could have been prosecuted pursuant to article twenty of the criminal procedure law; provided, however, that such person may not be prosecuted for enterprise corruption in such county based on this subdivision if the jurisdiction of such county is based solely on section 20.60 of the criminal procedure law; or
3. in any county in which he:
(a) conducts or participates in the affairs of the enterprise in violation of subdivision one of section 460.20 of this article, (b) acquires or maintains an interest in or control of the enterprise in violation of subdivision one of section 460.20 of this article, (c) invests proceeds in an enterprise in violation of subdivision one of section 460.20 of this article; or
4. in any county in which the conduct of the actor had or was likely to have a particular effect upon such county or a political subdivision or part thereof, and was performed with intent that it would, or with knowledge that it was likely to, have such particular effect therein.
Iviewit cites;
Whereby:
1. Subject to the provisions of section 460.60 of this article, a charge of enterprise corruption may be prosecuted by: (a) the district attorney of any county with jurisdiction over the offense pursuant to section 460.40 of this article; (b) the deputy attorney general in charge of the statewide organized crime task force when authorized by subdivision seven of section seventy-a of the executive law; or (c) the attorney general when he is otherwise authorized by law to prosecute each of the criminal acts specifically included in the pattern of criminal activity alleged in the enterprise corruption charge.
2. For purposes of paragraph (c) of subdivision one of this section, a criminal act or an offense is specifically included in a pattern of criminal activity when the count of the accusatory instrument charging a person with enterprise corruption alleges a pattern of criminal activity and the act is alleged to be a criminal act within the pattern of criminal activity.
Iviewit cites;
1. For purposes of this section, when a grand jury proceeding concerns a possible charge of enterprise corruption, or when an accusatory instrument includes a count charging a person with enterprise corruption, the affected district attorneys are the district attorneys otherwise empowered to prosecute any of the underlying acts of criminal activity in a county with jurisdiction over the offense of enterprise corruption pursuant to section 460.40 of this article, in which:
(a) there has been substantial and significant activity by the particular enterprise; or
(b) conduct occurred constituting a criminal act specifically included in the pattern of criminal activity charged in the accusatory instrument and not previously prosecuted; or
(c) the particular enterprise has its principal place of business.
2. A grand jury proceeding concerning a possible charge of enterprise corruption may be instituted only with the consent of the affected district attorneys. Should the possibility of such a charge develop after a grand jury proceeding has been instituted, the consent of the affected district attorneys shall be sought as soon as is practical, and an indictment charging a person with enterprise corruption may not be voted upon by the grand jury without such consent.
3. A person may be charged in an accusatory instrument with enterprise corruption only with the consent of the affected district attorneys. When it is impractical to obtain the consent specified in subdivision two of this section prior to the filing of the accusatory instrument, then that consent must be secured within twenty days thereafter.
4. When the prosecutor is the deputy attorney general in charge of the statewide organized crime task force, the consent required by subdivisions two and three of this section shall be in addition to that required by subdivision seven of section seventy-a of the executive law.
5. Within fifteen days after the arraignment of any person on an indictment charging a person with the crime of enterprise corruption the prosecutor shall provide a copy of the indictment to those district attorneys whose consent was required pursuant to subdivision three of this section, and shall notify the court and defendant of those district attorneys whose consent the prosecutor has secured. The court shall then review the indictment and the grand jury minutes, notify any district attorney whose consent under subdivision one of this section should have been but was not obtained, direct that the prosecutor provide that district attorney with the portion of the indictment and grand jury minutes that are relevant to a determination whether that district attorney is an "affected district attorney" within the meaning of subdivision one of this section.
6. The failure to obtain from any district attorney the consent required by subdivision two or three of this section shall not be grounds for dismissal of the accusatory instrument or for any other relief upon motion of a defendant in the criminal action. Upon motion of a district attorney whose consent, pursuant to subdivision three of this section, the court determines was required but not obtained, the court may not dismiss the accusatory instrument or any count thereof but may grant any appropriate relief. Such relief may include, but is not limited to:
(a) ordering that any money forfeited by a defendant in the criminal action, or the proceeds from the sale of any other property forfeited in the criminal action by a defendant, which would have been paid to the county of that district attorney pursuant to section thirteen hundred forty-nine of the civil practice law and rules had the forfeiture action been prosecuted in the county of that district attorney, be paid in whole or in part to the county of that district attorney; or (b) upon consent of the defendant, ordering the transfer of the prosecution, or any part thereof, to that district attorney or to any other prosecutor with jurisdiction over the prosecution, of the part thereof to be transferred. However, prior to ordering any transfer of the prosecution, the court shall provide to those district attorneys who have previously consented to the prosecution an opportunity to intervene and be heard concerning such transfer.
7. A district attorney whose consent, pursuant to subdivision three of this section, the court determines was required but not obtained may seek the relief described in subdivision six of this section exclusively by a pre-trial motion in the criminal action based on the indictment charging the crime of enterprise corruption. Such relief must be sought within forty-five days of the receipt of notice from the court pursuant to subdivision five of this section.
Iviewit prays for;
Wherefore:
1. The provisional remedies authorized by article thirteen-A of the civil practice law and rules shall be available in all criminal actions in which criminal forfeiture or a fine pursuant to section 460.60 is sought to the extent and under the same terms and conditions as provided in article thirteen-A of such law and rules.
2. Upon the filing of an indictment and special information seeking criminal forfeiture under this article all further proceedings with respect to provisional remedies shall be heard by the judge or justice in the criminal part to which the indictment and special information are assigned.
3. For purposes of this section, the indictment and special information seeking criminal forfeiture shall constitute the summons and complaint referred to in article thirteen-A of the civil practice law and rules.
Iviewit prays for;
Notwithstanding the provisions of article two hundred forty of the criminal procedure law, when forfeiture is sought pursuant to section 460.30 of this chapter, the court may order discovery of any property not otherwise disclosed which is material and reasonably necessary for preparation by the defendant with respect to the forfeiture proceeding pursuant to such section. The court may issue a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning, delaying or regulating such discovery where a danger to the integrity of physical evidence or a substantial risk of physical harm, intimidation, economic reprisal, bribery or unjustified annoyance or embarrassment to any person or an adverse effect upon the legitimate needs of law enforcement, including the protection of the confidentiality of informants, or any other factor or set of factors outweighs the usefulness of the discovery.
4. State of New York Trademark Laws
Defendants have violated the following New York laws;
360 - Definitions. 360-A - Registrability. 360-B - Application for registration. 360-C - Filing of applications. 360-D - Certificate of registration. 360-E - Duration and renewal. 360-F - Assignments, changes of name and other instruments. 360-G - Records. 360-H - Cancellation. 360-I - Classification. 360-J - Fraudulent registration. 360-K - Infringement. 360-L - Injury to business reputation; dilution. 360-M - Remedies. 360-N - Forum for actions regarding registration; service on out of state registrants. 360-O - Common law rights. 360-P - Fees. 360-Q - Rules and regulations. 360-R - Severability.
(a) The term "trademark" as used herein means any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof used by a person to identify and distinguish the goods of such person, including a unique product, from those manufactured and sold by others, and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
(b) The term "service mark" as used herein means any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof used by a person to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of others, and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names used by a person, and other distinctive features of radio or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor.
(c) The term "mark" as used herein includes any trademark or service mark, entitled to registration under this article whether registered or not.
(d) The term "trade name" means any name used by a person to identify a business or vocation of such person.
(e) The term "person" and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other party entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this article includes a juristic person as well as a natural person. The term "juristic person" includes a firm, partnership, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of law.
(f) The term "applicant" as used herein embraces the person filing an application for registration of a mark under this article, and the legal representatives, successors, or assigns of such person.
(g) The term "registrant" as used herein embraces the person to whom the registration of a mark under this article is issued, and the legal representatives, successors, or assigns of such person.
(h) The term "use" means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For the purposes of this article, a mark shall be deemed to be in use
(1) on goods when it is placed in any manner on the goods or other containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and the goods are sold or transported in commerce in this state, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in this state.
(i) A mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" when either of the following occurs:
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for two consecutive years shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment.
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to lose its significance as a mark.
(j) The term "secretary" as used herein means the secretary of the state or the designee of the secretary.
A mark by which the goods or services of any applicant for registration may be distinguished from the goods or services of others shall not be registered if it:
(a) consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive or scandalous matter; or
(b) consists of or comprises matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute; or
(c) consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any state or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof; or
(d) consists of or comprises the name, signature or portrait identifying a particular living individual, except by the individual's written consent; or
(e) consists of a mark which,
(1) when used on or in connection with the goods or services of the applicant, is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, or
(2) when used on or in connection with the goods or services of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, or
(3) is primarily merely a surname, provided, however, that nothing in this subdivision shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods or services. The secretary may accept as evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant's goods or services, proof of continuous use thereof as a mark by, the applicant in this state for the five years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made; or
(f) consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in this state or a mark or trade name previously used by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
Subject to the limitations set forth in this article, any person who uses a mark may file in the office of the secretary, in a manner complying with the requirements of the secretary, an application for registration of that mark setting forth, but not limited to, the following information:
(a) the name and business address of the person applying for such registration; and, if a corporation, the state of incorporation, or if a partnership, the state in which the partnership is organized and the names of the general partners, as specified by the secretary,
(b) the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used and the mode or manner in which the mark is used on or in connection with such goods or services and the class in which such goods or services fall,
(c) the date when the mark was first used anywhere and the date when it was first used in this state by the applicant or a predecessor in interest, and
(d) a statement that the applicant is the owner of the mark, that the mark is in use, and that, to the knowledge of the person verifying the application, no other person has registered, either federally or in this state, or has the right to use such mark either in the identical form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when applied to the goods or services of such other person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. The secretary may also require a statement as to whether an application to register the mark, or portions or a composite thereof, has been filed by the applicant or a predecessor in interest in the United States Patent and Trademark Office; and, if so, the applicant shall provide full particulars with respect thereto including the filing date and serial number of each application, the status thereof and, if any application was finally refused registration or has otherwise not resulted in a registration, the reasons therefor. The secretary may also require that a drawing of the mark, complying with such requirements as the secretary may specify, accompany the application. The application shall be signed and verified by oath, affirmation or declaration subject to perjury laws by the applicant or by a member of the firm or an officer of the corporation or association applying. The application shall be accompanied by three specimens showing the mark as actually used. The application shall be accompanied by the application fee payable to the secretary of state.
(a) Upon the filing of an application for registration and payment of the application fee, the secretary may cause the application to be examined for conformity with this article.
(b) The applicant shall provide any additional pertinent information requested by the secretary including a description of a design mark and may make, or authorize the secretary to make, such amendments to the application as may be reasonably requested by the secretary or deemed by the applicant to be advisable to respond to any rejection or objection.
(c) The secretary may require the applicant to disclaim an unregistrable component of a mark otherwise registrable, and an applicant may voluntarily disclaim a component of a mark sought to be registered. No disclaimer shall prejudice or affect the applicant's or registrant's rights then existing or thereafter arising in the disclaimed matter, or the applicant's or registrant's rights of registration on another application if the disclaimed matter be or shall have become distinctive of the applicant's or registrant's goods or services.
(d) Amendments may be made by the secretary upon the application submitted by the applicant upon applicant's agreement; or a fresh application may be required to be submitted.
(e) If the applicant is found not to be entitled to registration, the secretary shall advise the applicant thereof and of the reasons therefor. The applicant shall have a reasonable period of time specified by the secretary in which to reply or to amend the application, in which event the application shall then be reexamined. This procedure may be repeated until
(1) the secretary finally refuses registration of the mark or
(2) the applicant fails to reply or amend within the specified period, whereupon the application shall be deemed to have been abandoned.
(f) If the secretary finally refuses registration of the mark, the applicant may commence a proceeding pursuant to article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules for an order to compel such registration. Such writ may be granted, but without costs to the secretary, on proof that all the statements in the application are true and that the mark is otherwise entitled to registration.
(g) In the instance of applications concurrently being processed by the secretary seeking registration of the same or confusingly similar marks for the same or related goods or services, the secretary shall grant priority to the applications in order of filing. If a prior-filed application is granted a registration, the other application or applications shall then be rejected. Any rejected applicant may bring an action for cancellation of the registration upon grounds of prior or superior rights to the mark, in accordance with the provisions of this article.
Upon compliance by the applicant with the requirements of this article, the secretary shall cause a certificate of registration to be issued and delivered to the applicant. The certificate of registration shall be issued under the signature of the secretary and the seal of the state, and it shall show the name and business address and, if a corporation, the state of incorporation, or if a partnership, the state in which the partnership is organized and the names of the general partners, as specified by the secretary, of the person claiming ownership of the mark, the date claimed for the first use of the mark anywhere and the date claimed for the first use of the mark in this state, the class of goods or services and a description of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used, a reproduction of the mark, the registration date and the term of the registration. Any certificate of registration issued by the secretary under the provisions hereof or a copy thereof duly certified by the secretary shall be admissible in evidence as competent and sufficient proof of the registration of such mark in any actions or judicial proceedings in any court of this state.
A registration of mark hereunder shall be effective for a term of ten years from the date of registration and, upon application filed within six months prior to the expiration of such term, in a manner complying with the requirements of the secretary, the registration may be renewed for a like term from the end of the expiring term. A renewal fee, payable to the secretary, shall accompany the application for renewal of the registration. A registration may be renewed for successive periods of ten years in like manner. Any registration in force on the date on which this article shall become effective shall continue in full force and effect for the unexpired term thereof and may be renewed by filing an application for renewal with the secretary complying with the requirements of the secretary and paying the aforementioned renewal fee therefor within six months prior to the expiration of the registration. All applications for renewal under this article, whether of registrations made under this article or of registrations effected under any prior law, shall include a verified statement that the mark has been and is still in use and include a specimen showing actual use of the mark on or in connection with the goods or services.
(a) Any mark and its registration hereunder shall be assignable with the good will of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of the good will of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark. Assignment shall be by instruments in writing duly executed and may be recorded with the secretary upon the payment of the recording fee payable to the secretary who, upon recording of the assignment, shall issue in the name of the assignee a new certificate for the remainder of the term of the registration or of the last renewal thereof. An assignment of any registration under this article shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, unless it is recorded with the secretary within three months after the date thereof or prior to such subsequent purchase.
(b) Any registrant or applicant effecting a change of the name of the person to whom the mark was issued or for whom an application was filed may record a certificate of change of name of the registrant or applicant with the secretary upon the payment of the recording fee. The secretary may issue in the name of the assignee a certificate of registration of an assigned application. The secretary may issue in the name of the assignee, a new certificate or registration for the remainder of the term of the registration or last renewal thereof.
(c) Other instruments which relate to a mark registered or application pending pursuant to this article, such as, by way of example, licenses, security interests or mortgages, may be recorded in the discretion of the secretary, provided that such instrument is in writing and duly executed.
(d) Acknowledgement shall be prima facie evidence of the execution of an assignment or other instrument and, when recorded by the secretary, the record shall be prima facie evidence of execution.
(e) A photocopy of any instrument referred to in subdivision (a), (b) or (c) of this section, shall be accepted for recording if it is certified by any of the parties thereto, or their successors, to be a true and correct copy of the original.
The secretary shall keep for public examination a record of all marks registered or renewed under this article, as well as a record of all documents recorded pursuant to section three hundred sixty-f of this article.
The secretary shall cancel from the register, in whole or in part:
(a) any registration concerning which the secretary shall receive a voluntary request for cancellation thereof from the registrant or the assignee of record;
(b) all registrations granted under this article and not renewed in accordance with the provisions hereof;
(c) any registration concerning which a court of competent jurisdiction shall find:
(1) that the registered mark has been abandoned,
(2) that the registrant is not the owner of the mark,
(3) that the registration was granted improperly,
(4) that the registration was obtained fraudulently,
(5) that the mark is or has become the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it has been registered,
(6) that the registered mark is so similar, as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive, to a mark registered by another person in the United States Patent and Trademark Office prior to the date of the filing of the application for registration by the registrant hereunder, and not abandoned; provided, however, that, should the registrant prove that the registrant is the owner of a concurrent registration of a mark in the United States Patent and Trademark Office covering an area including this state, the registration hereunder shall not be cancelled for such area of the state, or
(d) when a court of competent jurisdiction shall order cancellation of a registration on any ground.
The secretary shall by regulation establish a classification of goods and services for convenience of administration of this article, but not to limit or extend the applicant's or registrant's rights, and a single application for registration of a mark may include any or all goods upon which, or services with which, the mark is actually being used indicating the appropriate class or classes of goods or services. When a single application includes goods or services which fall within multiple classes, the secretary may require payment of a fee for each class. To the extent practical, the classification of goods and services should conform to the classification adopted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, any person who shall for himself or herself, or on behalf of any other person, procure the filing or registration of any mark in the office of the secretary under the provisions hereof, by knowingly making any false or fraudulent representation or declaration, orally or in writing, or by any other fraudulent means, shall be liable to pay all damages sustained in consequence of such filing or registration, to be recovered by or on behalf of the party injured thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
Subject to the provisions of this section, any person who shall: (a) use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a mark registered under this article in connection with the sale, distribution, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive as to the source of origin of such goods or services; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any such mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, or advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with the sale or other distribution in this state of such goods or services; shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for any and all of the remedies provided in section three hundred sixty-l of this article, except that under this subdivision the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with the intent to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark registered or not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
Iviewit prays for;
Whereby, any owner of a mark registered under this article may proceed by suit to enjoin the manufacture, use, display or sale of any counterfeits or imitations thereof and any court of competent jurisdiction may grant injunctions to restrain such manufacture, use, display or sale as may be by the said court deemed just and reasonable, and may require the defendants to pay to such owner all profits derived from and/or all damages suffered by reason of such wrongful manufacture, use, display or sale; and such court may also order that any such counterfeits or imitations in the possession or under the control of any defendant in such case be delivered to an officer of the court, or to the complainant, to be destroyed. The court, in its discretion, may enter judgment for an amount not to exceed three times such profits and damages and/or reasonable attorneys' fees of the prevailing party in such cases where the court finds the other party committed such wrongful acts with knowledge or in bad faith or otherwise as according to the circumstances of this case. The enumeration of any right or remedy herein shall not affect a registrant's right to prosecute under the penal law.
(a) Actions to require cancellation of a mark registered pursuant to this article or in mandamus to compel registration of a mark pursuant to this article shall be brought in the supreme court. In an action in mandamus, the proceeding shall be based solely upon the record before the secretary. In an action for cancellation, the secretary shall not be made a party to the proceeding but shall be notified of the filing of the complaint by the clerk of the court in which it is filed and shall be given the right to intervene in the action.
(b) In any action brought against a non-resident registrant, service may be effected upon the secretary as agent for service of the registrant in accordance with the procedures established for service upon non-resident corporations and business entities.
Nothing herein shall adversely affect the rights or the enforcement of rights in marks acquired in good faith at any time at common law.
§ 360-p. Fees. The application for registration or renewal shall be accompanied by a filing fee or fifty dollars payable to the secretary of state.
The secretary of state may from time to time make regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this article provided, however, that such supplementary regulations shall be strictly limited in their application to the means and methods of compliance with the provisions of this article to which such power relates.
§ 360-r. Severability. If any provision hereof, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this article shall not be affected thereby.
5. NEW YORK STATE CONSOLIDATED LAWS ARTICLE 210 - PERJURY AND RELATED OFFENSES
Defendants have violated;
i. 210.05 Perjury in the third degree.
ii. 210.10 Perjury in the second degree.
iii. 210.15 Perjury in the first degree.
iv. 210.20 Perjury; pleading and proof where inconsistent statements involved.
v. 210.25 Perjury; defense.
vi. 210.30 Perjury; no defense.
vii. 210.35 Making an apparently sworn false statement in the second degree.
viii. 210.40 Making an apparently sworn false statement in the first degree.
ix. 210.45 Making a punishable false written statement.
x. 210.50 Perjury and related offenses; requirement of corroboration.
xi. S 210.00 Perjury and related offenses; definitions of terms.
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. "Oath" includes an affirmation and every other mode authorized by law of attesting to the truth of that which is stated.
2. "Swear" means to state under oath.
3. "Testimony" means an oral statement made under oath in a proceeding before any court, body, agency, public servant or other person authorized by law to conduct such proceeding and to administer the oath or cause it to be administered.
4. "Oath required by law." An affidavit, deposition or other subscribed written instrument is one for which an "oath is required by law" when, absent an oath or swearing thereto, it does not or would not, according to statute or appropriate regulatory provisions, have legal efficacy in a court of law or before any public or governmental body, agency or public servant to whom it is or might be submitted.
5. "Swear falsely." A person "swears falsely" when he intentionally makes a false statement which he does not believe to be true (a) while giving testimony, or (b) under oath in a subscribed written instrument. A false swearing in a subscribed written instrument shall not be deemed complete until the instrument is delivered by its subscriber, or by someone acting in his behalf, to another person with intent that it be uttered or published as true.
6. "Attesting officer" means any notary public or other person authorized by law to administer oaths in connection with affidavits, depositions and other subscribed written instruments, and to certify that the subscriber of such an instrument has appeared before him and has sworn to the truth of the contents thereof.
7. "Jurat" means a clause wherein an attesting officer certifies, among other matters, that the subscriber has appeared before him and sworn to the truth of the contents thereof.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of perjury in the third degree when he swears falsely. Perjury in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of perjury in the second degree when he swears falsely and when his false statement is (a) made in a subscribed written instrument for which an oath is required by law, and (b) made with intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official functions, and (c) material to the action, proceeding or matter involved. Perjury in the second degree is a class E felony.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of perjury in the first degree when he swears falsely and when his false statement (a) consists of testimony, and (b) is material to the action, proceeding or matter in which it is made. Perjury in the first degree is a class D felony.
Defendants have violated;
Where a person has made two statements under oath which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false, where the circumstances are such that each statement, if false, is perjuriously so, and where each statement was made within the jurisdiction of this state and within the period of the statute of limitations for the crime charged, the inability of the people to establish specifically which of the two statements is the false one does not preclude a prosecution for perjury, and such prosecution may be conducted as follows:
1. The indictment or information may set forth the two statements and, without designating either, charge that one of them is false and perjuriously made.
2. The falsity of one or the other of the two statements may be established by proof or a showing of their irreconcilable inconsistency.
3. The highest degree of perjury of which the defendant may be convicted is determined by hypothetically assuming each statement to be false and perjurious. If under such circumstances perjury of the same degree would be established by the making of each statement, the defendant may be convicted of that degree at most. If perjury of different degrees would be established by the making of the two statements, the defendant may be convicted of the lesser degree at most.
In any prosecution for perjury, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant retracted his false statement in the course of the proceeding in which it was made before such false statement substantially affected the proceeding and before it became manifest that its falsity was or would be exposed.
It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury that:
1. The defendant was not competent to make the false statement alleged; or
2. The defendant mistakenly believed the false statement to be immaterial; or
3. The oath was administered or taken in an irregular manner or that the authority or jurisdiction of the attesting officer who administered the oath was defective, if such defect was excusable under any statute or rule of law.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of making an apparently sworn false statement in the second degree when (a) he subscribes a written instrument knowing that it contains a statement which is in fact false and which he does not believe to be true, and (b) he intends or believes that such instrument will be uttered or delivered with a jurat affixed thereto, and (c) such instrument is uttered or delivered with a jurat affixed thereto. Making an apparently sworn false statement in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of making an apparently sworn false statement in the first degree when he commits the crime of making an apparently sworn false statement in the second degree, and when (a) the written instrument involved is one for which an oath is required by law, and (b) the false statement contained therein is made with intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official functions, and (c) such false statement is material to the action, proceeding or matter involved. Making an apparently sworn false statement in the first degree is a class E felony.
Defendants have violated;
A person is guilty of making a punishable false written statement when he knowingly makes a false statement, which he does not believe to be true, in a written instrument bearing a legally authorized form notice to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable. Making a punishable false written statement is a class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
In any prosecution for perjury, except a prosecution based upon inconsistent statements pursuant to section 210.20, or in any prosecution for making an apparently sworn false statement, or making a punishable false written statement, falsity of a statement may not be established by the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness.
I. Florida state crimes
1. FLORIDA CONSPIRACY
Defendants have violated Inventors' constitutional rights under;
Defendants have violated;`
Whereby,
(1) Whenever any person, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of rights secured by the State Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General may bring a civil or administrative action for damages, and for injunctive or other appropriate relief for violations of the rights secured. Any damages recovered under this section shall accrue to the injured person. The civil action shall be brought in the name of the state and may be brought on behalf of the injured person. The Attorney General is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs if the Department of Legal Affairs prevails in an action brought under this section.
(2) Any person who interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of rights secured by the State Constitution or laws of this state is liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. This penalty may be recovered in any action brought under this section by the Attorney General. A civil penalty so collected shall accrue to the state and shall be deposited as received into the General Revenue Fund unallocated.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
It is unlawful for any person:
(1) Who has with criminal intent received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of criminal activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any part of such proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or equity in, real property or in the establishment or operation of any enterprise.
(2) Through a pattern of criminal activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise or real property.
(3) Employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of criminal activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.
(4) To conspire or endeavor to violate any of the provisions of subsection (1), subsection (2), or subsection (3). History.--s. 3, ch. 86-277.
Defendants have violated;
Iviewit or whomever files a civil complaint should have cause under this section.
Plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has been injured by reason of any violation of the provisions of s. 772.103 shall have a cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained and, in any such action, is entitled to minimum damages in the amount of $200, and reasonable attorney's fees and court costs in the trial and appellate courts. In no event shall punitive damages be awarded under this section. The defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and court costs in the trial and appellate courts upon a finding that the claimant raised a claim that was without substantial fact or legal support. In awarding attorney's fees and costs under this section, the court shall not consider the ability of the opposing party to pay such fees and costs. Nothing under this section shall be interpreted as limiting any right to recover attorney's fees or costs provided under other provisions of law.
Defendants have violated;
Iviewit is;
Iviewit or whomever files a civil complaint should have cause under this section.
(1) Any person who proves by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has been injured in any fashion by reason of any violation of ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 825.103.
Wherefore, Iviewit;
(1) has a cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained and, in any such action, is entitled to minimum damages in the amount of $200, and reasonable attorney's fees and court costs in the trial and appellate courts. Before filing an action for damages under this section, the person claiming injury must make a written demand for $200 or the treble damage amount of the person liable for damages under this section. If the person to whom a written demand is made complies with such demand within 30 days after receipt of the demand, that person shall be given a written release from further civil liability for the specific act of theft or exploitation by the person making the written demand.
Defendants have violated;
2. FLORIDA RICO (RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION) ACT
Past history of crimes Utley, Dick & Wheeler
Prior patent misappropriations
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, as used in ss. 895.01-895.08, the term:
ALL CLASS I IN THEFTS OF PATENTS
ATTEMPTING TO BRIBE Employees TO STEAL EQUIPMENT AND THEN STEALING EQUIPMENT
(1) "Racketeering activity" means to commit, to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit, or to solicit, coerce, or intimidate another person to commit:
(a) Any crime, which is chargeable by indictment or information under the following provisions of the Florida Statutes:
3. Section 414.39, relating to public assistance fraud.
8. Chapter 517, relating to sale of securities and investor protection.
24. Section 810.02(2)(c), relating to specified burglary of a dwelling or structure.
25. Chapter 812, relating to theft, robbery, and related crimes.
26. Chapter 815, relating to computer-related crimes.
27. Chapter 817, relating to fraudulent practices, false pretenses, fraud generally, and credit card crimes.
30. Chapter 831, relating to forgery and counterfeiting.
32. Section 836.05, relating to extortion.
33. Chapter 837, relating to perjury.
34. Chapter 838, relating to bribery and misuse of public office.
35. Chapter 843, relating to obstruction of justice.
40. Chapter 896, relating to offenses related to financial transactions.
42. Sections 918.12 and 918.13, relating to tampering with jurors and evidence.
(b) Any conduct defined as "racketeering activity" under 18 U.S.C. s. 1961(1).
(4) "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or that otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act and that the last of such incidents occurred within 5 years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.
(5) "Documentary material" means any book, paper, document, writing, drawing, graph, chart, photograph, phonorecord, magnetic tape, computer printout, other data compilation from which information can be obtained or from which information can be translated into usable form, or other tangible item.
(6) "RICO lien notice" means the notice described in s. 895.05(12) or in s. 895.07.
(7) "Investigative agency" means the Department of Legal Affairs, the Office of Statewide Prosecution, or the office of a state attorney.
(8) "Beneficial interest" means any of the following:
(a) The interest of a person as a beneficiary under a trust established pursuant to s. 689.07 or s. 689.071 in which the trustee for the trust holds legal or record title to real property;
(b) The interest of a person as a beneficiary under any other trust arrangement pursuant to which a trustee holds legal or record title to real property for the benefit of such person; or
(c) The interest of a person under any other form of express fiduciary arrangement pursuant to which any other person holds legal or record title to real property for the benefit of such person.
The term "beneficial interest" does not include the interest of a stockholder in a corporation or the interest of a partner in either a general partnership or a limited partnership. A beneficial interest shall be deemed to be located where the real property owned by the trustee is located.
(9) "Real property" means any real property or any interest in such real property, including, but not limited to, any lease of or mortgage upon such real property.
(10) "Trustee" means any of the following:
(a) Any person acting as trustee pursuant to a trust established under s. 689.07 or s. 689.071 in which the trustee holds legal or record title to real property.
(b)Any person who holds legal or record title to real property in which any other person has a beneficial interest.
(c) Any successor trustee or
trustees to any or all of the foregoing persons.
However, the term "trustee" does not include any person appointed or acting as a
personal representative as defined in s. 731.201(25) or appointed or acting as a
trustee of any testamentary trust or as a trustee of any indenture of trust
under which any bonds have been or are to be issued.
(11) "Criminal proceeding" means any criminal proceeding commenced by an investigative agency under s. 895.03 or any other provision of the Florida RICO Act.
(12) "Civil proceeding" means any civil proceeding commenced by an investigative agency under s. 895.05 or any other provision of the Florida RICO Act.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby,
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has with criminal intent received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any part of such proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or equity in, real property or in the establishment or operation of any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise or real property.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire or endeavor to violate any of the provisions of subsection (1), subsection (2), or subsection (3).
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) Any person convicted of engaging in activity in violation of the provisions of s. 895.03 is guilty of a felony of the first degree and shall be punished as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law, any person convicted of engaging in conduct in violation of the provisions of s. 895.03, through which the person derived pecuniary value, or by which he or she caused personal injury or property damage or other loss, may be sentenced to pay a fine that does not exceed 3 times the gross value gained or 3 times the gross loss caused, whichever is the greater, plus court costs and the costs of investigation and prosecution, reasonably incurred.
(3) The court shall hold a hearing to determine the amount of the fine authorized by subsection (2).
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2), "pecuniary value" means:
(a) Anything of value in the form of money, a negotiable instrument, or a commercial interest or anything else the primary significance of which is economic advantage; or
(b) Any other property or service that has a value in excess of $100.
Iviewit prays for;
Whereby:
(1) Any circuit court may, after making due provision for the rights of innocent persons, enjoin violations of the provisions of s. 895.03 by issuing appropriate orders and judgments, including, but not limited to:
(a) Ordering any defendant to divest himself or herself of any interest in any enterprise, including real property.
(b) Imposing reasonable restrictions upon the future activities or investments of any defendant, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any defendant from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise in which the defendant was engaged in violation of the provisions of s. 895.03.
(c) Ordering the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
(d) Ordering the suspension or revocation of a license, permit, or prior approval granted to any enterprise by any agency of the state.
(e) Ordering the forfeiture of the charter of a corporation organized under the laws of the state, or the revocation of a certificate authorizing a foreign corporation to conduct business within the state, upon finding that the board of directors or a managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation, in conducting the affairs of the corporation, has authorized or engaged in conduct in violation of s. 895.03 and that, for the prevention of future criminal activity, the public interest requires the charter of the corporation forfeited and the corporation dissolved or the certificate revoked.
(2)(a) All property, real or personal, including money, used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05 is subject to civil forfeiture to the state.
(b) Upon the entry of a final judgment of forfeiture in favor of the state, the title of the state to the forfeited property shall relate back:
1. In the case of real property or a beneficial interest, to the date of filing of the RICO lien notice in the official records of the county where the real property or beneficial trust is located; if no RICO lien notice is filed, then to the date of the filing of any notice of lis pendens under s. 895.07(5)(a) in the official records of the county where the real property or beneficial interest is located; and if no RICO lien notice or notice of lis pendens is filed, then to the date of recording of the final judgment of forfeiture in the official records of the county where the real property or beneficial interest is located.
2. In the case of personal property, to the date the personal property was seized by the investigating agency. If property subject to forfeiture is conveyed, alienated, disposed of, or otherwise rendered unavailable for forfeiture after the filing of a RICO lien notice or after the filing of a civil proceeding or criminal proceeding, whichever is earlier, the investigative agency may, on behalf of the state, institute an action in any circuit court against the person named in the RICO lien notice or the defendant in the civil proceeding or criminal proceeding, and the court shall enter final judgment against the person named in the RICO lien notice or the defendant in the civil proceeding or criminal proceeding in an amount equal to the fair market value of the property, together with investigative costs and attorney's fees incurred by the investigative agency in the action. If a civil proceeding is pending, such action shall be filed only in the court where the civil proceeding is pending.
(c) The state shall dispose of all forfeited property as soon as commercially feasible. If property is not exercisable or transferable for value by the state, it shall expire. All forfeitures or dispositions under this section shall be made with due provision for the rights of innocent persons. The proceeds realized from such forfeiture and disposition shall be promptly distributed in accordance with the provisions of s. 895.09.
(3) Property subject to forfeiture under this section may be seized by a law enforcement officer upon court process. Seizure without process may be made if:
(a) The seizure is incident to a lawful arrest or search or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant.
(b) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a forfeiture proceeding based upon this section.
(4) In the event of a seizure under subsection (3), a forfeiture proceeding shall be instituted promptly. Property taken or detained under this section shall not be subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the law enforcement officer making the seizure, subject only to the order of the court. When property is seized under this section, pending forfeiture and final disposition, the law enforcement officer may:
(a) Place the property under seal.
(b) Remove the property to a place designated by court.
(c) Require another agency authorized by law to take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location.
(5) The Department of Legal Affairs, any state attorney, or any state agency having jurisdiction over conduct in violation of a provision of this act may institute civil proceedings under this section. In any action brought under this section, the circuit court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination. Pending final determination, the circuit court may at any time enter such injunctions, prohibitions, or restraining orders, or take such actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as the court may deem proper.
(6) Any aggrieved person may institute a proceeding under subsection (1). In such proceeding, relief shall be granted in conformity with the principles that govern the granting of injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage in other civil cases, except that no showing of special or irreparable damage to the person shall have to be made. Upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing of immediate danger of significant loss or damage, a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction may be issued in any such action before a final determination on the merits.
(7) The state, including any of its agencies, instrumentalities, subdivisions, or municipalities, if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has been injured by reason of any violation of the provisions of s. 895.03, shall have a cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained and shall also recover attorneys' fees in the trial and appellate courts and costs of investigation and litigation, reasonably incurred. In no event shall punitive damages be awarded. The defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs upon a finding that the claimant raised a claim which was without substantial factual or legal support.
(a) Either party may demand a trial by jury in any civil action brought pursuant to this subsection.
(b) Any prevailing plaintiff under this subsection or s. 772.104 shall have a right or claim to forfeited property or to the proceeds derived therefrom superior to any right or claim the state has in the same property or proceeds.
(8) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding under this act or any other criminal proceeding under state law shall estop the defendant in any subsequent civil action or proceeding under this act or under s. 772.104 as to all matters as to which such judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties.
(9) The Department of Legal Affairs may, upon timely application, intervene in any civil action or proceeding brought under subsection (6) or subsection (7) if it certifies that, in its opinion, the action or proceeding is of general public importance. In such action or proceeding, the state shall be entitled to the same relief as if the Department of Legal Affairs had instituted the action or proceeding.
(10) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under this act may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the conduct in violation of a provision of this act terminates or the cause of action accrues. If a criminal prosecution or civil action or other proceeding is brought, or intervened in, to punish, prevent, or restrain any violation of the provisions of this act, the running of the period of limitations prescribed by this section with respect to any cause of action arising under subsection (6) or subsection (7) which is based in whole or in part upon any matter complained of in any such prosecution, action, or proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency of such prosecution, action, or proceeding and for 2 years following its termination.
(11) The application of one civil remedy under any provision of this act does not preclude the application of any other remedy, civil or criminal, under this act or any other provision of law. Civil remedies under this act are supplemental, and not mutually exclusive.
(12)(a) In addition to the authority to file a RICO lien notice set forth in s. 895.07(1), the Department of Legal Affairs, the Office of Statewide Prosecution, or the office of a state attorney may apply ex parte to a criminal division of a circuit court and, upon petition supported by sworn affidavit, obtain an order authorizing the filing of a RICO lien notice against real property upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the property was used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05. If the lien notice authorization is granted, the department shall, after filing the lien notice, forthwith provide notice to the owner of the property by one of the following methods:
1. By serving the notice in the manner provided by law for the service of process.
2. By mailing the notice, postage prepaid, by registered or certified mail to the person to be served at his or her last known address and evidence of the delivery.
3. If neither of the foregoing can be accomplished, by posting the notice on the premises.
(b) The owner of the property may move the court to discharge the lien, and such motion shall be set for hearing at the earliest possible time.
(c) The court shall discharge the lien if it finds that there is no probable cause to believe that the property was used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05 or if it finds that the owner of the property neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the property was used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05.
(d) No testimony presented by the owner of the property at the hearing is admissible against him or her in any criminal proceeding except in a criminal prosecution for perjury or false statement, nor shall such testimony constitute a waiver of the owner's constitutional right against self-incrimination.
(e) A lien notice secured under the provisions of this subsection is valid for a period of 90 days from the date the court granted authorization, which period may be extended for an additional 90 days by the court for good cause shown, unless a civil proceeding is instituted under this section and a lien notice is filed under s. 895.07, in which event the term of the lien notice is governed by s. 895.08.
(f) The filing of a lien notice, whether or not subsequently discharged or otherwise lifted, shall constitute notice to the owner and knowledge by the owner that the property was used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05, such that lack of such notice and knowledge shall not be a defense in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding under this chapter.
Iviewit prays for;
Whereby:
(1) As used in this section, the term "investigative agency" means the Department of Legal Affairs, the Office of Statewide Prosecution, or the office of a state attorney.
(2) If, pursuant to the civil enforcement provisions of s. 895.05, an investigative agency has reason to believe that a person or other enterprise has engaged in, or is engaging in, activity in violation of this act, the investigative agency may administer oaths or affirmations, subpoena witnesses or material, and collect evidence.
(3) The investigative agency may apply ex parte to the circuit court for the circuit in which a subpoenaed person or entity resides, is found, or transacts business for an order directing that the subpoenaed person or entity not disclose the existence of the subpoena to any other person or entity except the subpoenaed person's attorney for a period of 90 days, which time may be extended by the court for good cause shown by the investigative agency. The order shall be served with the subpoena, and the subpoena shall include a reference to the order and a notice to the recipient of the subpoena that disclosure of the existence of the subpoena to any other person or entity in violation of the order may subject the subpoenaed person or entity to punishment for contempt of court. Such an order may be granted by the court only upon a showing:
(a) Of sufficient factual grounds to reasonably indicate a violation of ss. 895.01-895.06;
(b) That the documents or testimony sought appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and
(c) Of facts which reasonably indicate that disclosure of the subpoena would hamper or impede the investigation or would result in a flight from prosecution.
(4) If matter that the investigative agency seeks to obtain by the subpoena is located outside the state, the person or enterprise subpoenaed may make such matter available to the investigative agency or its representative for examination at the place where such matter is located. The investigative agency may designate representatives, including officials of the jurisdiction in which the matter is located, to inspect the matter on its behalf and may respond to similar requests from officials of other jurisdictions.
(5) Upon failure of a person or enterprise, without lawful excuse, to obey a subpoena issued under this section or a subpoena issued in the course of a civil proceeding instituted pursuant to s. 895.05, and after reasonable notice to such person or enterprise, the investigative agency may apply to the circuit court in which such civil proceeding is pending or, if no civil proceeding is pending, to the circuit court for the judicial circuit in which such person or enterprise resides, is found, or transacts business for an order compelling compliance. Except in a prosecution for perjury, an individual who complies with a court order to provide testimony or material after asserting a privilege against self-incrimination to which the individual is entitled by law shall not have the testimony or material so provided, or evidence derived therefrom, received against him or her in any criminal investigation or proceeding.
(6) A person who fails to obey a court order entered pursuant to this section may be punished for contempt of court.
Iviewit prays for;
Whereby:
(1) Upon the institution of any civil proceeding, the investigative agency, then or at any time during the pendency of the proceeding, may file a RICO lien notice in the official records of any one or more counties. No filing fee or other charge shall be required as a condition for filing the RICO lien notice, and the clerk of the circuit court shall, upon the presentation of a RICO lien notice, immediately record it in the official records.
(2) The RICO lien notice shall be signed by the head of the Department of Legal Affairs or her or his designee or by a state attorney or her or his designee. The notice shall be in such form as the Attorney General prescribes and shall set forth the following information:
(a) The name of the person against whom the civil proceeding has been brought. In its discretion, the investigative agency may also name in the RICO lien notice any other aliases, names, or fictitious names under which the person may be known and any corporation, partnership, or other entity that is either controlled or entirely owned by the person.
(b) If known to the investigative agency, the present residence and business addresses of the person named in the RICO lien notice and of the other names set forth in the RICO lien notice.
(c) A reference to the civil proceeding, stating: that a proceeding under the Florida RICO Act has been brought against the person named in the RICO lien notice; the name of the county or counties in which the proceeding has been brought; and, if known to the investigative agency at the time of filing the RICO lien notice, the case number of the proceeding.
(d) A statement that the notice is being filed pursuant to the Florida RICO Act.
(e) The name and address of the investigative agency filing the RICO lien notice and the name of the individual signing the RICO notice.
A RICO lien notice shall apply only to one person and, to the extent applicable, any other aliases, names, or fictitious names, including names of corporations, partnerships, or other entities, to the extent permitted in paragraph (a). A separate RICO lien notice shall be filed for each person against whom the investigative agency desires to file a RICO lien notice under this section.
(3) The investigative agency shall, as soon as practicable after the filing of each RICO lien notice, furnish to the person named in the notice either a copy of the recorded notice or a copy of the notice with a notation thereon of the county or counties in which the notice has been recorded. The failure of the investigative agency to furnish a copy of the notice under this subsection shall not invalidate or otherwise affect the notice.
(4) The filing of a RICO lien notice creates, from the time of its filing, a lien in favor of the state on the following property of the person named in the notice and against any other names set forth in the notice:
(a) Any real property situated in the county where the notice is filed then or thereafter owned by the person or under any of the names; and
(b) Any beneficial interest situated in the county where the notice is filed then or thereafter owned by the person or under any of the names.
The lien shall commence and attach as of the time of filing of the RICO lien notice and shall continue thereafter until expiration, termination, or release of the notice pursuant to s. 895.08. The lien created in favor of the state shall be superior and prior to the interest of any other person in the real property or beneficial interest if the interest is acquired subsequent to the filing of the notice.
(5) In conjunction with any civil proceeding:
(a) The investigative agency may file without prior court order in any county a lis pendens under the provisions of s. 48.23; in such case, any person acquiring an interest in the subject real property or beneficial interest, if the real property or beneficial interest is acquired subsequent to the filing of lis pendens, shall take the interest subject to the civil proceeding and any subsequent judgment of forfeiture.
(b) If a RICO lien notice has been filed, the investigative agency may name as a defendant, in addition to the person named in the notice, any person acquiring an interest in the real property or beneficial interest subsequent to the filing of the notice. If a judgment of forfeiture is entered in the proceeding in favor of the state, the interest of any person in the property that was acquired subsequent to the filing of the notice shall be subject to the notice and judgment of forfeiture.
(6) A trustee who acquires actual knowledge that a RICO lien notice or a civil proceeding or criminal proceeding has been filed against any person for whom the trustee holds legal or record title to real property shall immediately furnish to the investigative agency the following:
(a) The name and address of the person, as known to the trustee.
(b) The name and address, as known to the trustee, of each other person for whose benefit the trustee holds title to the real property.
(c) If requested by the investigative agency, a copy of the trust agreement or other instrument pursuant to which the trustee holds legal or record title to the real property. Any trustee who fails to comply with the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(7) Any trustee who conveys title to real property for which, at the time of the conveyance, a RICO lien notice naming a person who, to the actual knowledge of the trustee, holds a beneficial interest in the trust has been filed in the county where the real property is situated is liable to the state for the greatest of:
(a) The amount of proceeds received directly by the person named in the RICO lien notice as a result of the conveyance;
(b) The amount of proceeds received by the trustee as a result of the conveyance and distributed to the person named in the RICO lien notice; or
(c) The fair market value of the interest of the person named in the RICO lien notice in the real property so conveyed; however, if the trustee conveys the real property and holds the proceeds that would otherwise be paid or distributed to the beneficiary or at the direction of the beneficiary or her or his designee, the trustee's liability shall not exceed the amount of the proceeds so held for so long as the proceeds are held by the trustee.
(8) The filing of a RICO lien notice shall not constitute a lien on the record title to real property as owned by the trustee except to the extent that the trustee is named in the RICO lien notice. The investigative agency may bring a civil proceeding in any circuit court against the trustee to recover from the trustee the amount set forth in subsection (7), and the state shall also be entitled to recover investigative costs and attorney's fees incurred by the investigative agency.
(9) The filing of a RICO lien notice shall not affect the use to which real property or a beneficial interest owned by the person named in the RICO lien notice may be put or the right of the person to receive any avails, rents, or other proceeds resulting from the use and ownership, but not the sale, of the property until a judgment of forfeiture is entered.
(10)(a) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any conveyance by a trustee pursuant to a court order, unless such court order is entered in an action between the trustee and the beneficiary.
(b) Unless the trustee has actual knowledge that a person owning a beneficial interest in the trust is named in a RICO lien notice or is otherwise a defendant in a civil proceeding, the provisions of this section shall not apply to:
1. Any conveyance by the trustee required under the terms of the trust agreement, which trust agreement is a matter of public record prior to the filing of the RICO lien notice; or
2. Any conveyance by the trustee to all of the persons who own beneficial interests in the trust.
(11) All forfeitures or dispositions under this section shall be made with due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
Iviewit prays for;
Whereby:
(1) The term of a RICO lien notice shall be for a period of 6 years from the date of filing, unless a renewal RICO lien notice has been filed by the investigative agency; in such case, the term of the renewal RICO lien notice shall be for a period of 6 years from the date of its filing. The investigative agency shall be entitled to only one renewal of the RICO lien notice.
(2) The investigative agency filing a RICO lien notice may release in whole or in part the RICO lien notice or may release any specific real property or beneficial interest from the RICO lien notice upon such terms and conditions as it may determine. A release of a RICO lien notice executed by the investigative agency may be filed in the official records of any county. No charge or fee shall be imposed for the filing of a release of a RICO lien notice.
(3) If no civil proceeding has been instituted by the investigative agency seeking a forfeiture of any property owned by the person named in the RICO lien notice, the acquittal in the criminal proceeding of the person named in the RICO lien notice or the dismissal of the criminal proceeding shall terminate the RICO lien notice and, in such case, the filing of the RICO lien notice shall have no effect. In the event the criminal proceeding has been dismissed or the person named in the RICO lien notice has been acquitted in the criminal proceeding, the RICO lien notice shall continue for the duration of the civil proceeding.
(4) If no civil proceeding is then pending against the person named in a RICO lien notice, the person named in the RICO lien notice may institute an action in the county where the notice has been filed against the investigative agency that filed the notice seeking a release or extinguishment of the notice. In such case:
(a) The court shall, upon the motion of such person, immediately enter an order setting a date for hearing, which date shall be not less than 5 or more than 10 days after the suit has been filed, and the order along with a copy of the complaint shall be served on the investigative agency within 3 days after the institution of the suit. At the hearing, the court shall take evidence on the issue of whether any real property or beneficial interest owned by such person is covered by the RICO lien notice or is otherwise subject to forfeiture under the Florida RICO Act; if such person shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the RICO lien notice is not applicable to him or her or that any real property or beneficial interest owned by the person is not subject to forfeiture under the Florida RICO Act, the court shall enter a judgment extinguishing the RICO lien notice or releasing the real property or beneficial interest from the RICO lien notice.
(b) The court shall immediately enter its order releasing from the RICO lien notice any specific real property or beneficial interest if a sale of such real property or beneficial interest is pending and the filing of the notice prevents the sale of the property or interest; however, the proceeds resulting from the sale of such real property or beneficial interest shall be deposited into the registry of the court, subject to the further order of the court.
(c) At the hearing set forth in paragraph (a), the court may release any real property or beneficial interest from the RICO lien notice, upon the posting by such person of such security as is equal to the value of the real property or beneficial interest owned by such person.
(5) In the event a civil proceeding is pending against a person named in a RICO lien notice, the court upon motion by such person may grant the relief set forth herein.
Iviewit prays for;
3. CH 896 - OFFENSES RELATED TO FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 896.101 FLORIDA MONEY LAUNDERING ACT
Defendants have violated;
(1) This section may be cited as the "Florida Money Laundering Act."
(2) As used in this section, the term:
(a) "Knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity" means that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under state or federal law, regardless of whether or not such activity is specified in paragraph (g).
(b) "Conducts" includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating or concluding a transaction.
(c) "Transaction" means a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, use of a safety deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means effected.
(d) "Financial transaction" means a transaction involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or involving one or more monetary instruments, which in any way or degree affects commerce, or a transaction involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, commerce in any way or degree.
(e) "Monetary instruments" means coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders, investment securities in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery, and negotiable instruments in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.
(f) "Financial institution" means a financial institution as defined in 31 U.S.C. s. 5312 which institution is located in this state.
(g) "Specified unlawful activity" means any "racketeering activity" as defined in s. 895.02.
(h) "Knowing" means that a person knew; or, with respect to any transaction or transportation involving more than $10,000 in U.S. currency or foreign equivalent, should have known after reasonable inquiry, unless the person has a duty to file a federal currency transaction report, IRS Form 8300, or a like report under state law and has complied with that reporting requirement in accordance with law.
(i) "Plaintiff" means any local, county, state, or federal law enforcement agency; the Attorney General; any state attorney; or the statewide prosecutor.
(3) It is unlawful for a person:
(a) Knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, to conduct or attempt to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity:
1. With the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
2. Knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part:
a. To conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
b. To avoid a transaction reporting requirement or money transmitters' registration requirement under state law.
(b) To transport or attempt to transport a monetary instrument or funds:
1. With the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
2. Knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation is designed in whole or in part:
a. To conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
b. To avoid a transaction reporting requirement or money transmitters' registration requirement under state law.
(c) To conduct or attempt to conduct a financial transaction which involves property or proceeds which an investigative or law enforcement officer, or someone acting under such officer's direction, represents as being derived from, or as being used to conduct or facilitate, specified unlawful activity, when the person's conduct or attempted conduct is undertaken with the intent:
1. To promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
2. To conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds or property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
3. To avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state law.
(d) For the purposes of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the State of Florida or political subdivision thereof, of the United States, or of any other state or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct, on behalf of the government, investigations of, or to make arrests for, offenses enumerated in this subsection or similar federal offenses.
(5) A person who violates this section, if the violation involves:
(a) Financial transactions exceeding $300 but less than $20,000 in any 12-month period, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) Financial transactions totaling or exceeding $20,000 but less than $100,000 in any 12-month period, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(c) Financial transactions totaling or exceeding $100,000 in any 12-month period, commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(6) In addition to the penalties authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, a person who has been found guilty of or who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to having violated this section may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $250,000 or twice the value of the financial transactions, whichever is greater, except that for a second or subsequent violation of this section, the fine may be up to $500,000 or quintuple the value of the financial transactions, whichever is greater.
(7) A person who violates this section is also liable for a civil penalty of not more than the value of the financial transactions involved or $25,000, whichever is greater.
(8)(a) If a person is alienating or disposing of monetary instruments or funds, or appears likely to or demonstrates an intent to alienate or dispose of monetary instruments or funds, used in violation of this section, chapter 560, s. 655.50, or any crime listed as specified unlawful activity under this section, or monetary instruments or funds that are traceable to any such violation, the petitioner may commence a civil action in any circuit court having jurisdiction where such monetary instruments or funds are located or have been deposited for a temporary injunction to prohibit any person from withdrawing, transferring, removing, dissipating, or disposing of any such monetary instruments or funds of equivalent value. The temporary injunction will be obtained pursuant to Florida Civil Rule of Procedure 1.610. This section governs all temporary injunctions obtained pursuant to this section and supersedes all other provisions of the rule that may be inconsistent with this section. The court shall take into account any anticipated impact the temporary injunction will have on innocent third parties or businesses, balanced against the petitioner's need to preserve the monetary instruments or funds.
(b) A temporary injunction must be granted without bond to the petitioner. However, the court may authorize a respondent to post a bond equal to the amount to be enjoined and to have the injunction dissolved.
(c) A temporary injunction is to be entered upon application of the petitioner, ex parte and without notice or opportunity for a hearing with respect to the monetary instruments or funds.
(d) Such a temporary order expires not more than 10 days after the date on which the order is served, unless extended for good cause shown or unless the party against whom it is entered consents to an extension for a longer period.
(f) At the termination of the temporary injunction or at any time before the termination of the temporary injunction, the petitioner may:
1. Obtain a warrant or other court order and seize the monetary instruments or funds and initiate a civil forfeiture action;
2. Obtain a warrant or other court order and seize the monetary instruments or funds for any subsequent criminal prosecution; or
3. Petition the court to extend the order for a period not longer than 10 days from the original order's termination date. At the end of the termination of the 10-day extension, the petitioner may take either of the steps outlined in subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2. However, the petitioner may not be granted any additional extensions.
(g)1. Upon service of the temporary order served pursuant to this section, the petitioner shall immediately notify by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service, both the person or entity in possession of the monetary instruments or funds and the owner of the monetary instruments or funds if known, of the order entered pursuant to this section and that the lawful owner of the monetary instruments or funds being enjoined may request a hearing to contest and modify the order entered pursuant to this section by petitioning the court that issued the order, so that such notice is received within 72 hours.
2. The notice shall advise that the hearing shall be held within 3 days of the request, and the notice must state that the hearing will be set and noticed by the person against whom the order is served.
3. The notice shall specifically state that the lawful owner has the right to produce evidence of legitimate business expenses, obligations, and liabilities, including but not limited to, employee payroll expenses verified by current unemployment compensation records, employee workers' compensation insurance, employee health insurance, state and federal taxes, and regulatory or licensing fees only as may become due before the expiration of the temporary order.
4. Upon determination by the court that the expenses are valid, payment of such expenses may be effected by the owner of the enjoined monetary instruments or funds only to the court-ordered payees through court-reviewed checks, issued by the owner of, and the person or entity in possession of, the enjoined monetary instruments or funds. Upon presentment, the person or entity in possession of the enjoined funds or monetary instruments shall only honor the payment of the check to the court-ordered payee.
(h) Only the lawful owner or the account holder of the monetary instruments or funds being enjoined may request a hearing to contest the order entered pursuant to this section by petitioning the court that issued the order. A hearing must be held within 3 days after the request or as soon as practicable thereafter and before the expiration of the temporary order. The hearing must be set and noticed by the lawful owner of the monetary instruments or funds or his or her attorney. Notice of the hearing must be provided to the petitioner who procured the temporary injunction pursuant to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure but not less than 24 hours before the scheduled hearing. The court may receive and consider at a hearing held pursuant to this subsection, evidence and information that would be inadmissible under the Florida Rules of Evidence. A proceeding under this subsection is governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
(9)(a) The petitioner may request issuance of a warrant authorizing the seizure of property, monetary instruments, or funds subject to civil forfeiture in the same manner as provided for search warrants in chapter 933.
(b) Any financial institution that receives a seizure warrant pursuant to paragraph (a), temporary injunction, or other court order, may deduct from the account the funds necessary to pay any electronic transaction or check presented for payment where the electronic transaction was initiated or the check deposited prior to the time the seizure order was served on the financial institution.
(10) Any financial institution, licensed money transmitter, or other person served with and complying with the terms of a warrant, temporary injunction, or other court order, including any subpoena issued under the authority granted by s. 16.56 or s. 27.04, obtained in furtherance of an investigation of any crime in this section, including any crime listed as specified unlawful activity under this section or any felony violation of chapter 560, has immunity from criminal liability and shall not be liable to any person for any lawful action taken in complying with the warrant, temporary injunction, or other court order, including any subpoena issued under the authority granted by s. 16.56 or s. 27.04. If any subpoena issued under the authority granted by s. 16.56 or s. 27.04 contains a nondisclosure provision, any financial institution, licensed money transmitter, employee or officer of a financial institution or licensed money transmitter, or any other person may not notify, directly or indirectly, any customer of that financial institution or licensed money transmitter whose records are being sought by the subpoena, or any other person named in the subpoena, about the existence or the contents of that subpoena or about information that has been furnished to the state attorney or statewide prosecutor who issued the subpoena or other law enforcement officer named in the subpoena in response to the subpoena.
(11) In any prosecution brought pursuant to this chapter, the common law corpus delicti rule does not apply. The defendant's confession or admission is admissible during trial without the state's having to prove the corpus delicti if the court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the defendant's confession or admission is trustworthy. Before the court admits the defendant's confession or admission, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there is sufficient corroborating evidence that tends to establish the trustworthiness of the statement by the defendant. Hearsay evidence is admissible during the presentation of evidence at the hearing. In making its determination, the court may consider all relevant corroborating evidence, including the defendant's statements.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby they:
(1) engaged in a trade or business, except for those financial institutions that report to the Office of Financial Regulation pursuant to s. 655.50, who receive more than $10,000 in currency, including foreign currency, in one transaction, or who receive this amount through two or more related transactions, must complete and file with the Department of Revenue the information required pursuant to 26 U.S.C. s. 6050I., concerning returns relating to currency received in trade or business. Any person who willfully fails to comply with the reporting requirements of this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, or by a fine not exceeding $250,000 or twice the value of the amount of the currency transaction involved, whichever is greater, or by both such imprisonment and fine. For a second or subsequent conviction of a violation of the provisions of this subsection, the maximum fine that may be imposed is $500,000 or quintuple the value of the amount of the currency transaction involved, whichever is greater.
(2) The Department of Revenue shall enforce compliance with the provisions of subsection (1) and is to be the custodian of all information and documents filed pursuant to subsection (1). Such information and documents are confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution; however, the department must provide any report filed under this section, or information contained therein, to federal, state, and local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, to the Department of Financial Services, and to the Office of Financial Regulation, and the information is subject to disclosure pursuant to subpoena as provided in s. 213.053(8).
(3) The Department of Revenue may adopt rules and guidelines to administer and enforce these reporting requirements.
Defendants have violated;
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for purposes of this section and ss. 896.101 and 896.102, each individual currency transaction exceeding $10,000 which is made in violation of the provisions of s. 896.102(1) or each financial transaction in violation of the provisions of s. 896.101(3) which involves the movement of funds in excess of $10,000 shall constitute a separate, punishable offense.
Defendants have violated;
Tiedemann TRANSACTION - Proskauer STRUCTURED TO WALK CASH OUT AFTER IT WAS INVESTED. LOST TRANSACTION DOCUMENTS AND FINANCIAL RECORDS BY Lewin
Utley AND Reale THEFT OF FUNDS - NO REPORTING ON IVIEWIT BOOKS AND NO REPORTING ON THEIR BOOKS (OR DID THEY REPORT THE STOLEN CASH FUNDS ON RETURNS PERSONALLY. DID THEY TAKE THE MONEY WITH THE EQUIPMENT TO INTERNET TRAIN Tiedemann'S COMPANY
Whereby:
(1) DEFINITIONS.--For purposes of this section, the terms "structure" or "structuring" mean that a person, acting alone, or in conjunction with, or on behalf of, other persons, conducts or attempts to conduct one or more transactions in currency, in any amount, at one or more financial institutions, on one or more days, in any manner, for the purpose of evading currency transaction reporting requirements provided by state or federal law. "In any manner" includes, but is not limited to, the breaking down of a single sum of currency exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums, including sums at or below $10,000, or the conduct of a transaction, or series of currency transactions, at or below $10,000. The transaction or transactions need not exceed the $10,000 reporting threshold at any single financial institution on any single day in order to meet the definition of "structure" or "structuring" provided in this subsection.
(2) DOMESTIC COIN AND CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS.--A person may not, for the purpose of evading the reporting and registration requirements of chapter 560, chapter 655, or this chapter, or 31 U.S.C. s. 5313(a) or s. 5325, or any rules or regulations adopted under those chapters and sections, when some portion of the activity by that person occurs in this state:
(a) Cause or attempt to cause a person or financial institution in this state to fail to file an applicable report or registration required under those chapters and sections or any rule or regulation adopted under any of those chapters and sections;
(b) Cause or attempt to cause a person or financial institution in this state to file an applicable report required under those chapters and sections or any rule or regulation adopted under those chapters and sections which contains a material omission or misstatement of fact; or
(c) Structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any financial transaction with or involving one or more financial institutions in this state.
(3) INTERNATIONAL MONETARY INSTRUMENT TRANSACTIONS. A person may not, for the purpose of evading the reporting or registration requirements of chapter 560, chapter 655, or this chapter, or 31 U.S.C. s. 5316, when some portion of the activity by that person occurs in this state:
Fail to file an applicable registration or report required by those chapters and sections, or cause or attempt to cause a person to fail to file such a report;
(b) File or cause or attempt to cause a person to file an applicable registration or report required under those chapters and sections which contains a material omission or misstatement of fact; or
(c) Structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any importation or exportation of currency or monetary instruments or funds to, from, or through financial institutions in this state.
(4) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.
(a) A person who violates this section, if the violation involves:
1. Financial transactions exceeding $300 but less than $20,000 in any 12-month period, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
2. Financial transactions totaling or exceeding $20,000 but less than $100,000 in any 12-month period, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
3. Financial transactions totaling or exceeding $100,000 in any 12-month period, commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) In addition to the penalties authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, a person who has been found guilty of or who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to having violated this section may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $250,000 or twice the value of the financial transactions, whichever is greater, except that for a second or subsequent violation of this section, the fine may be up to $500,000 or quintuple the value of the financial transactions, whichever is greater.
(c) A person who violates this section is also liable for a civil penalty of not more than the value of the financial transactions involved or $25,000, whichever is greater.
(5) INFERENCE.--Proof that a person engaged for monetary consideration in the business of a funds transmitter as defined in s. 560.103(10) and who is transporting more than $10,000 in currency, or foreign equivalent, without being registered as a money transmitter or designated as an authorized vendor under the provisions of chapter 560, gives rise to an inference that the transportation was done with knowledge of the registration requirements of chapter 560 and the reporting requirements of this chapter.
(6) CONSTRUCTION.--This section may not be construed to require any new or additional reporting requirements on any entity obligated to file reports under state or federal law.
Defendants have violated;
Defendants have violated;
4. VIOLATION OF PUBLIC OFFICES FLORIDA SUPREME COURT - CASE SC04-1078, FLORIDA BAR COMPLAINTS AGAINST TRIGGS, Wheeler AND TURNER
Defendants have violated;
TRIGGS, Wheeler, TURNER, JOHNSON & HOFFMAN
TRIGGS CONFLICTS
TRIGGS CONFLICTS OVERLOOKED
FAILURE TO FILE COMPLAINTS AGAINST TURNER, TRIGGS, Wheeler II
SUPREME COURT FAILURE TO PROSECUTE OR ADMIT COMPLAINTS PROVING CONFLICT - FIVE MEMBERS
Whereby:
(1) It is essential to the proper conduct and operation of government that public officials be independent and impartial and that public office not be used for private gain other than the remuneration provided by law. The public interest, therefore, requires that the law protect against any conflict of interest and establish standards for the conduct of elected officials and government employees in situations where conflicts may exist.
(2) It is also essential that government attract those citizens best qualified to serve. Thus, the law against conflict of interest must be so designed as not to impede unreasonably or unnecessarily the recruitment and retention by government of those best qualified to serve. Public officials should not be denied the opportunity, available to all other citizens, to acquire and retain private economic interests except when conflicts with the responsibility of such officials to the public cannot be avoided.
(5) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state that no officer or employee of a state agency or of a county, city, or other political subdivision of the state, and no member of the Legislature or legislative employee, shall have any interest, financial or otherwise, direct or indirect; engage in any business transaction or professional activity; or incur any obligation of any nature which is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his or her duties in the public interest. To implement this policy and strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of the state in their government, there is enacted a code of ethics setting forth standards of conduct required of state, county, and city officers and employees, and of officers and employees of other political subdivisions of the state, in the performance of their official duties. It is the intent of the Legislature that this code shall serve not only as a guide for the official conduct of public servants in this state, but also as a basis for discipline of those who violate the provisions of this part.
(6) It is declared to be the policy of the state that public officers and employees, state and local, are agents of the people and hold their positions for the benefit of the public. They are bound to uphold the Constitution of the United States and the State Constitution and to perform efficiently and faithfully their duties under the laws of the federal, state, and local governments. Such officers and employees are bound to observe, in their official acts, the highest standards of ethics consistent with this code and the advisory opinions rendered with respect hereto regardless of personal considerations, recognizing that promoting the public interest and maintaining the respect of the people in their government must be of foremost concern.
As used in this part and for purposes of the provisions of s. 8, Art. II of the State Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Advisory body" means any board, commission, committee, council, or authority, however selected, whose total budget, appropriations, or authorized expenditures constitute less than 1 percent of the budget of each agency it serves or $100,000, whichever is less, and whose powers, jurisdiction, and authority are solely advisory and do not include the final determination or adjudication of any personal or property rights, duties, or obligations, other than those relating to its internal operations.
(2) "Agency" means any state, regional, county, local, or municipal government entity of this state, whether executive, judicial, or legislative; any department, division, bureau, commission, authority, or political subdivision of this state therein; or any public school, community college, or state university.
(3) "Breach of the public trust" means a violation of a provision of the State Constitution or this part which establishes a standard of ethical conduct, a disclosure requirement, or a prohibition applicable to public officers or employees in order to avoid conflicts between public duties and private interests, including, without limitation, a violation of s. 8, Art. II of the State Constitution or of this part.
(4) "Business associate" means any person or entity engaged in or carrying on a business enterprise with a public officer, public employee, or candidate as a partner, joint venturer, corporate shareholder where the shares of such corporation are not listed on any national or regional stock exchange, or coowner of property.
(5) "Business entity" means any corporation, partnership, limited partnership, proprietorship, firm, enterprise, franchise, association, self-employed individual, or trust, whether fictitiously named or not, doing business in this state.
(7) "Commission" means the Commission on Ethics created by s. 112.320 or any successor to which its duties are transferred.
(8) "Conflict" or "conflict of interest" means a situation in which regard for a private interest tends to lead to disregard of a public duty or interest.
(9) "Corruptly" means done with a wrongful intent and for the purpose of obtaining, or compensating or receiving compensation for, any benefit resulting from some act or omission of a public servant which is inconsistent with the proper performance of his or her public duties.
(11) "Facts materially related to the complaint at issue" means facts which tend to show a violation of this part or s. 8, Art. II of the State Constitution by the alleged violator other than those alleged in the complaint and consisting of separate instances of the same or similar conduct as alleged in the complaint, or which tend to show an additional violation of this part or s. 8, Art. II of the State Constitution by the alleged violator which arises out of or in connection with the allegations of the complaint.
(15) "Material interest" means direct or indirect ownership of more than 5 percent of the total assets or capital stock of any business entity. For the purposes of this act, indirect ownership does not include ownership by a spouse or minor child.
(16) "Materially affected" means involving an interest in real property located within the jurisdiction of the official's agency or involving an investment in a business entity, a source of income or a position of employment, office, or management in any business entity located within the jurisdiction or doing business within the jurisdiction of the official's agency which is or will be affected in a substantially different manner or degree than the manner or degree in which the public in general will be affected or, if the matter affects only a special class of persons, then affected in a substantially different manner or degree than the manner or degree in which such class will be affected.
Defendants have violated;
Flechaus and Boca PD - Flechaus misleads Iviewit with SEC and other nonsense and derails investigation - Can Boca PD investigate or are they now conflicted? Have they instituted an internal affairs investigation?
Whereby they have engaged in the:
(6) MISUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION.--No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others. This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31.
(7) CONFLICTING EMPLOYMENT OR CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP
(a) No public officer or employee of an agency shall have or hold any employment or contractual relationship with any business entity or any agency which is subject to the regulation of, or is doing business with, an agency of which he or she is an officer or employee, excluding those organizations and their officers who, when acting in their official capacity, enter into or negotiate a collective bargaining contract with the state or any municipality, county, or other political subdivision of the state; nor shall an officer or employee of an agency have or hold any employment or contractual relationship that will create a continuing or frequently recurring conflict between his or her private interests and the performance of his or her public duties or that would impede the full and faithful discharge of his or her public duties.
(8) DISCLOSURE OR USE OF CERTAIN INFORMATION
No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall disclose or use information not available to members of the general public and gained by reason of his or her official position for his or her personal gain or benefit or for the personal gain or benefit of any other person or business entity.
(VI) Any person having the power normally conferred upon the positions referenced in this sub-subparagraph.
b. "Appointed state officer" means any member of an appointive board, commission, committee, council, or authority of the executive or legislative branch of state government whose powers, jurisdiction, and authority are not solely advisory and include the final determination or adjudication of any personal or property rights, duties, or obligations, other than those relative to its internal operations.
c. "State agency" means an entity of the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of state government over which the Legislature exercises plenary budgetary and statutory control.
3. No member of the Legislature, appointed state officer, or statewide elected officer shall personally represent another person or entity for compensation before the government body or agency of which the individual was an officer or member for a period of 2 years following vacation of office. No member of the Legislature shall personally represent another person or entity for compensation during his or her term of office before any state agency other than judicial tribunals or in settlement negotiations after the filing of a lawsuit.
4. No agency employee shall personally represent another person or entity for compensation before the agency with which he or she was employed for a period of 2 years following vacation of position, unless employed by another agency of state government.
5. Any person violating this paragraph shall be subject to the penalties provided in s. 112.317 and a civil penalty of an amount equal to the compensation which the person receives for the prohibited conduct.
(16) LOCAL GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS
(c) No local government attorney or law firm in which the local government attorney is a member, partner, or employee shall represent a private individual or entity before the unit of local government to which the local government attorney provides legal services. A local government attorney whose contract with the unit of local government does not include provisions that authorize or mandate the use of the law firm of the local government attorney to complete legal services for the unit of local government shall not recommend or otherwise refer legal work to that attorney's law firm to be completed for the unit of local government.
Iviewit cites;
There is created a Commission on Ethics, the purpose of which is to serve as guardian of the standards of conduct for the officers and employees of the state, and of a county, city, or other political subdivision of the state, as defined in this part, and to serve as the independent commission provided for in s. 8(f), Art. II of the State Constitution.
Iviewit cites;
(1) Upon a written complaint executed on a form prescribed by the commission and signed under oath or affirmation by any person, the commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this part or any other alleged breach of the public trust within the jurisdiction of the commission as provided in s. 8(f), Art. II of the State Constitution in accordance with procedures set forth herein. Within 5 days after receipt of a complaint by the commission, a copy shall be transmitted to the alleged violator.
(2) The complaint and records relating to the complaint or to any preliminary investigation held by the commission or its agents or by a Commission on Ethics and Public Trust established by any county defined in s. 125.011(1), are confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution, and any proceeding conducted by the commission or a Commission on Ethics and Public Trust, pursuant to a complaint or preliminary investigation, is exempt from the provisions of s. 286.011, s. 24(b), Art. I of the State Constitution, and s. 120.525, until the complaint is dismissed as legally insufficient, until the alleged violator requests in writing that such records and proceedings be made public, or until the commission or a Commission on Ethics and Public Trust determines, based on such investigation, whether probable cause exists to believe that a violation has occurred. In no event shall a complaint under this part against a candidate in any general, special, or primary election be filed or any intention of filing such a complaint be disclosed on the day of any such election or within the 5 days immediately preceding the date of the election.
(3) A preliminary investigation shall be undertaken by the commission of each legally sufficient complaint over which the commission has jurisdiction to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred. If, upon completion of the preliminary investigation, the commission finds no probable cause to believe that this part has been violated or that any other breach of the public trust has been committed, the commission shall dismiss the complaint with the issuance of a public report to the complainant and the alleged violator, stating with particularity its reasons for dismissal of the complaint. At that time, the complaint and all materials relating to the complaint shall become a matter of public record. If the commission finds from the preliminary investigation probable cause to believe that this part has been violated or that any other breach of the public trust has been committed, it shall so notify the complainant and the alleged violator in writing. Such notification and all documents made or received in the disposition of the complaint shall then become public records. Upon request submitted to the commission in writing, any person who the commission finds probable cause to believe has violated any provision of this part or has committed any other breach of the public trust shall be entitled to a public hearing. Such person shall be deemed to have waived the right to a public hearing if the request is not received within 14 days following the mailing of the probable cause notification required by this subsection. However, the commission may on its own motion, require a public hearing, may conduct such further investigation as it deems necessary, and may enter into such stipulations and settlements as it finds to be just and in the best interest of the state. The commission is without jurisdiction to, and no respondent may voluntarily or involuntarily, enter into a stipulation or settlement which imposes any penalty, including, but not limited to, a sanction or admonition or any other penalty contained in s. 112.317. Penalties shall be imposed only by the appropriate disciplinary authority as designated in this section.
Iviewit cites;
Any final action by the commission taken pursuant to this part shall be subject to review in a district court of appeal upon the petition of the party against whom an adverse opinion, finding, or recommendation is made.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(c) "Public officer or employee" means an officer or employee of any public body, political subdivision, or public instrumentality within the state.
(e) "Specified offense" means:
3. Bribery in connection with the employment of a public officer or employee;
4. Any felony specified in chapter 838, except ss. 838.15 and 838.16;
5. The committing of an impeachable offense; or
6. The committing of any felony by a public officer or employee who, willfully and with intent to defraud the public or the public agency for which the public officer or employee acts or in which he or she is employed of the right to receive the faithful performance of his or her duty as a public officer or employee, realizes or obtains, or attempts to realize or obtain, a profit, gain, or advantage for himself or herself or for some other person through the use or attempted use of the power, rights, privileges, duties, or position of his or her public office or employment position.
(a) The clerk of a court in which a proceeding involving a specified offense is being conducted against a public officer or employee shall furnish notice of the proceeding to the Commission on Ethics. Such notice is sufficient if it is in the form of a copy of the indictment, information, or other document containing the charges. In addition, if a verdict of guilty is returned by a jury or by the court trying the case without a jury, or a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere is entered in the court by the public officer or employee, the clerk shall furnish a copy thereof to the Commission on Ethics.
(c) The employer of any member whose office or employment is terminated by reason of his or her admitted commission, aid, or abetment of a specified offense shall forward notice thereof to the commission.
(d) The Commission on Ethics shall forward any notice and any other document received by it pursuant to this subsection to the governing body of the public retirement system of which the public officer or employee is a member or from which the public officer or employee may be entitled to receive a benefit. When called on by the Commission on Ethics, the Department of Management Services shall assist the commission in identifying the appropriate public retirement system.
(5) FORFEITURE DETERMINATION
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) When a method for removal from office is not otherwise provided by the State Constitution or by law, the Governor may by executive order suspend from office an elected or appointed public official, by whatever title known, who is indicted or informed against for commission of any felony, or for any misdemeanor arising directly out of his or her official conduct or duties, and may fill the office by appointment for the period of suspension, not to extend beyond the term.
(2) During the period of the suspension, the public official shall not perform any official act, duty, or function or receive any pay, allowance, emolument, or privilege of office.
(3) If convicted, the public official may be removed from office by executive order of the Governor. For the purpose of this section, any person who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or who is found guilty shall be deemed to have been convicted, notwithstanding the suspension of sentence or the withholding of adjudication.
(4) If the public official is acquitted or found not guilty, or the charges are otherwise dismissed, the Governor shall by executive order revoke the suspension; and the public official shall be entitled to full back pay and such other emoluments or allowances to which he or she would have been entitled had he or she not been suspended.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) Violation of any provision of this part, including, but not limited to, any failure to file any disclosures required by this part or violation of any standard of conduct imposed by this part, or violation of any provision of s. 8, Art. II of the State Constitution, in addition to any criminal penalty or other civil penalty involved, shall, pursuant to applicable constitutional and statutory procedures, constitute grounds for, and may be punished by, one or more of the following: (a) In the case of a public officer: 1. Impeachment. 2. Removal from office. 3. Suspension from office. 4. Public censure and reprimand. 5. Forfeiture of no more than one-third salary per month for no more than 12 months. 6. A civil penalty not to exceed $10,000. 7. Restitution of any pecuniary benefits received because of the violation committed. (b) In the case of an employee or a person designated as a public officer by this part who otherwise would be deemed to be an employee: 1. Dismissal from employment. 2. Suspension from employment for not more than 90 days without pay. 3. Demotion. 4. Reduction in salary level. 5. Forfeiture of no more than one-third salary per month for no more than 12 months. 6. A civil penalty not to exceed $10,000. 7. Restitution of any pecuniary benefits received because of the violation committed. 8. Public censure and reprimand. (c) In the case of a candidate who violates the provisions of this part or s. 8(a) and (i), Art. II of the State Constitution: 1. Disqualification from being on the ballot. 2. Public censure. 3. Reprimand. 4. A civil penalty not to exceed $10,000. (d) In the case of a former public officer or employee who has violated a provision applicable to former officers or employees or whose violation occurred prior to such officer's or employee's leaving public office or employment: 1. Public censure and reprimand. 2. A civil penalty not to exceed $10,000. 3. Restitution of any pecuniary benefits received because of the violation committed. (2) In any case in which the commission finds a violation of this part or of s. 8, Art. II of the State Constitution and recommends a civil penalty or restitution penalty, the Attorney General shall bring a civil action to recover such penalty. No defense may be raised in the civil action to enforce the civil penalty or order of restitution that could have been raised by judicial review of the administrative findings and recommendations of the commission by certiorari to the district court of appeal. (3) The penalties prescribed in this part shall not be construed to limit or to conflict with: (a) The power of either house of the Legislature to discipline its own members or impeach a public officer. (b) The power of agencies to discipline officers or employees. (4) Any violation of this part or of s. 8, Art. II of the State Constitution by a public officer shall constitute malfeasance, misfeasance, or neglect of duty in office within the meaning of s. 7, Art. IV of the State Constitution. (5) By order of the Governor, upon recommendation of the commission, any elected municipal officer who violates any provision of this part or of s. 8, Art. II of the State Constitution may be suspended from office and the office filled by appointment for the period of suspension. The suspended officer may at any time before removal be reinstated by the Governor. The Senate may, in proceedings prescribed by law, remove from office, or reinstate, the suspended official, and for such purpose the Senate may be convened in special session by its President or by a majority of its membership. (6) Any person who willfully discloses, or permits to be disclosed, his or her intention to file a complaint, the existence or contents of a complaint which has been filed with the commission, or any document, action, or proceeding in connection with a confidential preliminary investigation of the commission, before such complaint, document, action, or proceeding becomes a public record as provided herein commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (7) In any case in which the commission finds probable cause to believe that a complainant has committed perjury in regard to any document filed with, or any testimony given before, the commission, it shall refer such evidence to the appropriate law enforcement agency for prosecution and taxation of costs. (8) In any case in which the commission determines that a person has filed a complaint against a public officer or employee with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of such officer or employee by filing the complaint with knowledge that the complaint contains one or more false allegations or with reckless disregard for whether the complaint contains false allegations of fact material to a violation of this part, the complainant shall be liable for costs plus reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the person complained against, including the costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in proving entitlement to and the amount of costs and fees. If the complainant fails to pay such costs and fees voluntarily within 30 days following such finding by the commission, the commission shall forward such information to the Department of Legal Affairs, which shall bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of such costs and fees awarded by the commission.
Defendants have violated;
TRIGGS - Wheeler - Proskauer
Whereby:
(1) It is unlawful for a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for any person or to cause harm to another, to:
(a) Falsify, or cause another person to falsify, any official record or official document;
(b) Conceal, cover up, destroy, mutilate, or alter any official record or official document or cause another person to perform such an act; or
(c) Obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to the commission of a felony that directly involves or affects the public agency or public entity served by the public servant.
(2) For the purposes of this section:
(a) The term "public servant" does not include a candidate who does not otherwise qualify as a public servant.
(b) An official record or official document includes only public records.
(3) Any person who violates this section commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Proskauer V. IVIEWIT
FALSE RECORDS ARE TRANSMITTED, WRONG COMPANIES SUED
JUDGE OVERLOOKS
TFB AND SUPREME COURT MAY PERMANENTLY ALTER AND PREMATURELY DESTROY RECORDS REGARDING CONFLICTS
Whereby:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), if any judge, justice, mayor, alderman, clerk, sheriff, coroner, or other public officer, or employee or agent of or contractor with a public agency, or any person whatsoever, shall steal, embezzle, alter, corruptly withdraw, falsify or avoid any record, process, charter, gift, grant, conveyance, or contract, or any paper filed in any judicial proceeding in any court of this state, or shall knowingly and willfully take off, discharge or conceal any issue, forfeited recognizance, or other forfeiture, or other paper above mentioned, or shall forge, deface, or falsify any document or instrument recorded, or filed in any court, or any registry, acknowledgment, or certificate, or shall fraudulently alter, deface, or falsify any minutes, documents, books, or any proceedings whatever of or belonging to any public office within this state; or if any person shall cause or procure any of the offenses aforesaid to be committed, or be in anywise concerned therein, the person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Defendants have violated;
TRIGGS Wheeler
IN THE IVIEWIT CASE TRIGGS IS TAKING AN INTEREST IN IVIEWIT WHILE HOLDING PUBLIC OFFICE. GAINS ACCESS TO IVIEWIT FILES AT BAR FOR USE IN CASE AGAINST IVIEWIT THAT HE HAS PERSONAL INTEREST IN
Whereby, any public servant who, in contemplation of official action by herself or himself or by a governmental unit with which the public servant is associated, or in reliance on information to which she or he has access in her or his official capacity and which has not been made public, commits any of the following acts:
(1) Acquisition of a pecuniary interest in any property, transaction, or enterprise or gaining of any pecuniary or other benefit which may be affected by such information or official action;
(3) Aiding another to do any of the foregoing, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Defendants have violated;
LONG LIST OF ACCOMPLICES IN THE BAR AND SUPREME COURT.
TO HAVE CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE, FRAUD DOCS TO SEC OF STATE
Wheeler Utley, ETC.
Whereby, whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense.
Defendants have violated;
LABARGA - FAILS TO NOTIFY AUTHORITIES
TURNER, HOFFMAN, MARVIN, BOGGS, SUPREME COURT AID AND ABETS
Whereby:
(1)(a) Any person not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity to the offender, who maintains or assists the principal or accessory before the fact, or gives the offender any other aid, knowing that the offender had committed a felony or been accessory thereto before the fact, with intent that the offender avoids or escapes detection, arrest, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.
If the felony offense committed is a capital felony, the offense of accessory after the fact is a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. (b) If the felony offense committed is a life felony or a felony of the first degree, the offense of accessory after the fact is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. (c) If the felony offense committed is a felony of the second degree or a felony of the third degree ranked in level 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023, the offense of accessory after the fact is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. (d) If the felony offense committed is a felony of the third degree ranked in level 1 or level 2 under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023, the offense of accessory after the fact is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. (3) Except as otherwise provided in s. 921.0022, for purposes of sentencing under chapter 921 and determining incentive gain-time eligibility under chapter 944, the offense of accessory after the fact is ranked two levels below the ranking under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023 of the felony offense committed. Attempts, solicitation, and conspiracy.
(1) A person who attempts to commit an offense prohibited by law and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of such offense, but fails in the perpetration or is intercepted or prevented in the execution thereof, commits the offense of criminal attempt, ranked for purposes of sentencing as provided in subsection (4).
(2) A person who solicits another to commit an offense prohibited by law and in the course of such solicitation commands, encourages, hires, or requests another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such offense or an attempt to commit such offense commits the offense of criminal solicitation, ranked for purposes of sentencing as provided in subsection (4).
(3) A person who agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with another person or persons to commit any offense commits the offense of criminal conspiracy, ranked for purposes of sentencing as provided in subsection (4).
(4)(a) Except as otherwise provided in ss. 104.091(2), 370.12(1), 828.125(2), 849.25(4), 893.135(5), and 921.0022, the offense of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is ranked for purposes of sentencing under chapter 921 and determining incentive gain-time eligibility under chapter 944 one level below the ranking under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023 of the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to. If the criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is of an offense ranked in level 1 or level 2 under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023, such offense is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in s. 893.135(5), if the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to is a life felony or a felony of the first degree, the offense of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in s. 104.091(2), s. 370.12(1), s. 828.125(2), or s. 849.25(4), if the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to is a:
1. Felony of the second degree;
2. Burglary that is a felony of the third degree; or
3. Felony of the third degree ranked in level 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023, the offense of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in s. 104.091(2), s. 370.12(1), s. 849.25(4), or paragraph (d), if the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to is a felony of the third degree, the offense of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in s. 104.091(2), if the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to is a misdemeanor of the first or second degree, the offense of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(5) It is a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy that, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his or her criminal purpose, the defendant:
(a) Abandoned his or her attempt to commit the offense or otherwise prevented its commission;
(b) After soliciting another person to commit an offense, persuaded such other person not to do so or otherwise prevented commission of the offense; or
(c) After conspiring with one or more persons to commit an offense, persuaded such persons not to do so or otherwise prevented commission of the offense.
WHEREFORE,
5. FLORIDA TRADE SECRETS ACT
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
DEFENDANTS IN BOCA THAT VIOLATED SUCH ARE Proskauer, Utley, Wheeler, DICK, FOLEY, Joao (STOLEN PATENT FILING OCCURRED IN BOCA) ALL USED ELECTRONIC EMAIL, FACSIMILE, US MAIL OTHER MEANS IS BROAD BUT IF THE BROAD FITS WEAR IT. THE THEFTS OF THE PATENT APPLICATIONS TO SHADOW COMPANIES.
(1) "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.
(2) "Misappropriation" means:
(a) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(b) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who:
1. Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
2. At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that her or his knowledge of the trade secret was:
a. Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it;
b. Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
c. Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
3. Before a material change of her or his position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Iviewit prays this Court order injunctive relief under;
Whereby:
(1) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation.
(2) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for which use could have been prohibited. Exceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable.
(3) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be compelled by court order.
Iviewit prays for damages from this court under;
(1) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation. Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. In lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.
(2) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award exemplary damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made under subsection
6. FLORIDA TITLE XXXIII REGULATION OF TRADE, COMMERCE, INVESTMENTS, AND SOLICITATIONS
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, any person who shall for herself or himself, or on behalf of any other person, procure the filing or registration of any mark with the Department of State under the provisions hereof, by knowingly making any false or fraudulent representation or declaration, verbally or in writing, or by any other fraudulent means, shall be liable to pay all damages sustained in consequence of such filing or registration, and for punitive or exemplary damages, to be recovered by or on behalf of the party injured thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
Subject to the provisions of s. 495.161, any person who shall: (1) Use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a mark registered under this chapter on any goods or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive as to the source or origin of such goods or services; or (2) Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any such mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used upon or in conjunction with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising in this state of goods or services; Shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of such registered mark for any or all of the remedies provided in s. 495.141, except that under subsection (2) hereof the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such mark is intended to be used to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
Iviewit prays for relief under;
Whereby:
(1) Any owner of a mark registered under this chapter may proceed by suit to enjoin the manufacture, use, display or sale of any counterfeits or imitations thereof and any court of competent jurisdiction may grant injunctions to restrain such manufacture, use, display or sale as may be by the said court deemed just and reasonable, and may require the defendants to pay to such owner all profits derived from and/or all damages suffered by reason of such wrongful manufacture, use, display or sale and to pay the costs of the action; and such court may also order that any such counterfeits or imitations in the possession or under the control of any defendant in such case be delivered to an officer of the court, or to the complainant, to be destroyed. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding 3 times such amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty. (2) The enumeration of any right or remedy herein shall not affect a registrant's right to prosecute under any penal law of this state.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, every person, association, or union of workers adopting and using a mark, trade name, label or form of advertisement may proceed by suit, and all courts having jurisdiction thereof shall grant injunctions, to enjoin subsequent use by another of the same or any similar mark, trade name, label or form of advertisement if it appears to the court that there exists a likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, trade name, label or form of advertisement of the prior user, notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
Nothing herein shall adversely affect or diminish the rights or the enforcement of rights in marks acquired in good faith at any time at common law.
Iviewit cites;
Any license issued by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation which is issued or renewed in response to an application upon which the person signing under oath or affirmation has falsely sworn to a material statement, including, but not limited to, the names and addresses of the owners or managers of the licensee or applicant, shall be subject to denial of the application or suspension or revocation of the license, and the person falsely swearing shall be subject to any other penalties provided by law.
7. FLORIDA PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
Defendants have violated;
THEFT OF THE SOURCE CODES AND REPRODUCTIONS IN SOFTWARE (I.E. MEDIA PLAYER) AND HARDWARE (I.E. CHIPSETS, CAMERA'S, ETC.)
Whereby:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Article" means any object, device, machine, material, substance, or composition of matter, or any mixture or copy thereof, whether in whole or in part, including any complete or partial writing, record, recording, drawing, sample, specimen, prototype model, photograph, microorganism, blueprint, map, or copy thereof.
(b) "Representing" means completely or partially describing, depicting, embodying, containing, constituting, reflecting, or recording.
(c) "Trade secret" means the whole or any portion or phase of any formula, pattern, device, combination of devices, or compilation of information which is for use, or is used, in the operation of a business and which provides the business an advantage, or an opportunity to obtain an advantage, over those who do not know or use it. "Trade secret" includes any scientific, technical, or commercial information, including any design, process, procedure, list of suppliers, list of customers, business code, or improvement thereof. Irrespective of novelty, invention, patentability, the state of the prior art, and the level of skill in the business, art, or field to which the subject matter pertains, a trade secret is considered to be:
1. Secret;
2. Of value;
3. For use or in use by the business; and
4. Of advantage to the business, or providing an opportunity to obtain an advantage, over those who do not know or use it when the owner thereof takes measures to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes.
(d) "Copy" means any facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction in whole or in part of an article and any note, drawing, or sketch made of or from an article or part or portion thereof.
(2) Any person who, with intent to deprive or withhold from the owner thereof the control of a trade secret, or with an intent to appropriate a trade secret to his or her own use or to the use of another, steals or embezzles an article representing a trade secret or without authority makes or causes to be made a copy of an article representing a trade secret is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(3) In a prosecution for a violation of the provisions of this section, it is no defense that the person so charged returned or intended to return the article so stolen, embezzled, or copied.
Defendants have committed robbery;
(1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.
(c) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3)(a) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing the robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission.
(b) An act shall be deemed "in the course of the taking" if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) OBTAINING BY TRICK, FALSE REPRESENTATION, ETC
Whoever, with the intent to defraud the owner or any person lawfully possessing any personal property or equipment, obtains the custody of such personal property or equipment by trick, deceit, or fraudulent or willful false representation shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, unless the value of the personal property or equipment is of a value of $300 or more; in that event the violation constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
9. CH 815 - COMPUTER-RELATED CRIMES
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) Computer-related crime is a growing problem in government as well as in the private sector.
(2) Computer-related crime occurs at great cost to the public since losses for each incident of computer crime tend to be far greater than the losses associated with each incident of other white collar crime.
(3) The opportunities for computer-related crimes in financial institutions, government programs, government records, and other business enterprises through the introduction of fraudulent records into a computer system, the unauthorized use of computer facilities, the alteration or destruction of computerized information or files, and the stealing of financial instruments, data, and other assets are great.
(4) While various forms of computer crime might possibly be the subject of criminal charges based on other provisions of law, it is appropriate and desirable that a supplemental and additional statute be provided which proscribes various forms of computer abuse.
(10) "Intellectual property" means data, including programs.
(11) "Property" means anything of value as defined in 1s. 812.011 and includes, but is not limited to, financial instruments, information, including electronically produced data and computer software and programs in either machine-readable or human-readable form, and any other tangible or intangible item of value.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization modifies data, programs, or supporting documentation residing or existing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network commits an offense against intellectual property.
(2) Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization destroys data, programs, or supporting documentation residing or existing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network commits an offense against intellectual property.
(3)(a) Data, programs, or supporting documentation which is a trade secret as defined in s. 812.081 which resides or exists internal or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network which is held by an agency as defined in chapter 119 is confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution. (b) Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization discloses or takes data, programs, or supporting documentation which is a trade secret as defined in s. 812.081 or is confidential as provided by law residing or existing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network commits an offense against intellectual property.
(4)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an offense against intellectual property is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) If the offense is committed for the purpose of devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain any property, then the offender is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, the Legislature finds that it is a public necessity that trade secret information as defined in s. 812.081, and as provided for in s. 815.04(3), be expressly made confidential and exempt from the public records law because it is a felony to disclose such records. Due to the legal uncertainty as to whether a public employee would be protected from a felony conviction if otherwise complying with chapter 119, and with s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution, it is imperative that a public records exemption be created. The Legislature in making disclosure of trade secrets a crime has clearly established the importance attached to trade secret protection. Disclosing trade secrets in an agency's possession would negatively impact the business interests of those providing an agency such trade secrets by damaging them in the marketplace, and those entities and individuals disclosing such trade secrets would hesitate to cooperate with that agency, which would impair the effective and efficient administration of governmental functions. Thus, the public and private harm in disclosing trade secrets significantly outweighs any public benefit derived from disclosure, and the public's ability to scrutinize and monitor agency action is not diminished by nondisclosure of trade secrets.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization:
(a) Accesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or computer network;
(b) Disrupts or denies or causes the denial of computer system services to an authorized user of such computer system services, which, in whole or part, is owned by, under contract to, or operated for, on behalf of, or in conjunction with another;
(c) Destroys, takes, injures, or damages equipment or supplies used or intended to be used in a computer, computer system, or computer network;
(d) Destroys, injures, or damages any computer, computer system, or computer network; or
(e) Introduces any computer contaminant into any computer, computer system, or computer network, commits an offense against computer users.
(2)(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c), whoever violates subsection (1) commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) Whoever violates subsection (1) and:
1. Damages a computer, computer equipment, computer supplies, a computer system, or a computer network, and the monetary damage or loss incurred as a result of the violation is $5,000 or greater;
2. Commits the offense for the purpose of devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain property; or
3. Interrupts or impairs a governmental operation or public communication, transportation, or supply of water, gas, or other public service, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization modifies equipment or supplies used or intended to be used in a computer, computer system, or computer network commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(4)(a) In addition to any other civil remedy available, the owner or lessee of the computer, computer system, computer network, computer program, computer equipment, computer supplies, or computer data may bring a civil action against any person convicted under this section for compensatory damages.
(b) In any action brought under this subsection, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
(5) Any computer, computer system, computer network, computer software, or computer data owned by a defendant which is used during the commission of any violation of this section or any computer owned by the defendant which is used as a repository for the storage of software or data obtained in violation of this section is subject to forfeiture as provided under ss. 932.701-932.704.
(6) This section does not apply to any person who accesses his or her employer's computer system, computer network, computer program, or computer data when acting within the scope of his or her lawful employment.
(7) For purposes of bringing a civil or criminal action under this section, a person who causes, by any means, the access to a computer, computer system, or computer network in one jurisdiction from another jurisdiction is deemed to have personally accessed the computer, computer system, or computer network in both jurisdictions.
The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to preclude the applicability of any other provision of the criminal law of this state which presently applies or may in the future apply to any transaction which violates this chapter, unless such provision is inconsistent with the terms of this chapter.
Defendants have violated;
(3) The term "forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark" refers to a mark:
(a) That is identical with or an imitation of a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the trademark register for the State of Florida or any other state, or protected by the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. s. 380, whether or not the offender knew such mark was so registered or protected; and
Whereby:
(1) Whoever, knowingly and willfully, forges or counterfeits, or causes or procures to be forged or counterfeited, upon or in connection with any goods or services, the trademark or service mark of any person, entity, or association, which goods or services are intended for resale, or knowingly possesses tools or other reproduction materials for reproduction of specific forged or counterfeit trademarks or service marks shall be guilty of the crime of counterfeiting. The crime of counterfeiting shall be punishable as follows:
(a) If the goods or services to which the forged or counterfeit trademarks or service marks are attached, affixed, or used in connection with, or to which the offender intended they be attached, affixed, or used in connection with, have a retail sale value of $1,000 or more, the offender commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) All defenses, affirmative defenses, and limitations on remedies that would be applicable in an action under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 1051 et seq., or to an action under s. 495.131 shall be applicable in a prosecution under this section.
(b) The use of which is unauthorized by the owner of the registered mark.
(4)(a) Any goods to which the forged or counterfeit trademarks or service marks are attached or affixed, or any tools or other reproduction materials for the reproduction of any specific forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark, which are produced or possessed in violation of this section, may be seized by any law enforcement officer and shall be destroyed upon the written consent of the offender or by judicial determination that the seized goods, tools, or other reproduction materials have attached or affixed to them a forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark, unless the owner of the registered or protected trademark or service mark which has been forged or counterfeited approves a different disposition. The owner of the registered or protected trademark shall be responsible for the actual costs incurred in the disposition of said forged or counterfeited goods.
(b) Any personal property, including, but not limited to, any item, object, tool, machine, or vehicle of any kind, employed as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of, the crime of counterfeiting, as proscribed by paragraphs (1)(a)-(c), and not otherwise included in paragraph (a), may be seized and is subject to forfeiture pursuant to ss. 932.701-932.704.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) Any person making any erasure, alteration, interlineation or interpolation in any writing or instrument mentioned in s. 92.28, and made admissible in evidence, with the fraudulent intent to change the same in any substantial manner after the same has once been made, shall be guilty of the crime of forgery, which, for the purposes of this section, constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) All defenses, affirmative defenses, and limitations on remedies that would be applicable in an action under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 1051 et seq., or to an action under s. 495.131 shall be applicable in a prosecution under this section.
(3) The term "forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark" refers to a mark:
(a) That is identical with or an imitation of a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the trademark register for the State of Florida or any other state, or protected by the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. s. 380, whether or not the offender knew such mark was so registered or protected; and
(b) The use of which is unauthorized by the owner of the registered mark.
(4)(a) Any goods to which the forged or counterfeit trademarks or service marks are attached or affixed, or any tools or other reproduction materials for the reproduction of any specific forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark, which are produced or possessed in violation of this section, may be seized by any law enforcement officer and shall be destroyed upon the written consent of the offender or by judicial determination that the seized goods, tools, or other reproduction materials have attached or affixed to them a forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark, unless the owner of the registered or protected trademark or service mark which has been forged or counterfeited approves a different disposition. The owner of the registered or protected trademark shall be responsible for the actual costs incurred in the disposition of said forged or counterfeited goods.
(b) Any personal property, including, but not limited to, any item, object, tool, machine, or vehicle of any kind, employed as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of, the crime of counterfeiting, as proscribed by paragraphs (1)(a)-(c), and not otherwise included in paragraph (a), may be seized and is subject to forfeiture pursuant to ss. 932.701-932.704.
Defendants have violated;
DO INSTRUMENTS OF WRITING STILL = USPTO AND FL PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS?? TRADEMARKS FOR SURE.
Whereby:
(1) Any person making any erasure, alteration, interlineation or interpolation in any writing or instrument mentioned in s. 92.28, and made admissible in evidence, with the fraudulent intent to change the same in any substantial manner after the same has once been made, shall be guilty of the crime of forgery, which, for the purposes of this section, constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) Whoever knowingly sells or offers for sale, or knowingly purchases and keeps or has in his or her possession, with intent that the same shall be sold or disposed, or vends any goods having thereon a forged or counterfeit trademark, or who knowingly sells or offers for sale any service which service is sold in conjunction with a forged or counterfeit service mark, of any person, entity, or association, knowing the same to be forged or counterfeited, shall be guilty of the crime of selling or offering for sale counterfeit goods or services, punishable as follows:
(a) If the goods or services which the offender sells, or offers for sale, have a retail sale value of $1,000 or more, the offender commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) If the goods or services which the offender sells, or offers for sale, have a retail sale value of less than $1,000, the offender commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) All defenses, affirmative defenses, and limitations on remedies that would be applicable in an action under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 1051 et seq., or to an action under s. 495.131, shall be applicable in a prosecution under this section.
(3) The terms "forged or counterfeit trademark" or "forged or counterfeit service mark" refer to a mark:
(a) That is identical with or an imitation of a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the trademark register for the State of Florida or any other state, or protected by the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. s. 380, whether or not the offender knew such mark was so registered or protected; and
(b) The use of which is unauthorized by the owner of the mark.
(4)(a) Any goods to which the forged or counterfeit trademarks or service marks are attached or affixed may be seized by any law enforcement officer and shall be destroyed upon the written consent of the offender or by judicial determination that the seized goods have attached or affixed to them a forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark, unless the owner of the registered or protected trademark or service mark which has been forged or counterfeited approves a different disposition. The owner of the registered or protected trademark shall be responsible for the actual costs incurred in the disposition of said forged or counterfeited goods.
(b) Any personal property, including, but not limited to, any item, object, tool, machine, or vehicle of any kind, employed as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of, the crime of selling or offering for sale counterfeit goods or services, as proscribed by paragraphs (1)(a)-(b), and not otherwise included in paragraph (a), may be seized and is subject to forfeiture pursuant to ss. 932.701-932.704.
10. FLORIDA - FORGERY
Defendants have violated;
LETS COUNT THE WAYS
FORGED PATENT DOCUMENTS
FORGED INSURANCE DOCUMENTS AIG & GENRE
FORGED BOOKS AND SEC OF STATE
FORGED TRANSACTION DOCUMENTS FOR Tiedemann MONIES
Whereby, whoever falsely makes, alters, forges or counterfeits a public record, or a certificate, return or attestation of any clerk or register of a court, public register, notary public, town clerk or any public officer, in relation to a matter wherein such certificate, return or attestation may be received as a legal proof; or a charter, deed, will, testament, bond, or writing obligatory, letter of attorney, policy of insurance, bill of lading, bill of exchange or promissory note, or an order, acquittance, or discharge for money or other property, or an acceptance of a bill of exchange or promissory note for the payment of money, or any receipt for money, goods or other property, or any passage ticket, pass or other evidence of transportation issued by a common carrier, with intent to injure or defraud any person, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, whoever utters and publishes as true a false, forged or altered record, deed, instrument or other writing mentioned in s. 831.01 knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited, with intent to injure or defraud any person, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) Whoever, knowingly and willfully, forges or counterfeits, or causes or procures to be forged or counterfeited, upon or in connection with any goods or services, the trademark or service mark of any person, entity, or association, which goods or services are intended for resale, or knowingly possesses tools or other reproduction materials for reproduction of specific forged or counterfeit trademarks or service marks shall be guilty of the crime of counterfeiting. The crime of counterfeiting shall be punishable as follows:
(a) If the goods or services to which the forged or counterfeit trademarks or service marks are attached, affixed, or used in connection with, or to which the offender intended they be attached, affixed, or used in connection with, have a retail sale value of $1,000 or more, the offender commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) All defenses, affirmative defenses, and limitations on remedies that would be applicable in an action under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 1051 et seq., or to an action under s. 495.131 shall be applicable in a prosecution under this section.
(3) The term "forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark" refers to a mark:
(a) That is identical with or an imitation of a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the trademark register for the State of Florida or any other state, or protected by the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. s. 380, whether or not the offender knew such mark was so registered or protected; and
(b) The use of which is unauthorized by the owner of the registered mark.
(4)(a) Any goods to which the forged or counterfeit trademarks or service marks are attached or affixed, or any tools or other reproduction materials for the reproduction of any specific forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark, which are produced or possessed in violation of this section, may be seized by any law enforcement officer and shall be destroyed upon the written consent of the offender or by judicial determination that the seized goods, tools, or other reproduction materials have attached or affixed to them a forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark, unless the owner of the registered or protected trademark or service mark which has been forged or counterfeited approves a different disposition. The owner of the registered or protected trademark shall be responsible for the actual costs incurred in the disposition of said forged or counterfeited goods.
(b) Any personal property, including, but not limited to, any item, object, tool, machine, or vehicle of any kind, employed as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of, the crime of counterfeiting, as proscribed by paragraphs (1)(a)-(c), and not otherwise included in paragraph (a), may be seized and is subject to forfeiture pursuant to ss. 932.701-932.704.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) Any person making any erasure, alteration, interlineation or interpolation in any writing or instrument mentioned in s. 92.28, and made admissible in evidence, with the fraudulent intent to change the same in any substantial manner after the same has once been made, shall be guilty of the crime of forgery, which, for the purposes of this section, constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) Whoever knowingly sells or offers for sale, or knowingly purchases and keeps or has in his or her possession, with intent that the same shall be sold or disposed, or vends any goods having thereon a forged or counterfeit trademark, or who knowingly sells or offers for sale any service which service is sold in conjunction with a forged or counterfeit service mark, of any person, entity, or association, knowing the same to be forged or counterfeited, shall be guilty of the crime of selling or offering for sale counterfeit goods or services, punishable as follows:
(a) If the goods or services which the offender sells, or offers for sale, have a retail sale value of $1,000 or more, the offender commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) If the goods or services which the offender sells, or offers for sale, have a retail sale value of less than $1,000, the offender commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) All defenses, affirmative defenses, and limitations on remedies that would be applicable in an action under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 1051 et seq., or to an action under s. 495.131, shall be applicable in a prosecution under this section.
(3) The terms "forged or counterfeit trademark" or "forged or counterfeit service mark" refer to a mark:
(a) That is identical with or an imitation of a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the trademark register for the State of Florida or any other state, or protected by the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. s. 380, whether or not the offender knew such mark was so registered or protected; and
(b) The use of which is unauthorized by the owner of the mark.
(4)(a) Any goods to which the forged or counterfeit trademarks or service marks are attached or affixed may be seized by any law enforcement officer and shall be destroyed upon the written consent of the offender or by judicial determination that the seized goods have attached or affixed to them a forged or counterfeit trademark or service mark, unless the owner of the registered or protected trademark or service mark which has been forged or counterfeited approves a different disposition. The owner of the registered or protected trademark shall be responsible for the actual costs incurred in the disposition of said forged or counterfeited goods.
(b) Any personal property, including, but not limited to, any item, object, tool, machine, or vehicle of any kind, employed as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of, the crime of selling or offering for sale counterfeit goods or services, as proscribed by paragraphs (1)(a)-(b), and not otherwise included in paragraph (a), may be seized and is subject to forfeiture pursuant to ss. 932.701-932.704.
Defendants have violated;
Tiedemann DOCS
INSURANCE APPLICATIONS AFTER Utley IS TERMINATED
Hersch ON DOCS
Lewin ON INCOME STATEMENTS
CORPORATE SHELLS
Whereby, if a fictitious or pretended signature, purporting to be the signature of an officer or agent of a corporation, is fraudulently affixed to any instrument or writing purporting to be a note, draft or evidence of debt issued by such corporation, with intent to pass the same as true, it shall be deemed a forgery, though no such person may ever have been an officer or agent of such corporation, or ever have existed.
11. FLORIDA CH 817 - FRAUDULENT PRACTICES - PART I - FALSE PRETENSES AND FRAUDS, GENERALLY
Defendants have violated;
SHADOW COMPANIES GAINING IP
Utley Reale TAKING CORPORATE FUNDS, Hersch SIGNING DOCS AND Wheeler CREATING SHADOW COMPANIES
Whereby, whoever falsely personates or represents another, and in such assumed character receives any property intended to be delivered to the party so personated, with intent to convert the same to his or her own use, shall be punished as if he or she had been convicted of larceny.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, a person who obtains access to a home or private business by false personation or representation, with the intent to commit a felony, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Lewin BOGUS INCOME STATEMENTS
Utley FALSE STATEMENTS AND RESUMES TO INVESTORS AND WACHOVIA AND SHAREHOLDERS.
BUSINESS PLANS AND RECORDS TRANSMITTED TO SBA TO SECURE FUNDS AND COMPLIANCE - MAY BE FED
Lewin ON RETURNS AND OTHER DOCS
ALL INVESTORS WERE GIVEN FALSE STATEMENTS REGARDING Rubenstein WHICH CAUSED INVESTMENT BASED ON SUCH FALSE STATEMENTS. TRANSFERRED FALSE INFORMATION TO ALL INVESTORS, SBA AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO SCORE CREDIT AND FINANCE.
Whereby, any person who shall make or cause to be made any false statement, in writing, relating to his or her financial condition, assets or liabilities, or relating to the financial condition, assets or liabilities of any firm or corporation in which such person has a financial interest, or for whom he or she is acting, with a fraudulent intent of obtaining credit, goods, money or other property, and shall by such false statement obtain credit, goods, money or other property, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, prosecutions under s. 817.03 may be begun in the county where the statement was written, or purports to have been written.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
(a) The Legislature recognizes that schemes to defraud have proliferated in the United States in recent years and that many operators of schemes to defraud use communications technology to solicit victims and thereby conceal their identities and overcome a victim's normal resistance to sales pressure by delivering a personalized sales message.
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to prevent the use of communications technology in furtherance of schemes to defraud by consolidating former statutes concerning schemes to defraud and organized fraud to permit prosecution of these crimes utilizing the legal precedent available under federal mail and wire fraud statutes.
(2) SHORT TITLE. This section may be cited as the "Florida Communications Fraud Act."
(3) DEFINITIONS.--As used in this section, the term:
(a) "Communicate" means to transmit or transfer or to cause another to transmit or transfer signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligences of any nature in whole or in part by mail, or by wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system.
(b) "Obtain" means temporarily or permanently to deprive any person of the right to property or a benefit therefrom, or to appropriate the property to one's own use or to the use of any other person not entitled thereto.
(c) "Property" means anything of value, and includes:
1. Real property, including things growing on, affixed to, or found in land;
2. Tangible or intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, and claims; and
3. Services.
(d) "Scheme to defraud" means a systematic, ongoing course of conduct with intent to defraud one or more persons, or with intent to obtain property from one or more persons by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises or willful misrepresentations of a future act.
(e) "Value" means value determined according to any of the following:
1.a. The market value of the property at the time and place of the offense, or, if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the offense.
b. The value of a written instrument that does not have a readily ascertainable market value, in the case of an instrument such as a check, draft, or promissory note, is the amount due or collectible or is, in the case of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges, or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege, or obligation, the greatest amount of economic loss that the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instrument.
c. The value of a trade secret that does not have a readily ascertainable market value is any reasonable value representing the damage to the owner, suffered by reason of losing an advantage over those who do not know of or use the trade secret.
2. If the value of property cannot be ascertained, the trier of fact may find the value to be not less than a certain amount; if no such minimum value can be ascertained, the value is an amount less than $300.
3. Amounts of value of separate properties obtained in one scheme to defraud, whether from the same person or from several persons, shall be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense under paragraph (4)(a).
(4) OFFENSES.--
(a) Any person who engages in a scheme to defraud and obtains property thereby is guilty of organized fraud, punishable as follows:
1. If the amount of property obtained has an aggregate value of $50,000 or more, the violator is guilty of a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
2. If the amount of property obtained has an aggregate value of $20,000 or more, but less than $50,000, the violator is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
3. If the amount of property obtained has an aggregate value of less than $20,000, the violator is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) Any person who engages in a scheme to defraud and, in furtherance of that scheme, communicates with any person with intent to obtain property from that person is guilty, for each such act of communication, of communications fraud, punishable as follows:
1. If the value of property obtained or endeavored to be obtained by the communication is valued at $300 or more, the violator is guilty of a third degree felony, punishable as set forth in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
2. If the value of the property obtained or endeavored to be obtained by the communication is valued at less than $300, the violator is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as set forth in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(c) Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of law, separate judgments and sentences for organized fraud under paragraph (a) and for each offense of communications fraud under paragraph (b) may be imposed when all such offenses involve the same scheme to defraud.
Defendants have violated;
Any merchant in the state, before extending credit to any person applying for the same, may require such applicant to furnish a statement in writing showing the property owned and the salary being earned by said applicant, and if said statement, or any part thereof, is false, provided the same be made willfully, and signed by applicant in presence of two witnesses, and any person obtains credit from any merchant by reason of the merchant relying on and being deceived by said false statement, or any part thereof, then said person so obtaining credit or goods shall be deemed guilty of obtaining money or goods under false pretenses and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) No person, persons, association, copartnership, or institution shall, with intent to offer or sell or in anywise dispose of merchandise, securities, certificates, diplomas, documents, or other credentials purporting to reflect proficiency in any trade, skill, profession, credits for academic achievement, service or anything offered by such person, persons, association, copartnership, corporation, or institution directly or indirectly, to the public, for sale or distribution or issuance, or with intent to increase the consumption or use thereof, or with intent to induce the public in any manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, or to acquire title thereto, or any interest therein, or ownership thereof, knowingly or intentionally make, publish, disseminate, circulate or place before the public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated or circulated or placed before the public in this state in a newspaper or other publication or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, bill, circular, pamphlet or letter or in any other way, an advertisement of any sort regarding such certificate, diploma, document, credential, academic credits, merchandise, security, service or anything so offered to the public, which advertisement contains any assertion, representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading.
(2) Any person, persons, association, copartnership, corporation, or institution found guilty of a violation of subsection (1) shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) It is unlawful for any person, company, corporation, agency, association, partnership, institution, or charitable entity to solicit payment of money by another by means of a statement or invoice, or any writing that would reasonably be interpreted as a statement or invoice, for goods not yet ordered or for services not yet performed and not yet ordered, unless there appears on the face of the statement or invoice or writing in 30-point boldfaced type the following warning:
"This is a solicitation for the order of goods or services, and you are under no obligation to make payment unless you accept the offer contained herein."
(2) Any person damaged by noncompliance with this section, in addition to other remedies, is entitled to damages in the amount equal to 3 times the sum solicited.
(3) Any person, company, corporation, agency, association, partnership, institution, or charitable entity that violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.083.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, any person guilty of violating the provisions of s. 817.11 shall be deemed guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Lewin - Proskauer - Utley - Reale - Hersch - E. Lewin - Kasser -
Whereby:
Any officer, agent, clerk or servant of a corporation who makes a false entry in the books thereof, with intent to defraud, and any person whose duty it is to make in such books a record or entry of the transfer of stock, or of the issuing and canceling of certificates thereof, or of the amount of stock issued by such corporation, who omits to make a true record or entry thereof, with intent to defraud, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Wheeler + Proskauer + Utley + Hersch
Whereby, a person may not, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the Department of State, knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal a material fact, make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, or make or use any false document, knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry. A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. The statute of limitations for prosecution of an act committed in violation of this section is 5 years from the date the act was committed.
Defendants have violated;
SHADOW COMPANIES - Proskauer - Utley - HUIZENGA - CROSSBOW - Hersh - Tiedemann
How about non-existent corporate formation for D&O policy
Whereby, any officer, agent, clerk or servant of a corporation, or any other person, who fraudulently issues or transfers a certificate of stock of a corporation to any person not entitled thereto, or fraudulently signs such certificate, in blank or otherwise, with the intent that it shall be so issued or transferred by himself or herself or any other person, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, Any officer, agent, clerk or servant of a corporation, or any other person, who issues, or signs with intent to issue, any certificate of stock in a corporation, or who issues, signs or endorses with intent to issue any bond, note, bill or other obligation or security in the name of such corporation, beyond the amount authorized by law, or limited by the legal votes of such corporation or its proper officers; or negotiates, transfers or disposes of such certificate, with intent to defraud, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Iviewit cites;
On the trial of any person under ss. 817.19 and 817.20 the books of any corporation to which such person has access or the right of access shall be admissible in evidence.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1)(a) A person commits insurance fraud punishable as provided in subsection (11) if that person, with the intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurer:
1. Presents or causes to be presented any written or oral statement as part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy or a health maintenance organization subscriber or provider contract, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim;
2. Prepares or makes any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any insurer in connection with, or in support of, any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy or a health maintenance organization subscriber or provider contract, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim; or
3.a. Knowingly presents, causes to be presented, or prepares or makes with knowledge or belief that it will be presented to any insurer, purported insurer, servicing corporation, insurance broker, or insurance agent, or any employee or agent thereof, any false, incomplete, or misleading information or written or oral statement as part of, or in support of, an application for the issuance of, or the rating of, any insurance policy, or a health maintenance organization subscriber or provider contract; or
b. Who knowingly conceals information concerning any fact material to such application.
(b) All claims and application forms shall contain a statement that is approved by the Office of Insurance Regulation of the Financial Services Commission which clearly states in substance the following: "Any person who knowingly and with intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurer files a statement of claim or an application containing any false, incomplete, or misleading information is guilty of a felony of the third degree." This paragraph shall not apply to reinsurance contracts, reinsurance agreements, or reinsurance claims transactions.
(2)(a) Any physician licensed under chapter 458, osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 459, chiropractic physician licensed under chapter 460, or other practitioner licensed under the laws of this state who knowingly and willfully assists, conspires with, or urges any insured party to fraudulently violate any of the provisions of this section or part XI of chapter 627, or any person who, due to such assistance, conspiracy, or urging by said physician, osteopathic physician, chiropractic physician, or practitioner, knowingly and willfully benefits from the proceeds derived from the use of such fraud, commits insurance fraud, punishable as provided in subsection (11). In the event that a physician, osteopathic physician, chiropractic physician, or practitioner is adjudicated guilty of a violation of this section, the Board of Medicine as set forth in chapter 458, the Board of Osteopathic Medicine as set forth in chapter 459, the Board of Chiropractic Medicine as set forth in chapter 460, or other appropriate licensing authority shall hold an administrative hearing to consider the imposition of administrative sanctions as provided by law against said physician, osteopathic physician, chiropractic physician, or practitioner.
(b) In addition to any other provision of law, systematic upcoding by a provider, as defined in s. 641.19(14), with the intent to obtain reimbursement otherwise not due from an insurer is punishable as provided in s. 641.52(5).
(3) Any attorney who knowingly and willfully assists, conspires with, or urges any claimant to fraudulently violate any of the provisions of this section or part XI of chapter 627, or any person who, due to such assistance, conspiracy, or urging on such attorney's part, knowingly and willfully benefits from the proceeds derived from the use of such fraud, commits insurance fraud, punishable as provided in subsection (11).
(4) Any person or governmental unit licensed under chapter 395 to maintain or operate a hospital, and any administrator or employee of any such hospital, who knowingly and willfully allows the use of the facilities of said hospital by an insured party in a scheme or conspiracy to fraudulently violate any of the provisions of this section or part XI of chapter 627 commits insurance fraud, punishable as provided in subsection (11). Any adjudication of guilt for a violation of this subsection, or the use of business practices demonstrating a pattern indicating that the spirit of the law set forth in this section or part XI of chapter 627 is not being followed, shall be grounds for suspension or revocation of the license to operate the hospital or the imposition of an administrative penalty of up to $5,000 by the licensing agency, as set forth in chapter 395.
(5) Any insurer damaged as a result of a violation of any provision of this section when there has been a criminal adjudication of guilt shall have a cause of action to recover compensatory damages, plus all reasonable investigation and litigation expenses, including attorneys' fees, at the trial and appellate courts.
(6) For the purposes of this section, "statement" includes, but is not limited to, any notice, statement, proof of loss, bill of lading, invoice, account, estimate of property damages, bill for services, diagnosis, prescription, hospital or doctor records, X ray, test result, or other evidence of loss, injury, or expense.
(b) The provisions of this section shall also apply as to any insurer or adjusting firm or its agents or representatives who, with intent, injure, defraud, or deceive any claimant with regard to any claim. The claimant shall have the right to recover the damages provided in this section.
(10) As used in this section, the term "insurer" means any insurer, health maintenance organization, self-insurer, self-insurance fund, or other similar entity or person regulated under chapter 440 or chapter 641 or by the Office of Insurance Regulation under the Florida Insurance Code.
(11) If the value of any property involved in a violation of this section:
(a) Is less than $20,000, the offender commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) Is $20,000 or more, but less than $100,000, the offender commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(c) Is $100,000 or more, the offender commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(12) As used in this section:
(a) "Property" means property as defined in s. 812.012.
(b) "Value" means value as defined in s. 812.012.
CROSSBOW & DISTREAM - SECURED CREDIT - ATTEMPTED TRANSFER
TRANSACTIONS WITH IVIEWIT
TRANSACTIONS WITH THE SBA
Whereby:
Crossbow
Proskauer
Utley
(1) As used in this section, the terms "proceeds," "security agreement," "security interest," and "secured party" shall be given the meanings prescribed for them in chapter 679.
(2) A person is guilty of fraud involving a security interest when, having executed a security agreement creating a security interest in personal property, including accounts receivable, which security interest secures a monetary obligation owed to a secured party, and:
(a) Having under the security agreement both the right of sale or other disposition of the property and the duty to account to the secured party for the proceeds of disposition, he or she sells or otherwise disposes of the property and wrongfully and willfully fails to account to the secured party for the proceeds of disposition; or
(b) Having under the security agreement no right of sale or other disposition of the property, he or she knowingly secretes, withholds, or disposes of such property in violation of the security agreement.
(3) Any person who knowingly violates this section shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the value of the property sold, secreted, withheld, or disposed of or the proceeds from the sale or disposition of the property is $300 or more, such person is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Utley Wheeler - Utley RESUME - Utley RESUME TO INVESTORS, Utley RESUME TO SBA AND OTHERS
Whereby, any person who, with intent to defraud, misrepresents his or her association with, or academic standing or other progress at, any postsecondary educational institution by falsely making, altering, simulating, or forging a document, degree, certificate, diploma, award, record, letter, transcript, form, or other paper; or any person who causes or procures such a misrepresentation; or any person who utters and publishes or otherwise represents such a document, degree, certificate, diploma, award, record, letter, transcript, form, or other paper as true, knowing it to be false, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Defendants have violated;
Utley Wheeler - Utley RESUME - Utley RESUME TO INVESTORS, Utley RESUME TO SBA AND OTHERS
Whereby:
(1) No person in the state may claim, either orally or in writing, to possess an academic degree, as defined in s. 1005.02, or the title associated with said degree, unless the person has, in fact, been awarded said degree from an institution that is:
(a) Accredited by a regional or professional accrediting agency recognized by the United States Department of Education or the Commission on Recognition of Postsecondary Accreditation;
(b) Provided, operated, and supported by a state government or any of its political subdivisions or by the Federal Government;
(c) A school, institute, college, or university chartered outside the United States, the academic degree from which has been validated by an accrediting agency approved by the United States Department of Education as equivalent to the baccalaureate or post baccalaureate degree conferred by a regionally accredited college or university in the United States;
(d) Licensed by the 1 State Board of Independent Colleges and Universities pursuant to ss. 1005.01-1005.38 or exempt from licensure pursuant to 2s. 246.085; or
(e) A religious seminary, institute, college, or university which offers only educational programs that prepare students for a religious vocation, career, occupation, profession, or lifework, and the nomenclature of whose certificates, diplomas, or degrees clearly identifies the religious character of the educational program.
(2) No person awarded a doctorate degree from an institution not listed in subsection (1) shall claim in the state, either orally or in writing, the title "Dr." before the person's name or any mark, appellation, or series of letters, numbers, or words, such as, but not limited to, "Ph.D.," "Ed.D.," "D.N.," or "D.Th.," which signifies, purports, or is generally taken to signify satisfactory completion of the requirements of a doctorate degree, after the person's name.
(3)(a) A person who violates the provisions of subsection (1) or subsection (2) commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) In addition to any penalty imposed under paragraph (a), a violator shall be subject to any other penalty provided by law, including, but not limited to, suspension or revocation of the violator's license or certification to practice an occupation or profession.
12. FLORIDA PERJURY
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, In this chapter, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(1) "Official proceeding" means a proceeding heard, or which may be or is required to be heard, before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence under oath, including any referee, master in chancery, administrative law judge, hearing officer, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person taking testimony or a deposition in connection with any such proceeding.
(2) "Oath" includes affirmation or any other form of attestation required or authorized by law by which a person acknowledges that he or she is bound in conscience or law to testify truthfully in an official proceeding or other official matter.
(3) "Material matter" means any subject, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could affect the course or outcome of the proceeding. Whether a matter is material in a given factual situation is a question of law.
Defendants have violated;
In Florida the following perjuries have occurred
Labarga court depositions
Rubenstein deposition perjury & Rubenstein Sworn Statements to Judge Jorge Labarga, conflict and constitute perjury
Wheeler perjured deposition that contradicts sworn statements to the Florida Bar and Wheeler admission of perjured statement
Triggs perjured statements made on behalf and in defense of Wheeler to the Florida Bar - Conflict of interest - Aiding and abetting Wheelers
Utley Perjury & Contradictions of other testimony of Wheeler
Lewin - Borderline perjury - “erasing memory”
Whereby:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), whoever makes a false statement, which he or she does not believe to be true, under oath in an official proceeding in regard to any material matter, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Whoever makes a false statement, which he or she does not believe to be true, under oath in an official proceeding that relates to the prosecution of a capital felony, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) Knowledge of the materiality of the statement is not an element of the crime of perjury under subsection (1) or subsection (2), and the defendant's mistaken belief that the statement was not material is not a defense.
Defendants have violated;
Wheeler, Rubenstein & Utley variety of statements in deposition are all false and contradictory to evidence. For example Utley deposition contradicts his own resume submitted to financial institutions, Wheeler and Triggs admit contradiction of statements in response to bar inquiry. Rubenstein has serious problems. The Rubenstein deposition was conducted via tele in a FL court proceeding with him in NY. Tapes available upon request.
Whereby;
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), whoever, in one or more official proceedings, willfully makes two or more material statements under oath which contradict each other, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Whoever, in one or more official proceedings that relate to the prosecution of a capital felony, willfully makes two or more material statements under oath which contradict each other, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) In any prosecution for perjury under this section:
(a) The prosecution may proceed in a single count by setting forth the willful making of contradictory statements under oath and alleging in the alternative that one or more of them are false.
(b) The question of whether a statement was material is a question of law to be determined by the court.
(c) It is not necessary to prove which, if any, of the contradictory statements is not true.
(d) It is a defense that the accused believed each statement to be true at the time the statement was made.
Defendants have violated;
Utley and Reale to Flechaus - false information
Kasser signing release is false
Tiedemann call with Flechaus
Is The Florida Bar considered law enforcement
Whereby:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), whoever knowingly gives false information to any law enforcement officer concerning the alleged commission of any crime, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) Whoever knowingly gives false information to a law enforcement officer concerning the alleged commission of a capital felony, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Defendants have violated;
Triggs & Wheeler make false statements to the Florida Bar
Rubenstein makes false statements to Labarga
SB make false statement with Selz regarding representation of Iviewit Holdings, Inc. in Labarga court
False statements are tendered to Labarga with intent on suing shadow companies
Utley, Reale, Intel/R3D, Hersh - Make false statements to Florida Bankruptcy Court (is this feds)
Whereby, whoever knowingly makes a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his or her official duty shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
13. FLORIDA STATE TAX LAW - CHAPTER 220 - INCOME TAX CODE
Lewin losses records
Lewin in conflict
Kasser hijacks records
Wheeler creates frauds in reporting
Lewin has no accounting for stolen funds
Tiedemann transaction both in stealing the money and failure to report the money
Defendants have violated:
Any taxpayer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter and who willfully fails to file a return or keep required books and records, files a fraudulent return, willfully violates any rule or regulation of the department, or willfully attempts in any other manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this chapter or the payment thereof, is, in addition to other penalties, guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Any person who aids, abets, counsels, or conspires to commit any of the acts described in s. 220.901 or s. 220.903 shall be subject to fine or imprisonment to the same extent as the perpetrator of such act.
14. THEFT, ROBBERY AND MISAPPROPRIATION AND CONVERSION OF FUNDS
This is a supplemental action for misappropriation and conversion of Iviewit funds pursuant to the state laws of Florida and New York.
15. FLORIDA LAW SEC 812.081 TRADE SECRETS; THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT; UNLAWFUL COPYING; DEFINITIONS; PENALTY.
Defendants have violated;
812.172 Intent.
812.175 Enforcement; civil fine.
812.014 Theft.
812.016 Possession of altered property.
812.019 Dealing in stolen property.
Wherefore, Iviewit prays for relief under;
Wherefore:
(1) Any circuit court may, after making due provisions for the rights of innocent persons, enjoin violations of the provisions of ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081 by issuing appropriate orders and judgments, including, but not limited to:
(a) Ordering any defendant to divest himself or herself of any interest in any enterprise, including real estate.
(b) Imposing reasonable restrictions upon the future activities or investments of any defendant, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any defendant from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise in which he or she was engaged in violation of the provisions of ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081.
(c) Ordering the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
(d) Ordering the suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or prior approval granted to any enterprise by any department or agency of the state.
(e) Ordering the forfeiture of the charter of a corporation organized under the laws of the state or the revocation of a certificate authorizing a foreign corporation to conduct business within the state, upon finding that the board of directors or a managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation, in conducting the affairs of the corporation, has authorized or engaged in conduct in violation of ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081 and that, for the prevention of future criminal activity, the public interest requires the charter of the corporation forfeited and the corporation dissolved or the certificate revoked.
(2) All property, real or personal, including money, used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081 is subject to civil forfeiture to the state. The state shall dispose of all forfeited property as soon as commercially feasible. If property is not exercisable or transferable for value by the state, it shall expire. All forfeitures or dispositions under this section shall be made with due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(3) Property subject to forfeiture under this section may be seized by a law enforcement officer upon court process. Seizure without process may be made if:
(a) The seizure is incident to a lawful arrest or search or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant.
(b) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a forfeiture proceeding based upon this section.
(c) The law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the property is directly or indirectly dangerous to the public health or safety.
(d) The law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the property is otherwise subject to forfeiture under this section.
(4) In the event of a seizure under subsection (3), a forfeiture proceeding shall be instituted promptly. When property is seized under this section, pending forfeiture and final disposition, the law enforcement officer may:
(a) Place the property under seal.
(b) Remove the property to a place designated by the court.
(c) Require another agency authorized by law to take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location.
(5) The Department of Legal Affairs, any state attorney, or any state agency having jurisdiction over conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081 may institute civil proceedings under this section. In any action brought under this section, the circuit court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination. Pending final determination, the circuit court may at any time enter such injunctions, prohibitions, or restraining orders, or take such actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as the court may deem proper.
(6) Any aggrieved person may institute a proceeding under subsection (1). In such proceeding, relief shall be granted in conformity with the principles that govern the granting of injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage in other civil cases, except that no showing of special or irreparable damage to the person shall have to be made. Upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing of immediate danger of significant loss or damage, a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction may be issued in any such action before a final determination on the merits.
(7) The state, including any of its agencies, instrumentalities, subdivisions, or municipalities, if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has been injured in any fashion by reason of any violation of the provisions of ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081, has a cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained and, in any such action, is entitled to minimum damages in the amount of $200 and shall also recover court costs and reasonable attorney's fees in the trial and appellate courts. In no event shall punitive damages be awarded under this section. The defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and court costs in the trial and appellate courts upon a finding that the claimant raised a claim which was without substantial fact or legal support.
(8) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding under ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081 shall estop the defendant in any subsequent civil action or proceeding as to all matters as to which such judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties.
(9) The Department of Legal Affairs may, upon timely application, intervene in any civil action or proceeding brought under subsection (6) or subsection (7) if he or she certifies that, in his or her opinion, the action or proceeding is of general public importance. In such action or proceeding, the state shall be entitled to the same relief as if the Department of Legal Affairs had instituted this action or proceeding.
(10) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081 may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the cause of action accrues; however, in a criminal proceeding under ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081, the period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or is without a reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case shall this extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 1 year. If a criminal prosecution or civil action or other proceeding is brought, or intervened in, to punish, prevent, or restrain any violation of the provisions of ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081, the running of the period of limitations prescribed by this section with respect to any cause of action arising under subsection (6) or subsection (7) which is based in whole or in part upon any matter complained of in any such prosecution, action, or proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency of such prosecution, action, or proceeding and for 2 years following its termination.
(11) The application of one civil remedy under any provision of ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081 shall not preclude the application of any other remedy, civil or criminal, under ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081 or any other section of the Florida Statutes.
16. FRAUD UPON IVIEWIT
Defendants have violated;
Utley - Wheeler - Hersh - Lewin filings with Secretary of State for shadow companies
Defendants, signed documents they knew were false in material respects with intent that the document be delivered to the Department of State for filing and are personally liable to any person who to her or his detriment reasonably relied on the document or information contained therein and is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.083.
Defendants have violated;
Board of Directors Implicated: Wheeler, Rubenstein, Joao, Dick, Lewin, Kane, Powell, Buchsbaum, Warner, Shaw, Utley, Miller, Prolow, & Shewmaker.
Not implicated Board members: Epstein, Bernstein, S. Bernstein, Anderson, Colter, Thagard.
Whereby:
(1) A corporation's board of directors may propose dissolution for submission to the shareholders. (2) For a proposal to dissolve to be adopted: (a) The board of directors must recommend dissolution to the shareholders, unless the board of directors determines that because of conflict of interest or other special circumstances it should make no recommendation and communicates the basis for its determination to the shareholders; and (b) The shareholders entitled to vote must approve the proposal to dissolve as provided in subsection (5). (3) The board of directors may condition its submission of the proposal for dissolution on any basis. (4) The corporation shall notify each shareholder of record, whether or not entitled to vote, of the proposed shareholders' meeting in accordance with s. 607.0705. The notice must also state that the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the meeting is to consider dissolving the corporation. (5) Unless the articles of incorporation or the board of directors (acting pursuant to subsection (3)) require a greater vote or a vote by voting groups, the proposal to dissolve to be adopted must be approved by a majority of all the votes entitled to be cast on that proposal. (6) Alternatively, without action of the board of directors, action to dissolve a corporation may be taken by the written consent of the shareholders pursuant to s. 607.0704.
A person who signs a document she or he knows is false in any material respect with intent that the document be delivered to the Department of State for filing is personally liable to any person who to her or his detriment reasonably relied on the document or information contained therein and is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.083.
Defendants have violated;
Lewin, Kane, Powell, Buchsbaum resign knowing of crimes in accounting alleged, the stolen money and knowledge of stolen patents. They fail to notify shareholders of any of this and attempt to jump ship without shareholder consent or notice. Shareholders have been thrashed with no communication other than via Eliot Bernstein who was left as almost the last man standing as lawyers, accounts and their friends, all on the board, disbanded and without any formal or informal communication. Crossbow acted further as board members to take secured loans and sell the company in a complex transaction, still fully undisclosed to the Iviewit Shareholders, with no authority and without a controlling interest in the company purportedly sold. See EXHIBIT “” - Palm Beach Post Article . Iviewit Shareholders were never notified, Iviewit management was unaware and with no authority and lacking ownership, makes the deal almost seem unbelievable but yet true. Crossbow acted as secured creditors in a most diabolical Machiavellian plot to steal the technologies through a series of transactions. These transactions were all done to the detriment of the Iviewit Shareholders, including the federally backed Small Business Administration through Crossbow's SBIC monies. Records necessary for the accounting of these transactions for compliance with Iviewit Shareholder's has been destroyed by the accounting and legal firms entrusted with them do not possess them.
Board of Directors
Implicated Board Members: Wheeler, Rubenstein, Lewin, Kane, Powell, Buchsbaum, Warner, Shaw, Utley, Miller, Prolow, Shewmaker, Joao and Dick.
Whereby:
(1) A director shall discharge his or her duties as a director, including his or her duties as a member of a committee:
(a) In good faith;
(b) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(c) In a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
(2) In discharging his or her duties, a director is entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
(a) One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(b) Legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the director reasonably believes are within the persons' professional or expert competence; or
(c) A committee of the board of directors of which he or she is not a member if the director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
(3) In discharging his or her duties, a director may consider such factors as the director deems relevant, including the long-term prospects and interests of the corporation and its shareholders, and the social, economic, legal, or other effects of any action on the employees, suppliers, customers of the corporation or its subsidiaries, the communities and society in which the corporation or its subsidiaries operate, and the economy of the state and the nation.
(4) A director is not acting in good faith if he or she has knowledge concerning the matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (2) unwarranted.
(5) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take any action, if he or she performed the duties of his or her office in compliance with this section.
Defendants have violated;
Rubenstein, Wheeler, Proskauer - Conflicts with MPEGLA, LLC. using
Dick, Foley, Utley -
Lewin clients violating NDA's
Proskauer clients violating NDA's
Goldman Sachs Clients violating NDA's - Donald Kane and Goldman Sachs - Kane using technologies in private venture fund
Whereby:
(1) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors or any other corporation, firm, association, or entity in which one or more of its directors are directors or officers or are financially interested shall be either void or voidable because of such relationship or interest, because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves, or ratifies such contract or transaction, or because his or her or their votes are counted for such purpose, if: (a) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the board of directors or committee which authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction by a vote or consent sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes or consents of such interested directors; (b) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve, or ratify such contract or transaction by vote or written consent; or (c) The contract or transaction is fair and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is authorized by the board, a committee, or the shareholders. (2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(a) only, a conflict of interest transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified if it receives the affirmative vote of a majority of the directors on the board of directors, or on the committee, who have no relationship or interest in the transaction described in subsection (1), but a transaction may not be authorized, approved, or ratified under this section by a single director. If a majority of the directors who have no such relationship or interest in the transaction vote to authorize, approve, or ratify the transaction, a quorum is present for the purpose of taking action under this section. The presence of, or a vote cast by, a director with such relationship or interest in the transaction does not affect the validity of any action taken under paragraph (1)(a) if the transaction is otherwise authorized, approved, or ratified as provided in that subsection, but such presence or vote of those directors may be counted for purposes of determining whether the transaction is approved under other sections of this act. (3) For purposes of paragraph (1)(b), a conflict of interest transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified if it receives the vote of a majority of the shares entitled to be counted under this subsection. Shares owned by or voted under the control of a director who has a relationship or interest in the transaction described in subsection (1) may not be counted in a vote of shareholders to determine whether to authorize, approve, or ratify a conflict of interest transaction under paragraph (1)(b). The vote of those shares, however, is counted in determining whether the transaction is approved under other sections of this act. A majority of the shares, whether or not present, that are entitled to be counted in a vote on the transaction under this subsection constitutes a quorum for the purpose of taking action under this section.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(1) A director who votes for or assents to a distribution made in violation of s. 607.06401 or the articles of incorporation is personally liable to the corporation for the amount of the distribution that exceeds what could have been distributed without violating s. 607.06401 or the articles of incorporation if it is established that the director did not perform his or her duties in compliance with s. 607.0830. In any proceeding commenced under this section, a director has all of the defenses ordinarily available to a director. (2) A director held liable under subsection (1) for an unlawful distribution is entitled to contribution: (a) From every other director who could be liable under subsection (1) for the unlawful distribution; and (b) From each shareholder for the amount the shareholder accepted knowing the distribution was made in violation of s. 607.06401 or the articles of incorporation. (3) A proceeding under this section is barred unless it is commenced within 2 years after the date on which the effect of the distribution was measured under s. 607.06401(6) or (8).
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, each officer has the authority and shall perform the duties set forth in the bylaws or, to the extent consistent with the bylaws, the duties prescribed by the board of directors or by direction of any officer authorized by the bylaws or the board of directors to prescribe the duties of other officers.
Defendants have violated;
Wheeler, Lewin, Proskauer, Foley, Utley, Joao - Shadow Companies
Whereby:
(1) For purposes of this section: (a) "Affiliate" means a person who directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or is under common control with, a specified person. (b) "Affiliated transaction," when used in reference to the corporation and any interested shareholder, means: 1. Any merger or consolidation of the corporation or any subsidiary of the corporation with: a. The interested shareholder; or b. Any other corporation (whether or not itself an interested shareholder) which is, or after such merger or consolidation would be, an affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder; 2. Any sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer, or other disposition (in one transaction or a series of transactions) to or with the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder of assets of the corporation or any subsidiary of the corporation: a. Having an aggregate fair market value equal to 5 percent or more of the aggregate fair market value of all the assets, determined on a consolidated basis, of the corporation; b. Having an aggregate fair market value equal to 5 percent or more of the aggregate fair market value of all the outstanding shares of the corporation; or c. Representing 5 percent or more of the earning power or net income, determined on a consolidated basis, of the corporation; 3. The issuance or transfer by the corporation or any subsidiary of the corporation (in one transaction or a series of transactions) of any shares of the corporation or any subsidiary of the corporation which have an aggregate fair market value equal to 5 percent or more of the aggregate fair market value of all the outstanding shares of the corporation to the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder except pursuant to the exercise of warrants or rights to purchase stock offered, or a dividend or distribution paid or made, pro rata to all shareholders of the corporation; 4. The adoption of any plan or proposal for the liquidation or dissolution of the corporation proposed by, or pursuant to any agreement, arrangement, or understanding (whether or not in writing) with, the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder; 5. Any reclassification of securities (including, without limitation, any stock split, stock dividend, or other distribution of shares in respect of shares, or any reverse stock split) or recapitalization of the corporation, or any merger or consolidation of the corporation with any subsidiary of the corporation, or any other transaction (whether or not with or into or otherwise involving the interested shareholder), with the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder, which has the effect, directly or indirectly (in one transaction or a series of transactions during any 12-month period), of increasing by more than 5 percent the percentage of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation or any subsidiary of the corporation beneficially owned by the interested shareholder; or 6. Any receipt by the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder of the benefit, directly or indirectly (except proportionately as a shareholder of the corporation), of any loans, advances, guaranties, pledges, or other financial assistance or any tax credits or other tax advantages provided by or through the corporation. (c) "Announcement date," when used in reference to any affiliated transaction, means the date of the first general public announcement of the proposed affiliated transaction or of the intention to propose an affiliated transaction, or the date on which the proposed affiliated transaction or the intention to propose an affiliated transaction is first communicated generally to the shareholders of the corporation, whichever is earlier. (d) "Associate," when used to indicate a relationship with any person, means any entity, other than the corporation or any of its subsidiaries, of which such person is an officer, director, or partner or is, directly or indirectly, the beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of any class of voting shares; any trust or other estate in which such person has a substantial beneficial interest or as to which such person serves as trustee or in a similar fiduciary capacity; and any relative or spouse of such person, or any relative of such spouse, who has the same home as such person or who is an officer or director of the corporation or any of its affiliates. (e) A person is deemed to be a "beneficial owner" of voting shares as to which such person and such person's affiliates and associates, individually or in the aggregate, have or share directly, or indirectly through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise: 1. Voting power, which includes the power to vote or to direct the voting of the voting shares; 2. Investment power, which includes the power to dispose of or to direct the disposition of the voting shares; or 3. The right to acquire the voting power or investment power, whether such right is exercisable immediately or only after the passage of time, pursuant to any contract, arrangement, or understanding, upon the exercise of conversion rights, exchange rights, warrants, or options, or otherwise; however, in no case shall a director of the corporation be deemed to be the beneficial owner of voting shares beneficially owned by another director of the corporation solely by reason of actions undertaken by such persons in their capacity as directors of the corporation. (f) "Control" means the possession, directly or indirectly, through the ownership of voting shares, by contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a person shall not be deemed to have control of a corporation if such person holds voting shares, in good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing this section, as an agent, bank, broker, nominee, custodian, or trustee for one or more beneficial owners who do not individually or as a group have control of such corporation. (g) "Determination date" means the date on which an interested shareholder became an interested shareholder. (h) Unless otherwise specified in the articles of incorporation initially filed with the Department of State, a "disinterested director" means as to any particular interested shareholder: 1. Any member of the board of directors of the corporation who was a member of the board of directors before the later of January 1, 1987, or the determination date; and 2. Any member of the board of directors of the corporation who was recommended for election by, or was elected to fill a vacancy and received the affirmative vote of, a majority of the disinterested directors then on the board. (i) "Exchange Act" means the Act of Congress known as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as the same has been or hereafter may be amended from time to time. (j) "Fair market value" means: 1. In the case of shares, the highest closing sale price of a share quoted during the 30-day period immediately preceding the date in question on the composite tape for shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange; or, if such shares are not quoted on the composite tape on the New York Stock Exchange or if such shares are not listed on such exchange, the highest closing sale price quoted during such period on the principal United States securities exchange registered under the Exchange Act on which such shares are listed; or, if such shares are not listed on any such exchange, the highest closing bid quotation with respect to a share during the 30-day period preceding the date in question on the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., automated quotations system or any similar system then in general use; or, if no such quotations are available, the fair market value of a share on the date in question as determined by a majority of disinterested directors; and 2. In the case of property other than cash or shares, the fair market value of such property on the date in question as determined by a majority of the disinterested directors. (k) "Interested shareholder" means any person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation. However, the term "interested shareholder" shall not include the corporation or any of its subsidiaries; any savings, employee stock ownership, or other employee benefit plan of the corporation or any of its subsidiaries; or any fiduciary with respect to any such plan when acting in such capacity. For the purpose of determining whether a person is an interested shareholder, the number of voting shares deemed to be outstanding shall include shares deemed owned by the interested shareholder through application of subparagraph (e)3. but shall not include any other voting shares that may be issuable pursuant to any contract, arrangement, or understanding, upon the exercise of conversion rights, exchange rights, warrants, or options, or otherwise. (l) "Shares" means the units into which the proprietary interests in an entity are divided and includes: 1. Any stock or similar security, any certificate of interest, any participation in any profit-sharing agreement, any voting trust certificate, or any certificate of deposit for shares; and 2. Any security convertible, with or without consideration, into shares; or any warrant, call, or other option or privilege of buying shares without being bound to do so; or any other security carrying any right to acquire, subscribe to, or purchase shares. (m) "Subsidiary" means, as to any corporation, any other corporation of which it owns, directly or indirectly through one or more subsidiaries, a majority of the voting shares. (n) "Valuation date" means, if the affiliated transaction is voted upon by shareholders, the day before the date of the vote of shareholders or, if the affiliated transaction is not voted upon by shareholders, the date of the consummation of the affiliated transaction. (o) "Voting shares" means the outstanding shares of all classes or series of the corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors. (2) Except as provided in subsection (4), in addition to any affirmative vote required by any other section of this act or by the articles of incorporation, an affiliated transaction shall be approved by the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the voting shares other than the shares beneficially owned by the interested shareholder. (3) A majority of the disinterested directors shall have the power to determine for the purposes of this section: (a) Whether a person is an interested shareholder; (b) The number of voting shares beneficially owned by any person; (c) Whether a person is an affiliate or associate of another; and (d) Whether the securities to be issued or transferred by the corporation or any of its subsidiaries to any interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder have an aggregate fair market value equal to or greater than 5 percent of the aggregate fair market value of all of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation or any of its subsidiaries. (4) The voting requirements set forth in subsection (2) do not apply to a particular affiliated transaction if all of the conditions specified in any one of the following paragraphs are met: (a) The affiliated transaction has been approved by a majority of the disinterested directors; (b) The corporation has not had more than 300 shareholders of record at any time during the 3 years preceding the announcement date; (c) The interested shareholder has been the beneficial owner of at least 80 percent of the corporation's outstanding voting shares for at least 5 years preceding the announcement date; (d) The interested shareholder is the beneficial owner of at least 90 percent of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation, exclusive of shares acquired directly from the corporation in a transaction not approved by a majority of the disinterested directors; (e) The corporation is an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940; or (f) In the affiliated transaction, consideration shall be paid to the holders of each class or series of voting shares and all of the following conditions shall be met: 1. The aggregate amount of the cash and the fair market value as of the valuation date of consideration other than cash to be received per share by holders of each class or series of voting shares in such affiliated transaction are at least equal to the highest of the following: a. If applicable, the highest per share price, including any brokerage commissions, transfer taxes, and soliciting dealers' fees, paid by the interested shareholder for any shares of such class or series acquired by it within the 2-year period immediately preceding the announcement date or in the transaction in which it became an interested shareholder, whichever is higher; b. The fair market value per share of such class or series on the announcement date or on the determination date, whichever is higher; c. If applicable, the price per share equal to the fair market value per share of such class or series determined pursuant to sub-subparagraph b., multiplied by the ratio of the highest per share price, including any brokerage commissions, transfer taxes, and soliciting dealers' fees, paid by the interested shareholder for any shares of such class or series acquired by it within the 2-year period immediately preceding the announcement date, to the fair market value per share of such class or series on the first day in such 2-year period on which the interested shareholder acquired any shares of such class or series; and d. If applicable, the highest preferential amount, if any, per share to which the holders of such class or series are entitled in the event of any voluntary or involuntary dissolution of the corporation. 2. The consideration to be received by holders of outstanding shares shall be in cash or in the same form as the interested shareholder has previously paid for shares of the same class or series, and if the interested shareholder has paid for shares with varying forms of consideration, the form of the consideration shall be either cash or the form used to acquire the largest number of shares of such class or series previously acquired by the interested shareholder. 3. During such portion of the 3-year period preceding the announcement date that such interested shareholder has been an interested shareholder, except as approved by a majority of the disinterested directors: a. There shall have been no failure to declare and pay at the regular date therefor any full periodic dividends, whether or not cumulative, on any outstanding shares of the corporation; b. There shall have been: (I) No reduction in the annual rate of dividends paid on any class or series of voting shares, except as necessary to reflect any subdivision of the class or series; and (II) An increase in such annual rate of dividends as necessary to reflect any reclassification, including any reverse stock split, recapitalization, reorganization, or similar transaction which has the effect of reducing the number of outstanding shares of the class or series; and c. Such interested shareholder shall not have become the beneficial owner of any additional voting shares except as part of the transaction which results in such interested shareholder becoming an interested shareholder. 4. During such portion of the 3-year period preceding the announcement date that such interested shareholder has been an interested shareholder, except as approved by a majority of the disinterested directors, such interested shareholder shall not have received the benefit, directly or indirectly (except proportionately as a shareholder), of any loans, advances, guaranties, pledges, or other financial assistance or any tax credits or other tax advantages provided by the corporation, whether in anticipation of or in connection with such affiliated transaction or otherwise. 5. Except as otherwise approved by a majority of the disinterested directors, a proxy or information statement describing the affiliated transaction and complying with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder has been mailed to holders of voting shares of the corporation at least 25 days before the consummation of such affiliated transaction, whether or not such proxy or information statement is required to be mailed pursuant to the Exchange Act or such rules or regulations. (5) The provisions of this section do not apply: (a) To any corporation the original articles of incorporation of which contain a provision expressly electing not to be governed by this section; (b) To any corporation which adopted an amendment to its articles of incorporation prior to January 1, 1989, expressly electing not to be governed by this section, provided that such amendment does not apply to any affiliated transaction of the corporation with an interested shareholder whose determination date is on or prior to the effective date of such amendment; (c) To any corporation which adopts an amendment to its articles of incorporation or bylaws, approved by the affirmative vote of the holders, other than interested shareholders and their affiliates and associates, of a majority of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation, excluding the voting shares of interested shareholders and their affiliates and associates, expressly electing not to be governed by this section, provided that such amendment to the articles of incorporation or bylaws shall not be effective until 18 months after such vote of the corporation's shareholders and shall not apply to any affiliated transaction of the corporation with an interested shareholder whose determination date is on or prior to the effective date of such amendment; or (d) To any affiliated transaction of the corporation with an interested shareholder of the corporation which became an interested shareholder inadvertently, if such interested shareholder, as soon as practicable, divests itself of a sufficient amount of the voting shares of the corporation so that it no longer is the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of 10 percent or more of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation, and would not at any time within the 5-year period preceding the announcement date with respect to such affiliated transaction have been an interested shareholder but for such inadvertent acquisition. (6) Any corporation that elected not to be governed by this section, either through a provision in its original articles of incorporation or through an amendment to its articles of incorporation or bylaws may elect to be bound by the provisions of this section by adopting an amendment to its articles of incorporation or bylaws that repeals the original article or the amendment. In addition to any requirements of this act, or the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation, any such amendment shall be approved by the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the voting shares other than shares beneficially owned by any interested shareholder.
J. DELAWARE STATE CRIMES
1. DELAWARE § 521 CONSPIRACY
Defendants have violated:
Defendants have violated;
Defendants have violated;
Whereby, a person is guilty of defrauding secured creditors if the person destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers or otherwise deals with property subject to a security interest, intending to defeat enforcement of that interest. Defrauding secured creditors is a class A misdemeanor.
Defendants have violated;
Fraud Documents of Joao, Rubenstein, Wheeler, Proskauer bills.
Crossbow secured loans and assignments
Whereby, a person is guilty of securing execution of documents by deception when, by knowingly misrepresenting the nature of the document, the person causes another person to execute any instrument affecting, purporting to affect or likely to affect the pecuniary interest of any person.
2. VIOLATIONS OF DELAWARE CORPORATE LAWS
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(a) The certificate of incorporation shall set forth:
(1) The name of the corporation, which (i) shall contain 1 of the words "association," "company," "corporation," "club," "foundation," "fund," "incorporated," "institute," "society," "union," "syndicate," or "limited," (or abbreviations thereof, with or without punctuation), or words (or abbreviations thereof, with or without punctuation) of like import of foreign countries or jurisdictions (provided they are written in roman characters or letters); provided, however, that the Division of Corporations in the Department of State may waive such requirement (unless it determines that such name is, or might otherwise appear to be, that of a natural person) if such corporation executes, acknowledges and files with the Secretary of State in accordance with § 103 of this title a certificate stating that its total assets, as defined in subsection (i) of § 503 of this title, are not less than $10,000,000, (ii) shall be such as to distinguish it upon the records in the office of the Division of Corporations in the Department of State from the names on such records of other corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability companies or statutory trusts organized, reserved or registered as a foreign corporation, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company or statutory trust under the laws of this State, except with the written consent of such other foreign corporation or domestic or foreign partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company or statutory trust executed, acknowledged and filed with the Secretary of State in accordance with § 103 of this title and (iii) shall not contain the word "bank," or any variation thereof, except for the name of a bank reporting to and under the supervision of the State Bank Commissioner of this State or a subsidiary of a bank or savings association (as those terms are defined in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended, at 12 U.S.C. § 1813), or a corporation regulated under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq., or the Home Owners' Loan Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.; provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to prevent the use of the word "bank," or any variation thereof, in a context clearly not purporting to refer to a banking business or otherwise likely to mislead the public about the nature of the business of the corporation or to lead to a pattern and practice of abuse that might cause harm to the interests of the public or the State as determined by the Division of Corporations in the Department of State;
(2) The address (which shall include the street, number, city and county) of the corporation's registered office in this State, and the name of its registered agent at such address;
(3) The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or promoted. It shall be sufficient to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware, and by such statement all lawful acts and activities shall be within the purposes of the corporation, except for express limitations, if any;
(4) If the corporation is to be authorized to issue only 1 class of stock, the total number of shares of stock which the corporation shall have authority to issue and the par value of each of such shares, or a statement that all such shares are to be without par value. If the corporation is to be authorized to issue more than 1 class of stock, the certificate of incorporation shall set forth the total number of shares of all classes of stock which the corporation shall have authority to issue and the number of shares of each class and shall specify each class the shares of which are to be without par value and each class the shares of which are to have par value and the par value of the shares of each such class. The certificate of incorporation shall also set forth a statement of the designations and the powers, preferences and rights, and the qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof, which are permitted by § 151 of this title in respect of any class or classes of stock or any series of any class of stock of the corporation and the fixing of which by the certificate of incorporation is desired, and an express grant of such authority as it may then be desired to grant to the board of directors to fix by resolution or resolutions any thereof that may be desired but which shall not be fixed by the certificate of incorporation. The foregoing provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to corporations which are not to have authority to issue capital stock. In the case of such corporations, the fact that they are not to have authority to issue capital stock shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation. The conditions of membership of such corporations shall likewise be stated in the certificate of incorporation or the certificate may provide that the conditions of membership shall be stated in the bylaws;
(5) The name and mailing address of the incorporator or incorporators;
(6) If the powers of the incorporator or incorporators are to terminate upon the filing of the certificate of incorporation, the names and mailing addresses of the persons who are to serve as directors until the first annual meeting of stockholders or until their successors are elected and qualify.
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the following matters:
(1) Any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders, or the members of a nonstock corporation; if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State. Any provision which is required or permitted by any section of this chapter to be stated in the bylaws may instead be stated in the certificate of incorporation;
(2) The following provisions, in haec verba, viz:
"Whenever a compromise or arrangement is proposed between this corporation and its creditors or any class of them and/or between this corporation and its stockholders or any class of them, any court of equitable jurisdiction within the State of Delaware may, on the application in a summary way of this corporation or of any creditor or stockholder thereof or on the application of any receiver or receivers appointed for this corporation under § 291 of Title 8 of the Delaware Code or on the application of trustees in dissolution or of any receiver or receivers appointed for this corporation under § 279 of Title 8 of the Delaware Code order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and/or of the stockholders or class of stockholders of this corporation, as the case may be, to be summoned in such manner as the said court directs. If a majority in number representing three fourths in value of the creditors or class of creditors, and/or of the stockholders or class of stockholders of this corporation, as the case may be, agree to any compromise or arrangement and to any reorganization of this corporation as consequence of such compromise or arrangement, the said compromise or arrangement and the said reorganization shall, if sanctioned by the court to which the said application has been made, be binding on all the creditors or class of creditors, and/or on all the stockholders or class of stockholders, of this corporation, as the case may be, and also on this corporation";
(3) Such provisions as may be desired granting to the holders of the stock of the corporation, or the holders of any class or series of a class thereof, the preemptive right to subscribe to any or all additional issues of stock of the corporation of any or all classes or series thereof, or to any securities of the corporation convertible into such stock. No stockholder shall have any preemptive right to subscribe to an additional issue of stock or to any security convertible into such stock unless, and except to the extent that, such right is expressly granted to such stockholder in the certificate of incorporation. All such rights in existence on July 3, 1967, shall remain in existence unaffected by this paragraph unless and until changed or terminated by appropriate action which expressly provides for the change or termination;
(4) Provisions requiring for any corporate action, the vote of a larger portion of the stock or of any class or series thereof, or of any other securities having voting power, or a larger number of the directors, than is required by this chapter;
(5) A provision limiting the duration of the corporation's existence to a specified date; otherwise, the corporation shall have perpetual existence;
(6) A provision imposing personal liability for the debts of the corporation on its stockholders or members to a specified extent and upon specified conditions; otherwise, the stockholders or members of a corporation shall not be personally liable for the payment of the corporation's debts except as they may be liable by reason of their own conduct or acts;
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective. All references in this paragraph to a director shall also be deemed to refer (x) to a member of the governing body of a corporation which is not authorized to issue capital stock, and (y) to such other person or persons, if any, who, pursuant to a provision of the certificate of incorporation in accordance with § 141(a) of this title, exercise or perform any of the powers or duties otherwise conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this title.
(c) It shall not be necessary to set forth in the certificate of incorporation any of the powers conferred on corporations by this chapter.
(d) Except for provisions included pursuant to subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(6), (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(7) of this section, and provisions included pursuant to subdivision (a)(4) of this section specifying the classes, number of shares, and par value of shares the corporation is authorized to issue, any provision of the certificate of incorporation may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside such instrument, provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate upon the provision is clearly and explicitly set forth therein. The term "facts," as used in this subsection, includes, but is not limited to, the occurrence of any event, including a determination or action by any person or body, including the corporation. (8 Del. C. 1953, § 102; 56 Del. Laws, c. 50; 57 Del. Laws, c. 148, § 1; 65 Del. Laws, c. 127, § 1; 65 Del. Laws, c. 289, §§ 1, 2; 66 Del. Laws, c. 136, § 1; 66 Del. Laws, c. 352, § 1; 67 Del. Laws, c. 376, § 1; 69 Del. Laws, c. 61, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 79, §§ 1-3; 71 Del. Laws, c. 120, § 1; 71 Del. Laws, c. 339, § 2; 72 Del. Laws, c. 123, § 1; 72 Del. Laws, c. 343, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 82, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 329, § 43; 74 Del. Laws, c. 326, § 1.)
Iviewit cites;
Any records maintained by a corporation in the regular course of its business, including its stock ledger, books of account, and minute books, may be kept on, or by means of, or be in the form of, any information storage device, or method provided that the records so kept can be converted into clearly legible paper form within a reasonable time. Any corporation shall so convert any records so kept upon the request of any person entitled to inspect such records pursuant to any provision of this chapter. When records are kept in such manner, a clearly legible paper form produced from or by means of the information storage device or method shall be admissible in evidence, and accepted for all other purposes, to the same extent as an original paper record of the same information would have been, provided the paper form accurately portrays the record. (8 Del. C. 1953, § 224; 56 Del. Laws, c. 50; 57 Del. Laws, c. 148, § 15; 72 Del. Laws, c. 343, § 14.)
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(a) Any 2 or more corporations existing under the laws of this State may merge into a single corporation, which may be any 1 of the constituent corporations or may consolidate into a new corporation formed by the consolidation, pursuant to an agreement of merger or consolidation, as the case may be, complying and approved in accordance with this section.
(b) The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation and declaring its advisability. The agreement shall state: (1) The terms and conditions of the merger or consolidation; (2) the mode of carrying the same into effect; (3) in the case of a merger, such amendments or changes in the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation as are desired to be effected by the merger, or, if no such amendments or changes are desired, a statement that the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation shall be its certificate of incorporation; (4) in the case of a consolidation, that the certificate of incorporation of the resulting corporation shall be as is set forth in an attachment to the agreement; (5) the manner, if any, of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations into shares or other securities of the corporation surviving or resulting from the merger or consolidation, or of canceling some or all of such shares, and, if any shares of any of the constituent corporations are not to remain outstanding, to be converted solely into shares or other securities of the surviving or resulting corporation or to be cancelled, the cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation or entity which the holders of such shares are to receive in exchange for, or upon conversion of such shares and the surrender of any certificates evidencing them, which cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation or entity may be in addition to or in lieu of shares or other securities of the surviving or resulting corporation; and (6) such other details or provisions as are deemed desirable, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, a provision for the payment of cash in lieu of the issuance or recognition of fractional shares, interests or rights, or for any other arrangement with respect thereto, consistent with § 155 of this title. The agreement so adopted shall be executed and acknowledged in accordance with § 103 of this title. Any of the terms of the agreement of merger or consolidation may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside of such agreement, provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate upon the terms of the agreement is clearly and expressly set forth in the agreement of merger or consolidation. The term "facts," as used in the preceding sentence, includes, but is not limited to, the occurrence of any event, including a determination or action by any person or body, including the corporation.
(c) The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section shall be submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation at an annual or special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement. Due notice of the time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed to each holder of stock, whether voting or nonvoting, of the corporation at the stockholder's address as it appears on the records of the corporation, at least 20 days prior to the date of the meeting. The notice shall contain a copy of the agreement or a brief summary thereof, as the directors shall deem advisable. At the meeting, the agreement shall be considered and a vote taken for its adoption or rejection. If a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of the agreement, that fact shall be certified on the agreement by the secretary or assistant secretary of the corporation. If the agreement shall be so adopted and certified by each constituent corporation, it shall then be filed and shall become effective, in accordance with § 103 of this title. In lieu of filing the agreement of merger or consolidation required by this section, the surviving or resulting corporation may file a certificate of merger or consolidation, executed in accordance with § 103 of this title, which states:
(1) The name and state of incorporation of each of the constituent corporations;
(2) That an agreement of merger or consolidation has been approved, adopted, certified, executed and acknowledged by each of the constituent corporations in accordance with this section;
(3) The name of the surviving or resulting corporation;
(4) In the case of a merger, such amendments or changes in the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation as are desired to be effected by the merger, or, if no such amendments or changes are desired, a statement that the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation shall be its certificate of incorporation;
(5) In the case of a consolidation, that the certificate of incorporation of the resulting corporation shall be as set forth in an attachment to the certificate;
(6) That the executed agreement of consolidation or merger is on file at an office of the surviving corporation, stating the address thereof; and
(7) That a copy of the agreement of consolidation or merger will be furnished by the surviving corporation, on request and without cost, to any stockholder of any constituent corporation.
(d) Any agreement of merger or consolidation may contain a provision that at any time prior to the time that the agreement (or a certificate in lieu thereof) filed with the Secretary of State becomes effective in accordance with § 103 of this title, the agreement may be terminated by the board of directors of any constituent corporation notwithstanding approval of the agreement by the stockholders of all or any of the constituent corporations; in the event the agreement of merger or consolidation is terminated after the filing of the agreement (or a certificate in lieu thereof) with the Secretary of State but before the agreement (or a certificate in lieu thereof) has become effective, a certificate of termination or merger or consolidation shall be filed in accordance with § 103 of this title. Any agreement of merger or consolidation may contain a provision that the boards of directors of the constituent corporations may amend the agreement at any time prior to the time that the agreement (or a certificate in lieu thereof) filed with the Secretary of State becomes effective in accordance with § 103 of this title, provided that an amendment made subsequent to the adoption of the agreement by the stockholders of any constituent corporation shall not (1) alter or change the amount or kind of shares, securities, cash, property and/or rights to be received in exchange for or on conversion of all or any of the shares of any class or series thereof of such constituent corporation, (2) alter or change any term of the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation to be effected by the merger or consolidation, or (3) alter or change any of the terms and conditions of the agreement if such alteration or change would adversely affect the holders of any class or series thereof of such constituent corporation; in the event the agreement of merger or consolidation is amended after the filing thereof with the Secretary of State but before the agreement has become effective, a certificate of amendment of merger or consolidation shall be filed in accordance with § 103 of this title.
(e) In the case of a merger, the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation shall automatically be amended to the extent, if any, that changes in the certificate of incorporation are set forth in the agreement of merger.
(f) Notwithstanding the requirements of subsection (c) of this section, unless required by its certificate of incorporation, no vote of stockholders of a constituent corporation surviving a merger shall be necessary to authorize a merger if (1) the agreement of merger does not amend in any respect the certificate of incorporation of such constituent corporation, (2) each share of stock of such constituent corporation outstanding immediately prior to the effective date of the merger is to be an identical outstanding or treasury share of the surviving corporation after the effective date of the merger, and (3) either no shares of common stock of the surviving corporation and no shares, securities or obligations convertible into such stock are to be issued or delivered under the plan of merger, or the authorized unissued shares or the treasury shares of common stock of the surviving corporation to be issued or delivered under the plan of merger plus those initially issuable upon conversion of any other shares, securities or obligations to be issued or delivered under such plan do not exceed 20% of the shares of common stock of such constituent corporation outstanding immediately prior to the effective date of the merger. No vote of stockholders of a constituent corporation shall be necessary to authorize a merger or consolidation if no shares of the stock of such corporation shall have been issued prior to the adoption by the board of directors of the resolution approving the agreement of merger or consolidation. If an agreement of merger is adopted by the constituent corporation surviving the merger, by action of its board of directors and without any vote of its stockholders pursuant to this subsection, the secretary or assistant secretary of that corporation shall certify on the agreement that the agreement has been adopted pursuant to this subsection and, (1) if it has been adopted pursuant to the first sentence of this subsection, that the conditions specified in that sentence have been satisfied, or (2) if it has been adopted pursuant to the second sentence of this subsection, that no shares of stock of such corporation were issued prior to the adoption by the board of directors of the resolution approving the agreement of merger or consolidation. The agreement so adopted and certified shall then be filed and shall become effective, in accordance with § 103 of this title. Such filing shall constitute a representation by the person who executes the agreement that the facts stated in the certificate remain true immediately prior to such filing.
(g) Notwithstanding the requirements of subsection (c) of this section, unless expressly required by its certificate of incorporation, no vote of stockholders of a constituent corporation shall be necessary to authorize a merger with or into a single direct or indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of such constituent corporation if: (1) such constituent corporation and the direct or indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of such constituent corporation are the only constituent entities to the merger; (2) each share or fraction of a share of the capital stock of the constituent corporation outstanding immediately prior to the effective time of the merger is converted in the merger into a share or equal fraction of share of capital stock of a holding company having the same designations, rights, powers and preferences, and the qualifications, limitations and restrictions thereof, as the share of stock of the constituent corporation being converted in the merger; (3) the holding company and the constituent corporation are corporations of this State and the direct or indirect wholly-owned subsidiary that is the other constituent entity to the merger is a corporation or limited liability company of this State; (4) the certificate of incorporation and by-laws of the holding company immediately following the effective time of the merger contain provisions identical to the certificate of incorporation and by-laws of the constituent corporation immediately prior to the effective time of the merger (other than provisions, if any, regarding the incorporator or incorporators, the corporate name, the registered office and agent, the initial board of directors and the initial subscribers for shares and such provisions contained in any amendment to the certificate of incorporation as were necessary to effect a change, exchange, reclassification, subdivision, combination or cancellation of stock, if such change, exchange, reclassification, subdivision, combination, or cancellation has become effective); (5) as a result of the merger the constituent corporation or its successor becomes or remains a direct or indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of the holding company; (6) the directors of the constituent corporation become or remain the directors of the holding company upon the effective time of the merger; (7) the organizational documents of the surviving entity immediately following the effective time of the merger contain provisions identical to the certificate of incorporation of the constituent corporation immediately prior to the effective time of the merger (other than provisions, if any, regarding the incorporator or incorporators, the corporate or entity name, the registered office and agent, the initial board of directors and the initial subscribers for shares, references to members rather than stockholders or shareholders, references to interests, units or the like rather than stock or shares, references to managers, managing members or other members of the governing body rather than directors and such provisions contained in any amendment to the certificate of incorporation as were necessary to effect a change, exchange, reclassification, subdivision, combination or cancellation of stock, if such change, exchange, reclassification, subdivision, combination or cancellation has become effective); provided, however, that (i) if the organizational documents of the surviving entity do not contain the following provisions, they shall be amended in the merger to contain provisions requiring that (A) any act or transaction by or involving the surviving entity, other than the election or removal of directors or managers, managing members or other members of the governing body of the surviving entity, that requires for its adoption under this chapter or its organizational documents the approval of the stockholders or members of the surviving entity shall, by specific reference to this subsection, require, in addition, the approval of the stockholders of the holding company (or any successor by merger), by the same vote as is required by this chapter and/or by the organizational documents of the surviving entity; provided, however, that for purposes of this clause (i)(A), any surviving entity that is not a corporation shall include in such amendment a requirement that the approval of the stockholders of the holding company be obtained for any act or transaction by or involving the surviving entity, other than the election or removal of directors or managers, managing members or other members of the governing body of the surviving entity, which would require the approval of the stockholders of the surviving entity if the surviving entity were a corporation subject to this chapter; (B) any amendment of the organizational documents of a surviving entity that is not a corporation, which amendment would, if adopted by a corporation subject to this chapter, be required to be included in the certificate of incorporation of such corporation, shall, by specific reference to this subsection, require, in addition, the approval of the stockholders of the holding company (or any successor by merger), by the same vote as is required by this chapter and/or by the organizational documents of the surviving entity; and (C) the business and affairs of a surviving entity that is not a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, board of managers or other governing body consisting of individuals who are subject to the same fiduciary duties applicable to, and who are liable for breach of such duties to the same extent as, directors of a corporation subject to this chapter; and (ii) the organizational documents of the surviving entity may be amended in the merger to reduce the number of classes and shares of capital stock or other equity interests or units that the surviving entity is authorized to issue; and (8) the stockholders of the constituent corporation do not recognize gain or loss for United States federal income tax purposes as determined by the board of directors of the constituent corporation. Neither subdivision (g)(7)(i) of this section nor any provision of a surviving entity's organizational documents required by subdivision (g)(7)(i) shall be deemed or construed to require approval of the stockholders of the holding company to elect or remove directors or managers, managing members or other members of the governing body of the surviving entity. The term "organizational documents", as used in subdivision (g)(7) and in the preceding sentence, shall, when used in reference to a corporation, mean the certificate of incorporation of such corporation, and when used in reference to a limited liability company, mean the limited liability company agreement of such limited liability company.
As used in this subsection only, the term "holding company" means a corporation which, from its incorporation until consummation of a merger governed by this subsection, was at all times a direct or indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of the constituent corporation and whose capital stock is issued in such merger. From and after the effective time of a merger adopted by a constituent corporation by action of its board of directors and without any vote of stockholders pursuant to this subsection: (i) to the extent the restrictions of § 203 of this title applied to the constituent corporation and its stockholders at the effective time of the merger, such restrictions shall apply to the holding company and its stockholders immediately after the effective time of the merger as though it were the constituent corporation, and all shares of stock of the holding company acquired in the merger shall for purposes of § 203 of this title be deemed to have been acquired at the time that the shares of stock of the constituent corporation converted in the merger were acquired, and provided further that any stockholder who immediately prior to the effective time of the merger was not an interested stockholder within the meaning of § 203 of this title shall not solely by reason of the merger become an interested stockholder of the holding company, (ii) if the corporate name of the holding company immediately following the effective time of the merger is the same as the corporate name of the constituent corporation immediately prior to the effective time of the merger, the shares of capital stock of the holding company into which the shares of capital stock of the constituent corporation are converted in the merger shall be represented by the stock certificates that previously represented shares of capital stock of the constituent corporation capital stock of the constituent corporation and (iii) to the extent a stockholder of the constituent corporation immediately prior to the merger had standing to institute or maintain derivative litigation on behalf of the constituent corporation, nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or extinguish such standing. If an agreement of merger is adopted by a constituent corporation by action of its board of directors and without any vote of stockholders pursuant to this subsection, the secretary or assistant secretary of the constituent corporation shall certify on the agreement that the agreement has been adopted pursuant to this subsection and that the conditions specified in the first sentence of this subsection have been satisfied. The agreement so adopted and certified shall then be filed and become effective, in accordance with § 103 of this title. Such filing shall constitute a representation by the person who executes the agreement that the facts stated in the certificate remain true immediately prior to such filing.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(a) In any case in which at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each class of the stock of a corporation or corporations (other than a corporation which has in its certificate of incorporation the provision required by § 251(g)(7)(i) of this title), of which class there are outstanding shares that, absent this subsection, would be entitled to vote on such merger, is owned by another corporation and 1 of the corporations is a corporation of this State and the other or others are corporations of this State, or any other state or states, or the District of Columbia and the laws of the other state or states, or the District permit a corporation of such jurisdiction to merge with a corporation of another jurisdiction, the corporation having such stock ownership may either merge the other corporation or corporations into itself and assume all of its or their obligations, or merge itself, or itself and 1 or more of such other corporations, into 1 of the other corporations by executing, acknowledging and filing, in accordance with § 103 of this title, a certificate of such ownership and merger setting forth a copy of the resolution of its board of directors to so merge and the date of the adoption; provided, however, that in case the parent corporation shall not own all the outstanding stock of all the subsidiary corporations, parties to a merger as aforesaid, the resolution of the board of directors of the parent corporation shall state the terms and conditions of the merger, including the securities, cash, property, or rights to be issued, paid, delivered or granted by the surviving corporation upon surrender of each share of the subsidiary corporation or corporations not owned by the parent corporation, or the cancellation of some or all of such shares. Any of the terms of the resolution of the board of directors to so merge may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside of such resolution, provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate upon the terms of the resolution is clearly and expressly set forth in the resolution. The term "facts," as used in the preceding sentence, includes, but is not limited to, the occurrence of any event, including a determination or action by any person or body, including the corporation. If the parent corporation be not the surviving corporation, the resolution shall include provision for the pro rata issuance of stock of the surviving corporation to the holders of the stock of the parent corporation on surrender of any certificates therefor, and the certificate of ownership and merger shall state that the proposed merger has been approved by a majority of the outstanding stock of the parent corporation entitled to vote thereon at a meeting duly called and held after 20 days' notice of the purpose of the meeting mailed to each such stockholder at the stockholder's address as it appears on the records of the corporation if the parent corporation is a corporation of this State or state that the proposed merger has been adopted, approved, certified, executed and acknowledged by the parent corporation in accordance with the laws under which it is organized if the parent corporation is not a corporation of this State. If the surviving corporation exists under the laws of the District of Columbia or any state or jurisdiction other than this State, subsection (d) of § 252 of this title shall also apply to a merger under this section.
(b) If the surviving corporation is a Delaware corporation, it may change its corporate name by the inclusion of a provision to that effect in the resolution of merger adopted by the directors of the parent corporation and set forth in the certificate of ownership and merger, and upon the effective date of the merger, the name of the corporation shall be so changed.
(c) Subsection (d) of § 251 of this title shall apply to a merger under this section, and subsection (e) of § 251 of this title shall apply to a merger under this section in which the surviving corporation is the subsidiary corporation and is a corporation of this State. References to "agreement of merger" in subsections (d) and (e) of § 251 of this title shall mean for purposes of this subsection the resolution of merger adopted by the board of directors of the parent corporation. Any merger which effects any changes other than those authorized by this section or made applicable by this subsection shall be accomplished under § 251 or § 252 of this title. Section 262 of this title shall not apply to any merger effected under this section, except as provided in subsection (d) of this section.
(d) In the event all of the stock of a subsidiary Delaware corporation party to a merger effected under this section is not owned by the parent corporation immediately prior to the merger, the stockholders of the subsidiary Delaware corporation party to the merger shall have appraisal rights as set forth in § 262 of this title.
(e) A merger may be effected under this section although 1 or more of the corporations parties to the merger is a corporation organized under the laws of a jurisdiction other than 1 of the United States; provided that the laws of such jurisdiction permit a corporation of such jurisdiction to merge with a corporation of another jurisdiction.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(a) Any 1 or more nonstock corporations of this State, whether or not organized for profit, may merge or consolidate with 1 or more stock corporations of this State, whether or not organized for profit. The constituent corporations may merge into a single corporation, which may be any 1 of the constituent corporations, or they may consolidate into a new corporation formed by the consolidation, pursuant to an agreement of merger or consolidation, as the case may be, complying and approved in accordance with this section. The surviving constituent corporation or the new corporation may be organized for profit or not organized for profit and may be a stock corporation or a nonstock corporation.
(b) The board of directors of each stock corporation which desires to merge or consolidate and the governing body of each nonstock corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation. The agreement shall state: (1) The terms and conditions of the merger or consolidation; (2) the mode of carrying the same into effect; (3) such other provisions or facts required or permitted by this chapter to be stated in a certificate of incorporation as can be stated in the case of a merger or consolidation, stated in such altered form as the circumstances of the case require; (4) the manner, if any, of converting the shares of stock of a stock corporation and the interests of the members of a nonstock corporation into shares or other securities of a stock corporation or membership interests of a nonstock corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation or of canceling some or all of such shares or interests, and, if any shares of any such stock corporation or membership interests of any such nonstock corporation are not to remain outstanding, to be converted solely into shares or other securities of the stock corporation or membership interests of the nonstock corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation or to be cancelled, the cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation or entity which the holders of shares of any such stock corporation or membership interests of any such nonstock corporation are to receive in exchange for, or upon conversion of such shares or membership interests, and the surrender of any certificates evidencing them, which cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation or entity may be in addition to or in lieu of shares or other securities of any stock corporation or membership interests of any nonstock corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation; and (5) such other details or provisions as are deemed desirable. In such merger or consolidation the interests of members of a constituent nonstock corporation may be treated in various ways so as to convert such interests into interests of value, other than shares of stock, in the surviving or resulting stock corporation or into shares of stock in the surviving or resulting stock corporation, voting or nonvoting, or into creditor interests or any other interests of value equivalent to their membership interests in their nonstock corporation. The voting rights of members of a constituent nonstock corporation need not be considered an element of value in measuring the reasonable equivalence of the value of the interests received in the surviving or resulting stock corporation by members of a constituent nonstock corporation, nor need the voting rights of shares of stock in a constituent stock corporation be considered as an element of value in measuring the reasonable equivalence of the value of the interests in the surviving or resulting nonstock corporations received by stockholders of a constituent stock corporation, and the voting or nonvoting shares of a stock corporation may be converted into voting or nonvoting regular, life, general, special or other type of membership, however designated, creditor interests or participating interests, in the nonstock corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation of a stock corporation and a nonstock corporation. Any of the terms of the agreement of merger or consolidation may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside of such agreement, provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate upon the terms of the agreement is clearly and expressly set forth in the agreement of merger or consolidation. The term "facts," as used in the preceding sentence, includes, but is not limited to, the occurrence of any event, including a determination or action by any person or body, including the corporation.
(c) The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section, in the case of each constituent stock corporation, shall be adopted, approved, certified, executed and acknowledged by each constituent corporation in the same manner as is provided in § 251 of this title and, in the case of each constituent nonstock corporation, shall be adopted, approved, certified, executed and acknowledged by each of said constituent corporations in the same manner as is provided in § 255 of this title. The agreement shall be filed and shall become effective for all purposes of the laws of this State when and as provided in § 251 of this title with respect to the merger of stock corporations of this State. Insofar as they may be applicable, the provisions set forth in the last sentence of subsection (c) of § 251 of this title shall apply to a merger under this section, and the reference therein to "stockholder" shall be deemed to include "member" hereunder.
(d) Subsection (e) of § 251 of this title shall apply to a merger under this section, if the surviving corporation is a corporation of this State; subsection (d) and the second sentence of subsection (c) of § 251 of this title shall apply to any constituent stock corporation participating in a merger or consolidation under this section; and subsection (f) of § 251 of this title shall apply to any constituent stock corporation participating in a merger under this section.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorize the merger of a charitable nonstock corporation into a stock corporation, if the charitable status of such nonstock corporation would thereby be lost or impaired; but a stock corporation may be merged into a charitable nonstock corporation which shall continue as the surviving corporation.
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(a) Every foreign corporation admitted to do business in this State which shall change its corporate name, or enlarge, limit or otherwise change the business which it proposes to do in this State, shall, within 30 days after the time said change becomes effective, file with the Secretary of State a certificate, which shall set forth:
(1) The name of the foreign corporation as it appears on the records of the Secretary of State of this State;
(2) The jurisdiction of its incorporation;
(3) The date it was authorized to do business in this State;
(4) If the name of the foreign corporation has been changed, a statement of the name relinquished, a statement of the new name and a statement that the change of name has been effected under the laws of the jurisdiction of its incorporation and the date the change was effected;
(5) If the business it proposes to do in this State is to be enlarged, limited or otherwise changed, a statement reflecting such change and a statement that it is authorized to do in the jurisdiction of its incorporation the business which it proposes to do in this State.
(b) Whenever a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this State shall be the survivor of a merger permitted by the laws of the state or country in which it is incorporated, it shall, within 30 days after the merger becomes effective, file a certificate, issued by the proper officer of the state or country of its incorporation, attesting to the occurrence of such event. If the merger has changed the corporate name of such foreign corporation or has enlarged, limited or otherwise changed the business it proposes to do in this State, it shall also comply with subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Whenever a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this State ceases to exist because of a statutory merger or consolidation, it shall comply with § 381 of this title.
(d) The Secretary of State shall be paid, for the use of the State, $50 for filing and indexing each certificate required by subsection (a) or (b) of this section, and in the event of a change of name an additional $20 shall be paid for a certificate to be issued as evidence of filing the change of name.
civil offenses
I. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Defendants have violated, including but not limited to the following state laws: Delaware, Florida and California their obligations as Directors and Officers of Iviewit.
This is a supplemental action for breach of fiduciary duties as directors and officers pursuant to the state laws of Florida, California and Delaware.
Utley aided by Wheeler, Rubenstein, Joao, and Proskauer, conspired to deprive, and in fact did deprive, Iviewit of its rights to the technologies developed by Iviewit as described herein above.
Iviewit alleges Defendants conspired and factually misappropriated and converted funds and properties of others for themselves as described herein.
Defendants concocted a disingenuous scheme to inflate Iviewit revenues, outside the bounds of generally accepted accounting principles, and in an effort to defraud Iviewit investors.
WHEREFORE, Iviewit demands judgment for damages against Defendants together with court costs, interest, and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable.
II. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
This is a supplemental action for legal malpractice pursuant to the state laws of Florida, New York, Wisconsin, California, Pennsylvania and other unknown at this time regions.
Defendants were employed by Iviewit's for purposes of representing Iviewit to obtain multiple patents and oversee foreign filings for the Inventions including the provisional filings for the technologies as described herein and failed intentionally.
Pursuant to such employment Defendants owed a duty under the state laws of Florida and New York to ensure that the rights and interests of Iviewit and Inventors were protected, and protected to the extent that such experts in the field would undertake such engagement according to the requisite standard of care in the states of Florida and New York and further at the USPTO.
iv. Failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the IP of Iviewit's and Inventor's were protected; and,
v. Knowingly and willfully failed to complete work regarding copyrights and trademarks; and,
vi. Engaged in unnecessary and duplicate corporate and other work resulting in billing for unnecessary legal services believed to be in excess of Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00); and,
vii. By redacting information from the billing statements regarding services provided so to as to give the appearance that the services provided by Proskauer, Foley, BSTZ, MLGWS were limited in nature, when in fact they involved various aspects of IP protection; and,
viii. By knowingly representing and agreeing to accept representation of clients in conflict with the interests of Iviewit's and Inventors, without either consent or waiver by Iviewit or Inventors.
The negligent actions of Defendants respectively resulted in the proximate cause of loss to Iviewit of Inventions and subsequent royalties.
III. BREACH OF CONTRACT
This is a supplemental action for breach of contract pursuant to the state laws of Florida, New York, California, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania and other unknowns at this time.
Defendants breached contracts with Iviewit, by failing to provide services billed for pursuant to the billing statements presented to Iviewit and over-billing for services provided and other such malfeasances described herein and in exhibit. In SB's case, breach of the LOU.
Defendant Crossbow has breached its contracts.
Defendant SB has breached it contracts.
BREACH OF CONTRACT: CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS
WHEREFORE, Iviewit demands judgment for damages against Defendants together with court costs, interest, and such other and further relief, as this Court deems just and equitable.
IV. TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP
This is a supplemental action for intentional and negligent tortuous interferences with advantageous business relationships pursuant to the state laws of Florida, New York, Delaware and California.
Iviewit was engaged in negotiations of technology agreements with both Warner Bros., AOLTW, Sony, Paramount, as to their use of the Inventions and investments in Iviewit as a strategic partner.
V. MISAPPROPRIATION AND CONVERSION OF FUNDS
K. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
1. FRAUD UPON THE JAPANESE PATENT OFFICES (JPO)
Defendants have violated;
WHEREFORE,
2. FRAUD UPON THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICES (EPO)
Defendants have violated;
WHEREFORE,
3. ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT
Defendants have violated;
Whereby:
(a) In General. Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly:
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
(b) Organizations. — Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $10,000,000.
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