

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION**

SIMON BERNSTEIN IRREVOCABLE)	
INSURANCE TRUST DTD 6/21/95,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	Case No. 13 C 3643
v.)	
)	Judge Amy St. Eve
)	
HERITAGE UNION LIFE INSURANCE)	
COMPANY,)	
)	
Defendant.)	

ORDER

The Court grants Benjamin P. Brown's motion to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) [110].

STATEMENT

On May 20, 2013, Defendant Jackson National Life Insurance Company ("Defendant" or "Jackson"), as successor in interest to Heritage Union Life Insurance Company ("Heritage"), filed an amended notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 removing the present lawsuit from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, based on the Court's diversity jurisdiction. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In the Complaint filed on April 5, 2013, Plaintiff Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Trust ("Bernstein Trust") alleged a breach of contract claim against Heritage based on Heritage's failure to pay Plaintiff proceeds from the life insurance policy of decedent Simon Bernstein. On June 26, 2013, Defendant filed a Third-Party Complaint and Counter-Claim for Interpleader pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 seeking a declaration of rights under the life insurance policy for which it is responsible to administer. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on January 13, 2014.

Before the Court is Benjamin P. Brown's ("Brown") motion to intervene both as of right and permissibly under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and Rule 24(b)(1)(B). Brown is the Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate of Simon Bernstein. For the following reasons, the Court grants Brown's motion brought pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2).

BACKGROUND

In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs, who are the Bernstein Trust and four of the five adult children of decedent Simon Bernstein, allege that at all times relevant to this lawsuit,

the Bernstein Trust was a common law trust established in Chicago, Illinois by Simon Bernstein. (R. 73, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7.) Plaintiffs assert that Ted Bernstein is the trustee of the Bernstein Trust and that the Bernstein Trust was a beneficiary of Simon Bernstein’s life insurance policy. (*Id.* ¶¶ 2, 4.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the beneficiaries to the Bernstein Trust are Simon Bernstein’s five children. (*Id.* ¶ 5.) According to Plaintiffs, at the time of his death, Simon Bernstein was the owner of the life insurance policy and the Bernstein Trust was the sole surviving beneficiary under the policy. (*Id.* ¶ 20.) Following Simon Bernstein’s death on September 13, 2012, the Bernstein Trust, by and through its counsel in Palm Beach County, Florida, submitted a death claim to Heritage under the life insurance policy at issue. (*Id.* ¶ 22.)

In its Counter-Claim and Third-Party Complaint for Interpleader, Jackson alleges that it did not originate or administer the life insurance policy at issue, but inherited the policy from its predecessors. (R. 17, Counter ¶ 2.) Jackson further alleges that on December 27, 1982, Capitol Bankers Life Insurance Company issued the policy to Simon Bernstein and that over the years, the owners, beneficiaries, contingent beneficiaries, and issuers of the policy have changed. (*Id.* ¶¶ 15, 16.) At the time of the insured’s death, the policy’s death benefits were \$1,689,070.00. (*Id.* ¶ 17.) It is undisputed that no one has located an executed copy of the Bernstein Trust. (*Id.* ¶ 19.)

In the present motion to intervene, Brown maintains that after Simon Bernstein, a resident of Florida, died in September 2012, his estate was admitted to probate in Palm Beach County, Florida on October 2, 2012. Brown further alleges that on May 23, 2014, a judge in the Probate Court of Palm Beach County appointed him as Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate of Simon Bernstein (“Estate”). According to Brown, the probate judge directed him to “assert the interests of the Estate in the Illinois Litigation involving the life insurance proceeds on the Decedent’s life.” Brown contends that because no one can locate an executed copy of the Bernstein Trust, and, in absence of a valid trust and designated beneficiary, the insurance policy proceeds at issue in the present lawsuit are payable to the Estate, and not Plaintiffs.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Rule 24 provides two avenues for intervention, either of which must be pursued by a timely motion.” *Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP*, 719 F.3d 785, 797 (7th Cir. 2013). Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) states that “the court must permit anyone to intervene who claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2); *see also Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen*, 578 F.3d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “Intervention as of right requires a ‘direct, significant[,] and legally protectable’ interest in the question at issue in the lawsuit.” *Wisconsin Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker*, 705 F.3d 640, 658 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “That interest must be unique to the proposed intervenor.” *Id.*

ANALYSIS

At issue in this lawsuit is who are the beneficiaries of Simon Bernstein's life insurance policy. In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that there is a common law trust, namely, the Bernstein Trust, and that the Bernstein Trust is the beneficiary of Simon Bernstein's life insurance policy. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the beneficiaries to the Bernstein Trust are Simon Bernstein's five children. In short, according to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, at the time of his death, Simon Bernstein was the owner of the life insurance policy and the Bernstein Trust was the sole surviving beneficiary under the policy.

It is undisputed, however, that no one can locate the Bernstein Trust. Accordingly, Brown, the Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate, moves to intervene arguing that in the absence of a valid trust and designated beneficiary, the insurance policy proceeds must be paid to the Estate as a matter of law. *See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rak* 24 Ill.2d 128, 134, 180 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 1962); *see Harris v. Byard*, 501 So.2d 730, 734 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987) ("Since the policy had no named beneficiary, there is no basis in law for directing payment of the policy proceeds to anyone other than decedent's estate for administration and distribution.").

In response to the present motion to intervene, Plaintiffs maintain that there is a designated beneficiary of the insurance proceeds. In support of their argument, Plaintiffs set forth an affidavit averring that "on the date of death of Simon Bernstein, the Owner of the Policy was Simon Bernstein, the primary beneficiary was designated as LaSalle National Trust, N.A. as Successor Trustee, and the Contingent Beneficiary was designated as the Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Trust dated June 21, 1995. (R. 116-2, Sanders Aff. ¶ 62.) By submitting Sanders' affidavit, Plaintiffs have contradicted their own allegations in their First Amended Complaint by contending that the primary beneficiary of the insurance policy is LaSalle National Trust, N.A., and not the Bernstein Trust. Nevertheless, the Court cannot view this averment in a vacuum without more information about the insurance policy's provisions and any additional extrinsic evidence. To clarify, under Illinois law, "[t]he designation of a beneficiary is solely a decision of the insured and when a controversy arises as to the identity of a beneficiary the intention of the insured is the controlling element. If such intention is dependent on extrinsic facts which are disputed the question, of course, must be resolved as one of fact." *Reich v. W. F. Hall Printing Co.*, 46 Ill.App.3d 837, 844, 361 N.E.2d 296, 5 Ill.Dec. 157 (2d Dist. 1977); *see also Estate of Wilkening*, 109 Ill.App.3d 934, 941, 441 N.E.2d 158, 163, 65 Ill.Dec. 366, 371 (1st Dist. 1982) ("Evidence to establish a trust must be unequivocal both as to its existence and to its terms and conditions.") Moreover, Plaintiffs' contradiction illustrates why Brown has a competing interest in the insurance proceeds justifying intervention.


Further, Plaintiffs take issue with the fact that William E. Stansbury, who brought an unsuccessful motion to intervene in January 2014, filed a petition in the Florida probate court for an administrator ad litem and is paying costs and legal fees for the present motion to intervene. Based on Stansbury's conduct, Plaintiffs argue that the law of the case doctrine and collateral estoppel apply. In denying Stansbury's motion, the Court concluded that his interest as an

unsecured creditor of the Estate was too remote for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2). *See Flying J, Inc.*, 578 F.3d at 571 (“the fact that you might anticipate a benefit from a judgment in favor of one of the parties to a lawsuit — maybe you’re a creditor of one of them — does not entitle you to intervene in their suit.”).

Plaintiffs’ law of the case doctrine argument fails because “[w]hether an applicant has an interest sufficient to warrant intervention as a matter of right is a highly fact-specific determination, making comparison to other cases of limited value.” *Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Schipporeit, Inc.*, 69 F.3d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1995). Here, Brown, as the Administrator Ad Litem, is protecting the Estate’s interest in the insurance proceeds, which is different from Stansbury’s remote interest as an unsecured creditor of the Estate. *See Walker*, 705 F.3d at 658; *see also Tallahassee Mem. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Petersen*, 920 So.2d 75, 78 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (“Florida Probate Rule 5.120(a) provides for discretionary appointment of a guardian ad litem in estate and trust proceedings where ... the personal representative or guardian may have adverse interests.”).

Furthermore, the doctrines of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion do not apply under the facts of this case because there was no separate, earlier judgment addressing the issues presented here. *See Adams v. City of Indianapolis*, 742 F.3d 720, 736 (7th Cir. 2014) (“‘collateral estoppel’ or ‘issue preclusion’—applies to prevent relitigation of issues resolved in an earlier suit.”). Therefore, this argument is unavailing.

Dated: July 28, 2014



AMY J. ST. EVE
United States District Court Judge